Surrender Or Suicide...Why America Needs SDI AUTHOR Major Robert M. Keane, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Professional Military Education (PME) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: SURRENDER OR SUICIDE...WHY AMERICA NEEDS SDI I. PURPOSE: TO ESTABLISH THE URGENT NEED TO ADOPT A NEW NUCLEAR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES, AND TO BE ABLE TO ARTICULATE, TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, THE MERITS OF PROTECTING THE FUNDING LEVEL OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI). II. PROBLEM: ALTHOUGH AMERICA'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY--BASED ON THE MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD) CONCEPT MAY HAVE BEEN VALID WHEN FIRST CONCEIVED--THE ASSUMPTIONS UPON WHICH THE MAD DOCTRINE WAS BASED ARE NO LONGER VALID. IN LIGHT OF THE TREMENDOUS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH SHOWS NO SIGN OF ABATING, CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO A FLAWED STRATEGY PLACES UNITED STATES SECURITY IN POTENTIALLY GRAVE JEOPARDY. AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY IS URGENTLY NEEDED TO MEET THE NATION'S CURRENT AND FUTURE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. THE SOUND STRATEGY OFFERED BY THE SDI CONCEPT OFFERS THE MOST PROMISING CHOICE; HOWEVER, THE FUNDING FOR THE SDI IS FACING SEVERE CUTBACKS IN CONGRESS. MILITARY REPRESEN- TATIVES AT BUDGET HEARINGS MUST BE ABLE TO ARTICULATE THE NEED FOR CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE STATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. III. DATA: SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABILITY CONTINUES TO MODERNIZE AT AN ALARMING RATE IN SPITE OF GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA. IN ADDITION TO THE POSSESSION OF AN OVERWHELMING OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE AND THE WORLD'S ONLY OPERATIONAL ABM SYSTEM, THE SOVIET UNION IS ALSO VIGOROUSLY PURSUING RESEARCH IN BREAKTHROUGH KINETIC AND DIRECTED ENERGY TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE GROUND AND SPACE-BASED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. U.S. SCIENTISTS ARE WELL AWARE OF THE GREAT POTENTIAL OF THESE TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES. A UNILATERAL DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH A DEFENSE SYSTEM BY THE SOVIET UNION PORTENDS GREAT RISK TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES: THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT A TRUE FIRST-STRIKE NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES AGAINST WHICH WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO RETALIATE. ADDITIONALLY, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT IN LESS THAN TWENTY YEARS MANY THIRD WORLD NATIONS WILL HAVE THE MEANS TO DELIV- ER NUCLEAR ATTACKS. NUCLEAR TERRORISM COULD BECOME THE THREAT OF THE 21ST CENTURY, ESPECIALLY TO NATIONS WITHOUT A NUCLEAR DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. IV. CONCLUSIONS: THE TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENTS MADE THROUGH THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM OFFER A SURE CAPABILITY TO MEET FUTURE SECURITY CHALLENGES. IT ALSO OFFERS BRIGHT HOPE OF MAKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS THEMSELVES OBSOLETE. HOWEVER, RECENT CHANGES IN THE PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT AS WELL AS SEVERE CUTBACKS IN DEFENSE SPENDING THREATEN THE FUNDING LEVELS REQUIRED TO MAKE SDI A REALITY. FUND- ING THE SDI AT LEVELS PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT MUST BECOME THE TOP DEFENSE PRIORITY. V. RECOMMENDATIONS: ENSURE THAT DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ATTENDING CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET HEARINGS ARE THOROUGHLY PREPARED TO ARTICULATE THE URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR CONGRESS TO APPROVE THE REQUESTED SDI BUDGET. SURRENDER OR SUICIDE... WHY AMERICA NEEDS SDI OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. THE UNITED STATES MUST MAKE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ITS TOP DEFENSE PRIORITY, IF ITS NATIONAL SECURITY IS TO BE GUARANTEED INTO THE NEXT DECADE. I. CHALLENGES TO THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE A. CHANGES AFFECTING PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT B. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET CUTS IN DEFENSE SPENDING II. AMERICA'S FLAWED NUCLEAR STRATEGY A. THE MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD) CONCEPT B. THE ABM TREATY: "DEFENSELESS AND NAKED" C. VULNERABILITY OF THE "STRATEGIC TRIAD" D. STRATEGY ASSESSMENT III. THE SOVIET THREAT A. NUCLEAR CAPABLITIES B. SOVIET SDI C. GLASNOST, PERESTROIKA AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IV. A NEW NUCLEAR STRATEGY: THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE A. HOW SDI WORKS B. ADVANTAGES FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS C. JUSTIFICATION VIS-A-VIS EASTERN EUROPE AND THIRD WORLD V. SUMMARY SURRENDER OR SUICIDE...WHY AMERICA NEEDS SDI FOLLOWING IN THE WAKE OF SOME OF THE MOST DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT HIS- TORY, 1990 PROMISES TO BE THE SEMINAL YEAR OF A PARTICULARLY CHALLENGING PERIOD FOR THE UNITED STATES MILITARY. THIS IS MOST DRAMATICALLY ILLUSTRATED, PERHAPS, IN THE TASK IMPOSED BY CONGRESS UPON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO COMPLETELY REVIEW U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY FOR ITS POSSIBLE OBSOLESCENCE VIS-A-VIS THE EVENTS NOW SWEEPING THROUGH EASTERN EUROPE. 1990 IS ALSO A CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION YEAR. AS A RESULT, THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF PRESSURE TO MAKE DRASTIC CUTS IN THE BUDGET IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE GROSS NATIONAL DEFICIT CREATED BY OUR LIBERAL LEGISLATORS. NATURALLY, THE NATION'S DEFENSE PRESENTS A MUCH MORE LUCRATIVE TARGET FOR LIB- ERAL POLITICIANS THAN A FAT CONGRESSIONAL PAYRAISE, OR ANY OF THE "VITAL" WELFARE- STATE SOCIAL PROGRAMS. VIGOROUS DEBATES--NOW TAKING PLACE ON CAPITOL HILL BETWEEN THE CONGRESS, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE WHITE HOUSE--ARE FOCUSED ON MILITARY SPENDING PRO- GRAMS. JUST WHICH PROGRAMS GET THE AXE AND WHICH SURVIVE WILL BE LARGELY DETER- MINED BY HOW DEFTLY THE WHITE HOUSE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND THE SERVICE CHIEFS CAN ARTICULATE THE NEED FOP THOSE PROGRAMS THEY CONSIDER ESSENTIAL TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OR TO THE ABILITY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICES TO CARRY OUT THEIR ASSIGNED MISSIONS. ALSO OF SIGNIFICANCE IS THE FACT THAT A MAJOR PORTION OF THE AUDIENCE THEY MUST CONVINCE HAS ALREADY BEEN SWEPT AWAY BY THE EUPHORIA OVER PROSPECTS FOR WORLD PEACE THEY FIND IN SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S NOW FAMOUS RHET- ORIC-- GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA. ONE OF THE PROGAMS BEING HOTLY CONTESTED IN THIS YEAR'S DEBATES IS THE STRA- TEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI); IT IS AGAIN UNDER ATTACK BY LIBERALS IN CONGRESS AND IN THE MEDIA. THE LARGELY HELD PERCEPTION THAT THE THREAT POSED BY THE SOVIET UNION NO LONGER EXISTS, IS THE MOST RECENT ADDITION TO THE ARGUMENTS CHALLENGING THE WISDOM OF THE SDI CONCEPT. THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER WILL BE TO DEMONSTRATE WHY NOW, MORE THAN EVER BEFORE, THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC MUST UNDERSTAND THE URGENT NEED TO ADOPT THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AS THE NEW BASIS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY. THIS IS TRUE IN LIGHT OF BOTH THE CHANGES OCCURRING IN EASTERN EUROPE AND ALSO IN THE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE THIRD WORLD. IT WILL BE INCUMBENT UPON PRESIDENT BUSH AND DEFENSE SECRETARY CHENEY TO EDUCATE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AS TO WHY THE NATION CANNOT AFFORD TO ALLOW SDI RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO SUFFER AGAIN THIS YEAR THE DRASTIC BUDGET CUTS IT ENDURED LAST YEAR. RECENT BREAKTHROUGHS IN SDI TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATE THAT PREVIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY OF THE SDI ARE NOW WITHOUT MERIT. (14:27) THE SDI CONCEPT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO OFFER THE KIND OF STRATEGIC SECURITY AND STABILITY FOR THE FUTURE THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN HERETOFORE UNIMAGINABLE BY OUR CURRENT NUCLEAR STRATEGY. AN EVEN MORE CRITCAL ISSUE MUST BE MADE CLEAR TO OUR NATION'S LEGISLATORS: THE CONTINUED SOVIET MODERNIZATION OF ITS ALREADY ENORMOUS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY (IN SPITE OF THE RHETORIC) HAS RENDERED CURRENT U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY VIRTUALLY IMPOTENT. (9:17-18) THE UNITED STATES MUST MAKE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ITS TOP DEFENSE PRIORITY, IF ITS NATIONAL SECURITY IS TO BE GUARANTEED INTO THE NEXT DECADE. THE INSANITY OF MAD SINCE THE 1960'S, THE NUCLEAR STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN BASED ON WHAT HAS COME TO BE KNOWN AS THE MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD) CONCEPT. (11:1-4) THE THEORY BEHIND MAD IS THAT AS LONG AS BOTH THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. REMAIN DEFENSELESS AGAINST EACH OTHER'S NUCLEAR ATTACK, THEN NUCLEAR WAR IS PREVENTED. NEITHER SIDE WOULD BE WILLING TO RISK ATTACKING THE OTHER KNOWING THAT IT WOULD ITSELF BE DESTROYED IN THE INEVITABLE RETALIATORY STRIKE OF ITS OPPONENT. HISTORY APPEARS TO HAVE VALIDATED THE THEORY, SINCE NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS HAS BEEN AVOIDED FOR NEARLY FORTY YEARS. THE UNITED STATES SO CONFIDENTLY ACCEPTED THE MAD CONCEPT THAT IT SIGNED THE ABM (ANTI- BALLISTIC MISSILE) TREATY IN 1972 WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BOTH NATIONS AGREED (ON PAPER) TO KEEP THEMSELVES--WITH VERY LIMITED EXCEPTIONS--DEFENSELESS AGAINST EACH OTHER'S NUCLEAR RETALIATORY FORCES. IT IS NOW CLEAR, FROM SOVIET MILITARY WRITINGS ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR DOCTRINE, THAT THE COMMUNISTS NEVER DID EMBRACE THE MAD CON- CEPT. (9:13-14) FURTHERMORE, DELIBERATE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, IN SPITE OF THE ABM TREATY, BEG THE QUESTION: IS THE MAD CONCEPT STILL A VALID BASIS FOR THE STRATEGIC SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES TODAY, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, FOR TOMORROW? TO ANSWER SUCH A QUESTION A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT NUCLEAR CORRELATION OF FORCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IS REQUIRED. IF THIS ANALY- SIS SHOULD REVEAL THAT A NUCLEAR STRATEGY BASED ON THE MAD CONCEPT IS SERIOUSLY FLAWED, THE OBVIOUS IMPLICATION WOULD BE THAT THE SURVIVAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES COULD WELL BE IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY. THEREFORE, AN ALTERNATE STRATEGY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED WITHOUT DELAY. WHAT WOULD THAT STRATEGY BE? WOULD IT BE TECHNOLOGICALLY FEASIBLE, MORALLY AND POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE, AND WOULD IT OFFER THE RESULTS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY ITS EXPENSE? BUT FIRST THE ANALYSIS: THE THREAT CONTINUES "...THE ABM TREATY WAS BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD REDUCE DRASTICALLY THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFENSIVE ARSENALS. IN LIGHT OF THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH IN SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES--NOT TO MENTION SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TREATY VIOLATIONS--THAT BASIC ASSUMPTION IS NO LONGER VALID." (11:48) AS ROBERT JASTROW POINTS OUT IN HIS BOOK, HOW TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OBSOLETE, THE UNITED STATES WAS WILLING TO GIVE UP ITS DEFENSES AND RELY ON THE THREAT OF RETALIATION TO DETER AN ATTACK; PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION DIDN'T EXPAND ITS OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARSENAL TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT IT COULD DESTROY THE RETAL- IATORY FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IN AN OVERWHELMING FIRST STRIKE. IF THE SOVIETS DEVELOPED SUCH A CAPABILITY, THEN THE WHOLE IDEA BEHIND THE ABM TREATY AND THE MAD CONCEPT IS RENDERED COMPLETELY INVALID. YET THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE ABM TREATY IN 1972. (9:17-20) U.S. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS REVEAL THAT SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE, SIZE, AND PLANS FOR EMPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE CLEARLY BASED (RHETORIC AND DIS-INFORMATION ASIDE) ON THE SOVIET PREFERRED POLICY OF PRE-EMPTION VICE THE MORE DEFENSIVE POLICY OF RETALIATION. (13:13) IN CONCERT WITH THIS POLICY, THE SOVIETS HAVE CREATED AN AWESOME OFFENSIVE ARSENAL, FAR EXCEEDING ANY CONCEIVABLE RETALIATORY CAPABILITY THEY MIGHT REQUIRE TO DETER A POTENTIAL NUCLEAR ATTACK FROM THE UNITED STATES. IT IS NOW EVIDENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS FIELDED, AND CONTINUES TO MODERNIZE A POWERFUL, EXTREMELY ACCURATE, AND NOW HIGHLY MOBILE NUCLEAR FIRST-STRIKE FORCE, CAPABLE OF DELIVERING A CRIPPLING BLOW TO AMERICAN RETALIATORY NUCLEAR FORCES IN A SURPRISE ATTACK. THE SOVIETS ARE CURRENTLY DEPLOYING THEIR FOURTH AND FIFTH GENERATIONS OF INTER- CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBM'S), SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBM'S), AND MANNED STRATEGIC BOMBERS. THESE MODERN, MORE ACCURATE, AND MORE CAPABLE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS INCLUDE: * THE HIGHLY ACCURATE SS-18 MOD 5 ICBM AND THE EVEN NEWER SS-19, THE ROAD- MOBILE SS-25 ICBM, AND THE RAIL-MOBILE AND FIXED-SITE SS-24 ICBM. * THE TYPHOON-CLASS STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE (SSBN) WITH SS-N-20 SLBM's, AND THE DELTA IV-CLASS SSBN WITH SS-N-23 SLBMs. * THE BLACKJACK AND BEAR H STRATEGIC BOMBERS ARMED WITH 1,800-MILE-RANGE, AIR- LAUNCHED NUCLEAR CRUISE MISSILES; AND * CONVERTED YANKEE-CLASS SUBMARINES CARRYING SEA-LAUNCHED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CRUISE MISSLES. (15:42) THOSE CRITICS THAT ACCUSE THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OF EXAGGERATING THE THREAT, STATE THAT WHEN ALL THE NUMBERS ARE ADDED UP THE U.S.S.R. HAS A LITTLE OVER 11,000 WARHEADS AND THE U.S HAS ALMOST 7,000; (15:86-90) HARDLY THE OVERWHELMING PRE- EMPTIVE COUP-DE-MAIN BEING SENSATIONALIZED BY THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT. WHAT THEY FAIL TO POINT OUT HOWEVER, IS THAT AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE CANNOT BE LIMITED TO MERE NUMBER COUNTING. ACCURACY AND SURVIVABILITY OF THE SYSTEMS AS WELL AS DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS OF THE NATION TO WAGE NUCLEAR WAR MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED; A MUCH DIFFERENT PICTURE THEN EMERGES.(13:13) IF A COMPARISON OF CAPABILITIES BASED ON ACCURACY IS MADE, A STARTLING DISPARITY IS REVEALED, JUSTIFYING THE CONCERN OF THE DEFENSE COMMUNITY. THE WAR- HEADS CONTAINED IN THE FOURTH GENERATION SS-18 MOD 5 AND SS-19 MISSILES ALONE-- ACCURATE ENOUGH TO DESTROY OUR 1000 HARDENED, MINUTEMAN AND PEACEKEEPER MISSILE SILOS--NUMBER OVER 6,600. THIS NUMBER MAY ACTUALLY BE VERY CONSERVATIVE BECAUSE THE SS-18, A HUGE MISSILE, IS CAPABLE OF CARRYING UP TO 30 WARHEADS IN EACH ICBM. BY COMPARISON, THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS OF SIMILAR ACCURACY CONTAINED IN THE MARK 12A WARHEAD OF THE MINUTEMAN II MISSILE, AND THE WARHEAD OF THE PEACE- KEEPER MISSILE, NUMBERS BARELY 200O (1989 FIGURES). (15:42-44) AS CONGRESSMAN NEWT GINGRICH POINTS OUT IN HIS LUCID BOOK, WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: "IF THE UNITED STATES HAS NO ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE, THEN SOVIET PLANNERS CAN PREDICT A SUCCESSFUL FIRST STRIKE WITH NEAR CERTAINTY IF THEY SIMPLY APPLY TWO OR THREE WARHEADS TO EVERY AMERICAN TARGET." (7:248) THE SS-18 IS ALSO "COLD-LAUNCHED" WHICH MEANS THE MISSILE LEAVES THE SILO BE- FORE THE ROCKET BOOSTER FIRES, PRESERVING THE SILO TO FIRE AGAIN. ONLY THE 50 U.S. PEACEKEEPER SILOS HAVE A COLD-LAUNCH CAPABILITY. U.S. MINUTEMAN II MISSILES (ONE WARHEAD PER ICBM) DO NOT POSSESS THE ACCURACY NEEDED TO ENSURE THE DESTRUCTION OF A HARDENED SILO-BASED ICBM WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. (9:17-37) MOREOVER, THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEPLOYED AT LEAST 750 OF THE EVEN MORE ACCUR- ATE AND LETHAL WARHEADS CONTAINED IN ITS FIFTH GENERATION MOBILE ICBM SYSTEMS, THE ROAD-MOBILE SS-25 AND THE RAIL-MOBILE SS-24. (15:45) THE MOBILITY OF THESE COLD LAUNCH, RE-LOADABLE SYSTEMS GIVES THE KREMLIN A DISTINCT ADVANTAGE OVER THE UNITED STATES: THE SS-24 AND SS-25 WOULD LIKELY SURVIVE THE INITIAL EXCHANGE AND BE FULLY CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING SUBSEQUENT ATTACKS. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT BY THE MID 1990'S FIFTY PERCENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES WILL BE MOBILE SYSTEMS. THE U.S. DOES NOT EVEN ANTICIPATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF A LAND-BASED MOBILE SYSTEM PRIOR TO 1995 (IF ONE EVER GETS FUNDED BY CONGRESS). (15:45) AS FORMER DIRECTOR OF NASA, ROBERT JASTROW, POINTS OUT IN HIS BOOK, IT DOES NOT MAKE SENSE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO UNDERTAKE THE TREMENDOUS EXPENSE OF GREATLY INCREASING THE ACCURACY OF AN ENORMOUS ICBM FORCE FOR USE AGAINST U.S. CITIES, UNLESS THEY HAVE AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PURPOSE FOR THAT FORCE, RETALIATORY STRIKES AGAINST UNDEFENDED U.S. CITIES DO NOT REQUIRE THE ACCURACY THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BUILDING INTO THEIR NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCES. THE KREMLIN APPEARS TO BE BENT ON ACQUIRING A DIFFERENT TYPE OF NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE--NOT ONE DESIGNED TO DETER AT- TACK AGAINST SOVIET CITiZENS, BUT ONE DESIGNED TO DESTROY U.S. MILITARY POWER. THE KREMLIN IS CONSTRUCTING A FIRST-STRIKE FORCE. (9:17-29) GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA HAVE PROVIDED NO CLEAR-CUT EVIDENCE THAT THE KREMLIN IS ABOUT TO ABANDON THIS DANGEROUS TREND. (2:35) NEITHER WILL THIS MONSTROUS THREAT BE SIGNIFICANTLY ABATED AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INF AND STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (START) REDUCTIONS; THIS IS DUE TO THE DECISION MADE DURING THE 1980'S BY THE SOVIETS TO UPGRADE THEIR STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF MIRVed ICBM'S. NOW, IN ORDER TO RES- TRAIN THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTITIATE; KNOWING THEY WILL STILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THEIR WARTIME REQUIREMENTS EVEN AFTER THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED. ADDITIONALLY, IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT VIEW WAR AS WE DO IN THE WEST. WHILE THEY ARE WELL AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR, SOVIET EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE REVEALS THAT THEY BELIEVE THEY CAN--THROUGH A WELL- TIMED FIRST STRIKE COUPLED WITH COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL DEFENSIVE MEASURES--WIN A NUCLEAR WAR WITH THE UNITED &TATES. (13:13) WHILE THE IMPLICATION OF THIS STATE- MENT--NAMELY, DISTRUST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS--RAISES THE HACKLES OF LIBERALS IN CONGRESS AND IN THE MEDIA, IT IS BASED ON THE WISE PREMISE THAT WHEN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IS IN COMPETITION WITH A TOTALITARIAN STATE, IT WOULD BE FAR MORE PRUDENT TO PREPARE TO MEET THE CAPABILITIES OF SUCH A REGIME THAN TO BE ENAMORED WITH ITS STATED INTENTIONS. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S NOW FAMOUS STATEMENT,"PEACE IN OUR TIME", BEARS TESTIMONY TO THE TRUTH OF THIS OFT-FORGOTTEN LESSON OF HISTORY. "THE KREMLIN IS WILLING TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST, SO THEY DESIGN THEIR WEAPONS TO CONDUCT A DEVASTATINGLY POWERFUL FIRST STRIKE. THE STRATEGIC TRIAD THE PAYLOAD AND ACCURACY OF SOVIET ICBM'S PRESENTS THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE "STRATEGIC TRIAD" UPON WHICH U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY RESTS. THE TRIAD CONSISTS OF SILO-BASED MINUTEMAN AND PEACEKEEPER ICBM'S, LAND-BASED STRATEGIC BOMBERS, AND POSEIDON AND TRIDENT CLASS NUCLEAR SUBMARINES. ACCORDING TO FORMER CHAIR- MAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR., THE PAYLOAD AND ACCURACY OF THE 1985 SOVIET FOURTH-GENERATION STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES WAS CAP- ABLE OF DESTROYING 75% OF OUR MINUTEMAN MISSILES IN A SURPRISE ATTACK. ACCOR- DING TO ROBERT JASTROW, THE INCREASED ACCURACY AND PAYLOAD OF SOVIET FIFTH-GENER- ATION ICBM SYSTEMS MAY ALLOW THE KREMLIN TO ANTICIPATE ELIMINATING AS MUCH AS 90- 95% OF AMERICA'S ICBM'S IN A SURPRISE FIRST STRIKE! THE LAND-BASED LEG OF THE STRA- TEGIC TRIAD IS EXTREMELY VULNERABLE AND BECOMING MORE SO EACH YEAR. (9:17-37) THE AIR-BASED LEG OF THE TRIAD IS EVEN MORE VULNERABLE TO A SOVIET ATTACK. SEVENTY PERCENT OF U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES ARE NOT ON ALERT AT ANY ONE TIME. WHATEVER BOMBER FORCES ESCAPED A SURPRISE SOVIET ATTACK WOULD HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF PENETRATING THE LARGEST AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE WORLD, AND DELIVERING A DECISIVE BLOW TO TARGETS DEEP WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. (9:17-37) THE B-2 STEALTH BOMBER IS OFFERED AS THE ANSWER TO PENETRATING THE SOVIET AIR DEFENSE NETWORK; BUT IT APPEARS THAT CONGRESS IS GOING TO LIMIT AIR FORCE B-2 PRO- CUREMENT TO ONLY ABOUT 70 TO 80 AIRCRAFT, AND INSTEAD SUBSTITUE CHEAPER AIR- LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES TO ACCOMPLISH THE B-2 MISSION. BUT AS GENERAL JOHN CHAIN, COMMANDER OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, POINTED OUT: THE PRE-PROGRAMMED CRUISE MISSILE IS STILL NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE MANNED BOMBER BECAUSE THE CRUISE MIS- SILE WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT AGAINST MOBILE ICBM SYSTEMS DEEP WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH IS THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE B-2. (1:40) THE CRUISE MISSILE ALSO HAS OTHER DRAWBACKS: THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING THE REDUCTION OF CRUISE MISSILES A KEY BARGAINING ISSUE IN THE ONGOING STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START). (6:7) ADDITIONALLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY TESTED THE LOOK-DOWN, SHOOT-DOWN CAPABILITY OF THE MIG- 31 FOXHOUND AGAINST LOW-ALTITUDE DRONES AT 200 FEET, SIMULATING DEFENSE AGAINST A CRUISE MISSILE ATTACK. (1:40) THE ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE MAY NOT BE SO PROMISING AFTER ALL; PERHAPS THIS IS WHY THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HAS ALREADY CUT BACK ITS ORDER FOR AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSLES FROM 4,348 TO 1,449. (9:22) NOW TWO LEGS OF THE STRATEGIC TRIAD ARE HIGHLY VULNERABLE. THE TRIAD HAS IN EFFECT BECOME A MONAD; RELYING ON THE LAST LEG, THE SEA LEG. THE SUBMARINE WILL BE A FORMIDABLE DETERRENT IN A NUCLEAR WAR. AT SEA IT IS QUIET, AND IN THE VASTNESS OF THE OCEAN, VERY DIFFICULT TO DETECT. THEREFORE, SUBMARINES AT SEA WILL MOST LIKELY SURVIVE A SOVIET ATTACK. THE WARHEADS ABOARD A SINGLE TRIDENT SUBMARINE CAN REACH ALL THE MAJOR CITIES IN THE U.S.S.R. BUT THE SUBMARINE IS NOT WITHOUT ITS PROBLEMS ALSO. AT ANY ONE TIME 50% OF THE U.S. SUBMARINES CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE IN PORT, MAK- ING THEM VULNERABLE TO A SURPRISE ATTACK. THE REMAINING 15 OR 20 BOATS CAN SUR- VIVE AT SEA FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME. BUT HOWEVER GOOD THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE SUBMARINE FOR THE PRESENT, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IS RELUCTANT TO RELY ON IT SOLE- LY IN THE FUTURE BECAUSE OF SPECULATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE ON THE VERGE OF BREAKTHROUGH TECHNOLOGY WHICH WILL MAKE THE OCEANS TRANSPARENT. (9:23) ANOTHER LIMITATION, AT PRESENT, FOR U.S. NUCLEAR SUBMARINES IS THE ACCURACY OF THEIR WARHEADS. THE TRIDENT C4 WARHEAD IS DESIGNED (BASED ON MAD THINKING) FOR TARGETING SOVIET POPULATION CENTERS AS A RETALIATORY DETERRENT. THE WARHEAD IS NOT ACCURATE ENOUGH TO DESTROY HARDENED SOVIET MISSILE SILOS. (9:25) BECAUSE OF THIS LIMITATION, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE UNABLE TO USE HIS SUBMARINES AT ALL: WHAT IF THE SOVIET UNION CONCENTRATED ITS SURPRISE ATTACK AGAINST U.S. STRA- TEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES WITH THE DEVASTATING EFFECTIVENESS SUGGESTED BY GEN. VESSEY OR ROBERT JASTROW. SUPPOSE ALSO--AS THEY WOULD VERY LIKELY DO--THE SOVIETS DELIBERATELY AVOIDED ATTACKING U.S. POPULATION CENTERS. NOW, WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO STRIKE A DECISIVE RETALIATORY BLOW EFFECTIVELY REMOVED, HIS ONLY REMAIN- ING OPTION WOULD BE THE MAD OPTION: TO DECIDE TO RETALIATE, WITH WHATEVER CAPABIL- ITY REMAINS, AGAINST THE SOVIET CITIZENS THEMSELVES--NOT A VERY NICE MORAL CHOICE. BUT BEFORE HE MAKES THAT DECISION THE SOVIETS GIVE HIM AN ULTIMATUM: AMERICAN CITIES WILL BE ANNIHILATED IN THE SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE IF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT RETALIATES. THE PRESIDENT IS THEN LEFT WITH THE CHOICE OF SURRENDER OR SUICIDE. (9:26) THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE TRIDENT D5 WARHEAD IN THE: 1990'S WILL HAVE THE ACCURACY TO DESTROY SOME HARDENED SOVIET SILOS, (9:25) BUT EVEN THE PRESENCE OF THIS WEAPON SYSTEM WOULD NOT ALLEVIATE THE DILEMMA. KNOWING THE SOVIET UNION POSSESSES AN OPERATIONAL ABM SYSTEM, AND NOT KNOWING WHAT EFFECT CAN BE ACHIEVED BY HIS LIMITED CAPABILITY AGAINST SOVIET MILITARY POWER, WOULD THE PRESIDENT STILL TAKE SUCH A RISK AND ORDER THE SUBMARINES TO FIRE? THIS SCENARIO EXEMPLIFIES THE HOPE- LESS SITUATI0N AMERICA RELEGATES ITSELF TO BY CONTINUING ITS ADHERENCE TO THE FAULTY MAD CONCEPT. IT IS AKIN TO TWO WESTERN GUNFIGHTERS FACING EACH OTHER, KNOWING THAT THE GUY WHO SHOOTS FIRST HAS THE BEST CHANCE. BUT ONE OF THE GUNFIGHTERS IS STANDING BEHIND A STONE WALL WITH A SHOTGUN, HIS HEAD BARELY VISIBLE, WHILE THE OTHER GUY, ARMED WITH A REVOLVER, IS COMPLETELY EXPOSED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE STREET. THUS, THE UNITED STATES HAS FOOLISHLY CONTINUED TO RELY UPON THE MAD CONCEPT (EVEN THOUGH THE SITUATION UNDER WHICH MAD WAS FIRST CONCEIVED HAS DRASTICALLY CHANGED) AND UPON THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AS THE BASIS FOR ITS NUCLEAR DEFENSE. THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, HAS PURSUED A MUCH DIF- FERENT STRATEGY. THE SOVIETS EARLY RECOGNIZED THE ADVANTAGE OF COMBINING STRATEGIC DEFENSE WITH THE STRATEGIC OFFENSE, AND HAVE ADDED TO THEIR ENORMOUS OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY THE WORLD'S ONLY ABM SYSTEM (AT LEAST ONE PORTION OF WHICH IS IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY). CIA DIRECTOR WEBSTER STATES THAT ThE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THE SOVIET UNION IS IN THE PROCESS OF DEPLOYING A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR DEFENSIVE SYSTEM. THIRTY EMIGRE SCIENTISTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION SAY THAT THE KREMLIN IS PUSHING ITS BEST SCIENTISTS NIGHT AND DAY, COVERTLY AND OVERTLY, IN CONDUCTING HIGH TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH TO DEPLOY A SOVIET GROUND AND SPACE-BASED ABM SYSTEM, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES DOES. (11:18-21) A UNILATERAL DEFENSIVE SYSTEM POSSESSED BY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD SMASH THE MAD CONCEPT TO PIECES (DESERVEDLY SO), AND PROVIDE THE U.S.S.R. WITH A FIRST-STRIKE FORCE, WHILE PROTECTING ITSELF FROM RETALIATION. EVEN THE DEPLOYMENT OF A PARTIAL SYSTEM, SUCH AS THE ONE THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE, ENORMOUSLY COMPLICATES U.S. RETALIATORY CALCULATIONS. BUT IF THE SOVIETS WERE ABLE TO UNILATERALLY DEPLOY A GROUND AND SPACE-BASED NUCLEAR DEFENSIVE SYSTEM, THE UNITED STATES WOULD DISAP- PEAR AS A SUPERPOWER, IMMEDIATELY BECOMING SUBJECT TO THE TIME-TESTED GOODWILL OF THE SOVIET UNION. A NEW STRATEGY NOW, FINALLY, MANY EXPERTS ARE BEGINNING TO ADMIT TO THE FUTILITY OF THE MAD DOCTRINE. CONGRESSMAN NEWT GINGRICH, CHAIRMAN OF THE CONGRESSIONAL SPACE CAUCUS CONCURS: QUIETLY, AMONG EXRERTS, A CONSENSUS IS GROWING THAT A DEFENSE-ORIENTED WORLD IS BETTER THAN AN OFFENSE-ORIENTED WORLD IN WHICH THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION CONTINUES TO PREVAIL...THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES TO MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION...BASED ON A DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY BEING ATTAINED BY BOTH THE U.S AND THE U.S.S.R; THERE IS DEFENSE PROTECTED BUILDDOWN, A DOCTRINE WHICH WOULD LINK THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSIVE WEAPONS TO A REDUCTION IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, THUS ALLAYING FEARS THAT A NEW ROUND OF U.S.-SOVIET ARMS COMPETITION WILL LEAD TO NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF PENETRATING ANY SUCH DEFENSE. (7:259) PRIOR TO THE 1980'S, AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY DID NOT JUSTIFY THE COST OF DEPLOYING A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM; IT COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN OVERCOME BY SATURATING IT WITH A LARGER NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE WARHEADS. FOR THIS REASON THE UNITED STATES ABAN- DONED ITS NUCLEAR DEFENSIVE EFFORTS SHORTLY AFTER SIGNING THE ABM TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN 1972. BUT DUE TO RECENT TECHNOLOGY BREAKTHROUGHS IN ABM WEAPONS RESEARCH, THIS SITUATION IS NO LONGER TRUE. DEPLOYMENT OF AN EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE ABM DEFENSIVE SYSTEM, CONCEIVABLY WITHIN THE DECADE, IS WITHIN THE REALM OF POS- SIBLITIES. (14:2) WHILE VEHEMENTLY REBUKING THE UNITED STATES FOR ENTERTAINING SUCH AN INSANE AND IMPOSSIBLE IDEA AS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DEFENSE, THE SOVIET UNION IS APPARENTLY WASTING NO TIME OR EFFORT TO DEVELOP SUCH A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM THEMSELVES. THIS IS WHY, IN THE SO-CALLED "STAR WARS" SPEECH OF MARCH 23, 1983, PRESIDENT REAGAN ANNOUNCED THE START OF AN AMERICAN EFFORT TO DEVELOP A DEFENSE AGAINST INTERCON- TINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES. IN HIS SPEECH, THE PRESIDENT URGED THE U.S. CONGRESS TO SUPPORT, AND U.S. SCIENTISTS TO PURSUE RESEARCH INTO THE TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY OF A NEW NUCLEAR STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES, KNOWN AS THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI). (11:7) REPLACING THE FLAWED MAD DOCTRINE WITH A DEFENSE-ORIENTED NUCLEAR STRATEGY AS PROPOSED BY SDI HAS MANY ADVANTAGES: IT IS MORE MORAL TO ENHANCE ONE'S DEFEN- SIVE POSTURE THAN TO INCREASE ONE'S ABILITY TO HOLD ANOTHER NATION'S CIVILIAN POPUL- ATION HOSTAGE TO NUCLEAR TERROR; IT IS LESS PROVOCATIVE, SINCE IT WOULD CONSIST OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IS DEFENSIVE IN NATURE; EVEN A PARTIAL DEFENSE SYSTEM CAN RADICALLY INCREASE AN AGGRESSOR'S UNCERTAINTY IN CONDUCTING A NUCLEAR STRIKE, GREATLY DECREASING THE CHANCES OF SUCH AN ATTACK EVER TAKING PLACE; IT REMOVES CONCERN OVER ONE OF THE THORNIEST ISSUES FACING A FREE AND OPEN SOCIETY WHEN CONDUCTING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH AN HISTORICALLY DECEPTIVE TOTALITARIAN REGIME--VERIFICATION; IT IS A FAR BETTER IDEA THAN NUCLEAR "FREEZE" (WHICH MERELY PERPETUATES THE TERROR OF NUCLEAR WAR), OR THE SUPREMELY NAIVE, WELFARE-STATE- MENTALITY IDEA OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT TO SECURE PEACE AT ANY PRICE. (7:252) MOST IMPORTANTLY PERHAPS, DEPLOYMENT OF A NUCLEAR DEFENSE BY THE UNITED STATES INCREASES THE PROSPECTS FOR MAKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OBSOLETE. (9:135-140) IF THE POSSESSION OF AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AGAINST ICBM'S REMOVES THE GUARANTEED SUCCESS OF AN OFFENSIVE STRIKE--WITHOUT FIRST HAVING TO EXPONENTIALLY INCREASE THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS--THEN THOSE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS MAY AS WELL BE DONE AWAY WITH; UNLESS OF COURSE ONLY ONE OF THE PLAYERS HAS SUCH A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM. THE SOVIETS, AND LIBERAL POLITICIANS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (SAME BEDFELLOWS), HAVE COUNTERED THAT THIS IS NOT SO. THEY CLAIM THAT IF THE U.S. DEPLOYED SDI, THE SOVIETS WOULD SIMPLY BE FORCED TO BUILD MORE NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO COUNTER IT. THEREFORE, CRITICS OF THE SDI CONCEPT ACCUSE IT OF ACTUALLY HAVING THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. MOREOVER, THEY SAY IT IS PROVOCATIVE; GIVING THE KREMLIN THE PERCEPTION THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS UNDERHANDEDLY TRYING TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION. ANALYSIS OF THIS CLAIM REVEALS IT TO BE NOTHING MORE THAN BLUSTERY COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA; DESIGNED--APPARENTLY SUC- CESSFULLY--TO RALLY AMERICAN LIBERALS AGAINST SDI, AND THUS ELIMINATE AMERICAN COMPETITION. IT WOULD BE FAR CHEAPER TO DEVELOP A MODERATELY EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM WITH TODAY'S TECHNOLOGY THAN TO BUILD A MUCH GREATER NUMBER (AS MUCH AS SEVENFOLD) OF ACCURATE WARHEADS REQUIRED TO GUARANTEE A FIRST-STRIKE SUCCESS AGAINST SUCH A SYSTEM. FOR EVERY ONE DOLLAR SPENT TO IMPROVE A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM, THREE DOLLARS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO IMPROVE THE OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY TO COUNTER IT. ONE THING THE SOVIET ECONOMY CERTAINLY CANNOT AFFORD IS GREATER STRESS. MOREOVER, IF THE SOVIETS REALLY BELIEVED THAT SDI HAD NO MERIT, WHY WOULDN'T THEY JUST LET THE "FOOLISH" AMERICANS KNOCK THEMSELVES OUT? (9:123-124) THE U.S.S.R. IS TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE OF AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY. THE TRUTH IS, THAT UNLESS AMERICA GOES FORWARD WITH SDI, IT WILL BE THE SOVIET UNION, NOT AMERICA, THAT GETS A MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM FIRST. IF HOWEVER, AS PROPONENTS OF THE SDI CONCEPT SUGGEST, BOTH THE U.S AND THE U.S.S.R. WERE TO DEPLOY EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, IT WOULD THEN BECOME FAR EASIER TO NEGOTIATE THE REDUCTION OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS MORE ELEMENTS OF THE ABM SYSTEM WERE DEPLOYED, FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS COULD BE NEGO- TIATED. VERIFICATION WOULD BE MUCH LESS OF A CONCERN SINCE THERE WOULD BE NO ADVAN TAGE TO "CHEATING". (7:259) IN EFFECT, THE WORLD COULD AT LAST BE FREE FROM THE NUCLEAR SHADOW IT HAS LIVED UNDER FOR OVER FORTY YEARS; A GIFT FOR OUR PROGENY WORTH INVESTING IN. THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY ON HISTORY HAS BEEN GREAT INDEED. IT MAY BE CONCLUDED THAT STRATEGY SHAPES HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY SHAPES STRAT- EGY. HOW SDI WOULD WORK EMERGING TECHNOLOGY-PRIMARILY IN KINETIC AND DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS, ADVAN- CED RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS, SPACE-BASED C3, AND HIGH-SPEED COMPUTER HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE FOR BATTLE MANAGEMENT--NOW MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MULTI-LAYERED, GROUND AND SPACE-BASED DEFENSE AGAINST INTERCONTI- NENTAL BALLISTIC MISSLES. (14:18-26) SUCH AN ABM SYSTEM WOULD DETER A NUCLEAR ATTACK EITHER BY GREATLY INCREASING THE UNCERTAINTY THAT SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL, OR BY DESTROYING INCOMING ICBMS BEFORE THEY REACH THEIR TARGETS IN THE EVENT SUCH AN ATTACK WAS ACCIDENTALLY OR DELIBERATELY PROMULGATED. THE FIRST LAYER OF DEFENSE, CALLED THE BOOST-PHASE DEFENSE, WOULD CONSIST OF EARLY-WARNING SATELLITES IN GEOSYNCHRONOUS ORBIT 22,300 MILES ABOVE THE SOVIET UNION TO DETECT AND COMMUNICATE WARNING OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK. UPON DETECTING A HOSTILE ATTACK, THESE SATELLITES WOULD ACTIVATE COMMAND AND CONTROL SATELLITES WHOSE COMPUTERS WOULD MANAGE THE BATTLE AND DIRECT THE FIRING OF THE LOWER-ALTI- TUDE INTERCEPTOR SATELLITES. THE INTERCEPTORS, WHOSE ON-BOARD SENSORS CAN DETECT THE HOT ROCKET PLUMES OF THE RISING ICBM'S, WOULD ENGAGE THE SOVIET MISSILES EARLY DURING THEIR BOOST PHASE, BEFORE THEIR MULTIPLE NUCLEAR WARHEADS COULD BE DEP- LOYED. SEVERAL NEW HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY TESTED FOR THEIR FEASIBILITY IN THE INTERCEPT ROLE. THE FIRST WOULD PROBABLY BE "BRILLIANT PEBBLES", A NON-NUCLEAR KINETIC ENERGY WEAPON BASED ON THE OFF-THE-SHELF TECHNOLOGY OF THE SMART BULLET. THE "SMART BULLET" WEIGHS JUST TEN POUNDS AND ONE HUNDRED PER SAT- ELLITE COULD BE FIRED FROM PLATFORMS ORBITING OVER THE SOVIET UNION. IT HOMES IN ON ITS TARGET AT 4 MILES PER SECOND USING ITS OWN ON-BOARD RADAR AND INFRARED SEN- SOR. IN 1986, AND AGAIN IN 1988, THE DEPARTMENT Of DEFENSE SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTED EXPERIMENTS IN SPACE TO TEST KINETIC ENERGY BOOST-PHASE AND MID-COURSE INTERCEPT CONCEPTS. THE SECOND LAYER OF DEFENSE IS REFERRED TO AS THE MID-COURSE PHASE WHERE MIS- SILES THAT ESCAPED THE BOOST-PHASE DEFENSES ARE ENGAGED AGAIN BY MORE INTERCEP- TOR SATELLITES AS THE ICBM'S ARC THROUGH SPACE ON THEIR WAY TO TARGETS IN THE UNITED STATES. THE THIRD LAYER OF THIS BASIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEM IS REFERRED TO AS THE TERMINAL PHASE, WHICH INTERCEPTS THE WARHEADS AT THE END OF THEIR TRAJECTORIES. THE DE- FENSE DURING THIS PHASE IS DIRECTED AT THOSE WARHEADS THAT MAY HAVE SLIPPED PAST THE MID-COURSE DEFENSE. SATELLITES, ORBITING OVER THE UNITED STATES, WOULD AGAIN ENGAGE THEIR TARGETS WITH "BRILLIANT PEBBLES." IN 1984, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ENGAGED AND DESTROYED AN ONCOMING WARHEAD AT 100 MILES ALTITUDE FROM VANDEN- BERG AIR FORCE BASE. (14:13) CRITICS ARGUE THAT NO DEFENSE BUILT COULD BE 100% EFFECTIVE, SO WHY WASTE MON- EY ON A "LEAKY" DEFENSE? BUT A 1OO% EFFECTIVE DEFENSE IS NOT NECESSARY. A CONSERV- ATIVE ESTIMATE IS THAT A "BRILLIANT PEBBLES" MULTI-LAYERED DEFENSE WOULD BE 90% EF- FECTIVE, MEANING ONLY ONE SOVIET WARHEAD IN TEN WOULD REACH ITS TARGET. THIS WOULD GUARANTEE U.S. RETALIATION AND INDUCE SO MUCH UNCERTAINTY INTO SOVIET PLAN- NING THAT THEY WOULD BE FORCED TO ABANDON ANY HOPES FOR A DEVASTING FIRST STRIKE. (7:249) THIS BASIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEM COULD BE DEPLOYED IN FIVE YEARS AT A TOTAL COST OF $69 BILLION DOLLARS, MUCH LESS MONEY THAN AMERICANS SPEND EACH YEAR ON ALCHOHOL. (14:28) AN ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSE UTILIZING SUCH EXOTIC TECHNOLOGIES AS GROUND AND SPACE-BASED DIRECTED ENERGY LASER AND PARTICLE BEAM WEAPONS COULD PROBABLY NOT BE DEPLOYED BEFORE THE NEXT CENTURY. BUT THE CONCEPTS BEHIND THESE WEAPONS ARE AL- READY BEING PROVEN IN THE LABORATORIES AT LOS ALAMOS AND WHITE SANDS. NEARLY ALL THE OBSTACLES PREVIOUSLY INHIBITING THE USE OF THESE TECHNOLOGIES HAVE BEEN OVER- COME. FOR INSTANCE, WE HAVE NOW DISCOVERED HOW TO PROPOGATE A FREE ELECTRON LASER BEAM INTO SPACE AND TO RELAY IT THROUGH SPACE OR REFLECT IT BACK DOWN TO THE GROUND. THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SKIN OF A MISSILE TO A CHEMICAL LASER HAS ALSO BEEN DEMONSTRATED. NEUTRAL PARTICLE BEAM EXPERIMENTS INDICATE THE FEASIBLITY OF THESE WEAPONS TO DESTROY BALLISTIC MISSLES. THE SDIO (STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION) IS PLANNING A SPACE FLIGHT TEST OF A SMALL NEUTRAL PARTICLE BEAM ACCELERATOR. THIS WILL BE THE FIRST SUCH EXPERIMENT OF ITS KIND OPERATED IN A SPACE ENVIRONMENT. SDIO PLANS TO DEMONSTRATE THE "BOOST SYSTEM", AN ADVANCED SPACE SURVEILLANCE AND TRACKING SYSTEM DESIGNED TO IDENTIFY AND TRACK ICBM'S AS THEY ARE LAUNCHED. EXPERIMENTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE ABLITY TO DISTINGUISH DECOYS FROM ACTUAL WARHEADS. U.S. ARMY EXPERIMENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT GROUND-BASED RADARS CAN BE USED TO TRACK NUCLEAR WARHEADS. SIMULATIONS TO EVALUATE THE BATTLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ARE RESOLVING COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATION ISSUES. (14:12-26) AMERICA WOULD BE ABLE TO REST MUCH EASIER IF THESE WEAPONS WERE ADDED TO ITS STRATEGIC DEFENSE; THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SOVIET NUCLEAR ATTACK WOULD THEN BE REDUCED ALMOST TO THE VANISHING POINT. (9:100) ADDRESSING THE CONCERNS OVER SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST SDI, THOMAS WARD, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY FOR SDIO, TOLD AN AMERICAN DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS ASSO- CIATION CONFERENCE THAT, "THERE IS NOTHING WE CONSIDER A SHOWSTOPPER OR THAT WE CANNOT COMPLTELY DEAL WITH." (3:36) YET IT APPEARS THAT THERE MAY BE A SHOWSTOPPER AFTERALL; PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC DEFENSE IS THREATENED, AGAIN THIS YEAR, BY SEVERE CONGRESSIONAL CUTBACKS IN THE SDI BUDGET. THIS IS BECAUSE OUR LIBERAL POLITICIANS, MOTIVATED BY THE UPCOMING ELECTION YEAR, NEED TO TAKE A CEREMONIAL WHACK AT THE DEFICIT AND AT THE SAME TIME SAFE- GUARD THEIR WELFARE-STATE SOCIAL PROGRAMS IN ORDER TO STAY POPULAR WITH THE CONSTITUENCY. THE NATION'S DEFENSE, IS TO THE LIBERAL MINDSET, ALWAYS THE RIGHT PLACE TO MAKE DRASTIC CUTS IN THE BUDGET. THE SENTIMENT IS FURTHER REINFORCED BY THE SHORT-SIGHTED PERCEPTION THAT THE DRAMATIC CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE ARE PROOF ENOUGH THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE NICE GUYS AFTERALL (JUST AS THE LIBERALS HAVE BEEN TRYING TO TELL US) AND PROMISE A MORE PEACEFUL AND STABLE WORLD. THERE- FORE, "STAR WARS" MONEY COULD BE MUCH BETTER USED ELSEWHERE, OR SO THE ARGUMENT GOES. REGARDING OUR MILITARY STRENGTH, THE INITIAL EUPHORIA OVER THE DRAMATIC AND HOPEFUL CHANGES THAT HAVE RECENTLY TAKEN PLACE IN EASTERN EUROPE HAS ALSO TENDED TO BRING IN ITS WAKE A WILLINGNESS TO SUDDENLY THROW ALL CAUTION TO THE WIND. WHILE CUTBACKS AND BUDGET REDUCTIONS MAY BE REQUIRED, A CLOSE AND PRUDENT ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND IN THE THIRD WORLD REVEALS THAT THE MOST CHALLENGING PERIOD FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEMOCRATIC ALLIES MAY STILL LIE AHEAD OF US. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF A VERY POWERFUL SOVIET CAPABILITY AND ITS POTENTIAL PURPOSES HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADDRESSED. THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION, "WHAT'S BEHIND GLASNOST AND PERESTRIOKA"? IS STILL A SUBJECT OF MUCH CONJECTURE. ARE THE CHAN- GES GENUINE OR IS A BRILLIANTLY CRAFTED PLOY BEING ORCHESTRATED BY GORBACHEV TO DEFUSE ANOTHER REVOLUTION IN HIS OWN COUNTRY, REVITALIZE A FAILING ECONOMY, AND AT THE SAME TIME CONTINUE TO PURSUE LONG-STANDING FOREIGN POLICY GOALS, SUCH AS: * FRAGMENTING THE NATO ALLIANCE; * TAPPING INTO WESTERN TECHNOLOGY, WHICH SOVIET INDUSTRY IS INCAPABLE OF PRO- DUCING, IN ORDER TO REMAIN COMPETITIVE WITH THE WEST; * GAINING ACCESS TO EUROPE `92; * RESTRAINING U.S MILITARY STRENGTH THROUGH ARMS CONTOL NEGOTIATIONS; * UNDERMINING THE U.S. SDI? THE CORRECT ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION IS: SOVIET INTENTIONS REMAIN UNCLEAR; IT IS SIMPLY TOO EARLY TO TELL. SADLY, BRAVE LITTLE LITHUANIA MAY SOON PROVIDE SOME IN- SIGHTS. ANOTHER QUESTION THAT DESERVES VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IS: WHAT IF GORBACHEV'S POLICIES DON'T SUCCEED? IF NOT, THEN DRAMATIC REVERSALS CAN OCCUR JUST AS QUICKLY AS DRAMATIC CHANGES, ESPECIALLY IF GORBACHEV WERE TO BE REMOVED. OF EQUAL CONCERN SHOULD BE THE RE-AWAKENING OF PRE-WWI AND PRE-WWII RIVALRIES. THE INSTABILITY OF THE TURBULENT BALKANS HAD APPARENTLY BEEN SUPPRESSED BY SOV- lET DOMINANCE IN THAT REGION FOR THE PAST FORTY YEARS. THE GERMAN RE-UNIFICATION ISSUE HAS ALSO RAISED UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERNS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND AND SOME OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. IS IT POSSIBLE THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE PRE- PARED TO MEET, FOR THE THIRD TIME IN A CENTURY, THE CHALLENGES POSED BY AN UNIM- PEDED, UNIFIED GERMANY, PURSUING ITS OWN AGENDA? THERE IS GROWING CONCERN OVER THE INCREASING ECONOMIC RIVALRY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. SEEMINGLY FARFETCHED PERHAPS, BUT A STUDY OF HISTORY'S LESSONS ABOUT THE CAUSES FOR THE WAR WITH JAPAN ARE ILLUSTRATIVE. INDEED, DEEPLY CONCERNED ATTENTION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE FUTURE PROSPECTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. A DRAMATIC RISE IN TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, AND INCREASING TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY (PARTICULARLY MILITARY), PORTENDS GREAT INSTABILITY IN SEVERAL REGIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. TO ADD TO THE ALREADY HIGH DEGREE OF TEN- SION IN THESE AREAS IS THE FOREBODING ESTIMATE THAT WITHIN 10-20 YEARS, AS MANY AS TWENTY NATIONS, MANY FROM THE THIRD WORLD, WILL POSSESS THE CAPABILITY TO DELIVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND BLACKMAIL COULD BECOME THE NEW THREAT, (7:254-255) ESPECIALLY FOR A NATION WITHOUT A DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE ONLY CERTAINTY IS THAT THE FUTURE WILL BE UNCERTAIN; AND IN THE LIGHT OF THAT UNCERTAINTY, THE MOST PRUDENT COURSE FOR THIS NATION SHOULD BE TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THE STRENGTH TO MEET ALL CHALLENGES. THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS MUST DECIDE TO PROVIDE THE FUNDS NECESSARY TO RESEARCH, DEVELOP, AND DEPLOY THE BEST NUCLEAR STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEM THAT AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC INGENUITY CAN PRO- DUCE, AND THAT AMERICAN MONEY CAN BUY. AS A PEOPLE, WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE THE SMALL SACRIFICE OF PULLING A FEW DOLLAR BILLS OUT OF OUR COLLECTIVE POCKETS, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE OUR PROGENY WITH THE SAME SECURITY THAT WAS PURCHASED, AT SUCH A DEAR PRICE, FOR US--BOUGHT WITH THE BRAVE BLOOD OF THE NOBLE THOUSANDS THAT HAVE HALLOWED AMERICA'S BATTLEFIELDS. "WHAT IF A FREE PEOPLE COULD LIVE SECURE IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THEIR SECURITY DID NOT REST UPON THE THREAT OF INS- TANT U.S. RETALIATION TO DETER A SOVIET ATTACK; THAT WE COULD INTERCEPT AND DESTROY STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES BEFORE THEY REACHED OUR OWN SOIL OR THAT OF OUR ALLIES?" RONALD REAGAN (8:1) BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. ADAMS, PETER. "CRUISE MISSILE'S ROLE MAY GROW." DEFENSE NEWS, VOL. 5 NO 11. (MARCH 12, 199O) pp. 3. 40. 2. ADAMS, PETER. "SOVIET LAWMAKER: MOBILE NUCLEAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENT TO CONTINUE." DEFENSE NEWS, VOL. 5 NO. 9. (FEBRUARY 25, 1990)p. 35. 3. ADAMS, PETER. "STUDY HIKES COST OF DEFEATING SDI." DEFENSE NEWS, VOL. 5 NO. 13, (MARCH 26, 1990)pp. 1,36. 4. CAIME, RICHARD. "SDI RESEARCH HONES U.S. TECHNOLOGY." DEFENSE NEWS, VOL. 5 NO. 8, (FEBRUARY 19, 1990) p. 23. 5. CHRISTENSEN, HOWARD. "EAST-WEST STRUGGLE NOT OVER YET." DEFENSE NEWS, VOL.5 NO. 8, (FEBRUARY 19, 1990) p. 24. 6. FINNEGAN, PHILIP. "AIR FORCE OFFICIALS ARGUE FOR B-2 FUNDING." DEFENSE NEWS, VOL. 5 NO. 9, (FEBRUARY 26, 1990) p. 7. 7. GINGRlCH, NEWT, CONGRESSMAN. WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE. NEW YORK: TOM DOHERTY ASSOCIATES, INC., 1984. 8. GRAHAM, DANIEL O., LTGEN, USA (RET.). WE MUST DEFEND AMERICA: A NEW STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL SURVIVAL. CHICAGO: REGNERY GATEWAY, 1983. 9. JASTROW, ROBERT. HOW TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OBSOLETE. BOSTON: LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY, 1985. 10. KERNEK, STERLING J. "WHITHER THE LONG PEACE?" PARAMETERS, XX NO. 1, (MARCH 199O), 64-75. 11. LARSON, JOYCE E., AND WILLIAM C. BRODIE. THE INTELLIGENT LAY PERSON'S GUIDE TO STAR WARS". NEW YORK: THE NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER, INC., 1986. 12. SNOW, DONALD M. "SOVIET REFORM AND THE HIGH-TECHNOLOGY IMPERATIVE." PARAMETERS. XX NO. 1,(MARCH 1990) 76-87. 13. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY, 1990. 14. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: PROGRESS AND PROMISE. WASHINGTON, D.C., 1989. 15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. SOVIET MILITARY POWER PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE. WASHINGTON, D.C., 1989.
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