Military Implications Of The Soviet Space Program AUTHOR Major Elek J. Szkalak, USMC CSC 1988 SUBJECT AREA National Security EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM I. PURPOSE: To address the current and future military implications of the Soviet space program and the threat posed from space by the Soviet Union against United States forces, specifically, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), and their ancillary space related systems, e.g., command and control links. II. PROBLEM: The Soviet Union has a dynamic, expanding, and robust military space program. During the last decade the Soviets have developed a viable ICBM counterforce capability, i.e., hard target kill as measured by low Circular Error Probable (CEP). U.S. land-based ICBMs, as well as those launched from ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), are becoming easier to target, and have become more vulnerable as Soviet technology improves. The Soviet Union is aggressively pursuing a variety of research programs which they hope will give them a technological breakthrough in neutralizing U.S. land-based ICBMs and submarine-based ICBM forces. Soviet intentions for the use of space in future conflicts are reasonably clear when one examines Soviet literature on the subject and compares it with current Soviet space-related activities. III. CONCLUSIONS: The Soviets are clearly seeking military superiority in order to satisfy geopolitical aims. In addition, the Soviets will continue to expand their efforts in space to enhance their military capabilities vis-a'-vis the West. IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: The United States must develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with the Soviet space threat. First, we must develop and deploy space systems that are survivable. Second, we must be prepared to deny space to the Soviets during crisis or war. Finally, and perhaps most important, we must establish an executive agency for space within the Department of Defense to ensure that our scarce resource dollars are spent on the right technological programs that will ultimately enhance our military posture in space. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. The Soviet Union is seeking military superiority in space. The outcome of the U.S.-Soviet race in space will depend primarily on the U.S. space shuttle program's ability to regain its technological edge, and on the ability of the Soviets to close the "technological gap." I. The Soviet Challenge A. The Historical Perspective B. The Threat to U.S. Assets II. The Soviet Ideological Perspective Towards Space A. Salyut B. Soviety Military Doctrine C. Soviet Space Doctrine 1. Soviet Offensive Tactics 2. The Role of the Strategic Rocket Forces III. The Soviet Government A. Current Capabilities B. Military Technology 1. Anti-Satellite Weapons 2. Particle-Beam Weapons MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM Control of space will be decided in the next century. If the Soviets control space, they can control earth, as in the past...the nations that controlled the seas dominated the continents. John F. Kennedy (1960) Strategic vision is a rare phenomenon and exposes one to ridicule and skepticism. The early proponents of air and armored warfare had their detractors and skeptics before World War II validated their theories. Today, there is a new frontier, one that needs to be approached with vision and innovation if a nation is to prevail and survive independently and freely. The United States is being challenged by the Soviet Union in an area where it dares not lose its technological advantage, i.e., space, the new frontier. The United States and the Soviet Union both depend on a variety of space systems to carry out the traditional military missions of communications, navigation, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance. Current space systems also serve as force multipliers for tactical and strategic forces, and assist both countries in the maintenance of a credible deterrent posture. Clearly, manned or unmanned platforms in space give a nation a distinctive edge over an opponent who does not have similar capabilities. The Soviet Union continues to aggressively expand its armed forces in support of a national policy that is designed to ensure that its geopolitical aims are achieved. Further, the Soviet Union has expanded its ability to project military forces not only beyond its frontiers, but into the depths of space as well. The development of military force for use beyond the borders of the Soviet Union should be seen as part of the general Soviet concept of an all-around war-fighting capability. In the Soviet view, superior military power must be possessed at all levels. Therefore, the fundamental mission of all elements of the Soviet armed forces has been, and remains, the defense of the homeland, with the perimeter of that defense continuously expanding outward.1 Although the Soviet effort in space has many facets, this paper will address briefly only one: the current and future threat posed from space by the Soviet Union against United States forces, specifically, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICB Ms), ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), and their ancillary space- related systems, e.g., command and control links. 1Norman Polmar and Norman Friedman, "Their Missions and Tactics," Proceedings. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, October 1982), pp. 35-44. The Soviet Union has a dynamic, expanding, and robust military space program. The late Leonid Brezhnev, former General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, remarked in 1978: Mankind will not forever remain on earth, but in the pursuit of light and space will first timidly emerge from the bounds of the atmosphere, and then advance until he has conquered the whole of circumsolar space. We believe that permanently manned space stations with interchangeable crews will be mankind's pathway into the universe.2 The Soviet Union's Salyut space stations have formed the backbone of an ambitious and expansive program involving human beings in space, e.g., the latest crew of the Salyut space station spent a record 400+ days in space. Furthermore, the development and deployment of the Zvezda space station module, the spaceplane, and the space shuttle, as well as their advanced space station programs under development, all indicate a dedicated, long-term effort to exploit the military value of a permanent manned presence in near earth orbit by the Soviets. Salyut space stations serve both military and civilian needs. Through the mid-1970's, each station could be distinguished as military or civilian--by its design, communications frequencies, orbits, on-board equipment, and crew composition. Military Salyuts (3 and 5) were flown in lower orbits, presumably to get the most out of the capabilities of on-board photo reconnaissance assets and 2Kenneth Gatland, chief author, The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Space Technology (London: Salamander Books, Ltd., 1981), p. 214. activities which replaced the astronomical activities of previous civilian flights. These programs are clearly designed to match Western efforts in space and to establish a superior tactical and strategic position vis-a' -vis the West. During the last decade, the Soviets have developed a viable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICB M) counterforce capability, i.e., hard-target kill as measured by low Circular Error Probable (CEP). U.S. land-based ICBMs, as well as those launched from ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), are becoming easier to target and have become more vulnerable as Soviet technology improves. In addition, recent reports indicate that the Soviets are actively pursuing experiments that will give them the ability to track and target U.S. submarines using lasers as well as other space systems. If the Soviets can effectively target the U.S. ballistic missile-carrying submarine force, as well as the land-based ICBMs, they will have the ability to effectively neutralize two of the three legs of the United States' strategic triad, thereby negating any credible U.S. military response. The first step in developing an understanding of Soviet military space doctrine is to establish an understanding of general Soviet military doctrine, within which Soviet military space efforts function. Perhaps the most current and authoritative Soviet treatment of this subject can be found in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, published between 1976 and 1980 under the direction of MSU N. V. Ogarkov, the former Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. This source defines military doctrine as follows: Military Doctrine. A system of views adopted in a state for a given period of time on the objectives and character of a possible war, on preparation of the country and armed forces for war, and on methods of waging war. Military doctrine usually determines the enemy who will have to be fought in a possible war; the character and objectives of a war in which a state and its armed forces will have to participate, and their missions; what armed forces are needed for successful conduct of a war and the directions in their development; procedures for preparing the country for war; and methods of waging war...3 In addition: Military doctrine distinguishes two closely related and mutually dependent aspects--political and military- technical--with the leading role played by the former. The political aspects take in matters concerning their political objectives and characters of a war and their effect on the development of the armed forces and the country's preparation for war. The military-technical aspect, in conformity with the political provisions, includes matters concerning methods of waging war, military development, the technical outfitting of armed forces, and keeping armed forces combat ready.4 3Soviet Military Encyclopedia (Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya) Vol. 3 (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1977), p. 225. 4Ibid., p. 227. The literature further amplifies this by claiming that, "Soviet military doctrine proceeds from a multitude of forms and methods of accomplishing military missions in a possible war. "5 These definitions of military doctrine are not static, but are dynamic concepts that recognize the supremacy of the political over the military. These are flexible definitions which are "adopted...for a given period of time..." The definitions, therefore, are expected to change as political-military conditions change. Two other aspects of Soviet military doctrine require comment. First is the primacy of the offensive in recognizing the attack as the decisive kind of military operation. The second refers to the uniformity of the concepts of Soviet military doctrine in their application to the Soviet Armed Forces as a whole and to each of the five services of the Soviet military, i.e., Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, Troops of National Air Defense, Air Forces, and Navy.6 These points are of special interest in considering Soviet military space doctrine for they emphasize that the role of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and Troops of National Air Defense (Voyska Pvo), the two Soviet armed services most deeply involved in the Soviet space program, may be more important than the other military branches of the Soviet Union. Certainly then Soviet military doctrine, 5Ibid., p. 229. 6Ibid., p. 231. requiring overwhelming force to defeat completely any enemy while protecting the Soviet Union, is sufficiently well developed to include space operations within its scope. This viewpoint is reinforced and expanded on by MSU V. D. Sokolovskiy in his first edition of Military Strategy, published in 1975. He devoted several sections to the topic of "Using Outer Space for Military Purposes." The following conclusion was reached by Sokolovskiy: In this regard Soviet military strategy takes into account the need for studying questions on the use of outer space and aerospace vehicles to strengthen the defense of socialist countries.7 Furthermore, ...It would be a mistake to allow the imperialist camp to achieve superiority in this field. We must oppose the imperialists with more effective means and methods for the use of space for defense purposes...8 Sokolovskiy's conclusions also contain a reference to the military use of outer space: The methods of waging war as a whole are expressed by the totality of the types of military actions: nuclear rocket strikes...; protection of a country and its armed forces against nuclear rocket strikes; actions in land 7MSU V. D. Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy (Published in English as Soviet Military Strategy, ed. Harriet Fast Scott) (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 38, 455-58. 8Ibid., pp. 459-60. theaters, and actions in naval theaters and probable type of military actions in space. Because in recent years the imperialist aggressors have devoted great attention to the study of the possibilities of carrying out military actions in space, and through space, Soviet military strategy cannot ignore this fact and must study the possibilities of opening up this sphere of military action.9 These statements clearly indicate that the forces of the Soviet Union shall be provided with all resources necessary to attain and maintain military superiority in outer space. Furthermore, the Soviets intend to deny the use of space to other potential adversaries, and to ensure optimal space-based military support for Soviet offensive and defensive combat operations on land, in the air, at sea, and in outer space. The possibility of using outer space for the development and deployment of offensive- or defensive-weapon systems to protect the Soviet Union against ballistic missile attack by the United States has received much support within the Soviet Government and defense establishment during the past few years. Indeed, one only needs to look at the current Soviet capabilities in space to appreciate the level of support strategic defense and space operations enjoy in the Soviet military establishment. The Soviet Union today maintains the world's only operational antisatellite (ASAT) and antiballistic 9Ibid., p. 381. missile (ABM) systems with a surge capability during periods of crisis and war.10 Massive Soviet research and development efforts over the past ten years have produced such advanced strategic and tactical weapons systems as improved satellites and antisatellite systems, and unconventional technologies such as high energy lasers and charged-particle-beam weapons. The principal use of the Soviet charged-particle-beam weapons is for antiballistic missile defense. Whichever side first perfects the anticipated use of particle-beam weapons with the capability of destroying the other side's ICBMs will have the potential for nuclear blackmail in world power politics, and could force the other side to back down by threatening to neutralize ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.11 Soviet intentions for the use of space in future conflicts are reasonably clear if one examines Soviet literature on the subject and compares it with current Soviet space-related activities. The Soviets are clearly seeking military superiority in space in order to satisfy geopolitcal aims. It appears that the Soviets will have the 10Soviet Military Power, 6th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, March 1987), p. 45. 11The use of Directed Energy Weapons (DEW), a beam of energy from high-powered lasers, offers the promise of destroying the offensive boosters during launch by depositing a lethal amount of radiant energy from space in the missile's skin, essentially instantaneously. operational capability in the near future to effectively target U.S. land-based ICBMs and ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), thereby effectively neutralizing them. If the Soviets can achieve a technological "Pearl Harbor," then the strategic advantage would pass to Moscow, leaving the United States in an untenable position as no credible response exists. The United States must develop its own space capabilities that are second to none. Basic national security needs and capabilities must be met first if we are to meet any other needs as a free and independent nation. The United States must also acknowledge that the Soviet Union is seeking a superior position in space, recognizing that the Soviet Union has developed a viable and robust space infrastructure to meet its peacetime and wartime requirements. Finally, the United States must acquire a superior capability to ensure that its military operations are unhampered in an environment that would be most likely contested in a future crisis or conflict. Clearly, the technological edge belongs to the United States for the time being. However, that edge can slip from its grasp if the U.S. as a nation does not retain its position as the leading technological power in the free world. BIBLIOGRAPHY Baylis, John and Gerald Segal. Soviet Strategy. London, England: Croom Helm, Ltd., 1981. Friedman, Norman. Their Space and Anti-Space Systems." Proceedings. Vol. 110/1/971. Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute, January 1984. Gatland, Kenneth, chief author. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Space Technology. London, England: Salamander Books, Ltd., 1981. Gilbert, Col. Keith G. "U.S. Response to 1992 Soviet Directed Energy ASAT." Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University of the United States Air Force, February 1983. Krebs, Lt. Col. T. and Major Ev Herrera. "The Soviet Space Threat." (U) Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, April 19, 1982. Polmar, Norman and Norman Friedman. "Their Missions and Tactics." Proceedings. Vol. 108/10/956. Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute, October 1982. Scott, Harriet Fast and William F. Scott. The Soviet Art of War Doctrine. Strategy. and Tactics. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982. Sokolovskiy, MSU V. D. Military Strategy. (Published in English as Soviet Military Strategy) Ed. Harriet Fast Scott. New York, New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975. Soviet Military Encyclopedia. (Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya) Vol. 3. Moscow, U.S.S.R.: Voyenizdat, 1977. Stine, G. Harry. Confrontation in Space. 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