[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-44]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 8, 2013
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana Georgia
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
Tim Morrison, Counsel
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Eric Smith, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, May 8, 2013, Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request for Missile Defense Programs...... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, May 8, 2013........................................... 23
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 2013
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR
MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Strategic Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense... 1
Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense................. 4
Syring, VADM James D., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency..... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R...................................... 29
Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael..................................... 64
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 27
Syring, VADM James D......................................... 40
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Hon. Michael R. Turner's Letter to President Barack Obama,
Dated April 17, 2013....................................... 75
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Brooks................................................... 93
Mr. Carson................................................... 94
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 91
Mr. Cooper................................................... 83
Mr. Langevin................................................. 89
Mr. Rogers................................................... 81
Mr. Turner................................................... 93
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-44]
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR
MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 8, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:58 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. This hearing of the Armed Services Subcommittee
on Strategic Forces will come to order. I want to thank the
folks who are here to participate and other people in
attendance.
I apologize for the delay. We were told votes were going to
start at 3, and obviously they didn't and they postponed it
until 5 so it is just something we don't have control over.
But in the interest of time, I am going to skip my opening
statement and just submit it for the record and recognize the
ranking member, Mr. Cooper, for any opening statement he may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no opening
statement and look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
We have a great panel today. We have the Honorable Madelyn
Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic
Affairs, Office of Secretary of Defense; Vice Admiral James
Syring, U.S. Navy, Director, Missile Defense Agency; and the
Honorable Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Office of Secretary of Defense.
And we will start with Ms. Creedon. You are recognized for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Secretary Creedon. Thank you very much.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to
testify today in support of the Department's fiscal year 2014
budget request for missile defense. Today I would like to
highlight the progress that we have had on some key policy
priorities, particularly the recent decisions to strengthen
homeland missile defense.
The U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential
limited ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] attacks from
both North Korea and Iran by the ground-based midcourse defense
system, or GMD. As stated in the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, we are committed to maintaining an advantageous
position vis-a-vis those threats. To do so requires continued
improvement to the GMD system, including performance
enhancements to the ground-based interceptors and the
deployment of new sensors along with upgrades to the command
and control network.
To stay ahead of the threat, as we have said that we would
do--in this case, the growing threat from North Korea--
President Obama recently decided to strengthen the U.S.
homeland missile defense posture. This decision was announced
by the Secretary on March 15th, and DOD [Department of Defense]
is now in the process of implementing the decision. The
decision also recognized the delay to the Standard Missile-3
[Block] IIB program, largely as the result of funding cuts in
prior years and the continuing resolution.
As Secretary Hagel announced, DOD will add 14 interceptors
to the GMD system for a total of 44 deployed GBIs [Ground-Based
Interceptor] by 2017, and deploy a second TPY-2 [Transportable
Radar Surveillance] radar to Japan. Deployment of the second
radar to Japan will provide improved early warning and tracking
of any missile launched from North Korea at the United States
or Japan and will improve both homeland and regional defenses.
As you know, we had planned to employ an SM-3 [Standard
Missile-3] IIB interceptor for the defense of the United States
from land-based sites in Europe, but the deployment schedule
had been delayed to at least 2022, as I mentioned, due to the
cuts. As a result, we decided to shift resources from this
program to the GBI program to cover the cost of the additional
14 GBIs and to the technology development line in the Missile
Defense Agency to develop new advanced kill vehicles and
booster technology.
These decisions will allow us to improve our defenses
against missiles from Iran sooner than we otherwise would have
while also providing additional protection from the North
Korean threat.
To be clear, there is no money in the fiscal year 2014
budget for the SM-3 IIB program, and we are no longer planning
for phase four of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. As a
result of much discussion, our allies understand and accept
this decision and we have reinforced with them that our
commitment to phases one through three of the EPAA [European
Phased Adaptive Approach] remains ironclad.
We have also worked with other regional allies and partners
in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East to improve cooperation
and enhanced regional missile defenses. We have deployed a
Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, battery to Guam
as a precautionary move to strengthen our defense posture
against the growing North Korean regional ballistic missile
threat. The deployment strengthens our defense capabilities for
American forces and citizens in the U.S. territory of Guam.
This deployment is an example of the benefit derived from
our investments in mobile missile defense systems, which can be
deployed worldwide as required.
We also continue to work with our GCC [Gulf Cooperation
Council] partners on regional missile defense cooperation, and
of course, we continue to support Israel and its missile
defense systems, including the Arrow co-development program.
The President's budget for fiscal year 2014 reflects DOD's
goals of retaining the flexibility to adjust and enhance our
defenses as the threat and as technologies evolve. Our most
vital security commitments--the defense of the United States
and the protection of our allies and partners and our forces
around the world--demand nothing less.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Creedon can be found
in the Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you.
And, Admiral Syring, you are recognized for up to 5 minutes
to summarize your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF VADM JAMES D. SYRING, USN, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY
Admiral Syring. Thank you, sir.
Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you for the first time as the
director of the Missile Defense Agency.
My priorities are to continue strong support of the
warfighter, support what we have deployed, and deliver more
capability to the combatant commanders.
We are taking several steps over the next few years to
implement Secretary Hagel's guidance to strengthen our homeland
defense. First among those steps is returning the redesigned
ground-based interceptor to flight testing later this year. The
successful controlled flight test of the redesigned GBI earlier
this year gives me great confidence we have addressed the
causes of the end-game failure in the December 2010 test.
Later this month we will demonstrate the improvements made
to the GBI fleet over the last 4\1/2\ years in an intercept
test of the first generation operational Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle, the first such test since December of 2008. We are
increasing the operational fleet of GBIs from 30 to 44 by 2017,
and this will involve the relocation of GBIs and the
refurbishment and reactivation of Missile Field 1 in Alaska.
We have already begun to evaluate locations in the
continental United States to determine a site suitable for
possible future deployment of our homeland defense
interceptors. Also, in order to provide more robust coverage
for the homeland defense, this year we are working with our
Japanese partners to deploy a second TPY-2 radar to Japan.
We will continue to strengthen our regional defenses and
funding to operate and sustain command and control management
and communications and TPY-2 radar's fielded sites, and we will
deliver more interceptors for THAAD and Aegis BMD. MDA [Missile
Defense Agency] will continue to fund the upgrades to phase one
of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, and we proceed on
schedule and on budget to complete the Aegis Ashore sites in
Romania by 2015 and Poland by 2018.
Mr. Chairman, when I arrived at the Missile Defense Agency
last November I was impressed with the organization and
professionalism of the workforce. They are highly motivated and
the very best in the world at what they do. It is an honor to
serve with them every day.
I ask that my written statement be accepted into the
record, and I look forward to answering the committee's
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Syring can be found in
the Appendix on page 40.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Gilmore, you are recognized for up to 5 minutes to
summarize your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL
TEST AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Dr. Gilmore. Given my responsibilities, I just simply want
to emphasize in my opening statement that we have conducted and
we are continuing to conduct tests that incorporate increasing
amounts of operational realism and, therefore, complexity. An
example of that is so-called FTI, or Flight Test Integrated-01
that was conducted late last year. It involved the coordinated
intercepts--near simultaneous intercepts by Aegis, THAAD, and
Patriot of ballistic missiles and air-breathing threats.
This was a very important test for a number of reasons, not
the least of which because the combatant commands had extensive
participation in this test and it was used to develop tactics,
techniques, and procedures that are being applied in U.S.
Central Command today.
We are going to be conducting later this year the first
full-blown operational test--multisystem operational test--FTO-
01 [Flight Test Operational-01], that will involve Aegis and
the THAAD conducting--or performing layered defense.
And Admiral Syring mentioned that we have conducted a test
that is very promising this year with ground-based missile
defense, indicates that the problems that caused the previous
intercept failure probably have been corrected. In all
likelihood we will be doing--that was with the Capability
Enhancement II kill vehicle.
In all likelihood, early in fiscal year 2014 there probably
will be a decision to conduct an intercept test with the CE-II
[Capability Enhancement II] kill vehicle. And we will be also
conducting, probably later this month, an intercept test with
the Capability Enhancement I kill vehicle, and that is
important to do, as well, because the CE-I [Capability
Enhancement I] kill vehicles will compose a majority of the
fleet of GBIs for some time to come, and we need to continue to
test those under realistic conditions, as well.
The first intercept of a true ICBM target remains scheduled
for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015. That is unchanged
from the last three integrated master test plans. And we will
be conducting increasingly complex and realistic tests of the
ground-based missile defense system after this year, and
including in fiscal year 2015, and after that point with ICBM
targets, and we will be conducting salvos and multiple
simultaneous engagements in order, again, to incorporate
increasing amounts of operational realism in the tests.
And it is only by doing that that we can give the combatant
commanders and the National Command Authority the information
they need to understand the performance of the system.
And so, in summary I would simply say that I support very
strongly the deliberate and rigorous test program that Admiral
Syring is executing. It enables learning, and that learning is
what is essential from testing. And in fact, I think the value
of the tests--and this may sound somewhat counterintuitive--but
the value of the tests is most demonstrated by the failures
that we have found, you know, the failure modes that we have
found by conducting those tests in Aegis and ground-based
missile defense over the last couple of years, because those
failures would not have been found if we didn't do that testing
and relied solely on modeling and simulation.
So thank you, and I will be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore can be found in the
Appendix on page 64.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you. And I also want to, you know, take
time and let you know how much I appreciate you all preparing
for this hearing and being here. I know it takes a lot of time
for you all to get ready for these things and it is appreciated
by us.
I will recognize myself first for questions.
Admiral Syring, I was very pleased that the DOD has gone
back to the Bush program of preparing to have 44 ground-based
midcourse defense interceptors, but I am concerned about the--
what I am understanding is the plan for purchasing the
additional 14 interceptors--2 per year for 7 years.
Seems to me there would be a more efficient way to purchase
those. Can you tell me what your thoughts are about how you
might approach that differently?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. I will answer the question with
two parts. The first gate that I must pass through is a
successful return to intercept flight later this year and--with
the CE-II configuration, in terms of we have got to have that
success; it underpins the entire strategy that we are now on,
and the criticality of demonstrating ``fly-before-you-buy'' and
not restarting delivery and integration of the current GBIs
that are under contract is step one.
Step two would be, once we are successful, as part of the
next budget submit, to work with the Department and then with
our Congress on some ideas to more efficiently buy those in
terms of economic order quantity, long lead, potentially
multiyear procurement authority based on the stability of what
we are able to demonstrate through flight testing this year and
next year.
Mr. Rogers. I know you say you want to wait until after
this test and you are forming next year's budget, but can't you
go ahead and have some people be comparing those options and
see which one, in the meantime, would be most practical and
cost-saving so that you are not trying to start that up next
year? I would hope you would be doing that----
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. We are doing that analysis now.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
Ms. Creedon, the President has cut the missile defense
budget each and every year he has been in office. It isn't
possible to merely cast blame on the Budget Control Act, as
some of his steepest cuts came prior to that act, which, by the
way, nowhere states that funds need to be cut out of our
missile defenses. Have any of our combatant commanders reduced
their interest in missile defense capabilities to justify these
devastating cuts?
Secretary Creedon. The majority of these cuts and
reductions are really associated with programs that have been
terminated over the course of time, so many of these programs,
such as the airborne laser program, proved to be technically
more challenging than initially thought. So the bulk of these
reductions really is associated with these sort of high-risk
types of programs and have not cut into the actual meat of the
program.
In fact, this year, having cut--having cancelled another
one of these programs that were fairly high-risk, we have been
able to fund an additional 14 GBIs and provide additional
protection to the homeland. So yes, the combatant commanders
continue to have high interest, but the support that we have
been able to provide through the budgets that have been
submitted are more than sufficient to both stay ahead of the
threat and ensure that the U.S. homeland is adequately
protected.
Mr. Rogers. Well, it just seems inconsistent, when you look
at the threat in North Korea and what is happening with Iran,
and China's buildup of their regional capability, that we ought
to not be spending less; if anything, should be enhancing our
spending, particularly given the modernization challenges I
have got.
Now, you talked about the radar--I mean, the laser system.
Have you all--and by that I mean the Administration--taken the
view that directed energy is not an area we should be focused
on?
Secretary Creedon. Not at all. The decision was really with
respect to the specific program, the airborne laser program.
And in fact, there is a substantial research and development
program associated with directed energy concepts currently
funded in the missile defense budget.
Mr. Rogers. I just think that is an area we really need
to--and I have talked with Admiral Syring about that--I think
we really need to focus a lot more on that.
Also, Ms. Creedon, I am concerned about Secretary Kerry's
comments to the Chinese while in that country. He said to the
Chinese that if they would help rein in North Korea and their
behavior that it could have a quid pro quo of withdrawal of
some of the U.S. assets in the region.
Hypothetically, if North Korea abandoned its missile and
nuclear programs tomorrow would the U.S. withdraw its missile
defense assets from Asia--for example, its two radar systems in
Japan?
Secretary Creedon. Obviously hypotheticals are always
difficult, but if North Korea were to abandon everything, you
know, completely denuclearize in a verifiable fashion,
completely walk away from any of its long-range missile
systems, it would, of course, have an impact on the U.S., but
largely with respect to the U.S. homeland missile defense
programs, which is really what is geared--what is what the
North Korean threat is driving.
So it is really the U.S.--so the regional concepts will
continue to be there as--you know, those are a different
aspect. Plus, the regional focus is also largely provided by
assets that are mobile and transportable, so as I mentioned in
my statement, these are the sorts of assets that we can move to
wherever the threat is. So if the threat were in the Asia-
Pacific they would be there; if the threat were somewhere else
we could move those assets there.
But I would certainly welcome the denuclearization and the
``demissilization,'' if that is a word, of North Korea.
Mr. Rogers. Well, and I would, too. I am not holding my
breath, but I would, too. But I would remind folks that China
is still over there and it is a rough neighborhood, so we need
to be mindful of that when we start--you know, when the--first
of all, the Secretary can't make those decisions, you know. If
he wants to withdraw anything it is going to take money and he
has to get the Congress to approve it, so I would like not to
have to read those kind of things in the paper, but I do want
to remind everybody that it is not just North Korea in that
neighborhood that is a problem.
And with that, I will yield to the ranking member for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know it is the job
of the opposition position party to be critical of the
Administration but I think it is also important to stress those
areas where we agree as well as the areas of disagreement, and
I noted in your opening statement that you submitted for the
record that you largely agree with the Administration on their
cancellation of the PTSS [Precision Tracking Space System]
project and the SM-3 Block IIB missile.
So those are significant cost savings for the MDA budget.
Those are things that I know in your statement you said, well,
maybe the money should be put back into other programs, but
still, it is great to have this source of agreement on
Administration policy on the cancellation of those two
programs.
I noted in Admiral Syring's testimony, toward the end on
page 20, he said that the impact of sequestration on the
program and workforce is significant, and I think that many
folks in our military are feeling that in whatever budget they
are supervising.
You also go on to say that you plan to work with the
Department to submit an above-threshold reprogramming request
as part of the Department's larger request this year. I was
wondering if the admiral could give us any idea of what some
areas of reprogramming that you might be most interested in at
this point.
Admiral Syring. Sir, thank you for the question. First,
there is an impact to the work I do and the workforce of
sequestration as those cuts came down, and what we have done as
part of our reprogramming request that will be submitted to the
Department is offer a better way and better method to take some
of those cuts to mitigate and keep my highest-priority issues
fully funded and on schedule.
Sir, I will share those details with you once I am allowed
to submit them via the comptroller once they are approved, but
I can assure you that what I have offered is a better use and
better way to spread the cuts and preserve my top priorities
for homeland regional and regional defense.
Mr. Cooper. Well, I appreciate the seriousness with which
you undertake your assignment, and there is a move afoot among
my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to perhaps offer
$250 million extra for ground-based interceptors for
procurement and for MILCON [Military Construction], and it
seems like the focus would be on the third site. And I was
wondering if you really need additional funding or authority in
fiscal year 2014 beyond the budget request, and if--would this
money be able to be spent in this upcoming fiscal year?
Admiral Syring. Sir, the first part of that answer is, as
you know, I am conducting a very extensive siting study, as
directed by the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], and
that process is ongoing, and as those recommendations are
briefed to the Department we will come forward with those
recommendations by the end of the year.
With that, I will be developing a contingency plan, which
means analysis of the east coast site, and I call it more
globally the CONUS [Continental United States] interceptor
site, coupled with some studies and direction I have gotten
from both General Kehler and General Jacoby to come back to
them with a holistic approach to the BMDS [Ballistic Missile
Defense System] architecture, given PTSS cancellation, given
the IIB cancellation.
So I would like to look at the CONUS interceptor site in
that context and that larger kill chain end-to-end and provide
recommendations across the board in terms of the benefit of the
CONUS interceptor site and the benefit of other parts of our
kill chain end-to-end, sir.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. And I would appreciate, not for this
hearing, but if you could supply a classified answer to the
question about our capability to provide shoot-look-shoot
capability for coverage of the United States that would be very
helpful.
Admiral Syring. Sir.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Wilson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here today, and we all
appreciate your service for our country.
Admiral Syring, the United States has had no boost-phase
missile defense program since approximately 2009, when the
Obama administration terminated the airborne laser, ABL, and
kinetic energy interceptor, KEI. I noted in a recent
unclassified slide that the Missile Defense Agency had no
programs designed to defeat a missile in the boost phase.
Sir, aren't there obvious advantages to engaging a missile
in this phase of the flight at the beginning, such as
precountermeasure and decoy release?
Admiral Syring. Sir, the boost-phase capability has been
long chronicled on the benefit that it might give. The problem
that we have had in terms of fielding boost-phase capability is
getting close enough to the threat, and certainly the SM-3 IIB
program was going to be a first-shot capability against the
threat, but again, sir, the predication of getting a first shot
was all based on what velocity could we achieve with that
missile, and technologically it was too challenging and too
costly and too long, in terms of the schedule, for us to get
there.
Mr. Wilson. And getting to know the location of the threat
with the satellite technology we have, with the other
technology and the intelligence, hopefully, we have, I would
hope that we would--could be pretty precise on where a
potential attack could come. Do you feel that way, or----
Admiral Syring. Sir, we have coverage against a limited
ICBM attack against Iran and North Korea, and I will talk more
about that as the questions come. But we do have a good
capability in terms of detection of launch, and then queuing of
the track to the proper systems within the BMDS. It is very
important and we do have that overhead and organic sensor
coverage today.
Mr. Wilson. Good. Well, I certainly want to reassure the
American people we are--have extraordinary monitoring
capability. Shouldn't we take a look at what options are
possible for boost-phase missile defense?
Admiral Syring. Sir, as part of the studies that I am doing
for the two combatant commanders where I get my requirements
for we are looking at what technology is available, boost-phase
and even left-of-launch, and I will leave it at that in this
forum.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
And for Dr. Gilmore and Admiral Syring, given the
intelligence community's current assessment of the developing
threats from North Korea and Iran, does the current ground-
based missile defense plan still meet requirements? What
changes should be made, if any? Will we see any proposed
changes in the hedging strategy?
Admiral Syring. Sir, was that for me or Ms. Creedon?
Mr. Wilson. Actually, for you and Dr. Gilmore.
Dr. Gilmore. Do you want to go first?
Admiral Syring. Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Wilson. But I sure appreciate the Secretary is here.
Thank you. There is life after serving on Capitol Hill.
Dr. Gilmore. I will let Admiral Syring address the question
of what changes might be made--you know, might be necessary to
the acquisition program. I try to stay out of recommending
changes to acquisition programs; I just provide test
information to the people who make those decisions, otherwise
they might think that I am trying to grind an axe.
From the standpoint of the test program, as I described in
my opening statement, the test program for ground-based missile
defense is going to be incorporating increasing operational
realism, including multiple simultaneous engagements, salvo
engagements, and demonstrating performance against
countermeasures. And so, in that regard, I think that the test
program is structured to deal with the evolving threat.
People can have debates about when certain kinds of
countermeasure might be available to either the North Koreans
or the Iranians, assuming that they--you know, the Iranians
developed an ICBM. But, you know, my understanding of those
threat projections and the uncertainties that they incorporate
is that the test program is appropriately paced in that regard,
so I think I will just leave it at that.
Mr. Wilson. And, Admiral, would you----
Admiral Syring. Sir, as far as changes to the strategy, I
wouldn't call them changes; I would call them augmentation
details that need to be worked in terms of, given the
cancellation of PTSS and IIB, which you will hear from me and
what I have shared with several members, is our need to focus
on discrimination capability. And to that I mean the sensor
network, and to that I mean the dual phenomenology of both
radar energy and I.R. energy. And in those--in both of those
spectrums, sir, we need to focus and have started to focus, in
terms of what that brings to the fight in terms of providing
the combatant commanders a better use of their existing
resources.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman's time is expired.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And some discussion has already taken place concerning the
east coast missile site, and the question of whether--first, I
guess, to Admiral, if you could tell us the status of the
current study that you have under way as a result of last
year's NDAA--what is the status of it? What are you studying?
Admiral Syring. Sir, we looked at a--are looking at a wide
range of possible locations for the CONUS interceptor site
based on criteria that includes proximity to population areas,
booster drop zone areas, DOD-controlled land, and performance,
frankly, in terms of what--where is our best location to
maximize our opportunity against the threat. Literally hundreds
of sites have been considered, and through a ranking and down-
select criteria, that process is ongoing through MDA and then
the Department and then, you know, eventually results will be
announced and further studies will happen at those locations
that we neck down to.
But that process is ongoing and very active today.
Mr. Garamendi. Could you give us some sense of timeframe as
to when the study would narrow it down to two or three
different sites and then down to one site?
Admiral Syring. The rough timeframe that I am working to is
towards the end of the summer, maybe as late as September.
Mr. Garamendi. That you will have a preferred site at that
time?
Admiral Syring. That I will have a preferred three sites at
that time to study even further before the end of the year.
Mr. Garamendi. And so by the end of the year you will have
selected a site?
Admiral Syring. I will have recommendations. It won't be my
selection. There would be a recommendation to the Department,
which will ultimately provide the recommendation to Congress.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. And then, assuming that a site has
been selected--or recommended and Congress takes it up--that
will actually be next year's NDAA that it would be taken up?
Admiral Syring. Potentially, sir, yes.
Mr. Garamendi. So the construction at that site is probably
another 2 or 3 years off?
Admiral Syring. The timetable that we are working to is
once we decide on a site by the end of this calendar year, 18
to 24 months for an environmental impact study on that site and
then site construction and subsequent additional GBI
procurements if so dictated by the Department and the combatant
commander
requirement.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. So we are looking at a situation where
additional expenditures beyond what is already allocated in the
2013 NDAA and continued studies and site environmental work in
the 2014 NDAA would be sufficient to meet your schedule?
Admiral Syring. The resources that are required to do this
study--the siting studies this year and then the environmental
impact study have been part and are the 2014 requirement is
part of my budget request in the reprogramming, actually, since
that was a late requirement. So those funds will be covered,
but it is only study at this point.
Mr. Garamendi. I promised my friend next to us that I
wouldn't get into another brawl with him on an east coast
missile defense site so I am just trying to lay out some
information that will help us all work through the scheduling
of money and whether we tie up a significant amount of money in
a--ahead of what it would actually be required--of when it
would actually be required.
So I am going to put a direct question to you and hopefully
not engage too deeply with my colleague over here. Would an
additional $250 million in the 2014 NDAA be of use to you in
the process that you have under way?
Admiral Syring. Not at this time, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
I will yield back my time.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Nugent, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank the panel for being here today.
But to the admiral, I want to thank you. A number of
members from this committee, you know, sent you a letter urging
that the MDA be--refocus attention on directed energy,
particularly as it relates to challenges with our missile--or
our adversaries' missiles capabilities. And first I want to
thank you for the response, and I am encouraged by your plans
to develop a next-generation airborne laser system.
But the directed energy budget is so relatively small, and
so I am trying to figure out--you know, the Army and Navy are
being very aggressive, I think, on directed energy capabilities
to intercept close-in threats on ground forces and ships, but
intercepting ballistic missiles obviously is a greater
challenge. So I am trying to figure out, do we have adequate
resources to allow us to move to that next level and get out of
the--from the laboratory stage to actually get to where we
could deploy?
Admiral Syring. Sir, it is a fair question. As you know, we
have two efforts ongoing today at Lawrence Livermore and out at
MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] Lincoln Labs, and
both show great promise.
And we will proceed to their first knowledge point in terms
of 10 kilowatts, 20 kilowatts, 30 kilowatts over the course of
the next 2 to 3 to 4 years. And, sir, as we have refocused our
efforts, those demonstrations are critically important to prove
the technology and our ability to scale up in power.
Equally important is the platform, and we have talked and I
have talked to several of the members about a demonstration on
a UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] in several years and the
importance of being above the cloud layer to show that infrared
and it is, in particular, directed energy is a benefit to the
discrimination problem that I face and the combatant commanders
face. And to date, the progress has been promising. As part of
the studies that I am doing for both combatant commanders we
are looking at this, as I have mentioned to a couple of
congressmen in private, to understand the allocation of money,
because right now we are--because we are spending less than $50
million a year on this at this point, and I have been asked by
several members to come back and give them my recommendation on
is that enough, are we focused in the right areas, are we
focused too slowly or too quickly?
Mr. Nugent. And I agree with those members, particularly
when you look at the ability--if we could develop a consistent
system it is certainly a lot less expensive to do the test at
that point than using a kinetic source--you know, another
missile to try to shoot down. So what do we need to do to help
resource you, or is $50 million enough? I mean, it doesn't
sound like it would be, but----
Admiral Syring. Sir, we are still in the scale-up
demonstration phase at this point to prove the two promising
technologies that we are working on--the DPAL [Diode Pumped
Alkali Laser] system out at Livermore and then the fiber
combined laser at MIT. And as I gain knowledge--and we are only
going to pass through the first knowledge point here in the
next 18 to 24 months----
Mr. Nugent. That was kind of my question: When do you
expect to see some kind of actual testing?
Admiral Syring. The first knowledge point of that system
will be in fiscal year 2015 to demonstrate it at a 30-kilowatt
level. And then, sir, we can make decisions based on where we
are with the physics and the technology, and then more
importantly, the packaging and the scaling of that technology
to go on a platform, which is equally important.
Mr. Nugent. And I think the question I heard one of my
colleagues ask--and this is a question I think I tried to
allude to earlier is, with additional funds could you move that
date up, because obviously if you could move that date closer
to where we are today it becomes more cost-effective once you
do that, obviously, for continuing testing, and would that
help? I mean, or is it--money isn't the issue, it is technology
or time, I am not sure which?
Admiral Syring. Certainly more people on each concept, in
terms of the number that we have today based on the budget
reductions that have happened over the last couple years, need
to be looked at and will be assessed by myself over the next
few months.
Mr. Nugent. So is the answer more money could hire more
researchers to get to a usable platform sooner?
Admiral Syring. Sir, I need----
Mr. Nugent. I know it is a tough question----
Admiral Syring. I need to study that and get back to you.
Mr. Nugent. If you would, please. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman's time is expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Sanchez, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Okay, gentlemen. I want to talk about that National
Research Council's report--the 2012 report--comparing boost-
phase ballistic missile defense to other approaches identified.
It identified six fundamental principles or precepts of a cost-
effective ballistic missile defense.
I want to quote this: ``It found the current GMD system
deficient with respect to all of these principles.'' Because of
these problems, the NRC [National Research Council] recommended
an entirely new ground-based missile defense system with new
interceptors, radars, and concept of operations.
So why is the Administration recommending the purchase of
14 more ground-based interceptors when the NRC found the
current system so lacking?
Admiral Syring. Ma'am, is that for me?
Ms. Sanchez. It is for whoever wants to answer that.
Admiral Syring. Ma'am, the current system we have has had a
history--the last two intercepts have been failures--FTG
[Flight Test Ground-Based Interceptor]-06 and FTG-06A. One was
a production quality issue and one was more of a design issue.
We successfully demonstrated the design correction for the
last intercept test in a controlled flight in January. It was
not an intercept flight but we put it through very aggressive
maneuvers in space to prove that the correction in isolation
mechanism of the navigation unit had, indeed, been isolated to
perform as designed in an intercept test.
And based on the analysis of that data that we got back, if
we had flown at target it would have been an intercept. So that
gives me great confidence that the correction is in place and
will work.
That said, I have still got to demonstrate an intercept
test later this year, and as I said previously, it is
imperative that before we start buying more GBIs in fiscal year
2016 that I come forward with that success and prove that, yes,
the new system is, indeed, corrected.
As you know, the--there is the older version of
interceptors that are in the ground today that have
successfully flown three of three times, and that those
continue to be at the forefront of the combatant commanders'
stable of missiles to--of interceptors to use in case of
conflict.
That said, we are proceeding with fly-before-you-buy. I am
not making any production decisions or spending any money on
new GBIs until we have proven that. I have stopped taking
delivery of GBIs; I have stopped taking delivery of EKVs
[Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle] that are either on the old
contract or the new contract until we have corrected this
problem. It underlines everything we are doing.
Ms. Sanchez. That is what I wanted to hear.
So saying it a different way, because we had Secretary
Hagel make a statement that complete confidence in the GBI
interceptors was a prerequisite to deployment of these 14
additional GBI interceptors, specifically, which flight or
intercept tests must be successfully conducted and what
capabilities must be demonstrated in order to meet Secretary
Hagel's stated requirement?
Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am. That intercept test today is
called the CE-II--Capability Enhancement II--intercept test
that will be of the vintage of the GBIs that we will procure
starting in fiscal year 2016.
Ms. Sanchez. So the new GBIs?
Admiral Syring. The new GBI correction will be intercept-
tested in the first quarter of fiscal year 2014--later this
calendar year.
Ms. Sanchez. And that is the only test that you think needs
to be passed in order for us to feel confident enough to buy
more GBIs?
Admiral Syring. There will be an additional intercept test
that is in the budget today for later in fiscal year 2014, and
my guidance in terms of the development of the test plan for
Dr. Gilmore has been at least one intercept test per year.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay, so----
Admiral Syring. And I can make some very informed decisions
after this intercept test on restarting integration and then
informing the new production buy.
Ms. Sanchez. So the CE-II capability--and you had some
other names associated with that test--for the new GBIs--you
think that if you do that one test that you can go ahead and
start purchasing the new GBIs? Or, then you said you also have
another test in fiscal year 2014 that would give you more
information. So are you telling me you want to buy those 14
after this test in the fall or are you telling me you are going
to wait until fiscal year 2014 test--the second one--to see if
both of those are good?
Admiral Syring. Ma'am, the problem that we had with the CE-
II test back in December of 2010 was very isolated to the
navigation unit and isolated in a sense that we understood
through the data and through ground testing and everything else
post-test that it was a very isolated component that is very
explainable and repeatable in the ground testing that we did.
We proved, through both of those--especially the December 2010
flight test--success at every stage of flight of the new
interceptor.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to get
that for the record because I heard two under Hagel's--the
question I said about Hagel, and now I hear one from the other
side. So I think it needs further discussion outside of this
hearing. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Brooks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Syring, do you possess any delegated authority by
the Secretary of Defense over foreign disclosures of classified
United States missile defense technology?
Admiral Syring. I am the classification authority for the
ballistic missile defense system.
Mr. Brooks. And have you been asked, since assuming your
position, to provide insight about disclosure to Russia of
United States missile defense technology?
Admiral Syring. I have not been asked to declassify
anything in terms of disclosing information to Russia.
Mr. Brooks. Have you been asked for your insight?
Admiral Syring. I have not been asked for my insight other
than questions that have been asked and are asked routinely on
what is classified and what is not.
Mr. Brooks. So as best you can recall, you have had no
discussions with anyone, for example, in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, about declassification of any of our
missile defense technology with respect to Russia?
Admiral Syring. I have had discussions with the Secretary
of Defense policy group on what information is classified and
what is not classified, and that guidance--that information, in
terms of what I have provided, has been adhered to 100 percent.
Mr. Brooks. I am not sure that you are answering the
question, or maybe I am not phrasing the question properly. Let
me give it another crack.
Have you had any discussions not about what information is
classified or classified, but instead, have you had any
discussions about whether any classified information should
become declassified with respect to our missile defense
technology in Russia?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. There has been a discussion on
the capability of the current missiles we are building and the
velocity at burnout.
Mr. Brooks. Who were those discussions with?
Admiral Syring. Sir, they have been discussions within OSD
policy up to Dr. Miller.
Mr. Brooks. Another question for you, Admiral Syring. If
you were given complete authority to reprogram funding as you
saw best in order to enhance America's national security, where
would you focus your resources and overall agency program
attention?
Admiral Syring. My number one priority, sir, would be to
focus on the discrimination capability of our system.
Mr. Brooks. Would there be any other reprogramming of funds
from one aspect of what you do to any other?
Admiral Syring. I am currently assessing that and it may be
possible.
Mr. Brooks. The MDA objective simulation framework, or OSF,
contract was awarded competitively in fiscal year 2012 and was
designed to provide flexible and robust solutions to assess the
United States' ability to fully protect the homeland as well as
provide the damage denial role vital to the success of our
military commanders' missions abroad. However, the program has
been subjected to a continuing series of budget reductions,
restructuring, and program slippages which have undercut the
overall OSF program objectives.
Now, I have been informed that there have been an
additional cut of $2.5 million that is requiring an immediate
layoff of key technical personnel whose talents are vital to
the continued success of OSF. Would you please provide me a
thorough review of the history and future funding and plans of
the OSF contract at the earliest opportunity? And that can be
in writing if you are not able to give it in the little bit of
time that we have left.
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the panel for your testimony today. Some of
my questions have been addressed.
I wanted to circle back, though, and Mr. Nugent has talked
about--and questioned about directed energy, and, Admiral, I
just had to give you a further opportunity to talk on this
topic. How does the fiscal year 2014 budget request preserve
the investments made in directed energy programs so far and
what role overall does MDA see for DE [Directed Energy]
capabilities in the future? And I am very interested in
specifics and, you know, how we integrate some of these things
into our missile defense capabilities in the long run.
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. The funding preserves us on a
path to the scheduled demonstration in fiscal year 2015 of the
two systems that I spoke about east and west, at MIT and
Lawrence Livermore.
More importantly, what I see the value of directed energy
to be is to help with the very complex debris scenes and
countermeasures that we see coming in the future, in terms of
having that capability for discrimination in the kill chain.
And I view that as a very--one of my highest priorities in
terms of developing that phenomenology, and the systems that we
are demonstrating east and west are critical to the confidence
of our ability to one, prove the technology, and then two, to
package and put on a platform and demonstration first and then
consider even smaller payloads in space, potentially.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Well, I think that these
investments are important and I hope we are doing our best to
preserve them and, you know, continue to see them aggressively
develop and hope we integrate it as soon as possible.
Let me turn to the TPY-2 radar issue. In fiscal year 2013
NDAA funding for an additional TYP-2 radar was included to meet
growing COCOM [Combatant Command] demands for missile defense.
This demand has grown ever since passage of that legislation.
How does MDA intend to continue TPY-2 production? And in
the area of RDT&E [Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation], what would you identify as your top three to four
priorities?
Admiral Syring. The funds provided in fiscal year 2013 for
the TPY-2 radar, given--and my answer to sequestration stands
in terms--there was some impact there in terms of how that cut
was taken, but given my reprogram request that is going to go
through the Congress, I am going to find or have proposed a
method to fully fund that radar and buy that radar in 2013, in
terms of what I said to maintain my top priorities intact. So
that is step one.
The future of TPY-2s in terms of the forward-based mode
will be driven by the combatant commanders and their
requirements for TPY-2s in theater. As you know, we are going
to--we are working with the government of Japan and our defense
partners in Japan to locate a second TPY-2 to Japan, and that
is going to be very, very helpful.
One of the things that I am working with the Army on is, do
we need a seventh THAAD battery, for example, and how can a
TPY-2 go with that THAAD battery, and that will be one of the
items that I consider as part of my 2015 budget request working
with the Army, as there is a standing requirement for nine
THAAD batteries today.
My top priorities in R&D--and I will just repeat this
again, sir--is discrimination and development of the
discrimination capability, the prove--the continued testing and
reliability improvements that are critical for the GMD system
and the current GBIs. We have incorporated over 20--I want to
say 24 or 25 improvements to the current CE-I fleet that I will
demonstrate in flight within the next month, and that--those
improvements and those continued--the continued improvements of
the current fleet is part of my R&D request, as well.
So discrimination, GBI testing and reliability, and then
finally, we are working very hard on the Aegis front in the
region to continue to upgrade that capability to meet the
requirements of EPAA phase two and three.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Syring, I was concerned about something you alluded
to earlier. I hadn't meant to ask about this but I must.
Given the development of the Iranian threat, maybe as early
as 2015, to have intercontinental capability, to see that the
eastern site is going to have to go through a 1\1/2\- to 2-year
environmental impact statement really bothers me because that
puts us past that. Isn't it allowable under the law for the
President to waive the National Environmental Policy Act for
national security purposes, especially if the site development
ends up on an existing military
facility?
Admiral Syring. Sir, I am not in the details of what we
could waive or what we could not waive. My answer on 18 to 24
months was based on the current law and current statute and,
frankly, the time period that it has taken us to do past EISs
[Environmental Impact Statement].
Mr. Lamborn. Well, Admiral, current law and current statute
allows for the President to waive an environmental impact
statement when we are trying to stave off a threat to our
homeland, and I would hope that your advice to him would be to
seek that waiver.
Admiral Syring. Sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Secondly, let me ask about a budget line on
the information that we have--sheet that we have here. Israeli
cooperative programs Arrow and David's Sling is going from $268
million to a request of $96 million. Why the big dropoff there?
Admiral Syring. Sir, we--just the stage that we are and in
those programs, and we have worked these numbers cooperatively
with Israel. It is the requirement that we see in 2014.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
Next question I would like to ask you is could you explain
the priorities that you have on the kill vehicle technology
that you would like to develop? I would just like to get a
little better sense of what--where you are coming from on that.
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. The kill vehicle technology is
1990s technology, and in terms of when that design was complete
and the components that we have in it, with very little time
spent or thought at the time for manufacturing, producibility,
and sustainability.
The technology has moved, obviously, 20 years since then
and that there is components within the current kill vehicle
that we would like to target near-term for upgrade--the
Inertial Measurement Unit focal plane array, some other areas
that might improve with--improve the inherent organic
discrimination capability of the EKV. The goodness--and there
is great goodness in terms of some of the technology that has
been developed as part of the Aegis kinetic warhead, and we
think that there is some synergy between the two in terms of
components that could be scaled and used in the same way,
obviously, with the same hit-to-kill mission that could be of
benefit to the EKV.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. And lastly, can you explain the
difference in the overall goals that you have before you of
capability development versus technology development? I would
like to hear your thoughts on that.
Admiral Syring. The biggest technology development that I
see is exactly what I have said in terms of discrimination,
radar-sensing algorithms, infrared directed energy. There is
where I see the technology investment for MDA being in the
future.
The balance will be continuing to field capability to the
warfighter, in terms of THAAD batteries continue, Aegis BMD
upgrades continue, the SM-3 1B missile deliveries are ramping
up this year, and providing that much-needed capacity to the
warfighter.
So I agree with you, it is a balance between keeping the
future, you know, keeping the future in front of us and ahead
of the threat versus providing the needed capacity to the
warfighter. And certainly as I study that with General Jacoby
and General Kehler this year we are looking at that exact
problem.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you very much, and I appreciate
the work that you do.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you for being here, for the investment of
your lives in the cause of freedom.
Admiral Syring, I know that you have emphasized
significantly discrimination related to our missile defense
capability, and I know something that is potentially related to
that, at least contingently related to it, is the need to
improve the kill assessment capability of our GMD system. So I
am going to ask you about four questions in a row here, what I
usually don't do, but it gives you an opportunity to emphasize
the areas that you think is most important for us to consider.
Are you, first of all, and the commander of NORTHCOM [U.S.
Northern Command] and the commander of STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic
Command], close to any kind of an agreement on the way ahead to
improve that capability--that kill assessment capability? How
feasible is it to leverage those current capabilities? To what
extent are new capabilities required? And is it feasible that
the U.S. should significantly enhance this capability by the
end of this decade?
Admiral Syring. Sir, kill assessment is a very important
capability that we are working on, and I do have direction from
the commander of NORTHCOM on his priorities for improving kill
assessment and other--frankly, other parts of what I call the
assessment chain, in terms of how do we--where do we need to
invest, what can we do near-term and what can we do maybe
further-term to better inform his shot doctrine?
And it is just not kill assessment; there are other parts
of that problem that need to be considered. There is EKV
discrimination capability, there is radar-sensing capability,
there is IR [Infrared]. There is a whole list of things that
would give him more information for that assessment.
Underlying all this, sir, is the improvement of the GBI
reliability and giving him confidence that we--each interceptor
is providing, indeed, the reliability that he counts on. Yes, I
am in very near-term discussions with him on that issue.
Mr. Franks. Well let me shift gears, then, and ask you,
were you satisfied that we had sufficient missiles available to
PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] during this recent escalation in
tensions and the threat of medium-range rocket launches by
North Korea? You know, I guess I am concerned that a lot of our
missiles were either at stockpiles at home or in other
theaters, and are we doing everything that we can to allocate
our resources in the best way
possible?
Admiral Syring. Sir, we had coverage to protect the
homeland--sufficient coverage to protect the homeland across
all of our systems--the Aegis ships that were on station, the
GMD system that was on alert--is on alert, and then the THAAD
battery, as you know, that went to Guam, and that capability
that we provided in very short order.
Mr. Franks. Well, touching briefly on the old third site--
not the east coast site, but the site that was once cancelled
in Poland--and I am not sure exactly how much you can say, but
given some of the shortcomings of the potential IIB missile to
be able to really do the job there, how much impact do you
think this has had on Iran's calculus or our ability to provide
redundant homeland protection by not having GBIs rather than,
at this point, not even the potential of IIBs in Poland?
Admiral Syring. Sir, if I can, can I just speak to the IIB?
Mr. Franks. Yes, sir.
Admiral Syring. Because I was not here back in 2009 and I
would like to keep my answer to the IIB, and I referred to this
earlier. The technology challenge to get to a velocity of that
missile in the time and budget that we had was insurmountable,
and there are many other issues that I have talked to you
about, but that--those three reasons alone--the technical
challenge, the cost, and the schedule--would have driven our
ability to field the IIB to 2022 or beyond, and from a schedule
standpoint, sir, that wasn't going to cut it.
So the President and Secretary Hagel made the decision to
focus on North Korea first, which we are doing with the
additional interceptors west in Greely, and then the second
part of that focus will be what do we need to do as Iran
continues to progress. And, sir, we are studying that in great
detail with the combatant commanders.
Mr. Franks. Well, so you know, I think you have made every
decision correctly; there is no criticism here aimed in your
direction at all. I am somewhat concerned--maybe this is--I
suppose this is a real intellectual ``I told you so'' kind of
thing related to the GBIs that were once planned there, which
would have had sufficient acceleration and speed to be able to
give us that redundant protection that now we will not have,
and it will not have the ability to change the Iranian
calculus, as well.
So, but anyway, glad you are on the job.
Thank you all.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Syring, do you agree with NORTHCOM Commander Jacoby
that, ``What a third site gives me, whether it is on the east
coast or in an alternate location, would be increased battle
space. That means increased opportunity for me to engage
threats from either Iran or North Korea.'' Do you agree with
that?
Admiral Syring. Yes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
I think that is incredibly important as we look to the
possibility of an east coast site, which, of course, would give
us that third site option. I was the author of the amendment in
the NDAA of last year to establish the east coast site. The
numbers that we have been working with--$100 million last year
in the NDAA and $232 million looking at the cost to build the
site in 6 years--have been based upon what General Reilly had
told us as we look to, you know, moving forward with this site.
Ms. Creedon, I have a great deal of respect for you but you
have to admit at this point that the Administration's missile
defense policies are in absolute shambles. I have a letter
dated April 17th to Barack Obama which I would like the chair
to put into the record that acknowledges that this policy that
the Administration has established of undoing and then redoing
the Bush administration's Alaska site is completely
insufficient as a basis for protecting the United States, and I
want to do a real quick drive-through of where we are and why
we are.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 75.]
Mr. Turner. The Bush administration had planned by 2013
that the Alaska site would be completed and that there would be
forward-based missiles in Europe, including a radar, and that
would be a third site to provide to the doctrine of shoot-look-
shoot, which General Jacoby and Admiral Syring just said is
preferable for protecting the United States. In the context of
the national intelligence estimate of the public statements of
our intelligence community that the threat from Iran and North
Korea to the continental United States from an ICBM attack with
a nuclear weapon could be as early as 2015, the Administration
came and cancelled the third site in Europe, significantly
reduced the site in Alaska, and said, contrary to all
intelligence estimates that were public and that we were
receiving, that the threat was slow to emerge so we could wait
until 2020 to protect the homeland with a third site, paraded
out the phased adaptive approach that had a fourth phase that
would include protection of the United States by 2020, one that
I opposed because I believe, A, it was going to be late--there
will be a gap between the 2015, what the intelligence community
was saying, and 2020; and two, that it looked like it was not
going to be achievable because it was a paper system, not
something that had yet been completed.
We now see ourselves with, of course, that fourth system
being cancelled--that fourth phase being cancelled because it
would have slipped past 2020 and was not technically feasible.
The Administration has now gone back and said we will complete
the Alaska site that the Bush administration would have had
completed by 2013 with a timeframe of 2017.
But where we are now is that North Korea has moved a
missile to a launch pad that our intelligence community says
could be an ICBM and could have a nuclear weapon on top of it.
And now the Administration is saying that we are going to
complete Alaska and currently isn't embracing an east coast
site, which would provide what Admiral Syring just said and
what Commander Jacoby said is preferable of having a third site
for shoot-look-shoot.
Now, the Obama administration had indicated in its missile
defense strategy that there needed, in addition to the phased
adaptive approach, there needed to be a hedge if the threat was
quicker to emerge than this Administration's analysis of 2020.
Now, I assure you that no one in Congress believed that that
hedge was going to be less protection from the homeland;
everyone believed that the hedge would be an increased
protection.
But now we have it the threat has been quicker to emerge,
North Korea actually threatening the United States, and you
have cancelled the fourth phase of the phased adaptive
approach, and you are opposing the east coast missile defense
site, and you have cancelled the European forward-based Bush
administration missiles, and we have no hedge.
Now, Ms. Creedon, it would have been laughable if the
Administration had come in 5 years ago with this plan and said
it was going to be sufficient to protect the United States, and
now, quite frankly, I believe it is just straight-up dangerous.
And my letter to the President of the United States is saying
that the current plan for this Administration to just build out
Alaska doesn't even meet the Obama administration's own
standards.
So what is coming next, Ms. Creedon? Are you going to
actually dedicate yourself to expanding our missile defense
system to protect the homeland?
Secretary Creedon. Yes, sir. That is exactly what the
decision to go to the additional 14 GBIs is----
Mr. Turner. No, no, no, wait. That is not sufficient. As
you know, that was scheduled already under the Bush
administration plan to be completed. Saying you are going to go
now back and complete what they would have had in the ground by
2013 is not expansion.
What are you going to do to give the third site that
Admiral Syring says that we need and that Commander Jacoby says
that we need for shoot-look-shoot, which has been the doctrine
while all these threats have been emerging? I mean, we are now
here, the threats are knocking on our door, and now you are
dismantling what would be the important doctrine that we need.
Secretary Creedon. Let me roll back just a little bit in
time just to today and reference back to the discussion that we
had earlier about the test program and the challenges that had
been associated with the GBIs that were in Alaska, so part of
the time that we bought by keeping the hedge intact, completing
the missile fields, not doing away with the extra six silos in
Missile Field 1, has allowed us to continue to improve the
capability and the reliability of the GBIs--both the CE-Is that
are there, and now working on the CE-II.
So the CE-II, which was the new kill vehicle, as we all
know, had a failure. We have been able to improve that. There
has been one test already; there is another test scheduled for
the end of the year.
So what we bought in that period of time is time to
actually fix the GBIs and make them more reliable, because
where we were in 2009 was not having the degree of confidence
in the GBIs that we needed to have, particularly in the new
ones. So with the work that has been done there, the--all the
enhancements to the CE-I that have been done over the course of
the last 4 years, and the work that is going on has increased
the capability of those GBIs.
Now with the 14, that is a big step forward. So we have 14
more and they are going to be more capable than they would have
been. And this will also help in looking at how we defend
against anything that would develop from Iran as well as
anything that develops from Korea.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the lady.
And the gentleman's time is expired.
I do want to accept the letter that he offered for the
record--without objection, so ordered--and remind you all, we
had hoped to have this hearing an hour earlier, which would
have given us time for a second round, but they have called us
for votes.
So the record will be held open for 10 days. Members may
submit questions to you and, I would ask that you return those
in writing.
And with that, thank you again for your attendance. This
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
May 8, 2013
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 8, 2013
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Mike Rogers
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request for Missile Defense Programs
May 8, 2013
I would like to take this opportunity to thank our
witnesses for being here today and investing their time in
preparing their written and oral statements. We have a good
panel today; our witnesses are:
LThe Honorable Madelyn Creedon, Assistant
Secretary of
Defense, Global Strategic Affairs, Office of the
Secretary of Defense;
LVice Admiral James D. Syring, USN, Director,
Missile Defense Agency; and
LThe Honorable J. Michael Gilmore, Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
Before I start my brief remarks, I'd just like to say, at
the risk of giving you a big head, Admiral, we are grateful to
have you here today in this position as Director. Those of us
who follow missile defense closely, as I have been doing for my
11 years on this committee, have noticed the significant
difference at that agency since you have assumed your new
position of responsibility. We are grateful for your service
and its imposition on your family. And we are grateful to our
other witnesses as well.
I will be brief so that we can get into the good part of
this hearing, which is your statements and our opportunity to
ask questions. While I am pleased that the President adjusted
his missile defense strategy to one more closely resembling the
plans of the previous administration in recognition of the
threat this country faces, I have to say that I continue to be
concerned about what appears to be a lack of support for
missile defense by this Administration.
The cut to this year's budget request--$100 million from
the topline, and even more when compared to last year's
appropriated sums and the addition of new programs this year--
comes on top of more than $6 billion in cuts to the Missile
Defense Agency since President Obama came to office in 2009,
more than 16% below what was planned by the Bush
administration. And while programs have been cancelled, like
the PTSS and SM-3 block IIB programs, decisions I largely agree
with, those funds have been hollowed out of the missile defense
budget instead of kept in it. Even with the plus-up of $1
billion over the next several years to implement Secretary
Hagel's missile defense announcement on March 15th, we're still
facing a further cut of $3 billion from the MDA topline across
the President's FY14 FYDP.
Yet the threat to the homeland is considerably greater this
year than last:
LWhy are we waiting for enemies to field
capabilities before we build defenses?
LAre we going to anticipate the threat from
Iran and be ready to meet it, or just wait until they
deploy?
I intend to explore these issues today.
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 8, 2013
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 8, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. 1) The Committee has received briefings that indicate
that one of only two SDACS (Solid Divert and Attitude Control System)
suppliers is scheduled to complete all contracted design and
development DACS work by the end of Fiscal Year 2013 and, without near-
term action, will no longer have work to retain its experienced
engineering team. Is this a concern of the Agency and, if so, is the
Agency prepared to take actions during the remainder of FY13 to
preclude the disbandment of this team?
Admiral Syring. Yes. The Agency is funding both Alliant Techsystems
and Aerojet in Fiscal Year 2013. Alliant Techsystems is investigating
and maturing lightweight, long-mission duration SDACS technology.
Aerojet is developing more capable SDACS for the SM-3 IB and SM-3 IIA
development programs.
Mr. Rogers. 2) Following testimony before this committee in 2012,
report language was included in the FY2013 House NDAA report regarding
concerns over the absence of competition in the design and production
of key missile defense technologies to include SM-3 Divert and Attitude
Control Systems, which were specifically cited in the language.
Included in the report was a requirement for the MDA Director to
provide a report that detailed the risk associated with relying on a
single supplier for critical technologies and Agency plans for how it
intended to deal with those risks. What is the status of that report
and would you please discuss the risks associated with relying on a
single supplier for technologies such as DACS?
Admiral Syring. The report is in internal review, and is
anticipated to be delivered by August 30, 2013. Risk can be defined in
terms of consequence of occurrence and likelihood of occurrence. The
consequence of having a single supplier is that if the supplier should
go out of business, we might not have a timely source for a critical
component or subsystem. That would be severe. The likelihood of that
occurring, especially for DACS, is remote.
Mr. Rogers. 3) Do you believe SM-3 missiles deployed in CONUS have
the performance capabilities to defend the United States from ballistic
missiles launched by Iran?
Also, please provide illustrations of the SM-3 capability
engagement windows of SM-3 IA and IB missiles if deployed on Aegis Navy
ships at suitable ship stations along the East Coast along the United
States.
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is prepared to
respond to this question, but access to the information is protected by
higher program security classification restrictions. MDA is currently
working with the responsible department to enable access to this
information.
Mr. Rogers. 4) How important is it that we improve the kill
assessment capability of the ground-based midcourse defense system? Are
you, the commander of NORTHCOM, and the commander of STRATCOM close to
an agreement on the way ahead to improve that capability? How feasible
is it to leverage current capabilities? To what extent are new
capabilities required? Is it feasible that the U.S. could significantly
enhance this capability by the end of the decade?
Admiral Syring. Improving kill assessment or post-intercept
assessment can provide reliable, trustworthy and sufficient evidence
which could influence warfighting considerations during an engagement
and enable the warfighter to conserve GMD interceptor inventory.
Confidence in post-intercept assessment could enable the warfighter to
stop subsequent intercepts, change the number of interceptors allocated
to later intercepts, change the targeting and timing of interceptors
and perform consequence of intercept mitigation.
We are making good progress and the assessments on how ``close'' we
are will flow from discussions over the next two to three months. The
Missile Defense Agency and NORTHCOM, through the Shot Management
Assessment Cell, are conducting a joint analysis of post-intercept
assessment options to assess performance of concepts singly or in
combination with other options. The options selected will be
incorporated into the BMDS Vision that is a future capabilities product
being developed at the request of STRATCOM.
Leveraging current capabilities is conceptually feasible and this
assessment is part of the near-term options review. The post-intercept
assessment study evaluates the performance of options singly or in
combination with other options in the near, mid, and far term. The
performance of the individual concepts will be assessed against cost to
determine which post-intercept options provide the most cost-effective
capability. The study will evaluate existing and new capabilities to
determine the needed mix in order to accomplish post-intercept
assessment.
It is feasible that the U.S. could enhance this capability by the
end of the decade. The post-intercept assessment study will examine
near-, mid-, and far-term options to provide a post-intercept
assessment capability.
Mr. Rogers. 5) Were you satisfied that we had sufficient missiles
available to the PACOM commander during the escalation in tensions and
the threat of medium-range rocket launches by the North Korean regime?
I am concerned that too many missiles were either at stockpiles at
home, or in other theaters. What can be done to better allocate these
resources?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) supports the Joint
Staff, the Services, and the Combatant Commanders through participation
in the Warfighter Involvement Process. This process allows the
warfighter to establish priorities for equipment and capabilities, and
MDA satisfies those priorities within budget and schedule constraints.
The final program plan is adjudicated by the Missile Defense Executive
Board where all stakeholders are represented. This process ensures that
maximum capability is provided within resources available.
The question of ``sufficient missiles available to the PACOM
commander'' is better answered by U.S. Pacific Command.
Mr. Rogers. 6) Can you help me understand how the budget request
supports technology development to build on the efforts of the Phantom
Eye, DPALS, the Army's HELMD, the Navy's LaWS, to deploy missile
defenses capable of engaging enemy missiles as the Airborne Laser
proved is possible?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) FY 2014 budget
request preserves the investments made in directed energy by firmly
supporting the technology development required to demonstrate next-
generation, multimission directed energy systems. MDA's key investments
include: high-energy, high-brightness electric lasers, high-altitude/
low-Mach platform characterization, high-altitude atmospheric
characterization, and directed energy system concept definition.
Specifically, we will continue to fund Phantom Eye flights, diode
pumped alkali laser system (DPALS) progression, as well as fiber
combined laser (FCL) technology joint development with the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Phantom Eye is scheduled to
perform a series of flights to record platform conditions at high-
altitude/low-Mach to inform the design and packaging of high-powered
laser payloads. We will characterize optical jitter at high altitudes
using either the Phantom Eye or another high-altitude unmanned aerial
vehicle. We will continue DPALS development to improve operability and
performance. We will also continue FCL work with DARPA using fiber
amplifiers procured by both Agencies to demonstrate increased laser
power, multiple combining techniques and the ability to combine the
large number of fiber lasers to achieve 100's of kilowatts at near-
perfect beam quality.
The MDA continues to collaborate with the Services and other
agencies. As we develop higher power, more compact lasers, they benefit
everyone in the directed energy community, including the Army's High
Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator and the Navy's Laser Weapon System.
Similarly, we benefit from the technology developed under these and
other DOD laser programs.
Mr. Rogers. 7) As you know, the United States has had no boost
phase missile defense program since approximately 2009, when the Obama
Administration terminated the Airborne Laser and the Kinetic Energy
Interceptor. To be certain, there were technology and cost challenges
with both systems, but there were also successes by both development
programs.
Sir, aren't there obvious advantages to engaging a missile in this
phase of flight, such as precountermeasure and decoy release? Shouldn't
we take a look at what options are possible for boost phase missile
defense?
Admiral Syring. There are at least three advantages to boost phase
intercept. Conceptually, it puts pressure on adversary payload
deployment timelines, thins out attacks, and denies unimpeded access
into midcourse with complex countermeasures. Boost phase intercept
thereby improves the effectiveness of the midcourse intercept layer.
Evolving adversary capabilities have made effective and
affordable boost phase intercept more challenging than when the
airborne laser and kinetic energy interceptor were conceived. Longer
range adversary ballistic missiles launched from deep inside adversary
territory increase the boost phase engagement range required for
intercept. They also increase the defensive standoff range outside an
adversary's territory.
Three technology advances potentially offer new opportunities for
effective and affordable boost phase intercept, if these technologies
can be successfully demonstrated through laboratory experimentation,
proof-of-concept demos, and prototyping phases.
First, high-efficiency, electric-powered, shorter
wavelength lasers that could be small and light enough to fit
on high-altitude unmanned air vehicles (UAVs)
Second, a new generation of hydrogen-fueled UAVs
which could provide multiday endurance at high altitude (65,000
ft) above clouds and atmospheric turbulence
Third, new designs for very small, light kill
vehicles which could enable much smaller and lighter
interceptors capable of high velocities required for kinetic
energy boost phase
The Missile Defense Agency FY 2014 budget request includes funding
to advance technologies in all three areas: two short wavelength
electric lasers are being scaled up in the laboratory from kilowatts to
tens of kilowatts; measurements of vibrations and high-altitude
turbulence and optical propagation are planned, using existing high-
altitude UAVs. Last, advanced component technologies to enable small,
light kill vehicles will be demonstrated.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. 8) General Dempsey testified before our committee that
DOD was considering the deployment of Aegis ships for missile defense
purposes to defend the East Coast as one of the options being
considered. Is this in fact the plan, as stated by General Dempsey? Or
is DOD only considering a missile defense site with ground-based
interceptors? Is Aegis Ashore being considered? Why/why not?
Secretary Creedon. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. 9) Secretary Kerry stated in April during a trip to
Japan that ``Obviously if the threat disappears--i.e. North Korea
denuclearizes--the same imperative does not exist at that point of time
for us to have that kind of robust forward leaning posture of defense .
. . And it would be our hope in the long run, or better yet in short
run, that we can address that.'' He also added speaking in Tokyo that
President Barack Obama ``deployed some additional missile defense
capability precisely because of the threat of North Korea. And it is
logical that if the threat of North Korea disappears because the
peninsula denuclearizes, then obviously the threat no longer mandates
that kind of posture'' but that ``there have been no agreements, no
discussions; there's nothing actually on the table with respect to
that.'' In response to these statements, HASC Republican members sent a
letter to the President, arguing that the Obama administration has once
again ``offered up America's missile defense as a bargaining chip.''
Are there plans to reduce the missile defense posture and
deployed forces in Asia?
Do you anticipate some missile defense forces would have
to be moved? Under what circumstances?
Secretary Creedon. The U.S. approach to regional missile defense
has not changed: we will continue to adapt our missile defenses to
address the current and emerging threat. As the threat changes, so will
our posture.
The United States has no plans to reduce U.S. missile defense
posture in the Asia/Pacific region at this time. U.S. policy on missile
defense emphasizes the need for flexibility in U.S. missile defense
plans and capabilities in response to evolving ballistic missile
threats. Highly adaptable and relocatable missile defense assets
represent the most prudent option for defending U.S. interests, allies,
and partners across multiple regions in times of crisis or conflict.
Mr. Cooper. 10) What analysis underpins the decision to deploy an
additional 14 interceptors? Specifically how did we arrive at the 14
number?
Secretary Creedon. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. 11) In a 1999 National Intelligence Estimate, the U.S.
National Intelligence Council stated: ``We assess that countries
developing ballistic missiles,'' including North Korea and Iran,
``would also develop various responses to U.S. theatre and national
defenses . . . by the time they flight test their missiles.''
Is that still the current assumption underpinning the response to
the threat and being factored into missile defense tests to ensure that
our missile defense system keeps ahead of the threat?
Secretary Creedon. Yes, our current assumption of the threat, in
the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), is consistent with the intelligence
assessments published in the 1999 National Intelligence Estimates. MDA
keeps ahead of the threat by ensuring that BMDS design and
specifications are based on data that are consistent, not only with the
most current intelligence assessments, but also extended beyond point
designs provided by the Intelligence Community, including threat
missiles that have not yet reached initial operational capability or
have not yet been flight tested as part of the parametrically defined
BMDS threat space. This expanded threat space provides a hedge against
uncertainties in adversary capabilities. Finally, MDA ensures missile
defense capabilities are tested using flight test targets that are
based on the same threat representative intelligence assessments.
Mr. Cooper. 12) Total missile defense costs have usually not
accounted for operations and support costs or MILCON funding. As a
result the cost for Aegis Ashore has increased from $837 million to
$1.6 billion. What are the plans to more accurately assess costs,
including a full-accounting of costs?
Secretary Creedon. Baselines reported by the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) in the annual Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
Accountability Report (BAR) describe program content. Missile defense
operations and support costs reported in the BAR include those MDA
expects to fund. MDA does not include in its Aegis Ashore BAR resource
baselines the operations and support costs that are Navy's
responsibility once transition and transfer of this missile defense
capability is
complete.
MDA reported its initial baseline for the Romania site of the
Ashore Program in the MDA 2010 BAR at $966M. This cost estimate
remained stable for the MDA 2011 BAR. The increase in the MDA 2012 BAR
was a result of completion of design reviews and program definition
which led to an updated system configuration and acquisition strategy.
Also, to more accurately provide full-accounting of costs,
approximately $600M in Military Construction, Site Activation, On Site
Systems Engineering, and Non-tactical Communications estimates were
moved to the Aegis Ashore Resource Baseline from other MDA program
baselines. With these updates, the total cost reported in the 2012 BAR
for the Aegis Ashore Romania baseline, which includes the PMRF site,
was $1,588 million. The costs associated with Aegis Ashore have
included in BMDS cost estimates, although not aligned with the Aegis
Ashore Baseline prior to the 2012 BAR.
In the 2013 BAR, MDA provided a revised Romania site resource
baseline and an initial Poland site baseline. Both baselines include a
full accounting of MDA cost. These costs form the basis for the annual
President's Budget request for Aegis Ashore programs.
Mr. Cooper. 13) Your stated plan is to recommend one site for an
additional missile defense location by the end of the year. Yet, the
NDAA FY 2013 requires DOD to perform Environmental Impact Statements
for 3 sites. What are the reasons for recommending one site before the
EIS process? Will it include a consideration of costs?
What factors would support deployment of a third interceptor site
on a short timeline? What are the tradeoffs with other necessary
improvements to missile defense that may be required before the
deployment of a third site?
Admiral Syring. In accordance with the FY 2013 NDAA, Section 227,
upon completion of the Continental United States Interceptor Site (CIS)
Study, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency will recommend at
least three locations of which at least two will be on the East Coast.
A single Environmental Impact Statement will assess the candidate
sites. MDA will evaluate cost for all potential CIS deployment sites.
The main factor that would affect an acceleration of a third site
deployment is the projected threat. There most likely would be
tradeoffs between a third site and other potential system improvements.
These other improvements include future investment in discrimination
and sensor enhancements, upgrades to Clear and Cape Cod radars,
additional AN/TPY-2 deployment to Japan, continued work on a GBI In-
Flight Interceptor Communications System Data Terminal at Fort Drum,
New York, and continued use of the Sea-Based x-Band Radar during real-
world events.
Mr. Cooper. 14) General Dempsey testified before our committee that
DOD was considering the deployment of Aegis ships for missile defense
purposes to defend the East Coast as one of the options being
considered. Is this in fact the plan, as stated by General Dempsey? Or
is DOD only considering a missile defense site with ground-based
interceptors? Is Aegis Ashore being considered? Why/why not?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. 15) Please provide a classified answer on the current
capability to provide shoot-look-shoot coverage of the United States,
and what the constraints are. What are your priorities to improve our
current S-L-S capability? What results must be achieved before the
United States can meet Secretary Hagel's stated requirement that
``complete confidence'' in the GBI interceptors was a prerequisite to
deployment of the 14 additional GBI interceptors? Specifically, which
flight or intercept tests must be successfully conducted and what
capabilities must be demonstrated in order to meet this requirement?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. 16) In tests of the GBI, is a ``hit'' considered a
``kill''? Are there any successful intercept tests where a hit would
have not equated to a kill of the target? How do these assumptions
impact the reliability of the GMD system?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. 17) What is the most pressing need for missile defense?
Where do you recommend we focus our investments?
Admiral Syring. The top priorities of the Missile Defense Agency
are to improve homeland defense through successful completion of the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense Return to Intercept path for Capability
Enhancement (CE)-II Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), improving the
performance, quality and reliability of GBIs and conducting a thorough
investigation of the recent Flight Test GMD-07 (FTG-07) flight test
failure of a CE-I GBI; achieve a full rate production decision for the
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB missile through successful execution
of Flight Test Standard Missile-21/22 (FTM-21/22); fielding a 2nd Army/
Navy/Ground, Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Series 2 (AN/
TPY-2) radar to Japan to improve homeland and regional defense; and
continuing progress in meeting European Phased Adaptive Architecture
Phase 2 deployment of Aegis Ashore to Romania.
Additionally, future investment in Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS) discrimination and sensor capabilities would result in cost-
effective near-term improvements to homeland missile defense. These
potential sensor enhancements would improve the BMDS kill chain and
increase threat discrimination. The Department of Defense is conducting
an evaluation of future investment options which will serve to inform
decisions on our future BMDS architecture and budget requests.
Mr. Cooper. 18) What are the options to improve discrimination for
homeland missile defense?
Admiral Syring. The top priorities of the Missile Defense Agency
are to improve homeland defense through successful completion of the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense Return to Intercept path for Capability
Enhancement (CE)-II Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), improving the
performance, quality and reliability of GBIs and conducting a thorough
investigation of the recent Flight Test GMD-07 (FTG-07) flight test
failure of a CE-I GBI; achieve a full rate production decision for the
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB missile through successful execution
of Flight Test Standard Missile-21/22 (FTM-21/22); fielding a 2nd Army/
Navy/Ground, Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Series 2 (AN/
TPY-2) radar to Japan to improve homeland and regional defense; and
continuing progress in meeting European Phased Adaptive Architecture
Phase 2 deployment of Aegis Ashore to Romania.
Additionally, future investment in Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS) discrimination and sensor capabilities would result in cost-
effective near-term improvements to homeland missile defense. These
potential sensor enhancements would improve the BMDS kill chain and
increase threat discrimination. The Department of Defense is conducting
an evaluation of future investment options which will serve to inform
decisions on our future BMDS architecture and budget requests.
Mr. Cooper. 19) What are your priorities to improve the reliability
of the GBIs for the warfighter?
Admiral Syring. Improving Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI)
reliability is a top MDA priority for supporting the Warfighter.
Increased reliability is the most cost-effective method of countering a
growing ballistic missile threat because the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) system is able to negate more targets with the same
number of fielded GBIs.
In 2012, MDA aligned its GBI reliability focus through four primary
initiatives for improving GBI reliability. Each of these initiatives is
described below.
GBI Fleet Upgrade Program: Removes fielded GBIs from silos,
upgrades them to remove known risks, performs mandatory maintenance,
replaces limited-life items, conducts acceptance testing, and returns
the upgraded GBIs to the operational fleet. At the end of 4th QTR
FY2013, there will be twelve upgraded GBIs in the operational fleet
with one additional upgrade scheduled for FY2014.
Flight Test Rotation Program: Removes older GBIs from silos,
performs a limited upgrade to meet flight test configuration
requirements, performs mandatory maintenance, replaces limited-life
items and conducts acceptance testing. The interceptor is used in the
flight test program and a new or upgraded spare GBI is reemplaced in
the silo.
GBI Reliability Growth Testing Program: Ensures design fixes are
effective and eliminates risks. In the near term, FTG-06b will
demonstrate design fixes for the problems uncovered in the FTG-06a
flight test. MDA conducts additional on-going ground testing of
components and assemblies to verify design fixes, demonstrate
reliability, qualify parts, and increase confidence in component
reliability.
Component Reliability Program: Includes testing, analyzing
performance trends, and identifies reliability improvements for GBI
component hardware. The program identifies components with limited
reliability history for accelerated aging testing to validate
reliability predictions. In 2011, MDA awarded the GMD Development and
Sustainment Contract (DSC) which promotes fleet reliability through its
incentive structure and specifically addresses reliability
improvements. First, the DSC requires the contractor to address known
shortcomings with design improvements in both new and upgraded
interceptors. Second, the contract requires extensive ground testing of
interceptor components to validate current reliability predictions, or
identify areas for improvement through redesign and replacement.
Finally, the DSC enhances the Stockpile Reliability Program activity to
test and track aging effects on the fielded systems.
In light of the recent FTG-07 flight test failure, MDA initiated an
independent assessment of the reliability of the GBI fleet. The
assessment will increase confidence by thoroughly investigating the GBI
fleet and identifying design, manufacturing, quality, and acceptance
test issues with GBI configurations that might preclude reliable GBI
operation. The assessment will also identify changes to the design and/
or manufacturing processes to provide improvements in reliability. MDA
also plans to authorize a trade study of existing GBI reliability
initiatives to determine any improvements that will yield increases to
overall fleet reliability and/or confidence.
Finally, under the DSC, MDA will deploy a follow-on GBI with an
updated booster to address obsolescence issues and an updated
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) known as the Capability Enhancement
(CE)-II Block 1 (CE-II Blk 1) that incorporates performance and
reliability improvements. In parallel, MDA is currently planning the
next generation of EKV to follow the CE-II EKVs. The options currently
under evaluation incorporate performance enhancements and increased
reliability, based on knowledge gained through MDA's on-going
reliability improvement efforts.
Mr. Cooper. 20) Please provide a chart (classified if necessary)
listing the improved capability of the CE-II versus the CE-I kill
vehicle associated with the new ground-based interceptor? What is the
current cost of a CE-II GBI? What are the estimated costs to modify the
CE-II kill vehicles already deployed on interceptors?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. 21) What are the risks and benefits of procuring
booster stacks for Ground-Based Interceptors in FY14, when GBI
procurement was not slated to begin until FY16?
Admiral Syring. Pursuing an accelerated procurement of booster
stacks (i.e. motors) in fiscal year (FY) 2014 would not benefit the MDA
or its ability to deliver on the Department's commitment for 44 GBIs.
This initiative would present two concerns to the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense program. First, initiating the procurement in FY 2014
would lead to delivery of the boosters earlier than needed and would
result in increased costs of approximately $1.5 million per year to the
program due to motor storage while they wait for integration into the
14 GBIs. Second, once the motors are manufactured, the shelf-life of
the motor begins. Delivering the motors earlier than needed to support
the delivery of the 14 GBIs would reduce usable expected life of these
components.
Mr. Cooper. 22) What analysis underpins the decision to deploy an
additional 14 interceptors? Specifically how did we arrive at the 14
number?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. 23) In a 1999 National Intelligence Estimate, the U.S.
National Intelligence Council stated: ``We assess that countries
developing ballistic missiles,'' including North Korea and Iran,
``would also develop various responses to U.S. theatre and national
defenses . . . by the time they flight test their missiles.''
Is that still the current assumption underpinning the response to
the threat and being factored into missile defense tests to ensure that
our missile defense system keeps ahead of the threat?
Admiral Syring. Yes, our current assumption of the threat, in the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), is consistent with the intelligence
assessments published in the 1999 National Intelligence Estimates. MDA
keeps ahead of the threat by ensuring that BMDS design and
specifications are based on data that are consistent, not only with the
most current intelligence assessments, but also extended beyond point
designs provided by the Intelligence Community, including threat
missiles that have not yet reached initial operational capability or
not yet been flight tested as part of the parametrically defined BMDS
threat space. This expanded threat space provides a hedge against
uncertainties in adversary capabilities. Finally, MDA ensures missile
defense capabilities are tested using flight test targets that are
based on the same threat representative intelligence assessments.
Mr. Cooper. 24) What are the benefits of the Administration's
commitment to ``fly-before-you-buy'' in the context of the additional
14 GBI procurement?
Admiral Syring. ``Fly-before-you-buy'' ensures that designs are
qualified and tested before being deployed for operational use. This
approach ensures that fielded assets are fully capable of meeting
required performance standards and defending the homeland, and reduces
cost risks associated with subsequent rework and upgrades.
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is committed to testing Capability
Enhancement (CE)-II ground-based interceptors (GBIs) with the new
version of firmware (V10) in the inertial measurement unit before more
CE-IIs are deployed.
We will conduct an intercept flight of an updated CE-II, Block I
GBI design (called the Common Booster Avionics and Obsolescence design
(CBAU)/CE-II Block I Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle) in FY 2016. As
requested in the President's Budget for FY 2014, production of the 14
additional GBIs will begin in FY 2016. They are currently planned to be
manufactured to this CE-II, Block I GBI configuration.
Mr. Cooper. 25) Total missile defense costs have usually not
accounted for operations and support costs or MILCON funding. As a
result the cost for Aegis Ashore has increased from $837 million to
$1.6 billion. What are the plans to more accurately assess costs,
including a full-accounting of costs?
Admiral Syring. Baselines reported by the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) in the annual Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
Accountability Report (BAR) describe program content. Missile defense
operations and support costs reported in the BAR include those MDA
expects to fund. MDA does not include in its Aegis Ashore BAR resource
baselines the operations and support costs that are Navy's
responsibility once transition and transfer of this missile defense
capability is complete.
MDA reported its initial baseline for the Romania site of the
Ashore Program in the MDA 2010 BAR at $966M. This cost estimate
remained stable for the MDA 2011 BAR. The increase in the MDA 2012 BAR
was a result of completion of design reviews and program definition
which led to an updated system configuration and acquisition strategy.
Also, to more accurately provide full-accounting of costs,
approximately $600M in Military Construction, Site Activation, On Site
Systems Engineering, and Non-tactical Communications estimates were
moved to the Aegis Ashore Resource Baseline from other MDA program
baselines. With these updates, the total cost reported in the 2012 BAR
for the Aegis Ashore Romania baseline, which includes the PMRF site,
was $1,588 million. The costs associated with Aegis Ashore have
included in BMDS cost estimates, although not aligned with the Aegis
Ashore Baseline prior to the 2012 BAR.
In the 2013 BAR, MDA provided a revised Romania site resource
baseline and an initial Poland site baseline. Both baselines include a
full accounting of MDA cost. These costs form the basis for the annual
President's Budget request for Aegis Ashore programs.
Mr. Cooper. 26) What are the contingency plans if the planned July
CE-1 or next CE-2 flight intercept tests fail?
Admiral Syring. On July 5, 2013, the Missile Defense Agency
conducted Flight Test Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) (FTG)-07. The test
objectives included engagement of a target by a Capability Enhancement
(CE)-I Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), and performing all EKV
functions to discriminate and intercept a lethal object from a
representative Intercontinental Ballistic Missile target scene. The
target met all requirements, and with the exception of the GBI, all
elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) functioned as
planned. The GBI successfully launched, but the target was not
intercepted. MDA has initiated a Failure Review Board (FRB) to
determine the root cause of the failure. Once the FRB is complete, MDA
will implement corrective actions and replan future intercept flight
tests.
In parallel with the FTG-07 FRB, MDA will verify there is
separation (the absence of potential common flaw) to ensure that the
cause of the FTG-07 failure is not present in the CE-II GBIs. Pending
the result of these analyses, MDA (with COCOM consideration) will plan
to execute FTG-06b as currently scheduled for March-May in the 2014
flight test window. If MDA cannot establish separation, the FTG-06b
flight test date will depend on results of the FTG-07 FRB and
implementation of any corrective action.
If CE-II fails, MDA will conduct a thorough investigation and
develop options for returning to intercept testing once root cause and
the need for design or process changes is known.
Mr. Cooper. 27) Sensors and radars, and particularly SBX are
increasingly becoming one of the most important assets required to
defend the homeland. What are the plans for SBX and what are the plans
to protect SBX from attack? What are the plans for providing a
redundancy capability? What is the limiting factor on deploying the SBX
and is MDA considering procuring a resupply vessel for the SBX?
Admiral Syring.
The budget request for SBX in FY 2014 maintains SBX in
limited test support status (LTSS). In LTSS the SBX supports the BMDS
ground and flight test program and remains available for contingency
activation for homeland defense.
The Department is currently studying how to better define
the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) sensor architecture of the
future for homeland defense, to include the role of the SBX.
Commander Third Fleet Operations Order 201 specifies
detailed force protection measures to protect SBX-1 from attack. These
measures are in accordance with Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
Instruction 538-02, ``BMDS Physical Security Program.'' To meet these
requirements, SBX uses a contracted security force and contracted
mariners for internal security, with other Navy force protection
assets. Assets include Naval Base security (when in port) and the Fleet
Commander-provided security (when under way). These will provide
escorts based on operational considerations and increasing force
protection levels.
Regarding a redundancy capability, the Department is currently
studying how to better define the BMDS sensor architecture of the
future for homeland defense. These studies are assessing potential
radar solutions such as type, location, and technical performance.
Funding is the only limiting factor for short-term deployment of
the SBX. For long-term deployment of the SBX, limiting factors are
funding and the lack of an offshore support vessel (OSV). The
President's Budget for FY 2014 doesn't include an OSV. There are no
plans to procure an OSV.
Mr. Cooper. 28) In a 1999 National Intelligence Estimate, the U.S.
National Intelligence Council stated: ``We assess that countries
developing ballistic missiles,'' including North Korea and Iran,
``would also develop various responses to U.S. theatre and national
defenses . . . by the time they flight test their missiles.''
Is that still the current assumption underpinning the response to
the threat and being factored into missile defense tests to ensure that
our missile defense system keeps ahead of the threat?
Dr. Gilmore. Yes. The Missile Defense Agency, the Ballistic Missile
Defense System Operational Test Agency Team, and my office work
together to develop and execute a test program for both theater/
regional and national/strategic missile defense systems accounting for
the capabilities the intelligence agencies project the threats these
systems are meant to negate could possess. This plan is codified in the
Ballistic Missile Defense System Integrated Master Test Plan.
Mr. Cooper. 29) What are the benefits of the Administration's
commitment to ``fly-before-you-buy'' in the context of the additional
14 GBI procurement?
Dr. Gilmore. The benefit of any ``fly-before-you-buy'' acquisition
program is that system performance is verified before substantial
commitment of resources to production. This approach makes it less
likely that additional resources will have to be committed to fix
problems discovered after production items are bought, delivered, and
fielded. The Department's experience indicates that problems discovered
after production items are delivered and fielded are more expensive to
fix than problems discovered (through testing) before production
commences.
Mr. Cooper. 30) What are the contingency plans if the planned July
CE-1 or next CE-2 flight intercept tests fail?
Dr. Gilmore. Subsequent to the hearing upon which this question is
based, the July intercept flight test of an interceptor equipped with a
Capability Enhancement I (CE-I) Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV)
failed. The investigation of this failure is under way. The content of
the plan for dealing with this failure will be based on its root cause,
which is not yet known. Similarly, if the flight test of the CE-II EKV,
currently scheduled for the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2014 fails,
the plan for dealing with that failure would depend on the details of
its root cause.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. 31) What results must be achieved before the United
States can meet Secretary Hagel's stated requirement that ``complete
confidence'' in the Ground-Based interceptors (GBI) is a prerequisite
to deployment of the 14 additional interceptors? Specifically, which
flight or intercept tests must be successfully conducted and what
capabilities must be demonstrated in order to meet this
requirement?
Secretary Creedon. Complete confidence will involve testing of both
Capability Enhancement (CE)-II and CE-II Block I since the 44 Ground-
Based Interceptors (GBIs) will have both variants. Before fielding the
additional 14 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), MDA will first complete
its Return to Intercept (RTI) program by conducting extensive ground
testing of the Capability Enhancement (CE)-II Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle (EKV) to ensure the root causes of the Flight Test GBI (FTG)-
06a flight test failure have been corrected and to qualify the design.
The CE-II EKV is currently scheduled to be demonstrated in an intercept
flight test (FTG-06b) planned for a March--May 2014 test window.
Successful completion of the flight test will allow resumption of
planned CE-II GBI deliveries for operational use. Additionally, MDA is
currently developing the CE-II Block I design that will incorporate
enhancements to improve performance and reliability. MDA will conduct
extensive modeling and simulation and ground testing to fully qualify
the CE-II Block I design. MDA will then demonstrate the CE-II Block I
EKV in an intercept flight test (FTG-15) scheduled for FY2016. The
successful completion of ground and flight testing of the legacy CE-I
and CE-II Block I designs will provide complete confidence in the
fielded CE-II fleet and for the deployment of additional interceptors
required to achieve 44 operational GBIs by the end of FY2017. In
response to the FTG-07 CE-I failure, MDA established a failure review
board of experts from government, the national laboratories, and
industry. The board is analyzing the FTG-07 data to establish the root
cause of the failure and will attempt to duplicate the failure sequence
through simulation and component ground test. When MDA has determined
the cause of the FTG-07 failure, then MDA will work with the COCOMS and
Pentagon leadership to determine the timing and configurations for
future CE-I/CE-II flight testing.
Mr. Langevin. 32) Will the 14 additional Ground-based Interceptors
that were announced in March 2013 be equipped with the CE-II kill
vehicle? If the next intercept test of the new CE-II kill vehicle
fails, will the deployment of the planned 14 additional GBI
interceptors still take place by 2017?
Secretary Creedon. The 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors
(GBIs), as announced in March 2013, will use an upgraded version of the
current Capability Enhancement (CE)-II Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV), known as CE-II Block I. Should there be a failure of the next
CE-II flight test (FTG-06b), MDA will conduct a failure review to
determine root cause and assess implications for CE-II EKVs. Depending
on the results of that assessment, MDA will develop and implement the
necessary changes. The planned objective to deploy 44 operational GBIs
by the end of Fiscal Year 2017 could be impacted.
Mr. Langevin. 33) How does the FY14 budget request preserve the
investments made in the directed energy programs, and what role does
MDA see for DE capabilities in the future?
Secretary Creedon. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) FY14 budget
request preserves the investments made in directed energy by firmly
supporting technology development to demonstrate next-generation,
multimission directed energy systems. The MDA's key investments include
high-energy, high-brightness electric lasers, high-altitude/low-Mach
platform characterization, high-altitude atmospheric characterization,
and directed energy system concept definition.
Specifically, we will continue to fund Phantom Eye flights, diode
pumped alkali laser system (DPALS) progression, as well as fiber
combined laser (FCL) technology joint development with the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Phantom Eye is scheduled to
perform a series of flights to record platform conditions at high-
altitude/low-Mach. This will inform the design and packaging of high-
powered laser payloads. We will characterize optical jitter at high
altitudes using either the Phantom Eye or another high-altitude
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). We will continue DPALS development to
improve operability and performance. We will also continue FCL work
with DARPA using fiber amplifiers procured by both Agencies. This work
is to demonstrate increased laser power, multiple combining techniques
and the ability to combine the large number of fiber lasers to achieve
100's of kilowatts at near-perfect beam quality.
Directed energy offers unique game-changing capabilities, including
discrimination and ultimately boost-phase engagement. To this end, MDA
will partner with industry in FY14 to define feasible concepts to
integrate high-energy lasers into UAVs for missile defense.
Mr. Langevin. 34) What results must be achieved before the United
States can meet Secretary Hagel's stated requirement that ``complete
confidence'' in the Ground-Based interceptors (GBI) is a prerequisite
to deployment of the 14 additional interceptors? Specifically, which
flight or intercept tests must be successfully conducted and what
capabilities must be demonstrated in order to meet this
requirement?
Admiral Syring. Complete confidence will involve testing of both
Capability Enhancement (CE)-II and CE-II Block 1 since the 44 Ground-
Based Interceptors (GBIs) will have both variants. Before fielding the
additional 14 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), MDA will first complete
its Return to Intercept (RTI) program by conducting extensive ground
testing of the Capability Enhancement (CE)-II Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle (EKV) to ensure the root causes of the Flight Test GBI (FTG)-
06a flight test failure have been corrected and to qualify the design.
The CE-II EKV is currently scheduled to be demonstrated in an intercept
flight test (FTG-06b) planned for a March--May 2014 test window.
Successful completion of the flight test will allow resumption of
planned CE-II GBI deliveries for operational use.
Additionally, MDA is currently developing the CE-II Block I design
that will incorporate enhancements to improve performance and
reliability. MDA will conduct extensive modeling and simulation and
ground testing to fully qualify the CE-II Block I design. MDA will then
demonstrate the CE-II Block I EKV in an intercept flight test (FTG-15)
scheduled for FY2016. The successful completion of ground and flight
testing of the legacy CE-II and CE-II Block I designs will provide
complete confidence in the fielded CE-II fleet and for the deployment
of additional interceptors required to achieve 44 operational GBIs by
the end of FY2017. In response to the FTG-07 CE-I failure, MDA
established a failure review board of experts from the Government, the
national laboratories, and industry. The board is analyzing the FTG-07
data to establish the root cause of the failure and will attempt to
duplicate the failure sequence through simulation and component ground
test. When MDA has determined the cause of the FTG-07 failure, then MDA
will work with the COCOMS and Pentagon leadership to determine the
timing and configurations for future CE-I/CE-II flight testing.
Mr. Langevin. 35) Will the 14 additional Ground-based Interceptors
that were announced in March 2013 be equipped with the CE-II kill
vehicle? If the next intercept test of the new CE-II kill vehicle
fails, will the deployment of the planned 14 additional GBI
interceptors still take place by 2017?
Admiral Syring. The 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs),
as announced in March 2013, will use an upgraded version of the current
Capability Enhancement (CE)-II Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), known
as CE-II Block I. Should there be a failure of the next CE-II flight
test (FTG-06b), MDA will conduct a failure review to determine root
cause and assess implications for CE-II EKVs. Depending on the results
of that assessment, MDA will develop and implement the necessary
changes. The planned objective to deploy 44 operational GBIs by the end
of fiscal year 2017 could be impacted.
Mr. Langevin. 36) How does the FY14 budget request preserve the
investments made in the directed energy programs, and what role does
MDA see for DE capabilities in the future?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) FY14 budget
request preserves the investments made in directed energy by firmly
supporting technology development to demonstrate next-generation,
multimission directed energy systems. The MDA's key investments include
high-energy, high-brightness electric lasers, high-altitude/low-Mach
platform characterization, high-altitude atmospheric characterization,
and directed energy system concept definition.
Specifically, we will continue to fund Phantom Eye flights, diode
pumped alkali laser system (DPALS) progression, as well as fiber
combined laser (FCL) technology joint development with the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Phantom Eye is scheduled to
perform a series of flights to record platform conditions at high-
altitude/low-Mach. This will inform the design and packaging of high-
powered laser payloads. We will characterize optical jitter at high
altitudes using either the Phantom Eye or another high-altitude
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). We will continue DPALS development to
improve operability and performance. We will also continue FCL work
with DARPA using fiber amplifiers procured by both Agencies. This work
is to demonstrate increased laser power, multiple combining techniques
and the ability to combine the large number of fiber lasers to achieve
100's of kilowatts at near-perfect beam quality.
Directed energy offers unique game-changing capabilities, including
discrimination and ultimately boost-phase engagement. To this end, MDA
will partner with industry in FY14 to define feasible concepts to
integrate high-energy lasers into UAVs for the missile defense of
space.
Mr. Langevin. 37) In the FY13 NDAA, funding for an additional TPY-2
radar was included to meet growing COCOM demands for missile defense.
This demand has grown even since passage of that legislation--how does
MDA intend to continue TPY-2 production?
In the area of RDTE, what would you identify as your top 3-4
priorities?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) supports the Joint
Staff, the Services, and combatant commanders through participation in
the Warfighter involvement process. This process allows the Warfighter
to set priorities for equipment and capabilities. We satisfy those
priorities within budget and schedule constraints. The final program
plan is adjudicated by the Missile Defense Executive Board where all
stakeholders are represented. This ensures that the President's Budget
provides maximum capability within resources available.
Our top RDT&E priorities are:
Debris mitigation
Improved discrimination
Performance against the future advanced threats
Mr. Langevin. 38) What results must be achieved before the United
States can meet Secretary Hagel's stated requirement that ``complete
confidence'' in the Ground-Based interceptors (GBI) is a prerequisite
to deployment of the 14 additional interceptors? Specifically, which
flight or intercept tests must be successfully conducted and what
capabilities must be demonstrated in order to meet this
requirement?
Dr. Gilmore. In my view, the minimum prerequisite for proceeding
with additional production of interceptors and kill vehicles comprises
the following: (1) At least one successful intercept using a Ground-
Based Interceptor equipped with a redesigned Capability Enhancement II
(CE-II) kill vehicle conducted under the same conditions as FTG-06, in
which a CE-II failed to intercept its intended target. This flight
test, designated FTG-06b, is currently scheduled to occur in the third
quarter of Fiscal Year 2014. (2) Additionally, determination of the
root cause of the failure of FTG-07 (which used a CE-I kill vehicle)
and, if that failure is associated with components and/or software used
in the CE-II kill vehicle, demonstration through appropriate testing of
its correction.
Mr. Langevin. 39) Will the 14 additional Ground-based Interceptors
that were announced in March 2013 be equipped with the CE-II kill
vehicle? If the next intercept test of the new CE-II kill vehicle
fails, will the deployment of the planned 14 additional GBI
interceptors still take place by 2017?
Dr. Gilmore. The Capability Enhancement I (CE-I) Exo-atmospheric
Kill Vehicle (EKV) is no longer in production. The fourteen additional
Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) will be equipped with CE-II EKVs. If
the next flight test of the CE-II EKV currently scheduled for the third
quarter of Fiscal Year 2014 fails, any recommendation I would make
regarding production and deployment of additional interceptors and kill
vehicles would depend upon the root cause of the failure. If the cause
of the failure was a significant fault common to all the interceptors,
I would not recommend additional production until a correction was
determined and verified through appropriate testing.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. 40) What is the status of the CAPE's evaluation of the
cost of the European Phased Adaptive Approach?
Secretary Creedon. As described in the 2010 Ballistic Missile
Defense Review, the United States is pursuing the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as well as missile defense approaches in other
key geographic regions. Each of these approaches is tailored to the
threats and circumstances unique to each region and will evolve over
time as the threat changes and new missile defense capabilities become
available. The approaches also heavily utilize mobile and relocatable
assets in order to provide maximum flexibility within and between
various regions where missile defense capabilities are assigned. This
factor alone complicates the analysis of which costs are attributable
to any given approach. In the case of the EPAA, certain elements, such
as the Aegis Ashore sites planned for construction in Romania (2015
timeframe) and Poland (2018 timeframe) are attributable to the EPAA.
However, other elements, such as missile defense-capable Aegis ships
operating in Europe and Standard Missile 3 interceptors, are available
for worldwide deployment and were not procured solely for the purpose
of the EPAA. Therefore, an attempt to attribute a portion of the cost
of these elements to the EPAA could be subjective. In addition, changes
to the EPAA announced by Secretary Hagel in March 2013 and the
uncertainty associated with the budgetary environment in Fiscal Year
(FY) 2014 and beyond complicate further an attempt to prepare an
accurate life-cycle cost estimate. Detailed cost information for
ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities utilized in the EPAA
mission can be found in documents already submitted to Congress,
including Missile Defense Agency's annual Selected Acquisition Report
and BMD System Accountability Report, and the FY 2014 President's
Budget justification
documents.
Mr. Coffman. 41) Has the Department calculated how much the EPAA
will cost the United States over the Future Years Defense Plan, and if
so, how much?
Secretary Creedon. As described in the 2010 Ballistic Missile
Defense Review, the United States is pursuing the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as well as missile defense approaches in other
key geographic regions. Each of these approaches is tailored to the
threats and circumstances unique to each region and will evolve over
time as the threat changes and new missile defense capabilities become
available. The approaches also heavily utilize mobile and relocatable
assets in order to provide maximum flexibility within and between
various regions where missile defense capabilities are assigned. This
factor alone complicates the analysis of which costs are attributable
to any given approach. In the case of the the EPAA, certain elements,
such as the Aegis Ashore sites planned for construction in Romania
(2015 timeframe) and Poland (2018 timeframe) are attributable to the
EPAA. However, other elements, such as missile defense-capable Aegis
ships operating in Europe and Standard Missile 3 interceptors, are
available for worldwide deployment and were not procured solely for the
purpose of the EPAA. Therefore, an attempt to attribute a portion of
the cost of these elements to the EPAA could be subjective. In
addition, changes to EPAA announced by Secretary Hagel in March 2013
and the uncertainty associated with the budgetary environment in Fiscal
Year (FY) 2014 and beyond complicate further an attempt to prepare an
accurate life-cycle cost estimate. Detailed cost information for
ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities utilized in the EPAA
mission can be found in documents already submitted to Congress,
including Missile Defense Agency's annual Selected Acquisition Report
and BMD System Accountability Report, and the FY 2014 President's
Budget justification documents.
Mr. Coffman. 42) Inasmuch as the President offered the EPAA to
Europe free-of-charge, before the Budget Control Act, at what point
does the Administration tell Europe, which has a larger economy than we
do, that it's time it pays a share of these costs?
Secretary Creedon. The United States is not alone in contributing
to ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe. In partnership with NATO
Ally host nations, the United States continues to implement the
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which will provide BMD for
U.S. forces and facilities in and around the region, and for our
Allies, as well as contribute to U.S. homeland missile defenses.
At the same time, we are working closely with the Allies to develop
NATO's BMD effort. The NATO Allies committed to spend approximately
$1.3 billion in Common Funding for the expansion of NATO's missile
defense command and control program through 2020 (the U.S. share of
common funding is approximately 22 percent). The Active Layered Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program is a command and control
network that will allow Allied missile defense assets to connect to
each other and share high-precision data. Several Allies have also
announced national contributions, and other Allies are considering
upgrades to achieve BMD capabilities or new BMD acquisitions. The
United States continues to encourage additional Allied national asset
contributions to NATO BMD.
The EPAA is the U.S. national contribution to the NATO missile
defense effort. As a central principle since the founding of the NATO
Alliance, weapons are volunteered by Allies to support a NATO mission.
The NATO Alliance itself does not ``buy'' weapons systems such as
interceptors or ships, and Allies do not seek NATO Common Funding for
their national asset contributions. U.S. requests for NATO Common
Funding to pay for the EPAA would be contrary to longstanding NATO
Alliance principles as well as Presidential-level commitments to the
Allies. Such requests would seriously damage support among the Allies
for NATO BMD and the EPAA, thus reducing the prospects for further
Allied asset contributions.
Mr. Coffman. 43) What is the status of resource pooling, like SM-3
missiles, for the EPAA to defray some U.S. costs and perhaps enable the
U.S. to reallocate those missiles to another theater?
Secretary Creedon. The United States encourages strongly additional
Allied national asset contributions to NATO's missile defense effort.
Several Allies have announced national BMD asset contributions to the
NATO effort, while other Allies are considering upgrades to achieve BMD
capabilities or new BMD acquisitions. One of the possibilities
discussed among the Allies has been the concept of interceptor pooling
or sharing as a potential contribution to NATO's missile defense
effort. Some Allied governments have experimented with these concepts
during exercise events designed to examine coalition missile defense
policy and operational issues. However, no Allied government has yet
decided to pursue an interceptor pooling concept. The United States
will continue to encourage further Allied investments in NATO BMD.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. 44) The MDA Objective Simulation Framework (OSF)
contract was awarded competitively in FY12 and was designed to provide
flexible and robust solutions to assess the U.S. ability to fully
protect the homeland as well as provide the damage denial role vital to
the success of our military commanders' missions abroad. However, the
program has been subjected to a continuing series of budget reductions,
restructuring and program slippages which have undercut the overall OSF
program objectives. I understand there has also been a recent
additional cut of $2.5M that is requiring an immediate layoff of key
technical personnel whose talents are vital to the continued success of
OSF.
Would you please provide me a thorough review of the history and
future funding and plans of the OSF contract at the earliest
opportunity?
Admiral Syring. After a full and open competition acquisition
process, the OSF contract was competitively awarded on August 30, 2011
to Teledyne Brown Engineering, Huntsville, AL. The contract start date
was September 1, 2011. The contract type is an indefinite delivery/
indefinite quantity, with an ordering period running through September
30, 2016.
The funding profile for current contract execution is:
FY 2011--Actual work incurred: $.932M
FY 2012--Actual work incurred: $28.446M
FY 2013--Planned: $40.852M (reflects the renegotiated
FY 2013 contract value following sequestration reductions,
?$2.126M)
FY 2014--Planned: $30.599M
FY 2015--Planned: $23.199M
FY 2016--Planned: $23.469M
Actual work incurred against OSF contract as of May
2013: $60.915M
The contract is on track in FY 2013 to spend to the sequestration
funding level, a reduction of $2.126M versus the $2.5M referenced
above. The Government cannot guide or influence the contractor's
staffing profiles, labor skill mix or manning levels to support the
contract requirements. OSF capabilities were retained during FY 2013
replanning activities. Impacts were absorbed by managing additional
schedule risk. The priority given to the OSF contract has not changed.
Plans were established that enable all awarded OSF requirements to be
met by September 30, 2016 (contract expiration).
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. 45) I'm concerned that the budget request last year,
continued this year in the President's Budget for FY14, limits the U.S.
to the procurement of only 12 TPY-2 radars and 6 THAAD batteries. You
participate in extensive capabilities prioritization with the combatant
commanders when putting together the MDA budget request. Do they have
sufficient THAAD and TPY-2 capabilities?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) supports the Joint
Staff, the Services, and the Combatant Commanders through participation
in the Warfighter Involvement Process. This process allows the
warfighter to establish priorities for equipment and capabilities, and
MDA satisfies those priorities within budget and schedule constraints.
The final program plan is adjudicated by the Missile Defense Executive
Board where all stakeholders are represented. This process ensures that
maximum capability is provided within resources available.
The question of ``sufficient THAAD and AN/TPY-2 capabilities'' is
more likely best answered by U.S. Strategic Command as the Global
Synchronizer for Ballistic Missile Defense System capabilities.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON
Mr. Carson. 46) The United States has the premier system of
university-based research institutions in the world. What steps is MDA
taking to better utilize this network for research, development, and
testing? What role will University Affiliated Research Centers play in
this effort and what capabilities do they offer that differ from those
offered by other universities?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has an active
university outreach effort that includes:
Campus visits from the MDA Director and top level MDA
management
A ``Campus Champion'' program that teams MDA leaders
with specific universities to develop strategic long-term
relationships with academic institutions
Distributing a ``University Programs Playbook''
handout to help university researchers understand the needs of
the Agency and how to submit research proposals
A cooperative international technology development
program teaming U.S. universities with foreign universities of
allied nations
The MDA pursues research opportunities with the Nation's
universities through broad agency announcements posted on the
FedBizOpps website twice a year. Research topics are derived from the
mission and needs of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Our
partners in research, development, and testing of the BMDS include
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Georgia Tech
Research Institute, Utah State University Space Dynamics laboratory,
MIT/Lincoln Laboratory, and Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering
Institute.
Collectively, these institutions are providing more than 600 staff
years of technical effort in fiscal year 2013. To maintain awareness of
the capabilities of these and other university-affiliated institutions,
we established the position of Federally Funded Research and
Development Center (FFRDC)/University Affiliated Research Center (UARC)
Technical Advisor in the office of the Director for Engineering (DE).
Each of the UARCs supporting MDA has a representative, or ``Captain,''
who works directly with the FFRDC/UARC Technical Advisor on a regular
basis to identify opportunities for contribution to the MDA and create
collaboration with peer institutions. We also established an annual
meeting at each of the laboratories to review the work program for MDA
and identify potential areas of research and development to apply to
our programs. UARCs offer technical support to us that is different in
two significant ways from support provided by other universities.
First, UARCs are established to maintain a long-term, strategic
relationship with DOD and their sponsoring agency. This relationship is
based on their unique set of essential core competencies applicable to
the sponsors' missions. As a result, they understand both the technical
and the mission aspects of the MDA's challenges. Second, as recipients
of sole-source contracts, UARCs are required to maintain a conflict-of-
interest free position with respect to their research activities. We
can therefore rely on them for objective technical advice and
recommendations.
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