1994 Congressional Documents

North Korea

• BOND - UNITED STATES-NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR DEAL (Senate - December 01, 1994) The problems with this agreement are many. Most important, it grants major concessions to the North Koreans while not requiring significant reciprocal actions for a decade.
• McCAIN - THE NUCLEAR AMBITIONS OF NORTH KOREA (Senate - October 07, 1994) While the talks drag on, the North Koreans will be granted sufficient time to reach a point when they can convert the fuel into weapons grade plutonium. During this time, they will not be constrained by economic sanctions or the build-up of U.S. military forces on the Korean peninsula. Short of persuading North Korea that they have reached the limit of our willingness to be played for fools, I am not sure there is anything else we can do to avert disaster.
• NEXT OF KIM -- (BY STEPHEN J. SOLARZ) (Extension of Remarks - August 03, 1994) North Korea continues work on a 200 megawatt reactor, which will give it the capacity to produce enough fissile material for ten or more atom bombs per year when it is completed in 1996. It is also still constructing a `second line' in its reprocessing plant.
• NO NUKES FOR NORTH KOREA -- (BY VICTOR GILINSKY) (Extension of Remarks - August 02, 1994) The idea has gotten about that there is a neat technical fix to the threat posed by North Korea's homemade nuclear reactors. This involves replacing their reactors, which are fueled with natural uranium and geared to producing plutonium, with ones like ours, which are more `proliferation resistant.'
• McCAIN - THE CRISIS IN KOREA (Senate - June 23, 1994) While the talks drag on, the North Koreans will be granted sufficient time to reach the point when they can convert the fuel into weapons grade plutonium. During this time they will not be constrained by economic sanctions or the buildup of United States military forces on the Korean peninsula.
• PRESSLER - NORTH KOREA AND CHINA (Senate - June 21, 1994) If the North Koreans can stare down the Clinton administration, it will be very difficult to persuade the rest of East Asia not to look after its own security interests.
• D'AMATO - PRESIDENT CLINTON'S KOREA POLICY (Senate - June 21, 1994) North Korea's latest offer to resolve the crisis over its nuclear program appears to include little that is new, but President Clinton's willingness to seize it as an opportunity to avoid a confrontation reflects an abrupt shift of policy.
• PELL - CONTAINING NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR THREATS (Senate - June 10, 1994) North Korea's refusal to comply with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has provoked a grave international crisis. The critical nature of the dilemma, however, should not be aggravated by loose talk and false bravado.
• McCAIN - UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE CRISIS IN KOREA (Senate - May 24, 1994) North Korea's nuclear program may be the defining crisis of the post-cold-war world. It represents a clear and present danger to our closest Asian allies and to the security of the United States itself. The American commander in South Korea, General Luck, was reported to have estimated that war on the Korean peninsula would last no longer than 90 days. First, increase the readiness and alert posture of U.S. and South Korean forces; second, deploy to South Korea additional troops from the United States; third, deploy additional fighter aircraft squadrons and Apache helicopters to South Korea; fourth, deploy a carrier battle group to the area; fifth, preposition bombers and tankers in the region; Air or cruise missile strikes on North Korea's nuclear facilities would not completely destroy their nuclear program, but they could damage it severely.
• DEFENSELESSNESS LIMITS OUR ABILITY TO ACT AGAINST NORTH KOREA -- (BY RICHARD PERLE) (Extension of Remarks - May 04, 1994) North Korea stands firm in its resolve to develop nuclear weapons despite the Clinton administration's diplomacy and exhortation. The administration's current strategy of looking to the U.N. Security Council promises to be equally ineffective. Meanwhile, it has limited our ability to act by not funding the most effective defense against North Korea's nuclear threat--missile defense technology.
• SIMON - CREATING A NUCLEAR STRAW MAN (Senate - April 20, 1994) I have been puzzled by the fact that South Korea and Japan seem to be less concerned about the North Korean nuclear threat than the United States. Obviously, they are concerned, but there is not the same frenzy about it.
• McINNIS - SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA (House of Representatives - March 22, 1994) If a conflict were to be initiated by North Korea, we believe that we would have about a 24-hour notice. We will within days of any kind of military conflict beginning take thousands and thousands of American casualties. We need to be prepared for what could be the biggest challenge to us since the commencement of World War II. There have been military estimates that say we could lose the peninsula in as short a period as 2 weeks.
• McCAIN - NORTH KOREA (Senate - March 16, 1994) At what point will this administration accept that appeasement of North Korea is a losing proposition? What is at the core of this reckless policy? I believe it is an utter failure of nerve; a failure to confront a difficult problem today in the hope that it will simply go away in time.
• ANTHONY LAKE ON NORTH KOREA -- HON. LEE H. HAMILTON (Extension of Remarks - March 08, 1994) North Korea may have produced enough plutonium for one or two nuclear devices. If North Korea continues to ignore its non-proliferation obligations, we are prepared to turn to options other than negotiations, including economic sanctions. As the President has said, `our goal is not endless discussions, but certifiable compliance.'
• BENNETT -- THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM (Senate - February 24, 1994) The problem was ably set out by Washington Post columnist Lally Weymouth in her column of February 17. As she notes, extracted plutonium is `a lot more valuable than cocaine.' For a desperate regime like North Korea, with a history of selling every major weapons system it has ever produced, the temptation to sell to the highest bidder could be too much.
• NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR CHALLENGE -- (BY LYNN DAVIS) (Extension of Remarks - February 02, 1994) North Korea, one of the few remaining hardline Stalinist countries in the world, appears intent on developing a nuclear weapons arsenal. Should it succeed, stability on the Korean peninsula will be threatened. Our friends in Japan and South Korea will face heightened pressures to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.
• PATRIOT MISSILES FOR UNITED STATES FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA: WHICH VERSION? (Senate - February 01, 1994) The number of Patriot batteries involved [in the planned South Korean deployment], as well as where they would come from, has yet to be determined. Only two Patriot battalions out of 11 in the US Army currently have the quick reaction program (QRP) improvements installed.
• MCCAIN (AND OTHERS) AMENDMENT NO. 1331 (Senate - February 01, 1994) North Korea must halt its nuclear weapons program and fully comply with the terms of the NPT and the January 30, 1992, full-scope safeguards agreement agreed to by North Korea and the IAEA.
• PATRIOT MISSILES FOR UNITED STATES FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA: WHEN? (Senate - January 31, 1994) The deployment of Patriot missiles has been discussed by Seoul and Washington for a long time as part of a plan to beef up defense against possible North Korean attack. The plan will go ahead, though the size and the time of deployment have yet to be fixed between the two governments.
• PATRIOT MISSILES FOR U.S. FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA: ANOTHER DISASTER BY INDECISION? (Senate - January 27, 1994) Gen. Gary E. Luck, Commander of the United Nations Command and U.S. Forces, Korea, has reportedly requested `about three dozen' Patriot missile launchers, each of which contains four missiles.' He wants to deploy the Patriots as a partial defense around South Korean ports and airfields that would be used by arriving United States reinforcements in a crisis.'