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Bernd W. Kubbig
Als Entscheidungsgrundlage für das Raketenabwehrprojekt MEADS ungeeignet
Eine Analyse der Dokumente von BMVg und Berichterstattergruppe
HSFK-Report 2/2005

Link to the Full Report

Bernd W. Kubbig
An Inappropriate Basis for Decision on the MEADS Anti-Missile Defense Project
An Analysis of the Documents of MoD and Parliamentary Rapporteurs Group on Ground-Based Air Defense
HSFK report 2/2005

Abstract

The German Government intends to participate in the missile defense system MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System), which is designed to ward off airplanes, helicopters, cruise missiles as well as tactical ballistic missiles with a range of up to 1,000 km. The role of MEADS is to protect soldiers on international operations as well as defending German territory. When used in combination with the improved Patriot missile plus the purchase about 300 of the newest Patriot system PAC-3, the Bundeswehr is confident of its ability to meet all current and future security challenges, and remedy existing shortcomings. According to current plans, these two systems will become the core elements of German ground-based extended air defense after 2012.

The Budgetary Committee ("Haushaltsausschuss") of the "Bundestag" will deal with MEADS in early 2005. German participation in development, procurement, and deployment of this trilateral arms project between the USA, Germany, and Italy, which started in the mid-1990's, have to be discussed and voted upon in parliament. The governments of Italy and the United States signed the required Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) at the end of September 2004, and have now begun development of the system. The German government will also be in a position to sign the MoU within six month if the "Bundestag" gives the green light by March 2005.

Thus far, MEADS has been an issue dealt with mainly in the Defense Committee ("Verteidigungsausschuss"), which convenes behind closed doors. This committee decided to establish a rapporteur group "Bodengebundene Luftverteidigung" ("ground-based air defense") on November 5, 2003. MEADS was the focus of attention during these discussions, attended by one civil officer and five air force officers from the defense ministry. They created a working paper which was then turned into a virtually identical final report by seven parliamentarians. They thereby accepted the working paper unanimously almost word-for-word. The rapporteur group consequently advised the Defense Committee on October 19 that Germany should participate in the MEADS program, including development and deployment. The committee in turn passed the final report unanimously on November 10, 2004.

Both documents estimate the German share in development to be in the order of $1 billion (995 mil.). However, there is no publicly accessible data on the number of systems to be obtained, or the unit prices. Neither the working paper nor the final report contains any relevant information. Depending on the method of assessment and its extent, MEADS can easily turn out to be a two-digit billion Euro project.

The defense ministry's working paper, and the final report by the seven members of parliament respectively, are the military arguments in favor of this tri-national arms project. This report analyzes the arguments presented in those documents and, in the light of the inaccuracies and inconsistencies which are revealed, the claims which cannot be sustained, and the lack of transparency shown, reaches the following conclusions: The working paper/final report are insufficient and inadequate as a basis for reaching a decision in the upcoming debates and votes in the Bundestag. Taken as a whole, this report shows a considerable need for greater precision, more information, and further clarification from both documents.

The nine central points of concern are summarized below.

Inadequate instrument for risk/threat assessment (2.1). As to their military assessment, the central terms "risk" and "(potential) threat" are used in both documents synonymously. The effect of drawing a distinction between threats and risks makes a remarkable difference to any adequate threat assessment, as this distinction considerably reduces the number of states which represent a potential danger to Germany.

Inconsistent argumentation for the military necessity of this arms project (2.2). MEADS is designed to repel missiles with a range of up to 1,000 km. However, both documents identify missiles with a range of over 1,000 km as the future potential threat, against which this arms project would not be able to offer protection.

Unclear and for the most part unconvincing military goals for MEADS (2.3). Both documents stress the importance of this project for the protection of soldiers. At the same time they give the impression that this system can also be used against terrorist attacks, which are usually carried out without early warning. It is misleading to assume that MEADS could protect German territory, which is the view put forward in the two documents. In this respect, both the authors from the defense ministry and the parliamentarians fall short of the goals set out in unreleased documents. These documents only outline highly selective protection of outstanding objects. Neither document addresses one of the main weaknesses in the argumentation for MEADS: Within a range of 1,000 km, over which the system could offer protection, Germany is only surrounded by friendly countries. The effectiveness of protecting soldiers in international operations is only indicated as "basic protection". Neither document answers any of these urgent questions, and they do not address any of the required scenarios.

Tendentious description of the technical capability of MEADS, while not taking into consideration experiences with Patriot missiles during the last Iraq war (2.4). The air force officers portray the technical capability of defense systems in the terminal phase of incoming missiles as a "textbook" situation - they list problems and offer solutions accordingly. The "real technicians" from the arms industry, on the other hand, present the same facts from a problem-oriented and cautiously optimistic viewpoint, and see them as extreme challenges to tactical defense systems. It is of strategic as well as of political significance for the German discussion on MEADS that both documents do not include the results achieved by the U.S. with Patriot missiles in the last Iraq war.

Questionable character of MEADS as a role model for transatlantic cooperation projects, and for the German arms industry (2.5). The assessment of this project as a European-American success story depends on the standards applied. Compromises were recently reached in negotiations between the U.S. and the European contractors.

Assessing this project in terms of the original and subsequent demands put forward by the Europeans (as the author of this report does), the result is less positive. One can hardly claim that the MEADS program is still about the common development of a joint arms project. Despite considerable European resistance, the U.S. successfully insisted on employing its PAC-3 weapon for MEADS. The United States has not even fulfilled the significantly weaker European request to gain insight into the PAC-3 data.

In order to have any positive effects for the German arms industry, exact quantification is required of all aspects of the development process. This is even more true of the financial expenditures needed during the deployment phase, and of the total national economic burden.

Claims which cannot be sustained for a multilateral arms project (2.6). MEADS has been a tri-national project. No other NATO countries interested in participating in the project can be identified. There cannot be a more distinct piece of evidence of the unattractiveness of this arms project in military, economic, and technological terms. Such a negative result should not be allowed to remain insignificant in parliamentary discussion.

MEADS as a problematic element for arms control in the context of the whole structure of missile defense (2.7). The contradictory goals and perspectives which exist between the European and American contractors are not only evident in economic and technical terms, but also in conceptual terms. Germany regards MEADS as a system in itself. The U.S., however, views it as a component of a comprehensive configuration of "Missile Defense", including technically more sophisticated and, in terms of arms control, more problematic plans for a global and regional defense shield. This suggests the necessity for a follow-up program to MEADS to be used against missiles of longer range. That armament perspective is included in both documents.

Unnecessary and probably ineffective signals to Washington in favor of easing political tension via MEADS (2.8). This political argument, constructed in both documents, rests on the claim that MEADS is the only major transatlantic arms cooperation project. This claim is false, as there exist at least two more large military programs. Moreover, there are no "receivers" for such signals in Washington, as the primary U.S. objective in promoting MEADS is economic, and has nothing to do with cooperation or alliance (during the Clinton Administration this at least was somewhat different). In the whole U.S. missile defense budget, MEADS is a program financially ranking "among the also-rans". A strong faction in the pronounced protectionist Congress wants MEADS under U.S. conditions, not from the point of view of cooperation, but rather because of sales considerations.

Incomplete information on development and deployment costs; at the same time uncertainty whether military demands for the protection of soldiers and territory in the designated capability-, time-, and cost span can be realized (2.9). The discussion on MEADS will concentrate on these questions in the following weeks and months. The German government will have to present the relevant figures, currently not included in either document, to parliament. Moreover, it is essential for the public to be able to get a precise idea of the dimensions of the project (as in the case of the Eurofighter).

Therefore, the upcoming discussions on MEADS in the Budgetary Committee and especially in the whole "Bundestag" are of vital importance. As mentioned above it is problematic that both the 17 page working paper presented by the defense ministry, and the 18 page version passed by the seven parliamentarians are practically identical.

In view of the impending consultations in the Budgetary Committee, the analysis of the resulting costs is of utmost importance. For that reason, the serious objections from the Federal Accounting Office ("Bundesrechnungshof") are of central concern.

Against this background this report concludes with three proposals:

First proposal: The Budgetary Committee should take the concerns and recommendations from the Federal Accounting Office seriously. The Federal Accounting Office brought up a painful subject, and formulated reservations and conditions. Its objections and proposals imply a need for clarification of whether the desired systems can be financed before entering the development stage - this is even more true since the accounting office combines budgetary aspects with consideration of the capability of MEADS, and its military necessity.

Second proposal: The Budgetary Committee and parliament should thoroughly inspect the military argumentation put forward by the defense ministry, initiate a discussion process at the earliest opportunity, and expand its own analytical resources for the independent evaluation of government requirements on a mid- and long-term basis. Decisions on major arms projects require broad legitimization which is not present in the case of MEADS. Deliberation and consultation took place almost exclusively behind closed doors. It is advisable to include the public, e.g. through an international hearing of experts. Taking into account the almost identical documents, a mid- and long-term goal should be the proposal that parliament expands its mechanisms for employing specialists in order to do justice to its checks and balances function.

Third proposal: Both the Budgetary Committee and the "Bundestag" should give priority to the examination of all aspects of the MEADS program, as well as the associated foreign policy questions, and take the time needed to do this thoroughly. Parliamentarians should regard March 2005 as a guiding principle, but not as a "must". Answering a number of questions will require more time. The "Bundestag" should not give up control over the issue to the government.

Parliamentarians should only vote in favor of German participation in the development of MEADS if the concerns posed by the Federal Accounting Office are resolved: Can the demand "in the scheduled capability, time and (particularly) cost frame" be realized? A great number of military, security, technological, alliance, and arms control aspects have to be taken into consideration, which were insufficiently processed by the defense ministry and the rapporteur group.