References

86. G. Batyr, et al, "The Current State of Russian Space Surveillance System and its Capability in Surveying Space Debris", Proceedings of the First European Conference on Space Debris, ESA SD-01, 1993, pp.43-47.
87. J. Trops, DIENA (Riga), 3 November 1994, p.3.
88. Moscow Russian Television Network, 3 May 1995.
89. W.B. Scott, "Russian Politics May Stymie Laser/Optics Collaboration", Aviation Week and Space Technology, 21 March 1994, pp.49-50.
90. W.B. Scott, "Uzbek Site May Benefit U.S. Surveillance Network", Aviation Week and Space Technology, 15 May 1995, pp. 68-69.
Adapted from: Europe and Asia in Space 1993-1994, Nicholas Johnson and David Rodvold [Kaman Sciences / Air Force Phillips Laboratory]

Networks

A special network of large-diameter antennas make up the Long-Range Space Communications System (TsDKC) for control of scientific spacecraft in high Earth orbits or on interplanetary flights. The network consists of 10 primary antennas (22-70 m diameter) at seven locations: Yevpatorlya, Simeiz, Pushchino, Medvezhi Ozera, Ulan Ude, Ussurlysk, and the Suffa Plateau (the last under construction). For example, current plans call for linking the RT-32 and RT-70 radio telescopes at Yevpatoriya and Ussurlysk and the RT-64 radio telescope at Medvezhi Ozera to form the primary tracking and telecommunications system for the Mars-96 mission.

Equally important as the KIK is the Russian network of large ground-based radars which form the backbone of the Russian Space Surveillance System (SSS), managed by the Air Defense Forces. Space surveillance tasks are primarily performed by Dnepr and Daryal-UMradars developed in the 1960's and 1980's, respectively. Eight facilities are intermittently operational: in Russia at Irkutsk, Murmansk, and Pechora; in Ukraine at Sevastopol and Uzhgorod; in Kazakhstan at Balkhash; in Azerbijan at Mingechaur; and in Latvia at Riga. An unfinished Daryal-UM radar in Latvia was scheduled for demolition in 1995, while the operational Dnepr radar nearby will remain open until 1998 under a Russian-Lativan agreement. A ninth sensor for the SSS is an ABM radar near Moscow. To augment the radar facilities which operate primarily at 150 MHz and 200 MHz, the SSS receives information from optical and electro-optical sites located in Russia, Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Turkmenia. A unique facility on Mt. Maidanak in Uzbekistan also has space surveillance capabilities and is being examined by US officials for possible contributions to the tracking of very small objects in space. During 1993-1994 several SSS sensors were temporarily out of operation due to funding difficulties, including the inability to pay electrical bills to the now-commercial power industry (References 86-90).

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