Ukraine and Satellite Navigation

Russia is hunting only for ground station signals from one of them: the Navstar satellite system used by the United States and available to many countries around the world. Navstar is talking about a typical set of radio frequencies that can be received by devices with GPS receivers, such as car navigation systems or cell phones. One way to circumvent jamming is to change or increase the transmission frequency to make it harder for interference systems to block the signal.

On 11 April 2022, NBC Nightly News published an interview with a representative of the US space forces, who said that Russian forces are targeting satellites of the Global Positioning System (GPS) from ground stations. Satellites are used for navigation, mapping and other purposes. (There is currently no evidence that the satellites themselves are under attack.) The report also notes that such suppression occurred long before the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, as the Russian military “has often jammed GPS signals in Ukraine since 2014.” In the same year, the Russians invaded and annexed Crimea.

In general, experts from the US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) are not surprised by this possibility, as recently Russia has used its interference systems in other situations, which look like large trucks with large antennas. According to a recent CSIS threat assessment report, the trucks are so large that they can be easily seen in some satellite imagery.

Russia began to interfere with GPS signals over its territory to prevent the attacks of Ukraine. Monitoring of GPS data on the territory of the Russian Federation reveals that multiple major Russian cities appear to have faced widespread GPS disruption during the past week, the American magazine WIRED reported 15 December 2022. The signal interference follows Ukraine launching long-range drone attacks deep into Russian territory. It may act as a way to potentially stop drones that rely upon GPS for navigation.

The Russian President's administration said that on the night of 03 May 2022, two unmanned aerial vehicles allegedly attacked the Kremlin residence of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Officially, the Russian authorities reported the incident only after noon on Wednesday. The Kremlin said that Kyiv and Washington are behind the "assassination attempt" on Putin’s life.

Ukrainian officials deny involvement in the drone attack. President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky said that Ukraine "does not attack either Putin or Moscow". John Kirby, US National Security Council Strategic Communications Coordinator, called the Russian accusations "ridiculous". "The United States did not take any part in this. [Kremlin spokesman Dmitry] Peskov is just lying," Kirby said.

On 4 May, malfunctions in the operation of the GPS (Global Positioning System) began in the Russian capital. The day before, the Russian Federation announced an "attack on the Kremlin" with drones, and Victory Day on 9 May was ahead. Residents of Moscow experienced GPS malfunctions, as Telegram channels Baza and Ateo Breaking reported. Information about problems with GPS was confirmed to RBC journalists by the Yandex search service.

A company representative said that the incorrect display of users' geolocation may be due to malfunctions in the satellite system, which affects all services, from navigators to fitness bracelets. At the same time, the source of the agency noted that internet services are not involved in GPS failures since applications receive false information from devices (smartphones and tablets). The company did not specify why the devices transmit incorrect information.

Parts, components, accessories, attachments, equipment, or systems that are subject to the EAR include Global Positioning System (GPS) receiving equipment specially designed for military application, or GPS receiving equipment with any of the following characteristics, and specially designed parts and components therefor:

1. Specially designed for encryption or decryption (e.g., Y-Code) of GPS precise positioning service (PPS) signals (MT if designed or modified for airborne applications);
2. Specially designed for use with a null steering antenna, an electronically steerable antenna, or including a null steering antenna designed to reduce or avoid jamming signals (MT if designed or modified for airborne applications);
3. Specially designed for use with rockets, missiles, SLVs, drones, or unmanned air vehicle systems capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km (MT if designed or modified for rockets, missiles, SLVs, drones, or unmanned air vehicle systems controlled in this subchapter).