TBM Defense In The Gulf War: A Slim Margin Of Victory CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA General EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: TBM Defense In The Gulf War: A Slim Margin Of Victory Author: Major Michael E. Zaborowski, United States Army Thesis: Much work is still required to counter the tactical ballistic missile (TBM) threat, or future operations will be seriously disrupted. Background: TBM defense in the Gulf War was part of counterair operations. Successful counterair operations include effective employment of active defensive counterair, offensive counterair, and passive defensive counterair measures. However, our success in the Gulf War was as much attributable to Iraqi ineptitude, poor tactics and their outdated TBM technology as it was to the skill and employment of coalition forces. Future enemies will learn the lessons of Desert Storm and not make the same mistakes as the Iraqis. Advanced TBM technology is available now. The potential for our enemies to arm these TBM's with nuclear and chemical warheads is greater with the demise of the Soviet Union. Successful future campaigns will require effectively countering these TBM's. Recommendation: Acquire the Theater High Altitude Area Air Defense (THAAD) system, improve TBM detection and early warning capabilities, and all branches of the armed forces must relearn and employ passive defensive counterair measures. TBM DEFENSE IN THE GULF WAR: A SLIM MARGIN OF VICTORY OUTLINE Thesis Statement. Much work is still required to counter the tactical ballistic missile (TBM) threat or future operations will be seriously disrupted. A solution to the future TBM threat is to field the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system while concurrently improving offensive counterair and passive defensive counterair measures. I. Active defensive counterair (Patriot) A. Engagement description B. Place in counterair operations C. Patriot versus Scud-B 1. Modification to Patriot 2. World War II technology 3. Patriot capability limited 4. Improved TBM's II. Offensive counterair A. Partial success B. Tracking difficulty C. Improved technology III. Passive defensive counterair A. Unlearned lessons 1. Pearl Harbor 2. Philippines 3. Tunisia B. Iraqi failure to exploit 1. First strike 2. Coalition problems IV. Integrated solutions V. Active defensive counterair A. Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system 1. Development background 2. Capabilities 3. Comparison with Patriot 4. Threat 5. Technical description of accuracy B. Ground-Based Radar system 1. Description/capabilities 2. Other missiles supported (a) Patriot (b) Extended Range Intercept Technology (ERINT) C. True theater defense system D. Deployment VI. Offensive counterair A. Measure of success B. Gulf War environment C. Improvement 1. Detection 2. Dissemination D. First strike capability VII. Passive defensive counterair A. Follow doctrine B. Examples C. Leadership enforce TBM DEFENSE IN THE GULF WAR: A SLIM MARGIN OF VICTORY Counterair Operations. Air operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority by the destruction or neutralization of enemy forces. Counterair operations include such measures as the use of interceptors, bomb- ers, antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air missiles, electronic countermeasures, and the destruction of the air or missile threat both before and after it is launched. Other measures that are taken to minimize the effects to hostile air actions are cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic), and mobility. (JCS Pub 3-01.2) A Patriot missile leaves its launcher with a loud report and streaks skyward over Israel. Scant seconds earlier the multifunction, phased-array radar of the Patriot system had acquired the incoming Iraqi-modified Scud missile. The Patriot missile is controlled to the general intercept point by a data link with the weapons control computer through the radar station. Once the Patriot missile reaches the target vicinity, the onboard missile seeker antenna acquires the target. (4:2-7) In this instance, in the night sky over Israel, the Patriot system's capabilities are truly tested as the Scud may have been detected too late for successful intercept. However, the Patriot missile adjusts and reverses its upward flight at a speed of Mach 6 and catches the Scud missile a mere 140 feet above the ground. (2:41) Patriot successfully intercepted 45 of 47 Scud missiles engaged. (14:31) No other weapon system so thoroughly captured the imagination of the world than the Patriot and its ability to stop the indiscriminate terror attacks of the Iraqi Scuds. Patriot seemingly performed its defensive counterair mission well, even as our offensive counterair assets had some difficulty in locating and destroying the mobile Scuds on the ground. Counterair operations are, by definition, Joint operations. Joint counterair operations combine the capabilities and resources of all forces to provide an effective defense against an air threat. The integration and mix of offensive and defensive forces creates a synergism which optimizes this defense. Thus, our offensive capabilities destroyed many of the Scud missiles on the ground while Patriot defeated those that were launched. However, our success in countering the Scuds was won by the slimmest of margins. Much work is still required to counter the tactical ballistic missile (TBM) threat, or future operations will be seriously disrupted. To begin, Patriot is not the ultimate solution for countering the TBM threat. Patriot originally was designed to provide medium-to-high altitude air defense against high performance aircraft. However, immediately prior to the recent war, modifications were made to the Patriot system providing the capability of self-defense from TBM's and limited point-defense coverage for collocated critical assets. In fact, the Patriot antitactical missile capabilities, phase II (PAC-2) modifications underwent final testing in actual combat as improved software and missiles were rushed to the Gulf region. Furthermore, Patriot had a relatively easy target in the Abbas and Hussein versions of the Soviet SS-1/Scud-B missile. The Scud missile had more in common with the German V-2 rocket of World War II than with current technology. The Scud had no terminal guidance or special systems to fool acquisition radars; hence, its trajectory was easily plotted by the Patriot system. Even so, many intercepts of Scuds by Patriots occurred directly over the target cities with flaming debris causing damage and injury. (2:41-42) We were extremely lucky Iraq was unable to arm any of her missiles with nuclear or chemical weapons. The Patriot missile rarely hits a target head-on or destroys it completely. This is beyond the capability of the system and the missile's small warhead. (14:31) Although successful, Patriot was just adequate for its mission. It performed at the very limits of its anti-TBM capability against a missile based on 1950's technology. (2: 42) The Soviets have replaced the Scud with second and third generation missiles. The third generation SS-23/Spider has increased range and accuracy. Although the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 called for its removal from the Soviet inventory, the SS-23 and similar technology are potential threats that cannot be ignored. (7: 5-69) Just recently the North Koreans began shipping Scud-C missiles and equipment to the country of Syria. The U.S. State Department demanded a halt to the shipment, but North Korea has not complied. The North Koreans tried to supply Syria with the missiles and equipment last year, but backed down when Israel threatened to sink the ships. Transfer of this technology is banned by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR), but North Korea is not a signatory. The uproar is because the Scud-C has a range two-thirds greater than the Scud-B. (16:A-15) It's range will seriously reduce Israel's offensive counterair capability against TBM's in Syria in the event of war. The proliferation of missiles with even a greater range and more modern than the Scud-C is possible today. The Chinese have the CSS-2 missile with a range of 1600 miles. China's neighbor, India, has the Agnl missile with similar range. Also, the Chinese are trying to sell their M-11 missile (180-mile-range) to Pakistan and their M-9 missile (375-mile-range) to Syria and Iran. It appears Third World countries will continue to expand and modernize their TBM forces well into the next century. (9:13) The second part of the problem is that although our offensive counterair destroyed many Scuds before they were launched, a large number were still fired at Saudi Arabia and Israel. Actual destruction of the liquid-fueled Scuds, the fixed and mobile launchers, and the storage sites was easy once they were located. However, tracking the mobile launchers was very difficult. Real-time acquisition and intelligence were also difficult even though it took more than one hour for the Iraqis to ready a Scud for firing. (2: 42) Missiles with newer technology require substantially less time to fire and thus present a smaller window of opportunity for offensive counterair to destroy them. We can be sure that our enemies are studying our performance in Desert Storm and seeking ways to counter it. Stronger active air defenses and more ingenious uses of passive air defense measures will be explored by them. Offensive counterair will find the mission of TBM-killer doubly difficult in the next war. The final part of the problem addresses our inability to employ passive defensive counterair operations consistently throughout Desert Storm and our history, for that matter. Our ability to use cover, concealment, dispersion, deception and hardening are commensurate with how we perceive the threat. Air superiority is good, but it does not allow an army to profit from the hard lessons learned by our forces in Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Tunisia when subjected to enemy airpower. U.S. losses from the Japanese naval air attack at Pearl Harbor are staggering when put into the context of what are considered acceptable losses on today's battlefield. Passive defensive counterair measures were lacking at Pearl Harbor and our ships, planes, and facilities were perfect targets. With complete surprise (although their aircraft were detected by U.S. Army radar) the Japanese sunk or damaged eighteen ships--to include eight battleships, three light cruisers, three destroyers and four auxiliary ships. U.S. Navy and Army aviation suffered losses of 164 planes destroyed and 128 damaged. Total U.S. casualties for the day were 3,581, with 2,403 listed as killed or missing and 1,178 listed as wounded. The Japanese lost only 29 planes, one submarine, and five midget submarines. (15:539-540) The results in the Philippines should have been different for U.S. forces, since they were struck by Japanese airpower ten hours after the Pearl Harbor attack. However, although warned, U.S. aircraft were not dispersed and offensive counterair operations against Japanese airfields on Formosa were bungled. Over half of the 277 U.S. aircraft in the Philippines were destroyed on the afternoon of December 8, 1941. Within two weeks all U.S. air and naval facilities were effectively put out of action. Our air and naval forces were swept from the area. Without air or naval support, U.S. ground forces ultimately surrendered to the Japanese. (19:107-108) Over one year later, in early 1943 in Tunisia, U.S. forces still did not properly employ passive defensive counterair measures. Although the Allies were supposed to have air superiority, U.S. forces initially were easy prey for the Luftwaffe and suffered casualties for their mistakes. Simple failures in camouflage and dispersal were to blame.* *In 1988 at Fort Sill, Oklahoma a retired field artillery colonel related the following anecdote. He was a young soldier with a unit in Tunisia during WWII. He remembered seeing British convoys with all the vehicles camouflaged and 100 meter intervals between vehicles. The British convoys upon sight of any aircraft would immediately pull off the road in staggered formation seeking cover and concealment until the plane was identified. He remembers his unit making fun of the British ways until his unit was strafed by two German planes and men were killed and wounded. The colonel stated that it was soon after this incident that his unit's vehicles began to resemble and act like the British convoys. For whatever reason (failure to read U.S. military history), the Iraqis did not maximize the full potential of their TBM's and airpower. Although total surprise was not possible, it was not necessary under the conditions. Iraq could have launched the first strike, instead of allowing coalition forces to start the air war. A Scud barrage (20 to 30 Scuds each) against a few key targets would probably have overwhelmed the coalition defenses. Still, the Scud's inaccuracy and small warhead would have limited the effectiveness of a barrage type attack. Even combined with a major effort by the Iraqi Air Force, this TBM first strike would probably not have changed the outcome of the war. However, no active defensive counterair system is fool proof. The lack of adherence to sound passive measures would have ensured higher coalition casualties under this type of attack. If the pictures from Desert Storm are any indication, we are still practicing bad habits when executing passive defensive counterair operations. Numerous and undispersed convoys, logistic dumps in the open, aircraft and ammunition lining airfields, and soldiers failing to take cover during air raid warnings are the pictures a potential enemy will remember. One Scud did get through and kill many of our soldiers when a Patriot system malfunctioned.* (14:31) *An interesting note is that if one Iraqi Su-24 Fencer had managed to elude our defensive counterair systems, its bomb load would have had the effect of 50 to 60 Scuds on its unfortunate target. This scenario is not so far-fetched if the daring and determination of the Argentine pilots in the 1982 Falklands War is remembered. (13:19-20) TBM's of the next war will probably be more accurate and lethal. Failure to employ passive measures could prove fatal in the future and disrupt operations. Any final solution to the future TBM threat must address all three areas of counterair operations: active defensive counterair, offensive counterair, and passive defensive counterair. Improvement is required in all three areas to ensure the minimum disruption to our armed forces in future wars. However, with the above thought in mind, perhaps the most critical improvement required lies in the area of active defensive counterair. A solution to the TBM threat in this area is to field the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The technology for a true anti-TBM system is available now. THAAD technology is an outgrowth of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research initiated in 1983 at President Reagan's request. (12:16) The THAAD system is based on proven technology specifically developed to defend against the most modern TBM's. (21:7) THAAD will improve and enhance theater missile defenses. In a TBM environment, Patriot provides only a point defense capability. This posture protects a limited area and only the most vital assets in the theater. (3:G-8) However, THAAD will have the capability to provide an area defense for either a mature or contingency theater. Cities, airfields, logistics bases, and troop concentrations will all be under the THAAD "umbrella". (12:16) The THAAD system has many characteristics superior to the Patriot system. THAAD has longer range and can engage at higher altitudes than the Patriot. The unclassified engagement range of the THAAD system is 100 miles, which is considerably farther than the Patriot's range. More importantly, the THAAD system can destroy TBM's at an altitude of 100 miles. Even with scheduled future product improvements, Patriot will not attain this range. Destruction of TBM's at greater ranges will mean the engagements will occur away from populated areas and critical installations. (21:7) Furthermore, the THAAD system is accurate enough to target and obliterate the TBM warhead. (12:16) THAAD's accuracy will reduce fallout from debris and the possibility of free falling warheads detonating and causing damage. The extended engagement range and ability to destroy the warhead will significantly improve the survivability of friendly forces against TBM's armed with nuclear or chemical warheads. This direct hit capability is doubly important because of the recent demise of the Soviet Union. There is a distinct possibility that many former Soviet scientists with nuclear and chemical warhead expertise will be lured to Third World countries by lucrative contracts. Nuclear and chemical programs in countries like Iraq, Iran, and Libya would benefit greatly from the infusion of talented scientists. A worse scenario is that the former Soviet republics strapped for hard currency might sell their hi-tech weapons to the highest bidder. Instant weapons and instant expertise are a deadly mix. Nuclear or chemically armed TBM's in the hands of countries unfriendly to the U.S. could be a reality in the next few years. THAAD achieves its accuracy by using a Ground-Based Radar (GBR) technology developed from SDI and other advanced technologies. (20:36) The radar serves as the fire control for THAAD. It will acquire and track incoming TBM's and launch missiles automatically. A THAAD missile will constantly receive updates from the radar to adjust its course. Also, the THAAD missile will have a terminal homing device. This device is an extremely accurate on-board seeker which provides the missile pinpoint accuracy. (12:16) Finally, the THAAD missile destroys the incoming warhead through a kinetic kill. (21:7) High closing speeds and the extreme accuracy of the THAAD system cause a head-on collision which results in total warhead destruction. (12: 16) The GBR is a phased-array radar specifically developed to handle theater missile defense and to even be a critical piece of the strategic defense system. (20:36) It has the added benefit of supporting Patriot and another new anti-TBM system named the Extended Range Intercept Technology (ERINT). The GBR working with Patriot will enhance Patriot's ability to destroy TBM's and can accomodate systems like ERINT which are being developed to extend the "operating envelope" of an integrated theater TBM defense. (12:17) THAAD will be a rapid deployment asset. The system will be light and compact. It will have the mobility of the Patriot system and be air transportable in C-130's. (21:7) The THAAD system could be operationally deployed by 1996 if the program is approved within the next few months. Currently, the fate of the system is in the hands of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Donald Yockey. He is responsible for releasing new equipment requests for proposals. (20:36) The THAAD and Ground-Based Radar solicitations would be the first step towards a viable future TBM defense. Notwithstanding THAAD, destroying TBM's on the ground would appear to be the best solution, but our offensive counterair capability still needs improvement. However, no amount of improvement will guarantee total destruction of enemy TBM's on the ground prior to launch. Offensive counterair's importance is that it must be successful enough to prevent TBM's from being launched in such numbers that they overwhelm active defensive measures. Offensive and defensive measures must work together for an effective TBM defense. In some ways the Gulf War was an excellent environment for offensive counterair operations. Coalition air launched the first strike destroying many Scud launchers and missiles immediately. Coalition air operated from modern facilities and had close to six months to deploy their air forces to the theater and set up the necessary support infrastructure. Also, Iraqi aviation assets were not used and ground-based air defense forces were ineffective over Scud launch sites. Coalition combat air patrols were flown around the clock over open desert terrain and responded quickly when notified of a Scud launch. Yet, sixteen Scuds were still fired in the last week of the war. (9:19-20) Realizing we will probably not enjoy many of these advantages in the next war, we must try to improve our offensive counterair capabilities in two areas. One improvement must be in detection, preferably prior to launch. Satellites were an important aspect of TBM defense in the Gulf War, along with reconnaissance aircraft, special operating forces, and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). We must continue to expand the capabilities and employability of these assets understanding that no one asset can do it all. Nevertheless, detection is useless unless we can improve our capabilities in disseminating TBM locations to offensive counterair assets, and give early warning of TBM launch to active defensive counterair assets, and to the theater force as a whole. The warning system used in the Gulf War was not designed for this role. It provided a limited capability to only a small portion of the force. Communication systems must be improved and packages developed for units away from corps assets. (18:14) One final thought on offensive counterair operations viewed from the political realm. In future crises or conflicts, we must position ourselves politically so that we have the option of launching the first strike as we did in the Gulf War, or a preemptive strike as Israel did against Iraq's nuclear facility in 1981. (9:14-15) The maneuverability of TBM's demands this. Our performance in the Gulf War will be remembered by potential adversaries only as long as they believe we have the will to fight and conditions favor us repeating that perfomance. Correcting deficiencies in passive defensive counterair measures are easier than trying to locate and destroy TBM's and less expensive than fielding a THAAD system. They can be corrected through the training and enforcement of doctrinally sound procedures. The investment in time and effort is relatively small compared to the return of protection received in combat against a determined foe striking from the air with TBM's and aircraft. In stationary positions, such as airfields and logistic dumps, simple procedures as staggered dispersal of equipment, dug-in and bunkered positions, protective berms, hardened shelters, liberal use of camouflage, and the wiping out of vehicle track marks will aid survival and reduce destruction. However, covered positions, bunkers, and chemical protective suits are not enough if our forces do not utilize them. When the air raid warning sounds, our forces must immediately follow standard operating procedures previously established through realistic training. (6:I-1- I-2) The responsibility of leaders is to ensure that even after numerous false alerts or minimal damage attacks that their units continue to take passive defensive counterair measures seriously. Well thought out, trained, and implemented passive defensive counterair measures are a key part of counterair operations. We cannot afford to choose to relearn these passive measures every war. 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