A Military Space Control Doctrine -- A Necessity In The Post-Cold War World

CSC 1992

SUBJECT AREA C4

                        EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title:  A Military Space Control Doctrine -- A Necessity in

                  the Post-Cold War World

Author: LCDR Jack A. Greenspan, United States Navy

Thesis: With space systems playing an increasing role in

the U.S. national security posture and with the

proliferation of space technology in the post-Cold War

world, the U.S. needs to adopt military space doctrine based

on space control.

Background:  The U.S. military has been operating in space

for the last 30 years, yet, surprisingly, no official

military doctrine for space exists.  Space doctrine is in

its infancy as air power doctrine was during the I92Os and

193Os. Despite the lack of an official doctrine, the U.S.

has developed a complex military space capability that

proved successful in Desert Storm.  Furthermore, the U.S.

military has become increasingly reliant on space systems to

support warfighting.  The systems and force structure were

developed during the Cold War when the Soviet Union was the

major threat to U.S. national security.  Today, the U.S. is

redefining its policies and strategies for the post-Cold War

world to deal with emerging powers and new global

relationships.  The proliferation of technology is allowing

many nations, both allies and potential adversaries, to

build space programs with military capabilities.  The Base

Force concept in the new National Security Strategy will

make U.S. forces more reliant on space for warfighting and

response to regional contingencies. Sound doctrine leads to

strategies and plans that would allow the U.S. to acquire

and employ space forces most effectively in support of

national objectives in the post-Cold War world.

Recommendation: The U.S. needs to adopt a military space

control doctrine that assures free access to space and the

capability to protect U.S. space resources.

             A MILITARY SPACE CONTROL DOCTRINE ---

         A NECESSITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

                                    OUTLINE

Thesis: With space systems playing an increasing role in

U.S. national security posture and with the proliferation of

space technology in the post-Cold War world, the U.S. needs

to adopt military space doctrine based on space control.

I.   Space forces provide substantial capability

     A. Reliance on space systems for support

     B. Desert Storm examples

II.  No real military space doctrine today

     A.  Current official doctrine

     B.  What  doctrine is

     C.  The evolution of unofficial space doctrine - four

           schools of thought

           1.  Sanctuary

           2.  Survivability

           3.  "High Ground"

           4.  Space Control

     D.  The Soviet threat and impact on doctrine

     E.  The ASAT debate

     F.  Space control -- the emerging doctrine

II. Emerging Space Powers and New Threats

     A. Proliferation of space technology

     B. Civil-Military applications of space -- new threat

IV.  Implications of new National Security Strategy on space

V.   Imperatives for a space control doctrine

              

             A MILITARY SPACE CONTROL DOCTRINE ---

         A NECESSITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

     The U.S. military has become increasingly reliant on

space systems to support warfighting.  Seventy percent of

the U.S. military space effort is tactical in nature and the

vast majority of support is provided to conventional forces.

(1:24)  Until the last 10 years, space systems merely

augmented terrestrial systems.  Now the situation has

changed.  Many terrestrial systems augment or serve as

backups for space systems, such as in communications,

weather, navigation and reconnaissance. (6:25-26)

     During the 1980s, space systems played an important

role in all U.S. conventional military operations.  They

were employed in operations Urgent Fury, (Grenada), El

Dorado Canyon (Libya) and Just Cause (Panama) for

communications, weather prediction, strike route planning

and battle damage assessment.

     Operation Desert Storm, however, proved a watershed

event in military space application.  Air Force Chief of

Staff Gen. Merril A. McPeak described it as "the first space

war." (3:18)  "While we did not war in space," writes

Commander-in-chief, U.S. Space Command, Gen. Donald J.

Kutyna, "Desert Storm was the first campaign-level combat

operation in which space was solidly integrated in the

combat operations and was vital to the degree of success

achieved in the conflict." (1:25)

     During the five-month buildup in Operation Desert

Shield, a mix of user sets, mobile terminals and portable

receivers were deployed to Saudi Arabia to create a space

infrastructure for receiving and disseminating space-based

data. (3:18)  Once hostilities began, space systems were a

key component of combat operations.

     Many critical support missions, including missile

warning, communications, navigation, mapping and weather

observation were performed primarily from space. (10:85)

     -- Defense Satellite Program (DSP) strategic-warning

     satellites provided early warning of Iraqi ballistic

     missile attack to both Coalition forces and the

     Israelis. (10:85)

     -- Various defense communications satellite systems

     carried more than 85 percent of all inter-theater and

     intra-theater communications. (3:19)

     -- The Global Positioning System (GPS) provided precise

     navigation to air, sea and land forces.  More than 4500

     GPS terminals allowed aircraft to conduct all-weather

     missions with extraordinary accuracy; tanks to maneuver

     precisely in the featureless desert; minesweeping forces

     to navigate safely and effectively in enemy minefields;

     and even ration trucks to find and feed soldiers in the

     desert. (10:86)

     -- LANDSAT, the Department of Commerce's  multispectral

     imaging satellite system, provided wide-area imagery to

     update maps, to aid in trafficability and terrain

     analysis, and to prepare air-route and weapons-delivery

     plans. (3:20)

     -- The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)

     provided images of cloud cover and other weather

     conditions to aid in planning combat operations.

     Accurate weather forecasting was critical in deciding

     whether to employ precision-guided munitions for an air

     sortie since target visibility is essential for laser

     designation.  In addition, DMSP imagery allowed analysts

     to determine moisture content of the soil, and thus,

     identify routes which would support the weight of the

     armored forces that conducted Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf's

     "left hook" into Iraq. (3:19)

     The U.S. military has been operating in space for the

last 30 years, yet surprisingly no official military

doctrine for space exists.  Despite the lack of an official

doctrine, the U.S. has developed a complex military space

capability that proved successful in Desert Storm.  The

systems and force structure were developed during the Cold

War when the Soviet Union was the major threat to U.S.

national security.

     Today, the U.S. is redefining its policies and

strategies for the post-Cold War world to deal with emerging

powers and new global relationships.  The proliferation of

technology is allowing many nations, both allies and

potential adversaries, to build space programs with military

capabilities.  Additionally, the U.S. military is reducing

force structure and overseas presence under the Base Force

concept, making it even more reliant on space systems.

     Sound doctrine can lead to strategies and plans that

would allow the U.S. to acquire and employ space forces most

effectively in support of national objectives in the post-

Cold War world.  A doctrine that assures free access to

space and the capability to protect U.S. space resources is

required.  With space systems playing an increasing role in

the U.S. national security posture and with the growing

number of space powers, the U.S. needs to adopt a military

space doctrine based on space control.

 "Just as air doctrine was in its formative years in the

 interwar period, space war-fighting doctrine is in its

 infancy today." (5:16)

     Space was first acknowledged in military doctrine in

1959.  Since then, there has been much debate as U.S.

military space doctrine has evolved both officially and

unofficially.  Numerous articles have appeared in military

professional journals by both staff officers and commanders

of  U.S. space forces arguing the merits of different

doctrinal approaches.  Efforts to publish an accepted space

doctrine have been largely futile due to changes in

technology and major disagreements on basic tenets of

military operations in space. (11:29)

     The U.S. Air Force has taken the lead in developing

military space doctrine.  The current version of AFM 1-1,

Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, contains

general doctrine that the Air Force claims is applicable to

air and space forces.  The first attempt at specific space

doctrine, AFM 1-6, Military Space Doctrine, was published in

1982, but later canceled.    According to military space

operators, neither has been considered useful doctrine for

space. (11:29)

     AFM 1-6 was flawed because instead of explaining how

U.S. space forces would be employed in future conflicts, it

simply restated public policy. (4:57)  Furthermore, AFM 1-1

and AFM 1-6 misstated the impact of the physical properties

of space. They were not grounded in history, nor founded on

the principles of war as applied to space. (5:15)

     AFM 1-1 views space as an extension of the atmosphere,

combining air and space forces into "aerospace" forces.

Space, however, is different than the air. The fundamental

characteristics of air forces -- speed, range and

flexibility -- do not apply to space forces in the same

ways.  Speed, for example, is bounded by orbital mechanics.

Speed is fixed for a given orbit.  At times, zero relative

speed is desirable in space as in geosynchronous orbit for a

communications satellite.  The characteristic "flexibility"

generally does not apply to space forces -- once in orbit,

space hardware is not easily modified. (5:14)

     The U.S. Air Force is currently working on a draft

space doctrine AFM 2-25, Space Operations, and a revision to

AFM 1-1, that will include updated thinking about the

military and space.  However, both documents are almost a

year away from publication. (11:38-39)

     Criticisms of existing official space doctrine reflect

the evolving nature of this new arena for military

operations.  Part of the problem stems from the word

"doctrine."  Doctrine has many different meanings and is

often confused with policy. (4:56)  According to Professor

I.B. Holley, Maj. Gen., USAFR, "military doctrine is what is

officially believed and taught about the best way to conduct

military affairs." (2:3)

     Lt.Col. Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow, authors

of Introduction to Strategy, a basic text on strategy used

at U.S. military war colleges, say that "doctrine, in

general, has three purposes.  First it provides the working

medium for a thorough analysis of past experience -- the

ultimate distillation of lessons learned.  Second, it

provides the means of passing on this experience by

educating and allowing successors to avoid repeating the

same old mistakes.  Third, it provides guidance for future

actions and allows for a commonality of understanding

between superiors and subordinates that is essential during

conflict." (11:30)

     According to Drew, doctrine is developed through

experience and the accurate analysis and interpretation of

history. (5:15)

     New doctrines frequently emerge from unofficial sources

and become official later during a war or when demonstrated

in peacetime weapons systems tests or in military exercises.

One example is the writings of Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan on

sea power at the turn of the century.  Despite their

influence on naval warfare and shipbuilding programs, they

were not officially embraced by the Navy until many years

after their release. (5:16)  Similarly, the Air Corps

Tactical School played a key role in the 1930s developing

and teaching air doctrine used in the early stages of World

War II, yet the official doctrine was not published until

1943. (2:3)

     Several unofficial space doctrines have been developed

in the last 30 years.  In "On Space Warfare: A Space Power

Doctrine", Lt.Col. David E. Lupton, USAF, identifies four of

the major schools of thought on space doctrine and argues

himself for a "space control" doctrine.  All of these

doctrinal schools are closely linked to strategic nuclear

strategies, since the first military use of space technology

was linked to arms control.

     The first school of space doctrine, labeled the

sanctuary doctrine, holds that space is to be used for

peaceful purposes and, therefore, is a sanctuary from war.

It speaks of "open skies" to conduct nuclear treaty

verification and provide strategic attack warning.  "It is a

doctrine born from the shootdown of Gary Powers and

Eisenhower's attempt to establish a sanctuary for space-

based national technical means." (9:118)

     The second school of space doctrine, the survivability

school, says that space systems are inherently vulnerable

due to the predictability of orbital mechanics and the ASAT

technology.  Proponents argue that a space denial strategy

is the best policy and that an ASAT capability is the best

deterrent.  They further do not believe that space systems

can be depended upon in time of war.

     The third school of space doctrine, the "high ground"

doctrine, argues for a space-based ballistic missile defense

"Star Wars" -- to assure survival in nuclear war   The

"high ground" school advocates space-based weapons systems

to resolve all conflicts whether in space or on the ground.

     The final school of doctrine, the control school,

argues that space forces need to assert space power just as

air forces and naval forces assert air power and sea power

respectively.  Space lines of communication are comparable

to sea lines of communication and must be controlled if war

is to be won either in space or in a terrestrial theater.

     Space control includes both ensuring free access and

use of space and the ability to deny use to a potential

enemy.   It includes the concept of space superiority

analagous to air superiority whereby an enemy use of a

region of space is denied for a specific period. It does not

require absolute control of all space. (5:27)

      Each doctrine was formulated when the Soviet Union was

the primary threat to U.S. national security.  The Soviet

Union was the only other major space power, and it had a

defined military space doctrine that advocated space

control.  Soviet doctrine dating from the 1960's declared

that space forces are to be integrated into combined arms

and that space forces were to do their part in accomplishing

the political goals of the state.  The Soviets viewed space

as another theater of war. (5:85)

     The Soviets built a military space program which

included a robust launch program to assure access to space.

They had the capability to surge operations in times of

crisis as demonstrated by launches of extra reconnaissance

and surveillance satellites during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

and the Falklands War.  By 1989, the Soviets had roughly 50

different satellite systems, with missions including

reconnaissance, surveillance, strategic and tactical

targeting, launch detection and attack warning,

communications, navigation and weather. (5:38)

     In addition, the Soviets were first to develop an

operational ASAT in the early 1970s, an interceptor placed

in orbit that would maneuver close to its target and

detonate.  The Soviets pursued several ASAT technologies

including a ground-based laser program and an electronic

warfare program judged to have an ASAT capability. (1:23)

            The Soviet ASAT capability meant the sanctuary doctrine

was no longer viable.  The debate over military space

doctrine concentrated on the survivability, "high ground,"

and space control schools.

     Concern with the Soviet ASAT capability fueled a public

policy debate on U.S. ASAT development during the early

1980s.  This issue clouded the doctrinal debate on space.

     By the early 1980s, the U.S. military had become

increasingly reliant on space systems, and a doctrine based

on space control was necessary if the U.S. was to ensure the

uninterrupted use of these systems during conflict with the

Soviets.  Space would not remain a sanctuary in war if the

Soviets fought according to their doctrine.

     The Reagan administration supported the need to build

offensive and defensive space weapons to protect U.S.

national security interests in space. (5:46)  Development

began on an ASAT system that included a missile interceptor

launched from an F-15 aircraft.  Also in 1983, President

Reagan announced the Stategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a

vision for a program using new technologies and space-based

weapons to counter the strategic nuclear threat.

     Space weapons and the advocacy of military space

control was a controversial topic in Congress, however.

Congressional concerns centered on whether current treaties

permitted the development and deployment of space control

technology, or whether peace could be better attained and

maintained through arms control. (5:43)  The President got

funding for SDI research, but Congress banned testing of a

U.S. ASAT throughout the mid 1980s.  By 1989, the anti-ASAT

fervor subsided, and the Bush administration was allowed to

continue development of an ASAT. (5:46-47)

     Also in 1989, the Bush administration published "The

National Space Policy" which addressed military operations in

space.  Objectives included "(1) deterring, or if necessary,

defending against enemy attack; (2) assuring that forces of

hostile nations cannot prevent our own use of space; (3)

negating, if necessary, hostile space systems; and (4)

enhancing operations of United States and Allied forces."

(5:52).  This policy required a doctrine of space control.

The space control school prevailed, or so it seemed:;

     Current doctrinal debate has centered on refining a

military space control doctrine.  Discussions in

professional literature have analyzed the relative aspects

of space control.  Given the high cost of space systems and

shrinking federal budgets, should the U.S. concentrate on

active defensive measures, such as ASATs?  Or, should more

passive defensive measures be used, such as improving access

to space with a more robust launch architecture? (4 and 6)

     The end of the Cold War and the recent collapse of the

Soviet Union, however, brings a new twist to evolving

military space doctrine.  With no other space power a

threat, why bother with a doctrine of space control?

     The most pressing concern is that space programs are

proliferating throughout the world, and new space powers are

emerging.  Many nations have the desire, technological

capability and economic resources to obtain space systems

for both commercial and military use.  Relationships with

these nations that are or have the ability to become space

powers are changing in the vacuum of superpower politics.

Their attitudes toward the free use of space are unknown.

     Current allies and potential adversaries learned the

lesson of the effectiveness of military space systems during

Desert Storm.  Many have significantly increased their

research and development activity and many are pursuing

launch technology and satellite programs. (10:90)  Table 1

extracted from the 1992 annual "Report of the Secretary of

Defense to the President and the Congress" lists 31 nations

that have existing space systems or emerging space

technology.

TABLE 1 - SPACE SYSTEMS (WORLDWIDE) EXISTING AND EMERGING

SPACE TECHNOLOGY/SATELLITE COUNTRIES (10:91)

     Argentina               Iran              Russia

     Australia               Iraq              South Africa

     Brazil                   Israel            South Korea

     Belarus                  Italy             Spain

     Canada                   Japan             Taiwan

     China                    Kazakhstan        Thailand

     Czechoslovakia          Luxembourg        Turkey

     France                   Mexico            UAE

     Germany                  Netherlands       Ukraine

     India                    Pakistan          United Kingdom

     Indonesia                                 United States

     During the last 10 years, China, India and Japan have

launched communications satellites. (9:9)  China, India and

Israel are believed to have launched reconnaissance

satellites. (9:9)  Japan, France and Russia are offering

commercial launch services to countries capable of building

or buying space systems and who can also afford the price of

access to space.

     The number of countries possessing short- and medium-

ranged ballistic missiles is growing.  Former CIA Director

William Webster recently informed Congress that by the year

2000, at least six Third World countries probably will have

ballistic missiles with ranges up to 3,300 miles.  Four of

these countries developing missile capabilities have nuclear

weapons or advanced programs. (1:22)  Space-launch vehicle

technology and hardware are interchangeable with these of

ballistic missiles. (10:90)

     Today some nations, such as China, rely heavily ;o-n

foreign military sales to shore up their economies, to help

client states, or to broaden their influence. As former

Space Command deputy Maj. Gen. Robert A. Rosenberg, USAF

(Ret.), writes, "No one has told these states they can't

sell access to space and space systems the same way. Is it

reasonable to think that states who want to exercise their

sovereignty to the reaches of outer space can't buy their

way into space weaponry?  What about terrorist states?  What

about the next generation of Iranian leadership or the next

Qadhafi?" (9:122)

     Of additional concern is the problem of unemployed

Soviet scientists selling their space expertise to potential

adversaries pursing a military space program.

     U.S. military space policy and doctrine must address

the proliferation of dual-use (military and commercial)

space systems and technologies that could significantly

jeopardize U.S. national security interests.  The

acquisition of critical space-based information by

adversaries engaged in regional conflicts could have a

dramatic impact on the course of the battle. (10:90)

     France has launched SPOT, a commercial observation

satellite system capable of 10-meter ground resolution.

Although the system has modest military utility, an improved

SPOT is planned for the mid-1990's with improved resolution.

The French as well as the Russians sell imagery obtained

from these multispectral satellites on the open market, thus

making it available to countries unable to field their own

systems. (5:8, 9:117)

     Gen. Kutyna writes, "Just as we would not tolerate

enemy reconnaissance aircraft flying over our forces, we

must not allow any enemy satellites to provide militarily

useful data from space in wartime.  Our forces obviously

need a capability to counter this threat." (1:23)

     The growing number of space powers and the increased

access of military space technology in a multipolar world

increases the overall threat to U.S. space systems and the

forces they support.  If the U.S. military is to continue to

operate in space, a doctrine of space control is necessary

to protect U.S. space assets and deny the use of space to

adversaries.

     The importance of military space forces to warfighting

that was demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm will

increase as the new National Security Strategy is

implemented.  The new strategy with its pillars of nuclear

deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and

reconstitution will be more reliant on space systems.  Under

the Base Force concept within the strategy, the U.S. will

have a smaller force structure and fewer forward operating

bases from which to respond to regional crises.

     As the U.S. presence in Europe and the Far East is

reduced, forward-deployed ground support systems such as

communications sites, navigational aids, weather stations

and collection activities will be eliminated.  Space systems

will replace these terrestrial systems to provide essential

support functions. (3:17-18)

     Because of their global nature, high readiness and

rapid response, space forces may be the only "on the scene"

capabilities in the early stages of future regional

conflicts. (10:85)  Furthermore, space forces can provide

real-time or near-real-time support to deployed or enroute

forces and national command authorities during a crisis.

     As Gen. Kutnya states, ". .  the ability of the U.S. to

use any of its force packages depends heavily on its ability

to operate in the high ground of space.  If we are to

maintain peak efficiency of our combat forces in an era of

reduced force levels and fewer forward operating locations,

our space systems must be available to our land, sea and air

forces when they are needed in both peacetime and wartime."

(1:24)

     In summary, space forces have become an integral part

of the U.S. warfighting capability.  Maturing space doctrine

must meet the challenges of the future.  In the evolving

post-Cold War world, new space powers are emerging that may

bring new threats to U.S. national security.  A space

control doctrine will assure the U.S. access to space and

the survivability of systems during conflict.  A space

control doctrine will allow the U.S. to maintain the space

lines of communication to support terrestrial forces' around

the world.  A space control doctrine can meet the challenges

of future.

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