Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Testimony of John S. Wolf
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Nonproliferation
U.S. Dept. of State
House International Relations Committee

May 8, 2003

Chairman Bereuter, it is an honor to appear before the House International Relations Committee’s Europe Subcommittee. Chairman Gallegly, it is especially appropriate for me to appear before the newly formed Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights. Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the materials and skills needed to make them is my mission.

Never has this responsibility been more important. Trends in the nonproliferation world are not good, and the tensions that result are becoming a serious challenge to world peace and stability. During the first 40 years following World War II, we and our allies depended largely on deterrence and tight export controls to limit the spread of dangerous weapons. Today, however, we face a substantially increased risk from countries and international terrorist groups with access to chemical and biological weapons, and at least several states with access to components and technology for making nuclear weapons.

Against this grim backdrop, there is a risk that complacency, inertia, and timidity are preventing the international community from blocking attempted violations, or from reacting decisively to them. Clearly, we cannot simply wring our hands and hope things will get better. We have an active agenda, in partnership with a wide range of other countries and international organizations, and unilaterally.

As we pursue these goals, task one is preventing the outflow of weapons of mass destruction, dangerous materials, and weapons expertise from the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). As you are well aware, the Soviets left behind a potential mother lode for terrorists and rogue states. While it is, of course, Russia and the FSU countries that have first responsibility to protect their sensitive capabilities and/or technologies, it’s in the US interest to help – and we are leading an international effort to do just that.

This is a government wide effort – and I am honored to appear here with members of that team. Close cooperation among State, Energy, and Defense is essential, and it is an every day fact.

In Russia and Eurasia, we must eliminate weapons and dangerous materials where we can, secure what cannot be eliminated, and ensure that the scientists and engineers who designed and built these things do not sell their know-how abroad. With regard to nuclear issues, this means we must:

Energy and Defense have effective programs to do these things, and State’s job is to provide them the diplomatic support they need to get on with the job. In March, for example, State’s diplomatic support was crucial to making it possible for Secretary Abraham to sign an amendment to the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, as well as an implementing agreement, committing Russia to a program that will eliminate production of plutonium in that country by 2011. State is also providing the lead in multilateral negotiations on an agreement to finance Russia’s plutonium disposition program, which will utilize nuclear reactors under strict controls to burn excess weapons plutonium corresponding to well over 4,000 nuclear weapons.

In addition, State is working to increase the international community’s contribution to the threat reduction effort in the former Soviet Union. Until recently, the threat reduction efforts were largely a U.S. show. At last year’s G-8 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, however, the other seven G-8 partners agreed to the creation of a Global Partnership in which they would match the $10 billion we plan to spend on threat reduction efforts in Russia and Eurasia over the next 10 years.

Since then, this Department has been energetically pressing the seven to firm up their pledges, commit to specific projects, and, in the case of Russia, to provide the necessary access and tax and liability protections needed for the others to begin work. As we meet today, I am happy to report that we have approximately $6 billion in firm pledges, expressions of interest in contributing from states outside the Seven such as Norway, and strong interest from our partners in contributing to such U.S. priorities as plutonium disposition and the Shchuch’ye chemical weapons destruction facility. Knotty discussions are still ongoing with Russia to resolve longstanding differences on liability issues, but we are making progress. We will continue to pursue the issue vigorously when the U.S. assumes the G-8 presidency next year.

State also has its own nonproliferation programs. We oversee the U.S. Government’s participation in the Moscow-based International Science and Technology Center and the Kiev-based Science and Technology Center of Ukraine. These centers provide flexible platforms for the engagement of former weapons scientists and for tasks that other U.S. agencies cannot accomplish through other means. State will use the centers to channel $52 million in the current fiscal year to redirect former Soviet WMD/missile scientists to peaceful, commercial purposes through cooperative research. This funding includes $20 million in FY 2003 specifically targeted at redirecting former biological and chemical weapons scientists. The Energy Department will use the centers to oversee expenditure of $12 million on Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) projects that are also designed to guide former weapons scientists to commercial employment. In addition, the Defense Department uses the Moscow center for projects to secure dangerous pathogens at Russian biological institutes. The State Department also provides funding to the U.S. Civilian Research & Development Foundation, a non-profit organization established by Congress with a broad charter to engage former weapons scientists of the FSU.

State is also responsible for implementing the Bio-Industry Initiative, established with $30 million provided by Congress in Defense Emergency Response Funds in June 2002 for conversion of former bio-weapon production facilities. This is the only U.S. program targeted at reconfiguring former Soviet biological production facilities, which are capable of producing large quantities of weaponized agents such as anthrax and smallpox. This initiative also supports our efforts to combat bio-terrorism by supporting accelerated drug and vaccine development for highly infectious diseases.

Our engagement effort produces results. It has forged strong links between the U.S. and FSU scientific communities. Former weapons scientists regularly tell us that our support provides them a genuine incentive to spurn offers from rogue states which we know continue to be made. But it also has made an impact in the marketplace. One project we sponsored resulted in the development of a high altitude laser-imaging device that can detect leaks from gas pipelines and is now under commercial development here in the U.S. Another has identified new electronics applications for beryllium that allow a shift from weapons to commercial manufacturing for one facility in Kazakhstan. Overall, the centers have produced 270 patentable ideas.

Some of our biggest achievements have been in the bio-medical sphere, where we have made real progress in public health and agricultural issues of concern both in the U.S. and abroad. In research jointly sponsored by State and the U.S. Public Health Service, Russian scientists have identified two anti-viral compounds that hold the promise of proving effective against smallpox, including for individuals who may have adverse reactions to existing vaccines. If this effort bears fruit, we could have an important new tool in the event our nation is ever exposed to attack with the smallpox virus. Another project involved U.S. collaboration with the Kazakh scientists formerly employed at the biological weapons facility at Stepnogorsk. The team developed new agents for which they are seeking patents to treat heart arrhythmia. Similarly, Russian researchers in the program are hard at work developing kits for rapid diagnosis of West Nile, Newcastle, and Avian flu – diseases that pose serious economic threats to U.S. poultry producers.

Improved access is another important benefit of our programs. The economic advantages of participating in our programs are so great – particularly with regard to the Bio-Industry Initiative -- that with time and persistence, we have steadily reduced the number of institutes that are closed to us. In recent months members of my staff were the first Americans to receive a thorough tour of the Berdsk biologics facility and the Vostok joint stock company facilities at Omutninsk. They also were the first Americans to be received in any fashion at the Institute of Toxicology in St. Petersburg.

Sometimes engaging former weapons scientists leads to a direct improvement in our ability and techniques to halt proliferation. For instance, our establishment and support of the International Geodynamics Research Center in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, not only engages scientists, but has created a location capable of verifying and detecting nuclear and seismic activities in nearby India, Pakistan, and China.

Looking to the future, with the additional funds we are requesting this year, we plan to step up efforts to engage Russian chemical weapons scientists in accordance with the conclusions of the policy review this Administration conducted shortly after coming into office. This year, we introduced representatives from the U.S. chemical industry to Russian scientists from a former CW research facility that, until last year, was closed to foreigners, and collaborative research projects are under development. We have also initiated projects with newly contacted former CW institutes in Ukraine. We will use our additional funds to develop new projects and relationships with other high-priority chemical institutes in Russia, Ukraine, and Central Asia.

We also plan to use the funds to step up efforts to guide former weapon scientists and the institutes at which they work to commercial self-sustainability. After a decade of engagement in cooperative research, it is high time that we begin implementing the steps that will eventually allow us to phase out these programs. Done right, this should produce more of those mutually beneficial situations I mentioned earlier. Commercialization efforts can, however, be more expensive in the short run than simple engagement programs. Former Soviet scientists and institutes often need advice on business development and ways to market their intellectual property.

Specifically in the coming year, we will reorganize the Moscow and Kiev centers to make them more effective at marketing the scientific research produced under their auspices. We will use Bio-Industry Initiative funds to assist former bio-weapon production facilities to obtain western business advice and to foster the formation of a consortium of key Russian industry, academic, and ministerial representatives. This consortium, led by the Moscow Medical Academy, will be used to support the development of a pipeline from research to commercialization for Russian biological researchers in the pharmaceutical industry. In the process, we will support American firms seeking to invest in projects at these institutes. The Eli Lilly pharmaceutical company has, for example, expressed interest in producing an anti-tuberculosis drug at one. If over time we can link former Soviet scientists into the international business community and allow their excellent scientific skills to be used to heal rather than to harm, we should be able to wind up these programs in a few years. Already, we have made considerable progress and I hope that within the next two years we can begin graduating institutes from our assistance programs.

This is not altruism, and it’s certainly not corporate charity. Refocusing scientists and facilities reduces risk that proliferators elsewhere will successfully tap into this expertise. Our access and contacts give us substantial encouragement that leakage is not occurring. We are not complacent however, and we use regular reviews, internal controls and external audits to further reduce the risks.

While I have focused so far on Russia and Eurasia, these are not the only countries of concern, and our nonproliferation programs are not the only tools we have at our disposal. A glance at the headlines shows proliferation threats all over the globe. Iraq is on the way to solution, but others remain. Recent visits by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to Iran have made it all too clear, for example, that Iran has made a sizable, heretofore clandestine, effort to acquire capabilities that make sense only as part of an effort to produce fissile material for weapons. North Korea has an openly avowed nuclear weapons program, and there are others who are in contravention of their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Outside of these regimes there are additional concerns. The situation in South Asia deserves special mention. It is different from the dangers posed by the rogue states. India and Pakistan are two very different countries, with which we are pursuing boldly different relationships. Each though has lethal arsenals, and the continuing friction between the two suggests the urgent need for dialogue and confidence building measures to lessen the risks.

Dealing with each of these challenges requires a different response. In most cases, we will not be able to fall back on the model of our proliferation threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union. The scale of the potential threat is much smaller, and we are unlikely to encounter elsewhere the willingness we found there to build down or scrap weapons establishments. In some instances our focus will be on securing sensitive technologies. This is particularly true in South Asia, where we have active nonproliferation dialogues with Pakistan and India. There we may need to be able to seize opportunities quickly.

This also the reason for developing a Dangerous Materials Initiative (DMI). We want to help countries establish better accounting and control mechanisms to secure radioactive materials, pathogens, and sensitive precursors, from the laboratory to movement into internal and international commerce. DMI will aim for synergies among U.S. Government agencies and programs and also with international partners and international organizations.

At this point, we are not seeking separate funding for the DMI but expect that the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) will be a major resource, along with other U.S. assistance programs. This is in part why the President has requested $35 million in FY 2004 for NDF, more than double the FY 2003 appropriation.

NDF has tackled tough, urgent, and often unanticipated problems on a worldwide basis. In the recent past, it has negotiated and executed the removal of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from Serbia, the destruction of missiles in Bulgaria and the return from Cyprus of nuclear reactor parts en route to the Middle East. The NDF has also led a successful international effort to develop a state-of-the-art automated tracking system, referred to as Tracker, designed to help governments strengthen their control over sensitive exports or transshipments. Tracker has been a key tool for engaging nearly two dozen countries – either as design partners, current users, or in discussions of future implementation. Now deployed throughout Central Europe to track sensitive exports, this system is of increasing interest to countries in Western Europe and Asia as a means to track terrorists and to monitor the movement of dangerous materials. The State Department is closely coordinating this export control assistance tool with other U.S. equipment assistance provided to European and Eurasian states.

In the future, we expect the NDF to focus on urgent, unanticipated opportunities to eliminate missile systems; destroy, secure and remove biological pathogens; eliminate chemical agents and weapons; rescue orphaned radiological sources; inventory and track dangerous materials; assist countries in developing laws and regulations to control the movement, storage, and security of dangerous materials; and encourage countries in the Middle East and South Asia to use the Tracker system and to assist with its development.

Another of our major programs to prevent transfers of sensitive goods to end-users of proliferation concern is centered in State’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program. The EXBS program assists governments in strengthening their export controls by improving their legal and regulatory framework, licensing processes, border control and investigative capabilities. We also work closely with the Department of Defense to coordinate our efforts.

We currently have active programs in over 30 countries, with 20 EXBS program advisors serving overseas engaging foreign officials on ways to strengthen controls, and directing training activities and the delivery of much-needed detection and enforcement equipment. In a number of countries officials trained by the EXBS program or using EXBS program-provided equipment have seized sensitive goods or weapons components bound for terrorists, state sponsors of terror, or other proliferant entities. U.S. export control assistance is largely responsible for over a dozen European and Eurasian countries adopting comprehensive export control laws that meet recognized international standards.

Even before September 11, 2001, the EXBS program and its advisors were active in key Central Asian countries, a factor that doubtlessly paid unanticipated dividends when these countries were thrust into the front line of the war against terrorism. Following September 11, increased EXBS program resources were focused on this strategic region to help these countries, and key countries in the Caucasus as well, shore up vulnerable borders and improve capabilities to deter, detect, and interdict the transit of illicit goods and weapons.

In Europe, we are increasing export control assistance to the Baltics and Southeastern Europe, and Mediterranean transshipment points like Malta and Cyprus. All states, especially those with large ports, must do their part to forestall the transit and transshipment of dangerous materials and technology. Furthermore, EXBS and NDF are working closely with our Allies and international partners to ensure that our assistance is non-duplicative and coordinated with international nonproliferation political and assistance efforts, and to ensure that the U.S. taxpayer receives the maximum value for his or her assistance dollar.

Given the global nature of the proliferation threat, the EXBS program has expanded its focus to include countries along key transit routes and countries with substantial volume of transshipment trade in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In potential South Asia supplier countries, we continue to encourage the development, full implementation and enforcement of export controls that meet international standards.

The State Department also works cooperatively with other, related programs to harmonize efforts abroad. For example, we have a close working relationship with both the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), which funds and manages the Second-Line-of-Defense (SLD) program that provides advanced radiation detection equipment to foreign governments, and with Customs/DHS, which has the lead on the Container Security Initiative (CSI) designed to secure the supply line of cargo shipments destined for U.S. ports. The State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Control Assistance (EXBS) program has worked with NNSA’s SLD program to integrate it into overall USG export control assistance efforts and to jointly ensure that previously provided radiation detection equipment is repaired and maintained. My bureau, which manages the EXBS program, also is leading an interagency effort to complete a strategic plan for provision of overseas radiation detection equipment. The Nonproliferation Bureau also chairs a NSC-mandated Sub-Policy Coordination Committee to coordinate all USG nonproliferation export control assistance. State is also working closely with U.S. Customs/DHS officials to ensure that U.S. Government approaches countries with ports scheduled to join the Container Security Initiative are aligned with our broader nonproliferation policy and with the export control outreach and assistance efforts we are carrying out in some of these countries.

Our third goal, making the export control regimes stronger, is also one aimed at reducing supply. As we noted in our response to last year’s examination of the regimes by the General Accounting Office, the Administration is in the process of reviewing the nonproliferation regimes. Since September 11, anti-terrorism has been adopted as a formal goal of the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, and Nuclear Suppliers Group. We have won Australia Group agreement to adopt catch-all and intangible technology control provisions, setting the standard for the other regimes. The Wassenaar Arrangement amended its dual-use export control list to begin adding items specifically of concern for terrorists, and this year is reviewing its controls on man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) like SA-7s and SA-18s with a view to further strengthening them.

In the year ahead we intend to push adoption of catch-all controls and denial consultation in areas where they haven’t yet been implemented; continue to review control lists to make sure they are keeping up with technology and the threat, and; as always, look for ways to strengthen implementation and enforcement. We are also working in the Nuclear Safety Group and Missile Technology Control Regime on other ways to tighten further these agreements.

While strong regimes are necessary, they are not enough. We also need to take concrete action to enforce commitments more strictly and make proliferation more costly – politically, and financially. This is one of my problems with the Europeans who seem to want to spend more time debating what I’d call "architecture" – treaties, arrangements, etc. – and not enough time discussing implementation. What we’re not doing enough of is taking concrete action to make other countries live up to their commitments more strictly.

Tightening regimes and improved enforcement are part of the answer. Many governments tell us about their export controls and laws. But what counts is their willingness to enforce the law, to make clear there is a price for violation of the law. Proliferators need to know they face isolation and consequences if their efforts continue. Ending the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction will send a powerful signal to other proliferators that the world will not stand by idly.

To help deal with determined proliferators not prepared to conform to international standards, we look among other things to the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iraq’s weapons programs is being dealt with, but the nuclear weapon ambitions of Iran, North Korea, and others are potential hot spots we must deal with now. When I spoke last week to the Preparatory Conference for the NPT 2005 Review Conference, I acknowledged that the NPT is built on three pillars: disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear power. While many speakers seemed fixated on the need to accelerate disarmament, I maintained that the problem in 2003 is that the treaty is out of balance. The failure of the more than 180 members of the NPT who abide by their obligations to insist that the small minority stop cheating puts both disarmament and peaceful nuclear trade at risk. We must strengthen enforcement tools, like the International Atomic Energy Agency, and we must ensure that the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA expanded inspections capabilities, is universally adopted. To enable the IAEA to use its strengthened capabilities effectively, we must ensure that the IAEA safeguards budget is fully funded. Even more importantly, the international community, not just the US and a few allies, must make clear to proliferators that the price of proliferation will be increased international political and economic isolation. Frankly, the ambivalent attitude of many governments in Europe and Asia is worrisome. We will not, however, be discouraged. We will press our friends, allies, and the world community as a whole to take decisive action to deal with a threat to us all.

Beyond multiple safeguards activities, the IAEA has an important role in preventing nuclear terrorism. After September 11, 2001, the IAEA moved quickly to develop a comprehensive Nuclear Security Program to help states protect against acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism. In March 2003, the Department of Energy, working with the IAEA and Russia, hosted an international conference to develop recommendations to help states, among other activities, identify and control their high-risk radioactive sources, and establish effective national infrastructures for the secure management of vulnerable radioactive sources. Part of our voluntary contribution to the IAEA will support this important effort.

In those instances when traditional approaches fail, the properly planned and executed use of targeted sanctions can make an important difference, and send a strong message -- both to states considering whether to acquire WMD capabilities, and to those that are willing to spread them. Sanctions are a key component of our counterproliferation efforts -- which constitute one of the three pillars of the President’s National Strategy to Combat WMD. That said, U.S. legislation currently offers a number of overlapping requirements that lack the transparency and clarity needed to enable foreign entities to understand them. We hope to be able to work with you to consolidate and rationalize these important legal authorities and to do it in a way that ensures the Administration has the tools and the flexibility to advance our nonproliferation objectives.

Let me turn now very briefly to the fourth goal that my bureau is actively pursuing -- strong support for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, consistent with continued adherence to stringent nonproliferation and safety standards. We maintain and carefully implement an extensive array of bilateral agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with other nations, the "good guys," nations that are firmly committed to a shared view of nonproliferation norms and values. In all, we have about 25 such agreements, including one with the European Atomic Energy Community -- Euratom -- which currently encompasses 15 member states and by this time next year will likely have ten more. Besides facilitating ordinary, day-to-day peaceful nuclear commerce, agreements for cooperation serve an important nonproliferation purpose, affording the United States bilateral controls over significant fuel cycle activities such as reprocessing and enrichment that go well beyond anything in multilateral nonproliferation instruments.

As we pursue our nonproliferation objectives, it is also very important for our broad political and economic relations with friends and allies that the United States continue to demonstrate that we are a predictable and reliable partner in civil nuclear affairs. Facilitating peaceful nuclear commerce under appropriate conditions and controls can directly support our broader nonproliferation agenda in very concrete ways. A case in point is the marketing worldwide of low enriched uranium reactor fuel derived from down-blended Russian weapons material under the U.S.-Russia HEU-LEU Agreement.

I have already spoken of IAEA safeguards in regard to the Additional Protocol, citing it as a valuable new nonproliferation tool. But I want to say a word here also about the enduring value of the traditional IAEA safeguards system. Traditional IAEA safeguards are essential to the ability of nations to engage in day-to-day commerce for peaceful nuclear purposes with a sufficiently high level of confidence that nuclear materials are not being diverted to non-peaceful purposes. Traditional IAEA safeguards are a key -- indeed for the U.S. a legally mandated -- feature of the agreements for cooperation I referred to a moment ago. The United States has historically made a tremendous contribution in support of traditional IAEA safeguards, and we will continue to do so.

One final point on this general theme: Ensuring safety and security, in transportation as well as at reactors and other nuclear sites, is obviously a key concern. The Nonproliferation Bureau at State is heavily engaged in matters relating to the safe transportation and use of radioactive materials, and we will continue to devote significant resources to these efforts as well.

We know the important role that Congress has played over the years in providing the intellectual, legal, and financial foundations for programs. Looking forward, we urge the Congress to support the President’s proposal to broaden the current Cooperative Threat Reduction spending authorities to permit use of up to $50 million of CTR funds beyond the Former Soviet Union, allowing the President to use those resources in the best way he can.

And, of course, I strongly urge Congress to support the President’s request that the authority to waive the requirements for CTR and Title V of the Freedom Support Act certifications be made permanent. We also strongly support permanent waiver authority to cover construction of the Shchuch’ye chemical weapons destruction plant in Russia. Finally, I urge that Congress revert to the annual CTR certification requirement to an annual year basis (from its current fiscal year basis) to prevent needless bureaucratic delays.

Conclusion -- Nonproliferation is a Team Effort:

We are all partners in the worldwide effort to make the world safer. There are many areas where the interlocking nature of the challenges confronts us all.

Nonproliferation challenges are multiple and multiplying. We need to focus on the meat of the issue, and not lose the forest for the trees.

Enhancing nonproliferation dialogue with our worldwide partners is essential to success. But dialogue is no substitute for concrete action, and where dialogue fails we will have to use other means -- whether multilateral, bilateral or unilateral. That is at the heart of President Bush's National Security Strategy.

There are lots of opportunities to make progress; it's up to us to transform opportunity into reality.

Thank you.