[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-40]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 25, 2013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana Georgia
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
Steve Kitay, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Eric Smith, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, April 25, 2013, Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request for National Security Space
Activities..................................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, April 25, 2013......................................... 27
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 2013
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Klinger, Gil, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Space and
Intelligence Office (AT&L), U.S. Department of Defense......... 4
Loverro, Doug, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Space
Policy, U.S. Department of Defense............................. 6
Sapp, Betty, Director, National Reconnaissance Office............ 3
Shelton, Gen William, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command,
U.S. Air Force................................................. 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Klinger, Gil................................................. 63
Loverro, Doug................................................ 72
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 31
Sapp, Betty.................................................. 53
Shelton, Gen William......................................... 33
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 85
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bridenstine.............................................. 105
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 104
Mr. Langevin................................................. 103
Mr. Rogers................................................... 89
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 25, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:35 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee is
called to order. I want to welcome everyone to the Strategic
Forces hearing on the fiscal 2014 budget request for the
national security space
activities.
Our distinguished panel of experts this afternoon are
General William Shelton, Commander of Air Force Space Command;
Ms. Betty Sapp, Director of NRO, National Reconnaissance
Office; Mr. Gil Klinger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Defense, Space and Intelligence Office; and Mr. Doug Loverro,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.
I appreciate your time in being here and the time it took
to prepare for this hearing. It is important and very helpful
to us for you to be able to participate.
Space is a critical element of our national security in
both peace and wartime environments. I am very concerned of the
impact of sequestration on national security space programs,
and I appreciate hearing more from you during our opening
statements on this issue.
Potential adversaries have taken note of our reliance on
space and are developing the means to degrade, deny, and
destroy our capabilities. Just like the evolution of ground,
sea and air platforms, when defenses and survivability
mechanisms had to be developed to keep pace with the threat,
now this is happening with space
systems.
I am pleased to see the Department's recognition of the
threat, as evidenced by the increased investment in space
situational awareness in the fiscal 2014 budget request. I
remain concerned on the future implementation of space defense
and resilience to include breaking up or disaggregating
programs that we have invested billions to develop and are just
starting to provide the necessary capabilities for the
warfighter. I look forward to further dialogue and study of
this important topic.
Separately, I commend the Department on the significant
advances it has made on many space programs. After years of
massive costs and schedule overruns, we have entered a new
period of stable procurement, incremental development. As noted
above, I am skeptical when I hear that we now may want to break
up these successful programs.
For instance, the Air Force recently reported that new
block-buy strategies for Space-Based Infrared System, Advanced
Extremely High Frequency Satellite, and the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle programs are resulting in over $2.5 billion in
savings over the next 5 years. This is a tremendous success for
the military and the taxpayer, and I hope to see those savings
reinvested and provide the necessary modernization initiatives
in accordance with the warfighter requirements.
Thank you again for being with us today, and I look forward
to your testimony. Ranking Member Cooper and I have spent a lot
of time together visiting the NRO and the NGA [National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency] headquarters and getting
classified mission and threat briefs. We are both focused on
the opportunities and threats we face.
And with that, I yield to my friend and colleague from
Tennessee, Mr. Cooper, for any statement he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to add my welcome to yours, and I look
forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. General Shelton, it is all you.
STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM SHELTON, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, Representative Cooper,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to
appear before you today as the commander of Air Force Space
Command. It is also my privilege to appear before you with
members of distinguished colleagues and members of the national
security space
enterprise.
Since its inception a little over 30 years ago, Air Force
Space Command has made significant progress in evolving and
sustaining space capabilities to underpin operations across the
spectrum of conflict. We have established three major goals to
ensure these foundational capabilities are available to the
warfighter and to the Nation. First, to provide assured full-
spectrum space capabilities; second, to develop highly skilled
and innovative space professionals; and, finally, to provide
resilient integrated systems that preserve operational
advantage for the warfighter.
Within the bounds of the current fiscal climate, we are
managing increased risk across the enterprise, while
modernizing, sustaining, and acquiring space capabilities
consistent with our national priorities. Accomplishing this in
an era of declining budgets, growing threats, and increasing
requirements is no small challenge. And we face a new daunting
challenge, providing these foundational capabilities in an
environment of sequestration.
In my command alone, I had to find $508 million in
reductions for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. The chaos
created by operations and maintenance account reductions this
large in this short time period cannot be overstated. At the
top of this list is the significant and justifiable angst of my
civilian workforce facing the prospect of a 20-percent pay cut
for the last 14 weeks of this fiscal year.
As we look to the future, I strongly urge your support to
amend the law to create the flexibility required to enable
smarter decisions. Despite our fiscal challenges, we will work
together with these mission partners and with industry to find
innovative approaches to providing vital space capability.
I thank the committee for your steadfast support of Air
Force Space Command and our people, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Shelton can be found in
the Appendix on page 33.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General.
Ms. Sapp, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF BETTY SAPP, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE
Ms. Sapp. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to appear
before you today on behalf of the NRO. It is an honor for me to
appear alongside our mission partners from the Department of
Defense. The NRO's close relationship and continuing
collaboration with our DOD [Department of Defense] partners is
vital to maintaining this nation's superiority in space.
I would like to begin with a few words about the state of
the NRO today. First and foremost, I am proud to report that
all of our major system acquisition programs are green, meeting
or beating all performance, costs, and schedule goals.
Additionally, for the fourth year in a row, the NRO received a
clean audit opinion on our financial statements.
The NRO's all-green acquisition scorecard and clean audit
record are best proof of our commitment to excellence and
conscientious stewardship of taxpayer dollars. We have also
continued our record of success on the launch front, launching
with our partners in Air Force four systems in just 5 months
last year. The missions were so problem-free that we brought
most of the systems and the critical capabilities they deliver
into operations ahead of schedule. This speaks, again, to our
commitment to excellence and to the quality of our partnership
with the Air Force.
Moving forward, the NRO is leveraging key investments in
our R&D [Research and Development] and in commercial
technologies to deliver a future architecture designed to
improve persistence, to better our performance against hard
targets, resilience in the face of increasing threats, and
affordability in the face of current and likely future budget
constraints.
As General Shelton mentioned, the current fiscal year is a
challenge, and I want to touch briefly on the effects that
sequestration is having on the NRO. Internally, we have reduced
all infrastructure costs, including those directly supporting
the mission. We have significantly reduced our core
contractors, key to everything we do from R&D to operations. We
have also had to reduce funding for our major system
acquisition programs, cuts that represent increased risk to
that record of acquisition success.
We are also proposing--and I stress proposing--that we
terminate some of our legacy operational programs. The
capability those programs provide, while important, are beyond
our documented requirements. We are vetting this proposal
through the community.
So while we are doing everything we can to minimize the
mission impacts of sequestration, some difficult choices will
have to be made and may be felt by those who count on us.
Despite our fiscal challenges, the NRO is committed to
sustaining the support most critical for our warfighters
worldwide. In addition to traditional NRO ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] capabilities, we provide a
wide array of systems and capabilities integral to the highest-
priority missions, including identifying, locating, and
tracking high-value targets, special communications support,
and counter-IED [Improvised Explosive Device] efforts.
In the counter-IED area, one of our most successful
programs continues to be RED DOT. RED DOT takes all the sources
of indications of warnings available, combines them into an
integrated picture, then sends that site picture out directly
to the tactical user to include the HMMWV [High-Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle] on patrol. Last year alone, RED
DOT indications resulted in the find and removal of 235 IEDs
from the battlefield, a huge success for the program and a real
lifesaver for our men and women in harm's way.
In summary, the NRO remains committed to maintaining our
record of acquisition and mission success, while also
delivering a more persistent, resilient, and affordable future
architecture. I would be happy to follow up with you for more
detailed discussions as to how our systems directly support our
warfighters and the national security of the United States.
I want to thank the committee for the support you have
shown me and the men and women of the NRO. Thank you again for
the opportunity to be here today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sapp can be found in the
Appendix on page 53.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Ms. Sapp.
Mr. Klinger, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF GIL KLINGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, SPACE AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICE (AT&L), U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Mr. Klinger. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper, and members. It is my pleasure to be part of this
distinguished panel representing the spectrum of disciplines
that are key to ensuring the success of our space acquisition
programs, from policy and governance to acquisition oversight,
program execution, and, finally, to our critical partnership
with the intelligence
community.
In that vein, I would like to highlight the activities we
have undertaken to provide a coherent, balanced national
security space program that prepares for future challenges,
supports our strategic guidance, and represents our commitment
to accomplish these goals, while executing affordable programs,
improving efficiency and execution, and strengthening the
industrial base.
Last year, I testified that in fiscal year 2012, we
evaluated space acquisition reform initiatives. I am pleased to
report that in fiscal year 2013, these initiatives are
integrated into the Department's Better Buying Power 2.0 to
better manage the costs of acquisition, while achieving
affordable programs. We are refining our contract strategies to
incentivize productivity and innovation and to promote
effective competition.
This year, a significant example of promoting competition
includes the restructured, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
program, which will enable new commercial entrants to compete
with the incumbent launch provider. We are moving forward to
introduce competition as early as possible with a more
efficient contracting strategy for acquiring space launch
services and associated launch capabilities for the Department
of Defense and the intelligence community's satellite programs.
These actions resulted in an estimated savings of over $1
billion in the Future Year Defense Program, below the fiscal
year 2013 President's budget, without excessive and
unacceptable risk.
As we continue to consider potential alternative
acquisition and procurement strategies across the national
security space portfolio, we are committed to a disciplined
cost approach that incorporates full funding and incremental
funding. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Service
acquisition executives have established affordability targets
for the majority of our large critical space programs.
We are also assessing how to take better advantage of
commercial opportunities. We will continue to pursue more
production-oriented processes and quantities as part of each
overall mission architecture. This approach may result in
greater affordability and reduced time to fielding in the
future. Your authorization in fiscal year 2012 to incrementally
fund up to 6 fiscal years to procure two Advanced Extremely
High Frequency satellites and your fiscal year 2013
authorization to fund two Space-Based Infrared System
satellites are reflected in the fiscal year 2014 President's
budget.
As you know, we are committed to balancing the
modernization of mission capability with the associated risks,
both in acquisition and operations. It is paramount that we
deliver the capabilities the warfighter will need in the
future, given the evolving threats. The 2014 budget proposal
increased investments over last year in the Space Modernization
Initiative for missile warning to inform future acquisition
decisions and anticipate evolving threats.
Also, the savings from the Advanced Extremely High
Frequency fixed-price strategy will support continued Space
Modernization Initiative research and development activities.
Excuse me.
The Department is implementing various Better Buying Power
initiatives to make GPS [Global Positioning System] more
affordable and to ensure we sustain this critical global
utility. These include a modified acquisition strategy for the
current buy of GPS III satellites five through eight from a
cost-plus to a fixed-price contract to limit risk to the
Government and encourage the prime contractor to implement
cost-cutting measures.
In fiscal year 2014, the Department's budget proposal
requests funding for an assessment to determine if we can
accelerate the military GPS user equipment program and funds
the development of the next-generation operational control
system. Both are required to enable a new military signal to
further improve our GPS anti-jamming capability.
I am pleased to report in fiscal year 2012 we completed the
architecture studies for resilient-based satellite
communications, space control, and overhead persistent infrared
capabilities. These studies helped the Department frame
potential decision points for follow-on capability, including
alternatives to extend production for current programs.
In calendar year 2013, the Defense Space Council is
providing the senior steering for ongoing analysis of
alternatives for space-based environmental monitoring, space
situational awareness, and protected satellite communications.
The capabilities we are considering include commercial
augmentation, international cooperation, hosted payloads, and
other key changes to the way we have done the space business in
the past. All of these initiatives are included in our second
submission of the 15-year space investment plan.
Finally, thank you for your continued support. Overseeing
space acquisition requires a constant steady hand over a long
period of time. We appreciate your willingness to engage with
us as we consider all of the ramifications of the various
architecture alternatives, business models, and industry
impacts we are addressing to provide a space capability that
addresses warfighter needs, prepares for future challenges,
looks after the broad range of our taxpayer--of our national
security interests, and protects the United States taxpayer.
I look forward to reacting to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Klinger can be found in the
Appendix on page 63.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Klinger.
And, Mr. Loverro, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DOUG LOVERRO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, SPACE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Loverro. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify this afternoon.
A year ago, Ambassador Schulte testified here about the
Department's progress in implementing the national security
space strategy. I am pleased to join General Shelton, Ms. Sapp,
and Mr. Klinger to continue that discussion today.
Let me start with the basic reality that space remains
vital to our national security. But that evolving strategic
environment increasingly challenges U.S. space advantages,
advantages that both our warfighters and our adversaries have
come to appreciate. As space becomes more congested,
competitive, and contested, the Department must formulate
programs and policies that will secure those advantages in the
years to come.
That reality is juxtaposed with the fact that as a nation,
we are providing these capabilities in an environment that is
increasingly cost-constrained. The growing challenges of the
budget, in addition to the increasing external threats, compel
us to now think and act differently so that in the future what
we choose to procure and how we choose to provision it reflect
both the changed threat and fiscal environment.
While these two realities present a clear challenge, I do
not by any means view them with a sense of doom or gloom. New
entrepreneurial suppliers alongside our legacy suppliers are
creating an ever-burgeoning commercial space market that can
provide a significant advantage to the DOD if we formulate the
policies and strategies to encourage their growth and use.
Similarly, there has been a growth worldwide in allied
space investment in capability, and that provides significant
opportunities for the DOD to help us build resilience into our
space capabilities. The policies and strategies that I will
discuss today begin to address these challenges and
opportunities, but they are just the initial steps in an area
that will continue to demand attention and action from us all.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepard statement of Mr. Loverro can be found in the
Appendix on page 72.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I thank all of the witnesses.
We will now go into the question period of our hearing, and
I will start off first with General Shelton. An effective and
affordable space launch program is an essential capability for
the military. Please describe the policy for assured access to
space and how you plan to implement this policy and maintain
necessary launch capability, as well as to conduct a fair
evaluation during the potential future competition of certified
launch providers.
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, as you said, this is
foundational. We have got to have space launch capability,
access to space. What we have decided to do is continue with
our current provider, tremendous success record of United
Launch Alliance. We are so proud of the operational success we
have seen from them. However, launch is very expensive.
So we have opted to introduce competition, new entrants
into the business. However, having said that, we want to have
them certified to perform at the mission assurance standard
that we have come to expect, so there is a very rigorous
certification process that we will work through with these new
entrants, the ones that have established a statement of intent
with us that they want to have national security space launches
as part of their business base.
As we look to the future in trying to provide this level
playing field, this competitive playing field that is fair and
equitable to everyone involved, we have established a block-buy
strategy where we will buy 36 cores from United Launch
Alliance. We have reserved 14 core vehicles for competition.
United Launch Alliance, as well as certified new entrants, can
compete for those 14 launches.
That level playing field will be interesting to define, and
we are working through that right now. And the reason for that
is, we have decided to provide a launch capability with United
Launch Alliance that provides for the infrastructure, provides
for the operational crew force, provides all those baseline
capabilities that are necessary to have a space launch
capability, and then buy individual boosters, booster by
booster.
There is much more than just the booster cost, obviously,
in each space launch, so deciding how to allocate those across-
the-board capabilities in a per-launch basis will be a
challenge for us, but that is our strategy, that is our way
ahead.
Mr. Rogers. What is the timeline on that certification
process?
General Shelton. It actually depends on each provider, sir.
As they have launches, as they work through the certification
process with us, it is up to them. It is up to them to have
whatever pace they would like to have.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. And, General Shelton, would you consider
the ELC [Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Launch
Capability] a subsidy?
General Shelton. No, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Why not?
General Shelton. It is an efficient way to do business when
we have got a single launch provider, because it gives us the
operational flexibility we need, it gives us the ability to
exchange crews between East Coast and West Coast. It just
provides that foundational level that we need across the entire
enterprise.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Ms. Sapp, can you provide your perspective on the
importance of maintaining a launch capability and, in general,
the unique requirements of the NRO?
Ms. Sapp. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We do rely on Air Force to
provide a launch capability for us. We definitely leverage
their efforts. The NRO is reliant on ULA [United Launch
Alliance] right now, just as the Air Force is. We are doing our
own certification, again, in a very cooperative way with the
Air Force for other providers. We would hope that they are
ready by fiscal year 2015. We were actually on contract today
with SpaceX for a smaller mission, but we would expect them to
compete for a mission we have in 2015.
We are certainly the ones who use the West Coast most
often. And we are certainly the ones who use heavy lift most
often. So, again, we rely on what the Air Force provides in the
way of launch capability.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Changing topics, Mr. Loverro, are you aware of any
commercial satellite services the Department procures in which
the People's Republic of China has significant ownership
interest?
Mr. Loverro. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I am. We do lease some
satellite services from some Chinese companies right now to
support JUONS [Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements] that
were issued by some of our operational commanders early last
year.
Mr. Rogers. Do you see reasons why we should be concerned
about that?
Mr. Loverro. Mr. Chairman, I became aware of these leases
as I assumed this new post about a month ago. We initiated
discussions with DISA [Defense Information Systems Agency],
with the Joint Staff on better ways to go ahead and manage that
capability and decisions to enter into those arrangements. We
are looking forward to, in fact, coming out with a process that
would go ahead and examine those closely as we move forward.
Clearly, we have to go ahead and balance operational need
with the security arrangements there. In the case of this
particular lease, it was the only lease available to support
the operational need, but we also recognize that we need to
have a good process to assure this is vetted across the
Department.
Mr. Rogers. Great, thank you very much. The chair now
recognizes the ranking member for any questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The elephant in the room--and maybe I should say, in the
interest of bipartisanship, also the donkey in the room--this
startling statement from General Shelton on page 16 and 17 of
his testimony, when he said, quote, regarding sequestration,
``The chaos created in my command by operations and maintenance
reductions this large in this short time period cannot be
overstated.'' Then he goes on to say that, ``The rigidity in
the law dictates that we must cut every appropriated line item
in our budget, severely restricting our trade space. I strongly
ask for your support for the reprogramming actions that will be
needed to enable smarter decisions.''
When I hear chaos in any military program, I get worried.
And I want to give my colleagues a heads-up--and this doesn't
have to be my amendment--but I would encourage my colleagues to
jointly work together to figure out some way of granting
flexibility here so that we do not create chaos in an extremely
important branch of our military or in the--similar problems
are being felt throughout the military as a whole.
This does not suggest reducing the amount of cuts. It is
just allowing some flexibility. Whether it is in the form of
reprogramming or in other ways, I think this is an urgent
national priority. And I just appreciate General Shelton, by
having put it in clear language, although it was way back on
page 16 or 17 of the testimony, that we really need to consider
flexibility.
And, of course, the usual committee procedure would be to
wait for the NDAA and the markup process and--I am even
thinking that perhaps this should be a standalone effort to go
ahead, because, you know, tomorrow, we will vote on the helium
reserve. You know, today we quit work at, what, 1:30 in the
afternoon? You know, there has got to be a more timely way to
address this problem, again, not reducing the amount of the
cuts, but granting the necessary flexibility so that we are not
creating chaos in the space service or other parts of our
military.
So just a quick heads-up. It doesn't have to be my
approach. I would be honored to co-sponsor an approach
sponsored by the majority. But there has got to be a way to
minimize the effect of sequester on the Pentagon.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity
to put in my two cents' worth. And I don't know if General
Shelton wants to add to that, but you made this most clear in
your testimony.
General Shelton. Thank you, sir. And you are exactly right.
It is not so much the level of the cut--although none of us
want to take cuts--but it is the rigidity in the law that
requires every line item to be cut. So it gives you no
opportunity to make smart trades. We just have to take the cuts
as mechanically assigned.
Mr. Rogers. And I thank the gentleman, and I agree with his
concerns and would like to see something done. I will be
talking with the full committee chairman and seeing if there is
anything intended during our upcoming activities.
But with that, we will turn to Mr. Lamborn for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Shelton, I want to ask you about the joint mission
systems program, which is an important program, since it is
responsible for tracking and analyzing our space assets. I know
this program has had some challenges. It is difficult to
replace and upgrade the old, fragile system. This committee has
strongly supported using commercial technology to upgrade the
system faster and to save money, and I understand the Air Force
is now starting to incorporate commercial software solutions.
But I am concerned, after reviewing the proposed budget
request, that there appears to be some slippage and delay in
integrating commercial technologies. Can you tell me where you
stand on this? And could you provide me an update and a
briefing personally in the next couple weeks on how we can
accelerate this process?
General Shelton. Yes, sir. I would be glad to provide the
briefing. But as you may recall, what we have designed here is
a very open architecture system, taking advantage as we can of
not only Government off-the-shelf software, but also commercial
off-the-shelf software. We are now on contract with two
providers of that commercial off-the-shelf software to provide
some very interesting capability for both visualization and
computational power.
So this is the system that provides the foundation for
space situational awareness. It will in the future, once we get
all the capabilities included, give us the ability to fuse all
sorts of data from disparate sources, so it is not just the
dedicated Government space surveillance capabilities, but we
can also ingest data from commercial providers, from
potentially other governments, allies, so on and so forth. So
we are very happy with where this is going. We would like for
the pace to be a little bit faster. We are subject--it is
almost a level of effort kind of build to funding, if you will,
kind of program.
So as we take cuts like we did from the HAC [House
Appropriations Committee] this last year, it adjusts the
program downward a little bit, slows it down a little bit, but
we will come back up on plane here very shortly with the
program.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you very much.
Mr. Loverro, the Department proposed to terminate the
Operationally Responsive Space program again in fiscal year
2014. The threats to our space systems are real, and ORS
[Operationally Responsive Space] has streamlined acquisition
capabilities to address urgent warfighter needs. Congress has
expressed the importance of this program, both in law through
the 2007 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], and most
recently in the 2013 authorization and appropriations acts,
which provided funding for ORS, despite the Department's
request to cancel it.
How does the Department plan to address the needs that are
intended to be met by Operationally Responsive Space?
Mr. Loverro. Thank you, Congressman. The Department clearly
got the Congress's message on ORS. We have, as directed in
legislation, stood--formed our executive committee, led by the
Secretary of the Air Force in his role as the executive agent
for space, and that charter has now been promulgated through
the Department.
We have moved the ORS office that was still in existence
under the Space and Missile System Center, under Air Force
Space Command, under General Shelton's leadership. We recognize
that, obviously, in budget--because of budget restrictions,
there were still choices that needed to be made in terms of
where we were going to take money from, and yet we also
recognize the value of ORS as part of that resilient strategy
that we talked about.
We are working now to go ahead and figure out how we would
make it a better part of that strategy and how we go ahead and
reformulate the program to address those needs.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
And lastly, General Shelton, real quickly here, GPS jamming
remains something that we have to be very concerned about. As a
result, Air Force has been developing the next generation
satellite constellation, GPS III. Can you give us a status
report on this and how many GPS III satellites the Air Force
would like to procure?
General Shelton. Yes, sir. We are in contract right now--as
Mr. Klinger said in his opening statement--we are on contract
through satellite vehicle number eight. Satellite vehicles nine
and beyond, the acquisition strategy for that will be debated
in the fall, and his office will be right in the middle of
that.
But we have got a very active GPS III program, that we are
proud of the progress of it, and we will continue to look to
the future on what is beyond the contracted one through eight.
Mr. Lamborn. And is it better to continue that, as opposed
to starting a whole new fourth generation?
General Shelton. That is the decision we will have to make
in the fall. It seems like the answer would be yes, but we will
study that.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
panel for all that you do in a very complex arena.
In a hearing last week, the issue of ISR came up. You
probably have heard about it. I think I said it seems to be
confused as to exactly what the Air Force wants to do, what the
Navy wants to do, maybe reconnaissance, also. I am not asking
for the answer here, but we really need to get into a
comprehensive understanding of what exactly we need to do.
Ms. Sapp, you raised one of the issues that would come out
of it, and that is the current work that is being done in
Afghanistan. It appears as though the assumption is that the
assets that are currently used in Afghanistan won't be needed
in the future. And everything I hear from others is that that
is not likely to be the case.
So my point here is that we need to understand and the
confusion that is apparent from the various elements of the ISR
community need to be integrated and fully understood, because
we are likely to make the wrong decision here based upon the
confusion that we are being presented with. So I will let that
go at that.
There are a series of questions. I want to go to Mr.
Loverro. In your response to the China issue, your response was
incomplete. What exactly were you talking about, if you can
answer the question here?
Mr. Loverro. Congressman, I am not sure exactly which part
is incomplete, but let me try to restate it and maybe you will
help me along. We are--we recognize that there are concerns
across the community on the usage of Chinese satellites to
support our warfighter, and yet as I expressed, we also
recognize that our warfighters need support and sometimes we
must go to the only place that we can get it from.
All of the correct procedures were followed in putting
those leases together. We reviewed all the security concerns,
all of the business concerns with such a lease. Those were
presented to the operational commander, who understood those--
all the encryption necessary to protect U.S. information was
put into place.
So from that perspective, I am very pleased with what we
did. And yet I think the larger issue is, we don't have a clear
policy laid out on how do we assess whether or not we want to
do this as a Department, as opposed to just a response to a
need. And so what we have decided with DISA and with the Joint
Staff is that we would look at how we put together a process to
do so.
I can't tell you any more on what that process will
involve, because we just decided on this literally a week-and-
a-half ago.
Mr. Garamendi. I think you just supplemented my point about
confusion. I should ask you exactly, what was it that the
warfighters needed? And why didn't we have it?
Mr. Loverro. Congressman, I can't tell you why we didn't
have it. What I can tell you is that the warfighter needed
SATCOM [satellite communications] support in his area of
operations. He went to the Defense Information Services Agency
to request that support. In their process, they send out bids
to their multiple providers. I think they have 17 on contract.
I am not certain of that number, if you will let me correct
that later if I need to.
They went out to their providers. Only one provider was
able to respond to the need. That is to say, only one provider
had bandwidth available in order to go ahead and give them, and
that bandwidth's available only on a Chinese satellite. And so
that is the communication capability that DISA presented to the
operational commander, who understood what was involved, how it
was being handled, and accepted that to meet his need.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you for the completeness of the
answer and the confirmation of the need for us to have full
understanding of the ISR requirements, whether they are
satellite, ground-based, or UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle], or
manned. We are being asked to make significant changes, but
there doesn't appear to be a comprehensive understanding or
vision of what is needed. So we will go with that.
I am going to yield back my remaining 42 seconds, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Coffman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Shelton, as I understand it, the current EELV
[Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle] provider, United Launch
Alliance, meets the full spectrum of capabilities across the
EELV manifest as outlined by the operations and systems
requirements. Will new entrants be required to provide launch
services across the full spectrum of EELV launches, even the
most heavy and complicated mission payloads, as the incumbent
provider currently does?
General Shelton. Congressman, that is the going-in
position. That is not to say that that won't change, but the
going-in position is that the new entrants would have to come
with that full suite of capability, but as we compete for those
14 launches in the future, those will be launch by launch. So
as we work through those, it could be that it is not a full
capability across the board.
But that is our going-in position. We want to have--we
don't want to have a launch provider that is just in one little
niche. We want them to have the full segment of capability.
Mr. Coffman. Well, then do you believe that having a system
that doesn't require the full spectrum creates an uneven
playing field for the incumbent, given that they must maintain
capabilities and costs across the entire spectrum?
General Shelton. That remains to be seen, sir. I mean, we
will have to judge that at the time, because there could be a
host of providers that cover the full spectrum. It is all about
assured access to space and mission assurance, so we are just
going to have to work our way through this as this matures.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. General Shelton and Mr. Klinger and Mr.
Loverro, through the Enhanced View program, commercial space
imagery is utilized to provide rapid delivery of mission-
critical, unclassified imagery for U.S. and coalition partner
missions. This is the only source of unclassified high-
resolution imagery that can be immediately disseminated and
shared with U.S. and coalition partners. This program was cut
by 50 percent in fiscal year 2013, and now there is only one
U.S. vendor supplying this imagery.
Will you support stable funding of the remaining portion of
the contracts so that this extremely valuable capability is not
lost or weakened? Why don't we start with General Shelton?
General Shelton. Sir, I am going to have to let someone
else answer that question.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
General Shelton. That is really not in my area.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Klinger.
Mr. Klinger. I think, overall, we certainly support
stability in funding that program, but with--as you understand,
Congressman, with sequestration going on and the fiscal
environment, budgetary environment that we are in, many things
are under review right now, so there is no question that we
support the President's budget at this point, which provides
for the continued services of that one provider. We will just
have to see in the ensuing months how this develops.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Loverro.
Mr. Loverro. Congressman, a little bit out of my wheelhouse
in this particular issue. I certainly agree with everything
that Mr. Klinger just said. Clearly, Enhanced View provides a
capability to the warfighter. Again, we have to go ahead and
examine in this budget environment how we maintain that
capability into the future. I don't think I have anything else
to add to that.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. General Shelton, maybe you can answer
this. How did the Air Force determine what satellite payloads
to set aside for competition? And which programs were part of
the ULA block buy?
General Shelton. Sir, the only ones we have actually set
aside so far are two that are really more research and
development, science and technology kinds of efforts, and we
felt like we could perhaps take a little bit more risk. So
rather than our--one of our mainstream programs, which is very
critical to national security, we could set aside these couple
of efforts here and assume just a little bit more risk.
And the advantage of that, of course, is furthering the
competition in new entrants and so on and so forth.
Mr. Coffman. General Shelton, will the future EELV launch
providers be required to comply with data requirements and cost
accounting standards of similar programs and included certified
cost or price data to protect the taxpayers' interest?
General Shelton. Yes, sir. They would be held to the same
standards.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the chairman emeritus of the
committee, Mr. Turner of Ohio.
Mr. Turner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
that, yes. Thank you. Mr. Garamendi just pointed out that that
translates to ``has-been.'' I don't know.
[Laughter.]
Thank you for that vote of confidence.
Before I ask my question, I just wanted to say one thing on
the ranking member, who I have a great deal of respect for. We
are going to have significant amount of debate here on
sequestration and what needs to occur. I, for one, as many of
this panel are aware, because I frequently pointed out, I voted
against this mess because I was afraid we would be right here,
right where we are, in a stalemate without any solution.
But I want to caution against a rush to provide
flexibility, because as the ranking member stated, it would not
reduce the amount of cuts--and I am very fearful that we would
be in a timeframe--in a time where the sequestration number
becomes the new norm. And many of the cuts that sequestration
are going to inflict are not going to result in savings. They
are actually going to result in increased costs later.
And my concern is, as we just heard from the commandant of
the Marines and General Odierno today, that both of them state
that at the sequestration numbers, that they would be unable to
have confidence of success in one major conflict where our
national strategy has been frequently two.
So although, you know, I certainly agree that what is
occurring is wrong and should not be done, I know we are going
to be receiving--and I don't want to give the General chills--
as we are going to be receiving a major request for
reprogramming, I certainly think that level of cooperation
between Congress and DOD and the Pentagon needs to occur, but a
broad flexibility, I think, would impose that number, which I
think is the wrong number on the Department of Defense. So as
that debate continues, I just want to caution there.
General Shelton, the Department has made very significant
improvements in Overhead Persistent Infrared, or OPIR. And the
newest Air Force satellite, satellite Space-Based Infrared
Systems, SBIRS, doing amazing work, as we all know, in the--
what is highly needed in the area of missile warning, missile
defense, battle space awareness, and technical intelligence.
Last year, we included in the NDAA a provision requesting
information on the exploitation of that information.
Specifically in section 915, we asked for an assessment of
whether there are further opportunities for the Department of
Defense and the intelligence community to capitalize on
increased data-sharing, fusion, interoperability, and
exploitation.
My question goes to, have you seen some successes in that
cooperation and the sharing of that information the like that
our committee was hoping would occur? And also, if you could
indicate any role that you see that NASIC [National Air and
Space Intelligence Center] plays in that area of sharing that
information, thank you.
General Shelton. Yes, sir. NASIC has been at the forefront
of OPIR exploitation for quite some time. In fact, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency has designated them as the
center of excellence for that kind of work. We turn to them for
not only new ways to apply that data, but also the exploitation
of that data to look at--to identify new types of missiles to
provide what we call templates for those missiles so that we
can quickly identify, when one of those missiles launches, we
can say that is that type of missile. That is the work that
goes on at NASIC.
There has been incredible sharing between Ms. Sapp's
people, our folks, NASIC, cooperating across the board to
further the ability of us to exploit this wonderful data that
is coming off SBIRS. And we have not even scratched the
surface, I think, of the potential that is there.
We have another sensor that we haven't fully exploited yet
as part of that satellite. We are doing a good job on the
scanning sensor. The staring sensor, which has much better
fidelity, we really haven't fully wrung out yet, because we
have been so focused on getting the scanning sensor calibrated
and certified.
So I think NASIC is going to be right in the forefront of
that and the cooperation between us, Ms. Sapp's people, the NGA
people, I think, is going to just further that effort.
Mr. Turner. Well, General, on a personal note, I told you
before this hearing, I know the members of this committee and
myself personally greatly appreciate your strong voice and your
highly substantive expertise. You have been a great assistance
to this committee, as we have looked to, you know, what is
really occurring and how do we need to respond, and thank you
for your personal dedication.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman yields back.
The chair now recognizes my colleague from Alabama, Mr.
Brooks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to echo some of the comments of my good friend
from the State of Ohio, Congressman Turner, and his comments
concerning sequestration. While flexibility is good, proper
funding for national security is better. The President's
sequestration idea, which was promoted by the Republican House
leadership, the Democrat Senate leadership, and a majority of
the Democrats in Congress and a majority of the Republicans in
Congress, quite frankly, is, as the President said in his State
of the Union, a bad idea.
It is inappropriate to make national defense absorb over 60
percent of the cuts in the Budget Control Act, when it is only
16 percent, 17 percent of total Federal Government spending.
That is not proper prioritization, in my judgment. And as an
aside, that is why I voted against the Budget Control Act in
August of 2011.
Having said that, General Shelton, quick question for you.
Does the current Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle provider
meet the full spectrum of capabilities across the EELV manifest
as outlined by the operations and systems requirements, which
in turn are as articulated in the operational requirements
document and systems requirements document?
General Shelton. Easy answer, sir, and that is yes.
Mr. Brooks. Will any new entrants into this market be
required to provide launch services across the full spectrum of
EELV launches, even the most heavily and complicated mission
payloads, as the incumbent provider is so required?
General Shelton. Yes, sir, that is our going-in position.
However, as we work our way through this and we look at the
ability of new entrants to compete for launches, we may adjust
that strategy. But our going-in position is they will have to
meet the full spectrum.
Mr. Brooks. Well, if new entrants are allowed to ignore
some elements, does that create an uneven playing field, in
your judgment, for the incumbent provider who must maintain
capabilities across the full EELV spectrum and those added
costs associated with those added stringent requirements?
General Shelton. Yes, sir, that is something we are going
to have to assess as we go.
Mr. Brooks. On a different issue now, General Shelton, the
Air Force currently launches all of its major satellites in a
single launch configuration, but this year's budget includes a
request for development of a dual-launch capability for the GPS
mission. Why is this important to the Air Force? And what are
the anticipated savings or advantages?
General Shelton. Yes, sir, this is all about lowering
launch costs, so if we can put two GPSs together on a little
bit bigger booster than what we launch on today, we believe
that there will be a significant savings. I can't give you a
dollar figure right off the top of my head here, but I could
get that for you.
We believe that that will be the best way to launch GPSs in
the future. And we are talking about GPS III satellite vehicle
nine and out. The die is already cast one through eight, but
nine and out, that is what we are looking at.
Mr. Brooks. And this next question is for the full panel,
whomever may wish to jump on it. As many of you are aware, we
have considerable reliance on liquid rocket technology from
decades ago. While our EELV launch program is extremely
successful, it stretches the performance to the limits of what
the engines were designed for. Should we be prioritizing
efforts for liquid rocket engine development? And if so, is the
greatest need in the upper stage or main engines? And lastly,
how is the Department working with NASA [National Aeronautics
and Space Administration] to ensure scarce resources in this
area are properly utilized?
Mr. Klinger. Congressman, the Air Force is reviewing the
terms offered by ULA in the block-buy strategy to determine the
optimum contract terms for annual quantity buys. And what that
is doing is stabilizing the supplier market for liquid rocket
engines. In addition, the new entrant, the onset of competition
and the prospect of competition is also stimulating some work
in the industrial base.
We have needs for both main stage and upper stage, and I
will be glad to take for the record to provide you a more
detailed answer. We do also work very closely with NASA on a
number of fronts, and both Ms. Sapp's organization, General
Shelton's organization work in strong partnership with NASA on
issues such as the liquid rocket industrial base.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the
remainder of my time.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes my colleague from Texas, Mr.
Veasey, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I appreciate
that.
And just wanted to just talk with you about the--looking
forward in the future, about what we need to be doing to make
sure that we maintain, I guess, superiority as far as space is
concerned, from a defense standpoint. I know that, you know, we
are always concerned about other countries developing
technologies rapidly and quickly. And, like, where are we at as
far as space and defense and how that all relates versus other
countries that may be also trying to develop these same sort of
strategies that we have or technologies that we have? And
anyone that can answer the question, be happy to----
General Shelton. [Off mike.]
Mr. Loverro. Thank you, General Shelton.
Congressman, yes, this is--you know, as you know, in the
space policy promulgated in 2010 by the President and the
national space security strategy that we published a little bit
later in 2011, we recognized fully the growing concerns in
threats to our space
systems.
I think we have a multifaceted strategy to go ahead and
deal with those across the lines of industrial competitiveness,
some of which we have already talked about in the launch
market, but just as thoroughly in the satellite side, as well,
resilience efforts, trying to go ahead and make sure that our
architectures are adjusted as we move to the future to be far
more resilient against any enemy attacks, protection efforts
that we can't necessarily talk about in here, but that we are
looking at for all of our space systems, and then, quite
frankly, and probably most importantly, the space situational
awareness efforts that General Shelton has already mentioned to
make sure we understand what is going on in space, and those we
feel are foundational to the protection of our space systems
and clearly one of the strongest parts of our investment going
forward.
All of those come together to try to address the concerns
that we see in the future from adversary nations. Clearly, we
are at the beginning of this endeavor. And I think we will be
happy to talk to you more about those as we move forward.
Mr. Veasey. Just out of curiosity, are there other
countries outside of obvious places like China that may also be
competing in this arena that we may not be aware of? Or not--I
say that we may not be aware of, that may not be talked about
as often as, let's say, what is going with our--you know,
competition with the Chinese on just about everything?
Mr. Loverro. Yes, Congressman. I don't want to go ahead and
go into specifics here today, if you will allow me----
Mr. Veasey. Okay.
Mr. Loverro [continuing]. Come back and give you a clearer
view, but we are aware of most activities across the world in
this regard.
Mr. Veasey. Okay, thank you.
General Shelton. Sir, if you would let me follow up, if you
consider our military operations for the last 21 years, 22
years, since 1991, we have been in major combat operations
sustained over that time. Other nations have had the
opportunity to go to school on us. They know how involved we
are with space capabilities, how integrated they are, and it is
a nice way to asymmetrically challenge us and our combat
capabilities.
So it doesn't take a whole lot of imagination to figure out
what they might be up to in terms of space capabilities and
what they would do to our space capabilities, given the
opportunity. So it is a large concern of ours, and it is clear
to us that not only with the budget challenges, but with the
increasing threats, the status quo just won't do.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes my colleague from Florida, Mr.
Nugent, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Nugent. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. And,
General, thank you so much for your service, and Ms. Sapp, too,
we appreciate it. And I know Mr. Loverro was also in the
service. We appreciate all of you.
And particularly as we talk about space--and Mr. Veasey hit
on China in regards to--you know, they have taken some
proactive actions in regards to showing that they have at least
the capability or the intent to neutralize satellites in space.
In an unclassified setting, could you tell me a little bit
about how we think we are going to be--and you talk about
resiliency--how we going to react to that? And is there a ``red
line'' in regards to their actions?
General Shelton. Well, I will start. Red lines are policy
questions, so I will have to punt that to Mr. Loverro. But in
terms of how we react, we can't get into much detail here, but
let me talk about the threat for just a second.
If you go back to 2007, we saw the Chinese very
successfully test an ASAT [anti-satellite] capability. That is
not easy. Technologically, that is not easy. That is literally
a bullet with a bullet, and they did a very good job.
Unfortunately, they generated tens of thousands of pieces of
debris at the same time, and I would call that polluting the
low-Earth orbit, which makes operations for some of our mission
partners quite a challenge.
So I think we need to pay very close attention to
activities there. I think there are technological capabilities
that have been revealed there that we need to pay attention to.
Mr. Nugent. And it is not only the kinetic, obviously, but
we have issues in regards to the nonkinetic ability. The GAO
[Government Accountability Office] annual report hit on a
duplication overlap and fragmentation of space launch
acquisition process for NASA and DOD, that they are not
formally coordinated, that they may duplicate one another and
may not really fully leverage our ability in our investment for
space exploration, but also space
defense.
What are we doing to--and this could go to any one of you--
what are we doing to work with NASA to see that we are getting
the best bang for our buck?
Mr. Klinger. Congressman, we believe that we work very
closely throughout the Department of Defense with the
intelligence community, with Ms. Sapp's organization and Air
Force Space Command and the corporate Air Force, along with
NASA, on a whole range of fronts. We have extensive R&D
cooperation in the propulsion area. We combine efforts--the new
entrant certification guide that you heard General Shelton talk
about, which underpins competition, was actually jointly
developed by NASA, the Air Force, and the NRO, so it is a
combined activity.
So we think there is actually a high level of cooperation
in those areas where cooperation makes the most sense. We don't
think there is unnecessary overlap amongst the different
efforts. We do think there are places where requirements--our
mission requirements legitimately diverge, the best example
being NASA's requirement for human rating, and that imposes a
level of requirements that is somewhat different and arguably
more stringent in certain ways than are the requirements
associated with the satellite launch--the booster programs that
support the satellite launches that we provide, but we believe
that there is a high level of cooperation ongoing on a number
of fronts on a routine basis.
Mr. Nugent. So that report--obviously, you know, GAO puts
out reports that are somewhat broad-brushed. And you didn't see
anything that would heighten our attention to it, in regards to
waste? I mean----
Mr. Klinger. I did not, sir.
Mr. Nugent. Okay.
General.
General Shelton. I would just say that I believe that--at
its basis--they would advocate for a single contractual
vehicle, and I just don't think that is very realistic.
Mr. Nugent. Possible.
General Shelton. I mean, as Mr. Klinger said, there is a
tremendous amount of cooperation among the space partners in
this Government. So it doesn't concern me.
Mr. Nugent. I appreciate it. Appreciate your comments, and
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes himself for a second round of
questions. General Shelton, I believe we both agree on the
level of threat to our space systems and the need to develop
necessary space defenses and a resilient architecture. But
there seems to be a significant focus on the disaggregation as
the solution to address this. To what extent has DOD validated
the assertion that disaggregated architectures offer greater
resiliency, operational efficiency, and/or cost savings?
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, those studies are under way
right now. We haven't leapt on that bandwagon yet, but it
appears to us, from the results that we have seen so far, that
there is an advantage to disaggregation. As I said earlier,
with the budget reductions that are here upon us now, with the
threat that is here upon us now and further developing, there
is a recognition that the status quo is just not adequate.
So we have to do something for sure to--even if the budget
was restored, we have to do something for sure to address the
threat. And part of that solution set that we have come to thus
far has been, let's disaggregate these large, monolithic
satellites into less complex, smaller satellites, and at least
complicate the targeting calculus for an adversary.
So that is what we are about. We are still studying these
things. We haven't made any decisions yet, but it sure looks
promising.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Sapp, what are your thoughts on this
resiliency issue and disaggregation in particular?
Ms. Sapp. I think it is very mission-specific, in terms of
what the satellites are supposed to be doing for the Nation. So
for us, disaggregation doesn't work as well, and we are taking
steps to provide resilience through both ground measures and
space-based measures, and we certainly rely on the Air Force to
provide space situational awareness.
So, again, we have measures we have in place today, and
certainly more we are adding in the fiscal year 2014 plan.
Mr. Rogers. Great, thank you.
I want to talk about commercial satellites right now with
Mr. Klinger and Mr. Loverro. The Defense Business Board
recently finished an interesting study on commercial satellite
services. The study showed we could save money if we procure
commercial satellites services more efficiently. What efforts
are under way in the Department to address this issue? And we
will start with you, Mr. Klinger.
Mr. Klinger. Mr. Chairman, you are right. It was our boss,
Mr. Kendall, that went to Dr. Carter, the deputy secretary, and
proposed that study that turned into the Defense Business
Board. Building on those results, the Department has initiated
a 90-day study to determine the best way forward, and Mr.
Kendall announced this a couple of weeks ago. It is a study
that will be jointly led by the Under Secretary for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the CIO [Chief
Information Officer], who has a lot of supervisory
responsibilities in this area, and the focus will be on how
best the Department can move forward to take better advantage
of commercial goods and services in a commercial communications
space area.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Loverro.
Mr. Loverro. Certainly, Congressman. I, number one, concur
wholeheartedly with everything that Mr. Klinger says. This is a
key area for us, as I indicated in my opening comments. The
leveraging of commercial space is one of the hallmarks of how
we are going to move forward, both building resilience and to
go ahead and address the budget issues we have. Commercial
space has grown immensely over the last two decades. We have
taken advantage of them in a--in what many have considered--and
I think with the report you quoted--it is not the best economic
approach, and we recognize that, and we recognize that there is
a need to change that.
The study that Mr. Klinger talked about, I think, is the
exact right way to address the best way to go ahead and do
that.
Mr. Rogers. You know, I was troubled by the fact the report
also notes that no senior official claims sole responsibility
for SATCOM, and multiple DOD officials asserted ownership of
key components of SATCOM. What is being done about this
leadership issue, if anything? Mr. Klinger.
Mr. Klinger. I think that is within the scope of the study,
is we are not just going to look externally, Mr. Chairman, in
terms of our relationship with industry, but one of the things
that this study is going to look at is our internal processes
both in terms of statute and policy, as well as how we are
organized to manage and adjudicate commercial satellite goods
and services, and that is one of the issues that will be within
the scope of this 90-day study.
Mr. Rogers. Well, good. Well, in these days of austerity,
that is something that we need to be focused on like a laser.
Mr. Klinger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. The chair now recognizes the ranking member for
any additional questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I could return to the topic of sequestration, I have
great respect for my colleagues who also focused on this topic.
And without being in any way adversarial, I would just like to
point out for the record that the Commander of Space Command in
his testimony said that he needed flexibility. And without
having that flexibility, we have what he described as chaos,
which could not be overstated in his command.
Now, that would mean to me, trying to read in the
testimony, that he needs flexibility. Now, that is perhaps not
all that he would like to have--and I don't in any way want to
limit General Shelton--because you are entitled to ask for more
money, as well--but in your testimony, you acutely need right
now flexibility. And yet that is what Congress is not
providing.
So reprogramming authority would help reduce the chaos or
help the command. I am for it. There are many other things I
would like to have, but I don't want the best to be the enemy
of the good. And in the meantime, shouldn't we be reducing
chaos in Space
Command?
Now, that is the flexibility issue. And I am not for
holding Space Command or any part of the military hostage until
I get what I want, because I want you to have flexibility now
when you need it.
On the issue of more funding, I think all of us on this
committee would like more funding. Right now, we don't quite
know how to get it. So in the meantime, let's offer
flexibility.
Now, there are ways, probably, to provide more funding. You
know, the House has passed a budget--as it usually does--now
for the first time in 4 or 5 years. Even the Senate has passed
a budget. But we are refusing to conference the budgets, so
that is our fault, and we should not punish the military or
Space Command for that failure to even have a conference
committee.
I hope, perhaps, one side or the other will relent and we
can have a conference committee, regular order, and actually
maybe agree on a budget. That would be nice. But in the
meantime, we need flexibility. So let's consider granting
flexibility.
I am not trying to be argumentative or hard here. I am just
saying, here we have a commander who is doing an excellent job,
pointing out a need. Shouldn't we on the subcommittee and in
the full HASC [House Armed Services Committee] consider meeting
that need? That shouldn't be too hard. And let's work on the
money issue at the same time, and I hope we can get more money,
because that would ease a lot of problems.
But this is an amazing situation, where we are choosing not
to listen to our commanders, when they clearly express a need.
We all have ears. We have got to use them and try to help out
when we can, because I think this is a problem that is
Congress-inflicted. It is really a self-inflicted wound. And we
should not take out this disagreement on our men and women in
uniform or in our valuable other agencies that, in my opinion,
are doing an extraordinary job of serving the needs of the
nation, even during these very difficult circumstances.
So as I say, I don't want to be argumentative. I just want
us to logically try to figure out a way to solve this problem.
And I appreciate the excellent job that the witnesses before us
are doing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Coffman for any additional
questions he may have.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a quick
statement. A comment to what Mr. Cooper has said. I think he
raised two points.
First, I think, conferencing on the budget, I--you know,
the budget is merely a blueprint to show priorities in
spending. And so it is a nonbinding document. I don't know that
that is important for us to conference there, but I think what
is important that Mr. Cooper said is the need for flexibility.
I think that I am disappointed in my colleagues on both sides
of the aisle, to include the President, when they don't want to
give flexibility merely to prove a point, to show how bad
sequestration is in order to gain more funding or to gain a tax
increase, where I think we need flexibility for purposes of
national security.
We need flexibility across the board to allow Government to
work. And this notion that we are going to show the American
taxpayers how Government can't work by not giving them
flexibility is simply the wrong path. And so I certainly second
Mr. Cooper's comments when it comes to providing that
flexibility.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes another chairman emeritus, Mr.
Langevin of Rhode Island, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
holding this hearing before us, and I want to thank our
witnesses for being here today, as well.
Well, let me start off by saying that I would first like to
note this has been a pretty eventful week in the week of the
space launch world, with the successful launch of the Orbital
Sciences Antares vehicle on the practice space station resupply
mission. I think we would all agree, the successful launch of
Antares puts Orbital in a similar trajectory, if you will
pardon the pun, with SpaceX.
And obviously, if SpaceX continues forward on its plan to
build the Falcon 9 Heavy and the--and Orbital is successful,
these two companies will be positioned to satisfy the Air
Force's demanding requirement to have a dual-launch capability
and a heavy-launch capability. In other words, if SpaceX and
Orbital proceed as planned, achieving the ``new entrant''
criteria appears almost certain. And thus, the Government would
be well-positioned to reduce their launch course radically.
So--and this is before we even start to consider other entrants
that could compete down the line, such as Lockheed Martin or--
and ATK.
So if all of the above proceeds as planned and these new
entrants are certified within 3 years contractually, my
question is, how difficult will it be to move the majority of
our launches to a less expensive provider? And more
specifically, has the Air Force provisioned termination options
within the block-buy acquisitions? And if so, how will the
program comply with the Federal acquisitions regulations by
which the program evaluates market research and alternative
sources? And what would be the transition costs in that case?
General, let's start with you.
General Shelton. Yes, sir. We have designed this block-buy
approach with that flexibility in mind. So we have--we are
committing to 36 cores with ULA preserving these 14 cores for
competition. That will certainly prime the pump, so to speak,
on new
entrants.
So if they get certified, they can compete for those 14
launches. And then beyond the 5-year acquisition timeline for
this new block buy, then it is a brand-new competition, all
players involved, all certified players involved.
Mr. Langevin. Okay, very good. Before my time expires, then
let me turn to something else. With regard to commercial
imagery, our international competitors are not letting up, as
some are currently selling imagery at resolutions below what we
are protecting via export controls. And others are gearing up
to do the same.
So in order to sustain our industry's competitiveness,
would you support a relook at commercial remote-sensing export
restrictions currently listed in the section 1248 report
regarding space export control policy reform? Modernization of
these items, some would, I would say, would help ensure our
satellite industry remains not only made in America, but also
second-to-none.
Mr. Loverro. Yes, Congressman. Certainly, as technology
marches on, we recognize the need to adjust our policies, and
so we definitely would support a relook as we move forward.
Mr. Langevin. Okay, I would encourage that. I think that is
important.
Let me turn to this. As the Air Force and, to some extent,
the National Reconnaissance Office currently fund
infrastructure and other facility support costs for the
incumbent provider in order to help the committee to understand
the current arrangement of the contract with the incumbent, can
you describe why cost-plus vehicle is in place, given the
maturity of the program?
General Shelton. I guess I don't know the basis of why--
specifically why that was decided to be cost-plus.
Mr. Klinger. Yes, I think, if we may, we would take that
for the record and get you--get you a more detailed answer,
Congressman.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 85.]
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Fair enough. I will take that one for
the record. I see my time is about to expire, as well. I will
yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Garamendi, for any additional questions he may have.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to continue to pursue some of the questions
that Mr. Cooper has raised. General Shelton, the--you have
asked for flexibility. I assume that is flexibility within your
domain and not--or are you talking about flexibility within the
entire Department of Defense?
General Shelton. Yes, sir. Again, the mechanics of the law,
every line-item appropriation hit----
Mr. Garamendi. I understand.
General Shelton. So the flexibility would be--let us make
those choices internal to the Department and make
prioritization decisions, as opposed to those decisions being
preordained.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. So it is within the entire Department
of Defense budget, not just your budget?
General Shelton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. If you had the opportunity to prioritize
within your budget, what would you eliminate or reduce?
General Shelton. Well, that is a very good question. I
would like to be able to--I would like to have the flexibility
to line the programs up one to n, and we look across the board
and determine, which programs are we going to--at the lower end
of the priorities, which programs would we actually cut in
terms of paying operations and maintenance bills, in terms of
sustaining our acquisition programs whole.
What is being built up here--and I don't think everyone
realizes this--but as you take these bites out of every
program, there is a bow wave of expenses that are going to the
right here. At some point in the future, these bills come due,
and it may be next year.
Mr. Garamendi. Bow wave? Is that an appropriate term for
the Air Force?
[Laughter.]
General Shelton. It could be a term of art.
Mr. Garamendi. It worked. It worked. We understood it. I
think you have just described the conundrum that we are going
to face. All members of the House Armed Services Committee have
their favorite programs, and the prioritization process, if it
requires our involvement, is likely to lead to a difficult and
probably a time-consuming process, which is the normal NDAA.
You, I suspect, do not want to have to go through all of that,
and I suspect your colleagues in the other parts of the
Department of Defense don't,
either.
And so I think what Mr. Cooper is probably--I will speak
for him for a moment--a blanket authority to prioritize, to
achieve the $85--whatever--the billion dollars that would be
required, is going to result in some of our sacred cows being
sacrificed.
That may be a good thing at the end of the day. But
nonetheless, therein lies the problem that I think you are
going to face, not that we should not do it, but that we would
like to know what you are going to reduce, prioritize, so that
we might participate in what is ultimately our authority.
I will let it go at that, but that is a process that would
have to--I think have to take place from Mr. Cooper's
suggestion to become law. And I do think his suggestion should
become law. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman for yielding back.
The chair believes--is led to believe that the gentleman
from Rhode Island would like to be recognized again?
Mr. Langevin. If I could, just----
Mr. Rogers. Absolutely.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One last question, if I could, General Shelton or Mr.
Klinger. What is the status of the new acquisition strategy for
the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program? How did the Air
Force determine which satellite payloads to set aside for
competition? And which programs were part of the ULA block buy?
And finally, how does the Air Force plan to manage this
competition to ensure a level playing field?
General Shelton. Yes, sir. As we looked--we set aside two
missions, and those missions were research and development,
science and technology kind of based missions. They weren't
operational--mainstream operational missions. So we felt like
we could take a little bit more risk, set those aside, and
provide those as seed corn, if you will, toward new entrant
certification. So that is just part of the process, setting
those aside, making them a vehicle toward
certification.
We believe that we will have a struggle here, as we try to
allocate expenses that are now part of the foundational launch
capability, allocate those to an individual mission cost, if
you will, because that is not the way we do it right now. We
provide the launch bases. We provide the launch crews. That is
just the cost of doing business, if you will. And then we buy
booster by booster.
Allocating those fixed costs, if you will, booster by
booster is going to be a bit of a challenge for us to do an
apples-to-apples competition. But that is our job to do, and we
will do it.
Mr. Langevin. True. I think a level playing field in that
competition is absolutely essential, to make sure that we are
comparing apples-to-apples and----
General Shelton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Klinger, do you have anything else to add?
Mr. Klinger. You asked about--Congressman, you asked about
the acquisition strategy, and that was signed--the amendment to
the existing acquisition strategy was signed in February 2013.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Very good. Thank you very much. I will
yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. And I want to thank our
witnesses again for your participation and your preparation. I
would remind all the witnesses that the hearing record will be
left open for 10 days. There may be some members who could not
make it today that would have some questions that they would
submit to you in writing, or maybe some of the members here who
think of something afterwards they would like to get an answer
from. So I would ask you to respond to those in writing.
And with that, this committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
April 25, 2013
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 25, 2013
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Mike Rogers
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request for National Security Space Activities
April 25, 2013
Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee's hearing on the fiscal year 2014 budget
request for national security space activities. Our
distinguished panel of experts this afternoon are:
LGeneral William Shelton, Commander of Air
Force Space Command;
LMs. Betty Sapp, Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office;
LMr. Gil Klinger, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense, Space and Intelligence Office; and
LMr. Doug Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Space Policy.
I appreciate your time in appearing before this
subcommittee, and I thank you for your leadership in national
security space.
Space is a critical element of our national security, in
both peace and wartime environments. I am very concerned of the
impact of sequestration on national security space programs,
and I appreciate hearing more from you, during your opening
statements, on this issue.
Potential adversaries have taken note of our reliance on
space, and are developing the means to degrade, deny, or
destroy our capabilities. Just like in the evolution of ground,
sea, and air platforms, when defenses and survivability
mechanisms had to be developed to keep pace with the threat,
now this is happening with space systems.
I am pleased to see the Department's recognition of the
threat, as evidenced by the increased investment in space
situational awareness in the fiscal year 2014 budget request.
But I remain concerned on the future implementation of space
defense and resilience, to include breaking-up or
``disaggregating'' programs that we've invested billions to
develop and are just starting to provide the necessary
capabilities for the warfighter. I look forward to further
dialogue and study of this important topic.
Separately, I commend the Department on the significant
advances it has made on many space programs. After years of
massive cost and schedule overruns, we have entered a new
period of stable procurement and incremental development. As
noted above, I am skeptical when I hear that we now may want to
break up these successful programs.
For instance, the Air Force recently reported that new
block-buy strategies for the Space-Based Infrared System,
Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite, and the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle program are resulting in over $2.5
billion in savings over the next 5 years.
That is a tremendous success for the military and the
taxpayer and I hope to see those savings reinvested to provide
the necessary modernization initiatives in accordance with
warfighter requirements.
Thank you again for being with us today, and I look forward
to your testimony. Ranking Member Cooper and I have spent a lot
of time together visiting an NRO ground station, the NGA
headquarters, and getting the classified mission and threat
briefs. We're both focused on the opportunities and threats we
face in space.
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 25, 2013
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Klinger. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all
issues associated with the DOD end-to-end Space and Intelligence
infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition
oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to
speak authoritatively on this question. However, I am aware that the
Air Force's EELV Launch Capability efforts are currently contracted
using a cost-type contract. The Air Force is assessing the contract
type as they implement the USD(AT&L)'s direction to commit to up to 36
launch vehicle cores with United Launch Alliance and will assess it
again if the Launch Capability is retained in future phases of the EELV
program. [See page 24.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 25, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. 1) What steps has DOD taken to improve the management
of requirements in order to reduce program risk?
General Shelton. The Air Force has taken several steps to reduce
program risk by improving management of requirements through increased
education and improvements to the requirements generation process.
First, all Air Force requirements managers must complete the
Requirements Management Certification Training through Defense
Acquisition University courses. Second, each Air Force program entering
the requirements process must complete Requirements Risk Assessments
that are validated through the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council
and Joint Staff. This validation ensures program requirements are
vetted against the most significant risks to warfighter missions.
Third, during the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) phase of the
acquisitions cycle, cost versus capability analyses ensure that
decision makers can make smart decisions on cost versus capability
trades. Fourth, capability development documents, based on decisions
from the AoA, focus research and development efforts on validated
warfighter requirements to guide program managers and reduce the risk
of requirements creep.
Mr. Rogers. 2) How can space acquisitions be made affordable during
years of budget constraints? What needs to change in the acquisition
paradigm, if anything?
General Shelton. Making space acquisition more affordable demands
greater partnership with industry, increased cooperation with our
partners and allies, finding ways to decrease launch costs and ensuring
our space architectures are resilient. With the appropriate legislative
and policy guidelines in place, we can increase our industry and
international partnerships to lower costs in those space mission areas
best suited for partnership and focus resources on space mission areas
that are less risk tolerant. The Department also needs to continue to
explore distributed architectures during the Analysis of Alternatives
portion of the acquisition process. Where it makes sense to move away
from few, monolithic systems to more, smaller systems, we should do so
to both increase resiliency and decrease launch costs. For launch
costs, we should simultaneously continue to increase competition in the
launch arena by both encouraging new entrants and leveraging market
conditions that support more than one viable launch provider.
Mr. Rogers. 3) Is there an effort to move toward firm fixed-price
contracts? Why?
General Shelton. The Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center
(SMC) has moved toward use of more fixed-price contracts where
appropriate. As SMC's larger programs move from development to
production, program requirements have stabilized and manufacturing
processes are becoming more mature, making it sensible to shift to
fixed-price contracts. SMC also uses firm fixed-price (FFP) contracts
for more commercial-like satellite procurements like the Wideband
Global Satellite system. In addition, the Joint Space Operations Center
(JSpOC) Mission System (JMS) is being executed using commercial, FFP
contract vehicles for software applications.
Mr. Rogers. 4) What is the status of the new acquisition strategy
for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program? How did the USAF
determine which satellite payloads to set aside for competition, and
which programs were part of the ULA block-buy? And, how does the Air
Force plan to manage this competition to ensure a level playing field?
General Shelton. The Air Force is implementing a revised Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) acquisition strategy approved by the
Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) on February 11, 2013, which
includes a quantity and rate commitment to stabilize the industrial
base, as well as certification criteria for new entrants. All qualified
competitors will have an opportunity to compete as early as FY15. A
quantity commitment of 36 cores (supporting all National Security Space
programs) allows ULA, the current EELV provider, to purchase economic
order-type quantities of critical parts and components, run production
lines more efficiently, and reduce non-recurring engineering costs. The
strategy sets aside up to 14 cores (based on physical capability of new
entrant expected performance), in addition to the above commitment, for
competition as early as FY15 if new entrants become certified. If no
certified competitor is viable at the time of need, these missions will
be awarded to the incumbent, under variation in quantity and
configuration (VIQ&C) provisions to be negotiated into a contract with
ULA.
The specific method in which the current incumbent EELV Launch
Capability (ELC) and EELV Launch Services (ELS) costs will be competed
with new entrants has yet to be determined, but will be addressed in
the Source Selection Plan. The details of the competition are being
developed and will ensure the best value for the Government among all
certified providers and will be conducted in accordance with Federal
Acquisition Regulations.
Mr. Rogers. 5) What is the process to assess the risk
classification of payloads for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle?
General Shelton. National Security Space (NSS) Payloads are
classified by each responsible agency using a common set of criteria as
specified in the coordinated New Entrant Strategy. These criteria
include national significance, complexity, mission lifetime/
constellation health, cost, launch constraints, in-flight maintenance
and re-flight opportunities. NSS missions will usually be assigned a
Class A risk designation; however, some may be assessed as Class B
based on the above criteria.
Mr. Rogers. 6) In GAO's annual report on duplication, overlap, and
fragmentation, it reported that ``Space launch acquisition processes
for NASA and DOD are not formally coordinated, duplicate one another,
and may not fully leverage the Government's investment because the
Government is not acting as a single buyer.'' Please identify cost
savings opportunities and identify what is being done to reduce
duplication and leverage investments.
General Shelton. Current U.S. Space Transportation Policy (NSPD-
40), December 2004, assigns separate responsibilities to the Secretary
of Defense and the NASA Administrator to purchase launch services for
national security requirements and civil requirements, respectively.
We continue to pursue the goal of improving efficiencies and
improving the Government's buying power for Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) launch vehicles and are working with our NASA colleagues
in such a way as to achieve this goal while still allowing each agency
to perform its assigned space-related responsibilities.
We believe wholesale consolidation is not viable due to the unique
responsibilities of each agency. That said, the Air Force is leveraging
the combined Air Force/NASA/NRO buying power to obtain a more favorable
economic order quantity pricing construct in the FY13-17 Launch Vehicle
Production Services contract which will benefit all ULA customers.
Mr. Rogers. 7) What is DOD doing, or planning to do, to define and
assess its mission assurance costs and activities, and to what extent
will the strategy protect against overly high launch vehicle prices
compared with mission assurance changes/efficiencies resulting from
these assessments? Further please outline how mission assurance for
national security space missions differs from commercial space
missions.
General Shelton. The Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center
(SMC) collaborates with our industry partners to ensure our space
system acquisitions are cost effective with acceptable risk. In the
last five years, we have experienced unprecedented success in our
launch operations. The experience we have gained based on mission
assurance priorities and requirements are being used to identify
opportunities to reduce mission assurance costs. Also, in collaboration
with industry, we are identifying non-value added tasks or unnecessary
operations.
The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) new entrant
acquisition strategy is to permit commercially available launch
services with proven mission practices and design to compete for
contract awards. New entrants wishing to participate in the EELV
program must meet SMC mission assurance standards for launch systems
development and operations.
Government requirements for risk management and mission assurance
are different from those of the commercial market. Commercial space
systems, when launched, focus on loss to capital and typically use
private insurance to offset any losses. National Security Space
missions measure loss in terms of mission capability and are self-
insured. Typical mission assurance costs are approximately 5% of the
total cost of the satellite and launch vehicle. This level of expense
is justified in light of the operational and financial costs of a
launch failure.
Mr. Rogers. 8) How will certified cost and pricing data
requirements be applied to EELV contractors, both currently and in a
potential future competition?
General Shelton. New entrants will be required to comply with
applicable accounting standards related to Federal Acquisition
Regulation, Part 15, contracts and progress payment provisions.
Mr. Rogers. 9) What are the projected savings for the dual launch
capability for GPS III? How will you ensure a level-playing field for
new entrants that might compete for GPS launches?
General Shelton. Dual launch is an approach to lowering launch
costs. It originated in the FY13 President's Budget as a potential cost
savings/risk mitigator and relieves operational congestion to the
Consolidated Launch Schedule and Launch Manifest at the Eastern Range.
This effort is not yet on contract, so the cost data available is an
estimate. We anticipate a total cost avoidance of approximately $500M
through FY29 if operational considerations allow utilization of dual-
launching GPS on a routine basis.
It is the Government's intent to provide assured access to space at
the best value to the Government, and not to posture one launch
provider with a competitive advantage. Any costs associated with
mission-unique payload integration will be expressly excluded from
consideration during competition to ensure a level playing field and no
unfair advantage for the incumbent.
There are numerous unknowns concerning potential new entrants and
the performance characteristics of the launch vehicles they are
developing. Along with certified new entrants, dual launch capability
will be an invaluable tool to reconstitute a critical constellation of
satellites quickly. When a new entrant becomes certified, the Air Force
will reassess the best solutions with the criteria laid out for any
full and open competition.
Mr. Rogers. 10) How is resilience measured and what are the most
important steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space systems
that are resilient to threats?
General Shelton. Resilience is a combination of both quantitative
and qualitative inputs. The proposed DOD definition of resilience for
space is ``. . . the ability of an architecture to support the
functions necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or
adverse conditions. An architecture is `more resilient' if it can
provide these functions with higher probability, shorter periods of
reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions
and threats. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative
Government, commercial, or international capabilities.'' As this
definition is less than two years old, DOD organizations continue to
refine ways for quantitative resilience analysis during the budget
review and space Analysis of Alternatives processes. These quantitative
measurements will, necessarily, vary across the space mission areas.
Air Force Space Command is developing metrics to measure the
resilience of providing capabilities to the warfighter and Nation based
on warfighter requirements and threats. The Air Force is currently
evaluating mission areas through Space Modernization Initiative (SMI)
investments and other studies to determine what steps should be taken
to ensure the Air Force provides resilient capability in the
increasingly congested, contested, and competitive space environment.
Mr. Rogers. 11) Please describe the current efforts and priority
you are placing on space situational awareness and space protection.
General Shelton. Space capabilities are critical to enable United
States and allied forces to accomplish missions ranging from winning
wars to humanitarian and disaster relief operations. In addition, the
United States and global economies have become equally reliant on space
capabilities. The first step in being able to protect those
capabilities is having the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) to detect,
track, and identify human-made objects in Earth orbit; characterize
threats, hostile, unintentional and even environmental; and integrate
space situational data into decision quality information. SSA is
fundamental to the protection and sustainment of our capabilities.
For SSA, our first priority is to preserve current capabilities in
light of the difficult decisions that were necessary to comply with
sequestration. The next priority is to narrow the gaps imposed by
current system limitations and increasing threats. Air Force Space
Command (AFSPC) is investing more capable ground sensors, satellites
and modernizing data integration and processing.
In parallel to enhancing our SSA capabilities, AFSPC is also
studying approaches to protecting our critical space assets. Our
current efforts are focused on developing more resilient architectures.
Leveraging the interest of the entire national security space
community, we are working to determine the right balance between
capability, affordability and resilience that will enable a greater
ability of our architecture to respond to threats, both unintentional
and intentional. AFSPC will continue to work with the newly chartered
Space Security and Defense Program, among others, to develop and
integrate these concepts into our architectures, providing for much
needed protection of our critical space assets.
Mr. Rogers. 12) To what extent has DOD validated the assertion that
disaggregated architectures offer to greater resiliency, operational
efficiency, and/or cost savings?
General Shelton. Our efforts to date have focused on evaluating
more affordable, disaggregated systems as future alternatives to, or
evolutions of, existing space architectures. In principle,
disaggregation offers more resilience and achieves cost efficiencies
through the use of smaller, but individually less capable, satellites.
Much of the Space Modernization Initiative (SMI) funding will support
further investigation of disaggregated architectures in order to inform
decisions on future systems based on operational efficiency, cost and
resiliency. Initial studies show the use of hosted payloads could yield
operational efficiency, greater resiliency and potential savings over
the cost of a free-flying satellite. Demonstrations such as the
Commercial Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP) are validating these
potential benefits as are other preliminary findings.
Mr. Rogers. 13) How will the Department decide whether to apply
disaggregated architecture principles to future space system
acquisitions? Who will make the final decision whether a disaggregated
approach is used?
General Shelton. A standardized methodology for creating and
analyzing future architectures, including analyses of alternatives,
will be employed in order to measure disaggregated architectures
against current architectural baselines. System demonstrations will
also be used to validate performance and cost estimates and mature new
technologies for elements of the new architectures. Decisions will be
made through the standard Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Execution process and the acquisition decision process.
Mr. Rogers. 14) What steps does DOD plan to take, if any, to begin
working toward disaggregated architectures? For example, are there
plans to test the applicability of disaggregation at a smaller scale to
specific mission areas?
General Shelton. The Department of Defense is already taking steps
in this area through Space Modernization Initiative (SMI) efforts that
assist in defining new disaggregated architectures in multiple mission
areas (e.g., Overhead Persistent Infra-Red and MILSATCOM) and
demonstrating projects to validate their performance, cost and
technology maturity. These efforts will assist the Air Force in
evaluating the concept of disaggregation for decisions on future
systems.
Mr. Rogers. 15) What is the status of the Joint Space Operations
Center Mission System Program? Is the program structured to provide to
meet requirements at the lowest cost and shortest schedule?
General Shelton. The Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission
System (JMS) program was restructured in 2011 to significantly reduce
cost and to accelerate the delivery of capabilities to the warfighter.
The current program of record provides capabilities to the JSpOC
through a series of incremental deliveries rather than a single large
package. The program is also specifically designed to maximize the use
of existing software products including commercial software whenever
feasible and affordable. The incorporation of commercially developed
software, as well as Government developed, is key to meeting cost and
schedule targets.
JMS Increment-1 was fielded at the JSpOC in late October 2012 and
has successfully completed its independent operational test and trial
period. Increment-1 is currently in use on a daily basis and has
supported a number of recent high-profile events. JMS Increment-2 began
integration in April 2013. Increment-2 service packs will be provided
to the JSpOC from mid-FY14 and through FY16, with deliveries occurring
every six to seven months. The use of discrete service packs within the
larger increments provides capability to the warfighter as soon
possible.
Mr. Rogers. 16) With the cancellation of the Spaced Based
Surveillance System (SBSS) follow-on program in the FY14 budget
request, what is the Air Force position on the need for space situation
awareness from satellites? Are there any gaps in coverage?
General Shelton. With Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Block
10 System becoming operational in August 2012, we continue to meet
USSTRATCOM requirements for the timely detect, track, and
identification of deep space objects in all regions of space until its
end of life (estimated September 2017).
Without an above-the-weather space-based Space Situational
Awareness (SSA) system like this, our deep space architecture relies
largely on ground-based optical telescopes, which are limited by
daylight and weather, and radars which are limited by sensitivity. The
resultant sensing gaps afford adversaries freedom of action and delay
identification of potential unintentional threats such as maneuvers and
conjunctions.
Because of the capabilities and advantages provided by space-based
capability, it is critical that we continue to invest in space-based
platforms as a part of the SSA architecture. This will ensure we
maintain custody of threats and support threat identification and in
turn enable defensive action in deep space.
Given the current budget challenges, Air Force Space Command is
exploring options and timing for a follow on space-based platform to
preserve this vital capability at an affordable cost.
Mr. Rogers. 17) There are various efforts in the Department, namely
Air Force, Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid, low-cost launch
solutions. How do you foresee this type of capability being used by the
warfighter? In light of increasing foreign threats to our space
systems, how important is it that we prioritize these efforts?
General Shelton. For many years, the space community has studied
responsive capabilities. These studies often have been segmented,
looking at only responsive launch, or only responsive satellites. For
the concept to be viable, both satellite and launch must be equally
responsive, and therein lies the problem. We could easily produce
responsive launch vehicle capability, but for the full mission
capability to be truly responsive, satellites would need to be ready to
respond at the same pace as the booster, likely requiring stored and
ready satellites. This approach is too expensive in the current budget
climate.
Additionally, unless offensive action has been taken to neutralize
the threat that negated existing on orbit capability, responsive
systems would be launching into the same threat environment that caused
the loss of the original satellite.
We are working with the entire community to ensure viable concepts
of operation, coupled with affordability, to drive our work on
responsive systems.
Mr. Rogers. 18) What is being done to monitor any efforts to
disrupt or degrade our space capabilities?
General Shelton. Current systems maintain track of satellites and
debris in orbit. In addition, these systems respond to events such as
launches, maneuvers and breakups. Further, in concert with our
intelligence community partners, we are working to understand the
threats those objects or events may pose to our satellites.
To improve those capabilities, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has
developed a comprehensive Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
architecture approach spanning the capability areas. The first
increment of that SSA architecture is focused on affording the best mix
of near earth and deep space sensors, along with the requisite data
integration and exploitation to process the sensor data, integrate it
with intelligence, environmental and other data and provide timely,
decision quality information to commanders and other users. This
architecture will provide a greater capacity for predicting events,
creating decision space and enabling action.
To combat the emerging threats to our satellites from cyberspace,
AFSPC is collaborating with USSTRATCOM and other space community
partners through an initiative called Crystal Defender which is in
Phase-II of its analysis, currently conducting a vulnerability
assessment on the Global Positioning System (GPS) and analyzing the
nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture.
Additionally, focused tiger teams are in place to oversee initiatives
that establish individual computer network defense service providers
for each space system. Finally, the integration of space and cyber
under one command and the lessons learned coming from Crystal Defender
enable AFSPC to manage security threats and vulnerabilities of the Air
Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) with the same rigor that is in
place for managing threats in our backbone network for administration,
business, and mission systems, the Air Force Information Network
(AFIN).
Mr. Rogers. 19) What is the process to respond to situations where
our satellites are interfered with or attacked? Are there established
``red lines'' and responses?
General Shelton. Electromagnetic interference (EMI), whether
purposeful or non-purposeful, can be detected by the system user,
owner/operator, or through deliberate monitoring activities. Once
detected, this interference is reported and mitigated through a
standard process: the owner/operator will notify the Joint Space
Operations Center (JSpOC) located at Vandenberg AFB. The JSpOC will
then task assets and request support from the intelligence community to
assist in determining the type and source of the interference. If the
interference is determined to be purposeful, it is then reported to
USSTRATCOM, who will engage with the Department of Defense to determine
the best course of action. There are currently no established ``red
lines'' or responses for the attack on a satellite.
Mr. Rogers. 20) What steps has DOD taken to improve the management
of requirements in order to reduce program risk?
Ms. Sapp. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) works with its
partners in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to ensure the cost and risk
associated with requirements is understood. This partnership, along
with NRO's rigorous acquisition policies and management, allow for the
responsible management of risk in Major System Acquisition (MSA)
programs.
Mr. Rogers. 21) How can space acquisitions be made affordable
during years of budget constraints? What needs to change in the
acquisition paradigm, if anything?
Ms. Sapp. The NRO's evolutionary acquisition approach leverages the
investments already made in a particular program, and makes adjustments
and changes in response to risks and opportunities. By not ``re-
creating the wheel'' for each program, the NRO can advance technology
and make any major program changes up front, saving significant costs
in the acquisition of such specialized systems.
Mr. Rogers. 22) Is there an effort to move toward firm fixed-price
contracts? Why?
Ms. Sapp. The NRO's contracting policy is to assess each
acquisition and utilize the appropriate contract type based on
technical, cost, and schedule performance and the risk associated with
each of these factors. The NRO does not have a policy that emphasizes
the use of any particular contract type. NRO Directorates and Offices
are required to brief a proposed acquisition strategy to the NRO
Acquisition Strategy Council for each Major System Acquisition 12-18
months prior to release of the solicitation by NRO senior leadership
and prior to any required approvals by the program Milestone Decision
Authorities at the Joint Intelligence Acquisition Board. A proposed
contract type with justification is briefed and reviewed during both
forums to ensure it results in reasonable contractor risk and provides
the contractor with the greatest incentive for efficient and cost-
effective performance.
Mr. Rogers. 23) What is the process to assess the risk
classification of payloads for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle?
Ms. Sapp. The NRO, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and U.S. Air Force (AF) formalized a common
approach and criteria for the risk classification of payloads for all
missions, including those intended to be launched using the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) system. The NRO will assess each
mission against these common criteria to determine payload risk
classification.
Mr. Rogers. 24) In GAO's annual report on duplication, overlap, and
fragmentation, it reported that ``Space launch acquisition processes
for NASA and DOD are not formally coordinated, duplicate one another,
and may not fully leverage the Government's investment because the
Government is not acting as a single buyer.'' Please identify cost-
savings opportunities and identify what is being done to reduce
duplication and leverage investments.
Ms. Sapp. The NRO has taken significant steps to ensure its launch
activities are fully coordinated with the AF and NASA. As noted in the
Government Accountability Office report, the three launch agencies have
formalized our approach to EELV acquisition in a Memorandum of
Understanding. Strategic acquisition planning is discussed at the
agency director level at recurring AF-NASA-NRO Summits, while
programmatic and tactical planning is addressed at the Government
Expendable Launch Vehicle Executive Board (GEEB) and Launch
Collaboration Steering Group (LCSG). The GEEB and LCSG provide key
mechanisms to foster sharing of acquisition planning and lessons
learned across the NASA, AF, and NRO launch communities. The NRO
partners with the AF to acquire launches for national security
missions, and the NRO/AF EELV block-buy acquisition currently underway
seeks to stabilize current EELV suppliers with a 36 core commitment
while enabling competition as new launch capability is demonstrated and
certified. This strategy was discussed by the three agencies as a means
to provide cost savings to all Government EELV users by stabilizing
production over the next few years. The NASA keeps the AF and NRO
apprised of their commercial cargo and crew acquisition planning and
Space Launch System development plans to further enable stabilization
of the broader space launch industrial base. Finally, the NRO, AF, and
NASA have agreed to a common certification approach for New Entrant
launch service providers, and the NRO is leveraging the certification
efforts of the AF and NASA in its certification activities. Through
these efforts, the Government is able to achieve cost savings and to
leverage investments with minimal duplication through the established
forums for communication across all management levels.
Mr. Rogers. 25) What is DOD doing, or planning to do, to define and
assess its mission assurance costs and activities, and to what extent
will the strategy protect against overly high launch vehicle prices
compared with mission assurance changes/efficiencies resulting from
these assessments? Further please outline how mission assurance for
national security space missions differs from commercial space
missions.
Ms. Sapp. In February 2010 the Secretary of the AF commissioned the
Broad Area Review X Study to provide an updated assessment on the
effectiveness of the EELV mission assurance process. The study
recognized that Government mission assurance builds on the launch
contractor mission assurance and quality assurance processes, and
recommended that the AF and DNRO should: ``Maintain the current mission
success/mission assurance focus, and continue to provide resources to
support the Mission Assurance process that has resulted in
unprecedented levels of Mission Success over the last decade.''
The NRO has a dedicated Mission Assurance Team that is focused on
maximizing mission success for NRO payloads and provides an independent
technical risk assessment to AF EELV system-level mission assurance.
The NRO, working with the AF, has refined its contribution to AF-
managed EELV fleet mission assurance and continues to collaborate on
ways to maintain the highest possible levels of mission success as
efficiently as possible.
Most commercial space missions rely on insurance to cover the risk
of launch and/or spacecraft failure as well as loss of commercial
revenue streams. Government Launch Vehicle Mission Assurance (LVMA)
serves as ``insurance'' for Government missions seeking to increase
probability of success in lieu of payment for lost sunk costs. Most
Government missions' value to the Nation is well beyond the cost
expended for the spacecraft and launch, and Government LVMA helps to
ensure that the critical capabilities of our space systems are not lost
due to launch failure. Commercial space customers and the insurance
underwriters benefit from the Government LVMA which seeks to increase
the overall reliability of the launch system, as demonstrated by the
current EELV program outstanding success record.
Mr. Rogers. 26) How is resilience measured and what are the most
important steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space systems
that are resilient to threats?
Ms. Sapp. For the NRO, a direct measure of space system resiliency
involves assessing the decrease in collection capability as a function
of an adversary's counterspace actions. The NRO uses sophisticated
modeling tradecraft to help make these assessments. The NRO's modeling
tradecraft combines foreign counter-space threat information provided
by the Intelligence Community (IC) with the projected effectiveness of
the resiliency enhancement(s) in question. The resulting information is
then used to calculate the reduction in collection as a function of
conflict intensity and time. Due to the variability of the data input,
statistical analysis is used to obtain the most likely reduction in
collection for different threat levels and resiliency options.
The most important step to creating resilient space systems is
achieving the appropriate balance of system hardening, mission
operations tradecraft, and architecture diversity. Operational
tradecraft, including the use of indications and warning to trigger
courses of action and concepts of operation, offers a cost effective,
near-term solution to the most likely counterspace threats.
Architecture diversity, and its coordinated use, not only results in
more timely and actionable intelligence, but enhances the NRO's ability
to operate through some of the most challenging threats.
Mr. Rogers. 27) Please describe the current efforts and priority
you are placing on space situational awareness and space protection.
Ms. Sapp. Situational awareness, including the monitoring of space,
terrestrial, and cyber threats, is a key element of NRO's survivability
strategy. Continuous monitoring of these elements establishes both a
baseline of normal activity and changes to the baseline associated with
foreign counterspace actions. Such monitoring and awareness are
critical for indicating when potential responses/actions may be
warranted. Actions available to operators include various courses of
action and concepts of operation that either minimize or mitigate
counterspace threats. With regard to Space Situational Awareness (SSA),
the NRO has key partnerships with the AF to ensure that we have the
strongest team possible in addressing these critical threats.
Timely and appropriate response to space situational awareness
indications and warning is particularly important due to operational
requirements. Because of this, the NRO places a high priority on
monitoring, categorizing, and characterizing potential threats through
all possible means, domains, and partnerships. To further enhance our
capabilities, the NRO is also developing a decision support tool to
help satellite operators integrate, visualize, and act upon the
situational awareness data. The NRO places a high priority on space
protection, though specific details regarding space protection are
classified.
Mr. Rogers. 28) What steps does DOD plan to take, if any, to begin
working toward disaggregated architectures? For example, are there
plans to test the applicability of disaggregation at a smaller scale to
specific mission areas?
Ms. Sapp. The NRO does not have any plans to begin working towards
disaggregated architectures, as they do not meet the unique mission
needs of our NRO systems. The NRO is taking steps to address resiliency
through ground-based and space-based measures and our partnerships with
the AF and the IC.
Mr. Rogers. 29) There are various efforts in the Department, namely
Air Force, Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid, low-cost launch
solutions. How do you foresee this type of capability being used by the
warfighter? In light of increasing foreign threats to our space
systems, how important is it that we prioritize these efforts?
Ms. Sapp. The NRO requires reliable, predictable, and affordable
launch capability, which we address through our partnership with the AF
on launch capabilities. We address foreign threats to our space systems
through awareness, protection, diversity and Concepts of Operations
(CONOPS).
Mr. Rogers. 30) What is the process to respond to situations where
our satellites are interfered with or attacked? Are there established
``red lines'' and responses?
Ms. Sapp. The NRO continues to refine a process to better respond
to satellite interference and/or attack, but these activities are
largely classified. The first element involves determining if the
anomalous behavior is the result of environmental activity (e.g., solar
activity or weather-related disruption), system anomaly (component or
subsystem failures), or counterspace activity. To quickly assess and
delineate among these factors, the NRO maintains a team of skilled
satellite operators with reach-back support that continuously monitor
operations and satellite state-of-health. With respect to counterspace
activities, in addition to refining established processes, the NRO is
developing a decision support tool that integrates an array of
situational awareness and indications and warning sensors that allow
satellite operators to anticipate and, when necessary, take appropriate
actions to avoid counterspace activities. In cases where anomalous
activity is detected, but not anticipated, the decision tool can hasten
troubleshooting the situation, thereby facilitating operators taking
appropriate and timely actions. In addition, the NRO has established a
process and timeline for senior interagency and Congressional
leadership notification in the event of suspect or confirmed satellite
interference and/or attack. There are few established or prescribed
``red lines'' other than those captured in current treaty language, for
example, not to interfere with national technical means of
verification. The NRO is engaged with others in the interagency to
include the IC, the Department of Defense, and the State Department to
review this and related issues.
Mr. Rogers. 31) What steps has DOD taken to improve the management
of requirements in order to reduce program risk?
Mr. Klinger. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all
issues associated with the DOD end-to-end Space and Intelligence
infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition
oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to
speak authoritatively on this question. However, we are aware that the
requirements and acquisition communities are working closely together
to reduce program risk and incorporate better buying power principles
wherever possible.
Mr. Rogers. 32) How can space acquisitions be made affordable
during years of budget constraints? What needs to change in the
acquisition paradigm, if anything?
Mr. Klinger. The USD(AT&L)'s Better Buying Power 2.0 (BBP 2.0)
Initiative is intended to help mitigate this era of severe budget
constraints. BBP 2.0 was provided to industry and we have received
numerous comments from the commercial satellite industry including
suggestions how the Government might improve the efficiency of
procurement of commercial satellite systems and services. Subsequently,
the Department kicked off a review to determine best practices in
teaming with industry to lower costs of space systems and services.
An excellent example of improved affordability is the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. The FY14PB reduced the EELV
program budget by almost $1B across the FYDP. This is a direct result
of improved communication with our current provider to stabilize the
EELV production rate and supply chain. In addition, the Department has
taken actions to introduce competition in the EELV program by
publishing a new entrant certification process, providing opportunities
for new entrants to launch more risk tolerant payloads prior to
certification, and establishing early competition opportunities as soon
as new entrants are certified.
The Department is continually reviewing our acquisition
legislative, policy, guidelines, regulatory or contracting actions
which could be taken to improve the Government satellite procurement
process along with our acquisition models to ensure space acquisitions
are as affordable as possible.
Mr. Rogers. 33) Is there an effort to move toward firm fixed-price
contracts? Why?
Mr. Klinger. We continually look for better and more efficient ways
to acquire the Department's materiel needs. In November 2010, the
USD(AT&L) issued Better Buying Power (BBP) 1.0 Guidance for obtaining
greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending, which included
guidance on increasing the use of Fixed-Price contracts, where
appropriate. Last November, USD(AT&L) issued BBP 2.0 which builds upon
this guidance to stress using appropriate contract types while
encouraging the use of Fixed Price Incentive contracts for early
production. Through the BBP initiatives, we are striving to incentivize
productivity and innovation in industry and Government by utilizing the
appropriate contract type for each phase of an acquisition. Fixed Price
contracts are generally more suitable for the production phase of
satellite acquisition since the requirements are firm, the design is
mature as demonstrated in developmental testing, and manufacturing
processes with qualified suppliers are in place. The Department follows
the Congressional direction in section 818 of the John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, P.L. 109-364, to select
the contract type for a development program at the time of Milestone B
approval that is consistent with the level of program risk
Mr. Rogers. 34) What is the status of the new acquisition strategy
for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program? How did the USAF
determine which satellite payloads to set aside for competition, and
which programs were part of the ULA block-buy? And, how does the Air
Force plan to manage this competition to ensure a level playing field?
Mr. Klinger. USD(AT&L) approved an amendment to the EELV
Acquisition Strategy on February 10, 2013, authorizing the Air Force to
order up to 36 rocket cores from United Launch Alliance (ULA) during
FY13-17 and to leave open for competition up to 14 additional rocket
cores during the same period. The missions reserved for competition are
those that (1) meet the performance capabilities (mass to orbit
injection) of the potential New Entrant's launch vehicles (as stated by
the vendors) and (2) will be ordered after the estimated certification
date for the New Entrant's launch vehicles (as stated by the vendors),
with a single exception where the cost to compete the launch service
was not in the best interest of the Government. The 36 cores that the
Air Force is negotiating with ULA are either outside the New Entrant's
stated lift capability and/or will be ordered before the New Entrant(s)
expect to achieve certification; e.g., only those launch service orders
that the New Entrants cannot satisfy are planned for sole-source award
to the ULA.
The Air Force is currently developing the detailed plan to compete
as many of the 14 cores as soon as the FY15 launch service awards. This
plan will address the factors used to ensure a fair and equitable
competition. The Air Force plans to obtain USD(AT&L)'s approval of this
plan late this calendar year. In addition, the Air Force will award
early integration contracts following a new entrant's first successful
certification flight to provide insight into launch vehicle to
satellite compatibility.
Mr. Rogers. 35) What is the process to assess the risk
classification of payloads for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle?
Mr. Klinger. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all
issues associated with the DOD end-to-end Space and Intelligence
infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition
oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to
speak authoritatively on this question. However, the Air Force is
responsible for assessing the risk classification of payloads using the
common set of criteria defined in the ``Coordinated Strategy Among the
US Air Force, the NRO and NASA for New Entrant Launch Vehicle
Certification,'' signed on October 12, 2011.
Mr. Rogers. 36) In GAO's annual report on duplication, overlap, and
fragmentation, it reported that ``Space launch acquisition processes
for NASA and DOD are not formally coordinated, duplicate one another,
and may not fully leverage the Government's investment because the
Government is not acting as a single buyer.'' Please identify cost-
savings opportunities and identify what is being done to reduce
duplication and leverage investments.
Mr. Klinger. The concerns cited in the GAO's report are derived
from US Space Transportation Policy (NSPD-40), from December 2004,
which assigns separate responsibilities to the SECDEF and the NASA
Administrator to purchase launch services for national security
requirements and civil requirements, respectively. Under ``Assuring
Access to Space,'' NSPD-40 assigns responsibilities for acquiring
launch services as follows, ``2) The Secretary of Defense shall be the
launch agent for the national security sector and shall maintain the
capability to develop, evolve, operate, and purchase services for those
space transportation systems, infrastructure, and support activities
necessary to meet national security requirements.'', ``3) The
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
shall be the launch agent for the civil sector and shall maintain the
capability to develop, evolve, operate, and purchase services for those
space transportation systems, infrastructure, and support activities
necessary to meet civil requirements, including the capability to
conduct human and robotic space flight for exploration, scientific, and
other civil purposes.''
Mr. Rogers. 37) What is DOD doing, or planning to do, to define and
assess its mission assurance costs and activities, and to what extent
will the strategy protect against overly high launch vehicle prices
compared with mission assurance changes/efficiencies resulting from
these assessments? Further please outline how mission assurance for
national security space missions differs from commercial space
missions.
Mr. Klinger. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all
issues associated with the DOD end-to-end Space and Intelligence
infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition
oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to
speak authoritatively on this question. However, the Air Force is the
responsible agency for National Security Space Launch and, as such,
defines the Department's mission assurance process. I do believe our
Mission Assurance costs, which are on the order of 3-5% of the cost of
the launch vehicle, are appropriate. In addition, I believe there is a
fundamental difference between launching a commercial satellite and a
National Security Space satellite that justifies the Department's
approach. While a commercial entity can use insurance to offset the
financial losses associated with a failure to place the satellite in
the correct orbit, the Department loses the capability that that
satellite would have provided. These systems take many months or years
to regenerate, leaving our national and warfighting users without
capability they were planning to have for their missions.
Mr. Rogers. 38) How is resilience measured and what are the most
important steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space systems
that are resilient to threats?
Mr. Klinger. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all
issues associated with the DOD end-to-end Space and Intelligence
infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition
oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to
speak authoritatively on this question. However, I am aware that the
intelligence, requirements, and acquisition communities are working
closely together to address this question.
Mr. Rogers. 39) Please describe the current efforts and priority
you are placing on space situational awareness and space protection.
Mr. Klinger. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all
issues associated with the DOD end-to-end Space and Intelligence
infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition
oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to
speak authoritatively on this question. However, assuring required
space capabilities are available in a contested environment is a top
priority for the Department. Space situational awareness is the
foundation for all space operations and the key enabler for protecting
U.S. interests in space.
In March 2013, the Department and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence jointly established the Space Security and
Defense Program (SSDP). The SSDP will serve as the center of excellence
to inform options and strategies (materiel, non-materiel, cross-Title
10 and 50 United States Code, and cross-domain) to enable a more
resilient and survivable National Security Space Enterprise. As part
this effort, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence is
establishing a Space Threat Assessment Cell to provide long-term threat
assessment and evaluation support to the SSDP.
Mr. Rogers. 40) How will the Department decide whether to apply
disaggregated architecture principles to future space system
acquisitions? Who will make the final decision whether a disaggregated
approach is used?
Mr. Klinger. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all
issues associated with the DOD end-to-end Space and Intelligence
infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition
oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to
speak authoritatively on this question. However, I am aware that Air
Force Space Command is reviewing and evaluating disaggregated
architecture principles for future space systems. There will be senior-
level Department reviews prior to submission to the Deputy Secretary
for final decision about whether a disaggregated approach is used.
Mr. Rogers. 41) What steps does DOD plan to take, if any, to begin
working toward disaggregated architectures? For example, are there
plans to test the applicability of disaggregation at a smaller scale to
specific mission areas?
Mr. Klinger. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all
issues associated with the DOD end-to-end Space and Intelligence
infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition
oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to
speak authoritatively on this question. However, I am aware that Air
Force Space Command is reviewing/evaluating disaggregated
architectures. I expect they will assess disaggregated architecture
response options as part of the trade space and the need to understand
performance issues surrounding proposed architectures.
Mr. Rogers. 42) There are various efforts in the Department, namely
Air Force, Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid, low-cost launch
solutions. How do you foresee this type of capability being used by the
warfighter? In light of increasing foreign threats to our space
systems, how important is it that we prioritize these efforts?
Mr. Klinger. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all
issues associated with the DOD end-to-end Space and Intelligence
infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition
oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to
speak authoritatively on this question. However, I am aware all
applicable communities are collaborating on this important issue.
Mr. Rogers. 43) There have been major advances in Overhead
Persistent Infrared with the launch of the Space-Based Infrared System.
Are we leveraging this capability to the fullest extent? What
challenges and opportunities are ahead?
Mr. Klinger. I agree with the comment General Shelton made during
the hearing, stating ``we have not even scratched the surface'' in
exploiting and leveraging the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) to
its fullest extent. Air Force Space Command, as the command responsible
for operations and acquisition of the SBIRS system, continues to make
progress to further leverage the capabilities of the on-orbit
spacecraft and sensors, in conjunction with NASIC, NGA, and the NRO.
While it is most appropriate for the Air Force to provide specific
operational plans, the OPIR community continues working to leverage the
strengths and expertise of each other's respective organizations to
effectively operate the OPIR Enterprise to address both existing
requirements and emerging threats in a cost-conscious and affordable
way. The ground segment has sought to exploit our OPIR sensors more
effectively by introducing new processing techniques, fusing data
streams, and adopting common mission management tools. The ground
segment has also sought to make both processed and raw data more
accessible to a wider base of users. We have accomplished much, but
have more to do in this area.
Looking forward, many challenges and opportunities exist. The DOD
and IC will continue to cooperate in the development of new sensors,
technology, tradecraft, sources, and collaborative strategies while
improving cost performance and ensuring mission functional
availability. The objective is an effective and affordable OPIR
Enterprise that will continue to provide a key strategic advantage for
dealing with emerging threats and enduring national security challenges
of the 21st century.
Mr. Rogers. 44) Are we procuring commercial satellite services in
the most efficient way, and if not, what opportunities for improvement
are there? Also, who has sole responsibility for satellite
communications in the Department?
Mr. Klinger. In response to the USD(AT&L) announcement of his
Better Buying Power 2.0 Initiative some members of the commercial
SATCOM industry provided some suggestions to the DOD on how the DOD
might improve the efficiency of procuring commercial SATCOM services.
The Department has kicked off a review to determine any near-term
legislative, policy, regulatory or contracting actions which could be
taken to improve the existing Government SATCOM procurement process.
There is no sole responsibility for satellite communications within
the Department. USD(AT&L) has responsibility for MILSATCOM acquisition
programs, DOD CIO has the responsibility for SATCOM policy, and DISA
has the responsibility for commercial SATCOM contracting.
Mr. Rogers. 45) What is the process to respond to situations where
our satellites are interfered with or attacked? Are there established
``red lines'' and responses?
Mr. Klinger. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
and Intelligence, I am the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on all
issues associated with the DOD end-to-end Space and Intelligence
infrastructure. In this role, I am accountable for acquisition
oversight and acquisition related matters. Therefore, I am not able to
speak authoritatively on this question. However, we are aware that
there are currently no established ``red lines'' or responses for the
attack of an on orbit satellite.
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy published
the DOD Space Policy, updated in October 2012 and it outlines the
Department's multilayered approach to deterrence in the space domain.
The policy also declares that purposeful interference with U.S. space
systems and other space systems upon which the U.S. relies is
irresponsible in peacetime and may be escalatory in a crisis.
Mr. Rogers. 46) How can space acquisitions be made affordable
during years of budget constraints? What needs to change in the
acquisition paradigm, if anything?
Mr. Loverro. The Department has already begun to make great strides
in reducing the cost of space acquisition. Using the Efficient Space
Procurement (ESP) authority granted by Congress and by following the
precepts within the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics Better Buying Power initiatives, Air Force
Space Command (AFSPC) has already made substantial progress in reducing
the cost of multiple production satellites, notably the most recent
Wideband Global Service (WGS) satellites, and the Advanced Extremely
High Frequency (AEHF) satellites. The WGS system as a whole also
benefits from the international cooperative arrangements that the Air
Force has negotiated to increase the number of production satellites
and drive down the cost for all.
In general, these types of good business strategies can be applied
across most space acquisitions, and AFSPC is in the process of applying
these same strategies to the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), the
Global Positioning System (GPS), and the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) program.
Still, more can be done. Greater communication and coordination
with industry in those areas where commercial space has a substantial
footprint and increased cooperation with allies and partners can both
continue to drive down space acquisition cost and create more resilient
space capabilities. To that end, the Department is already working with
new entrant commercial launch providers, and has entered into multiple
space situational awareness sharing or cooperative arrangements. We
have partnered with Taiwan on the COSMIC-2 space weather system,
effectively cutting the cost of that system by more than two-thirds.
We need to expand our leveraging of allied space capabilities,
where operationally suitable. Our allies and partners have significant
and growing space-based capabilities in a range of mission areas. By
leveraging their systems, we can augment our capabilities, add
diversity and resilience to our architectures, and complicate the
decision-making of potential adversaries all while reducing cost. On
the commercial side, we need to become more astute buyers of commercial
satellite communication (SATCOM) services by exploring innovative
approaches, such as multi-year contract authority or co-investment for
commercial space services. Additionally, we believe hosted payloads and
disaggregated architectures have the potential to allow us to take
advantage of the most competitive sectors of our space market and drive
down costs further. The Commercially Hosted Infrared Program (CHIRP)
demonstration showed the advantages of this approach and the AFSPC
Hosted Payload Indefinite/Indefinite Delivery allows the Department to
further explore its long term benefits.
Mr. Rogers. 47) Is there an effort to move toward firm fixed-price
contracts? Why?
Mr. Loverro. The specific circumstance of an acquisition is the
most important determinant of the type of contract to be issued. The
Department is exploring methods to improve our acquisition processes,
energize the U.S. industrial base, and enhance technological
innovation. We are striving to ensure the industrial base is robust,
competitive, flexible, healthy, and delivers reliable space
capabilities on time and on budget. The Department follows the
congressional direction in section 818 of the John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L. 109-364) to select
the contract type for a development program that is consistent with the
level of program risk at the time of Milestone B approval.
In some cases, we have found that these goals can be best
accomplished by expanding the traditional focus from primarily cost-
plus to those that include fixed price arrangements. Such was the case
for both SBIRS and AEHF where the baseline was firm and production
processes were mature. Similarly, the Air Force intends to investigate
whether to buy the next set of GPS III satellites under fixed price,
and/or to renegotiate several existing cost-plus GPS III satellite
contracts, if they conclude a sufficient level of maturity has been
reached on that program and if it is in the program's best interests.
In general, when baselines are firm, production processes mature,
Government and contractor oversight processes are settled, and
technology risk has been eliminated, the move to fixed price
arrangements can be beneficial for both the contractor and the
Department. That normally happens as systems enter production. But it
can also be true for developmental programs if the acquisition was
structured correctly. Such is the case for the Air Force Space Fence
program which spent the first 5 years establishing the right conditions
for a fixed price development, significantly driving down both cost and
risk in the process.
Mr. Rogers. 48) In January 2012, the Secretary of State announced a
decision to initiate formal negotiations with the European Union and
other space-faring nations to develop an International Code of Conduct
for Outer Space Activities. What is the status of these activities?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of negotiating and signing
onto such a Code? What national security considerations should the
Department take into account as it reviews such a proposal? How do we
balance increased cooperation with assured access and freedom of
action?
Mr. Loverro. Negotiations for the International Code of Conduct are
underway. As noted in the DOD Space Policy, the Department is working
with interagency, international, and commercial partners to define and
promote safe and responsible space operations. The Department of
Defense is actively working with the Department of State to conduct
bilateral and multilateral discussions with allies and other space-
faring nations in support of a non-legally binding International Code
of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The congested and contested
space environment presents challenges for all space-faring nations.
Efforts such as the proposed Code can help increase awareness, enhance
spaceflight safety, and prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust,
thereby helping to ensure that access to space is preserved for all.
The proposed Code, drafted as a non-legally binding set of guidelines,
calls on subscribing states to refrain from activities that create
long-lived debris and to provide notification of certain space
activities, including those that might risk creating debris. Space
debris is a growing concern for all space-faring nations. Additionally,
the proposed Code reinforces key space norms internationally that the
U.S. Government has already endorsed but that are not universally
followed, including pre-launch notifications under the Hague Code of
Conduct, UN Debris Mitigation Guidelines, and safety of flight
practices such as sharing collision warning
information.
Importantly, the proposed Code explicitly recognizes nations'
inherent right of self-defense. The Code would not constrain either the
development of the full range of space capabilities, or the ability of
the United States to conduct necessary operations in crisis or war. As
the Secretary of State noted in January 2012, the United States would
not subscribe to a Code that in any way constrains our national
security-related activities in space or our ability to protect the
United States and our allies.
Mr. Rogers. 49) The Department has made recent efforts to engage in
further collaboration with the international community regarding space
situational awareness. What policies govern the sharing of data
associated with space situational awareness? What are the benefits and
risks of sharing information?
Mr. Loverro. Title 10 U.S. Code Section 2274, Space Situational
Awareness (SSA) Services and Information, authorizes the Secretary to
provide various space situational awareness services and information,
and to receive space situational awareness data and information.
Additionally, the 2010 National Space Policy, the 2011 National
Security Space Strategy, and the 2012 Department of Defense Space
Policy call for expanding international cooperation and increasing U.S.
leadership to promote the sustainable and responsible use of space.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is fundamental to all space
operations, from launch to on-orbit operations to re-entry activities.
As the National Security Space Strategy states, shared awareness of
spaceflight activity must improve in order to foster global spaceflight
safety and help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.
Effective SSA requires cooperation--we cannot do it alone. U.S.
Strategic Command has concluded 37 arrangements with commercial owner/
operators and two arrangements with foreign governments. The Department
continues to negotiate additional SSA sharing agreements with both
commercial and international operators, and to explore the joint
development and operation of SSA sensors with allies and partners.
Sharing SSA data, services, and information with Government, intra-
governmental, and commercial satellite owner/operators helps to improve
spaceflight safety by improving space object databases, establishing
common international data standards and data integrity measures,
disseminating predictions of space object conjunctions and close
approaches, and supporting other measures to preserve the space
environment.
Mr. Rogers. 50) How is resilience measured and what are the most
important steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space systems
that are resilient to threats?
Mr. Loverro. Resilience is measured in both qualitative and
quantitative terms. Qualitatively, the Department of Defense defines
resilience for space as the ability of an architecture to support the
functions necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or
adverse conditions. An architecture is ``more resilient'' if it can
provide these functions with higher probability, with shorter periods
of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios,
conditions and threats.
As this definition is less than two years old, DOD organizations
have now begun to refine ways to conduct quantitative analysis of the
resilience of space systems during the budget review and space analysis
of alternatives (AOA) processes. These quantitative measurements will,
necessarily, be different for different space mission areas, space
systems, and other aspects of the space enterprise.
As we look to the future, resilience will be achieved by pursuing a
multifaceted approach across all space systems. These will include
further incorporating and encouraging a more competitive U.S.
commercial space service industry, integrating space capabilities from
allied and partner nations, pursuing a more disaggregated model for
many system architectures including less complex systems and hosted
payloads, and investigating the role of reconstitution.
Resilience may not be solely an internal architecture
characteristic. Some alternative orbitology or basing modes may make it
easier for external space surveillance awareness sensors to provide
warning of impending attack and time for potential defensive actions to
be taken.
Mr. Rogers. 51) Please describe the current efforts and priority
you are placing on space situational awareness and space protection.
Mr. Loverro. Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is fundamental to
all space operations and underpins DOD's space strategy. To protect our
high-valued space assets from both unintentional damage as well as
hostile interference, we must maintain an awareness of the space
environment--one that is increasingly becoming more congested,
contested, and competitive. U.S. Strategic Command is establishing SSA
sharing arrangements with commercial and international satellite owner/
operators to enhance safety of flight. As the National Security Space
Strategy notes, shared awareness of spaceflight activity must improve
in order to foster global spaceflight safety, as well as to help
prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.
Additionally, we have made significant progress in pursuing
elements of our future SSA architecture. The Space-Based Space
Surveillance System (SBSS) became operational last year and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is successfully testing its
space surveillance telescope (SST). We have concluded negotiations with
Australia to move a C-band SSA radar to that nation, and with the help
of Congress, that effort is now underway. We are pursuing a similar
arrangement with DARPA's SST. And the Department has made a substantial
investment in the Space Fence system and is preparing to award a full
development contract in FY 13.
We also continue to increase our focus on protection. To that end,
in March of this year, we established the Space Security and Defense
Program, which will pursue studies aimed at providing space protection
capabilities for all U.S. space forces. We have placed increased
emphasis on this program through the President's budget submission for
fiscal year 2014. We have ongoing investments in the Global Positioning
System (GPS) modernization efforts to emplace a far more secure and jam
resistant space and user equipment M-code system and also increase the
cyber security of the GPS control segment. We are also beginning
efforts in other areas, such as the Wideband Global System to enhance
jam resistance. Finally, we have made substantial strides in defining
and fielding an advanced command and control system through the Joint
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission Systems (JMS) program to help
us better understand and warn of possible threats to our systems.
Mr. Rogers. 52) There are various efforts in the Department, namely
Air Force, Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid, low-cost launch
solutions. How do you foresee this type of capability being used by the
warfighter? In light of increasing foreign threats to our space
systems, how important is it that we prioritize these efforts?
Mr. Loverro. Timely, low-cost launch capability might be one part
of a capability to allow reconstitution of a space-based capability
should it be degraded by attack or mishap. The role of reconstitution
in a resilient architecture is still being investigated and the efforts
by the Air Force, Army, and DARPA help serve to provide the data
through demonstration that would allow those architectural trades to be
made.
For example, the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command's
(SMDC) Soldier-Warfighter Operationally Responsive Deployer for Space
(SWORDS) is an effort to develop a relatively low-cost nanosatellite
launch system for the U.S. Army. The Department approved SWORDS as a
2012 Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD).
Additionally, DARPA's Airborne Launch Assist Space Access (ALASA)
system is designed for launch from an aircraft to improve performance,
reduce range costs, and enable more frequent missions. ALASA completed
initial trade studies and a market/business case analysis in fiscal
year 2011, and has entered into a Design Risk Reduction phase.
At this point, it is too early to commit to responsive launch as a
high priority until those demonstration and trades are complete.
Mr. Rogers. 53) Are we procuring commercial satellite services in
the most efficient way, and if not, what opportunities for improvement
are there? Also, who has sole responsibility for satellite
communications in the Department?
Mr. Loverro. We are not procuring commercial satellite
communications (SATCOM) services in the most efficient manner. The
commercial business model looks for a return of initial investment
within 3-5 years. As such, the cost of a commercial SATCOM lease must
include all the amortization to achieve that return for the service
provider. While longer-term leases lower the bill they can only reduce
the cost of business risk encompassed in a one-year lease (about 10
percent), but they still bear the huge expense of investment
recoupment. In order to do better, the Department should begin to
explore innovative partnerships with industry that involve a DOD
capital investment and shared access across a global footprint. This
approach has the potential for far greater savings while significantly
enhancing both DOD resilience and long term commercial stability.
Although historically there has been no component with sole
responsibility for satellite communications within the Department, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD/AT&L) has responsibility for military SATCOM (MILSATCOM)
acquisition programs; the DOD Chief Information Officer (DOD/CIO) has
the responsibility for SATCOM policy; and the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA) has the responsibility for commercial SATCOM
contracting. DOD's current efforts to examine how the Department
procures SATCOM includes addressing this issue. DOD/CIO, for example,
has recently initiated a SATCOM governance construct, and SATCOM
coordination occurs as part of the actions of the Defense Space
Council. In addition, USD/AT&L and DOD/CIO have jointly launched a
Commercial Satellite Study to examine ways to better leverage,
integrate, and acquire commercial satellite (COMSATCOM) services.
Mr. Rogers. 54) What is the process to respond to situations where
our satellites are interfered with or attacked? Are there established
``red lines'' and responses?
Mr. Loverro. There are currently no established ``red lines'' or
responses for the attack of an on-orbit satellite. The DOD Space
Policy, updated in October 2012, outlines the Department's multilayered
approach to deterrence in the space domain. The policy also declares
that purposeful interference with U.S. space systems and other space
systems upon which the United States relies is irresponsible in
peacetime and may be escalatory in a crisis
Mr. Rogers. 55) Please describe the urgent warfighter requirement
that led DISA to procure satellite services from the Chinese company.
When you testified, you stated that this was done in response to a
JUON. Is this still your best understanding of the facts?
Mr. Loverro. Beginning in mid-2012, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)
required wider geographic coverage using a single satellite to cover
the entire African continent. This bandwidth is to support
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in the
eastern, central, and southern portions of the continent. These
operations range from counter-piracy to counter-Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA), plus a host of other operations. The bandwidth also supports
coalition networks enabling time-sensitive information sharing with
African partner nations that help support counter-Violent Extremist
Operations and the USAFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan.
With regards to whether this was a Joint Urgent Operational Need
(JUON), while I indicated during testimony that we were leasing some
satellite services from a Chinese company to support a JUON, as we
continued to analyze the situation, I learned that USAFRICOM's need,
although operationally critical and requiring expedited service, was
not in fact a JUON.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. 56) As the Air Force and, to some extent, the
National Reconnaissance Office currently fund infrastructure and other
facility support costs for the incumbent provider, in order to help the
committee understand the current arrangement of the contract with the
incumbent, can you describe why a cost-plus vehicle is in place, given
the maturity of the program?
General Shelton. The Phase 1 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) Launch Capability (ELC) efforts will continue under the Cost
Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) construct. The EELV program requires
operational flexibility to meet its National Security Space (NSS)
mission. ELC provides the program flexibility to manage changes to
mission requirements without Request for Equitable Adjustments (REAs)
or schedule penalties (e.g., launch slips due to satellite vehicle
acquisition issues, first time integration delays or anomaly resolution
from a previous mission). The Air Force is examining options to
restructure ELC to allocate appropriately the discrete and unambiguous
costs to the launch vehicle and each individual payload customer. The
plan is to incorporate these adjustments into the Phase 1 contract and
consider them for future acquisition phases of the program.
Mr. Langevin. 57) In last year's hearing, General Shelton, in a
response to a question for the record, you stated that you plan to meet
warfighter needs for responsive space capabilities through programs of
record and mechanisms such as the Joint Urgent Operational Needs
process. Given that ORS is intended to foster low-cost launch methods,
as well as common design and interfacing methods, and that ORS is
zeroed out in the FY14 budget, I'm curious as to how you propose to
address the problem of space responsiveness through existing
procurement programs and a variety of initiatives that, according to
the GAO, have not been planned for in a very robust or strategic
manner.
General Shelton. The Department of Defense (DOD) understands the
importance of the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept and
recognizes the progress made under the ORS Office. In accordance with
the FY13 NDAA, the transition of the ORS Office to the Space and
Missile Systems Center (SMC) will be formalized in June 2013. DOD is
currently incorporating ORS lessons learned and responsive processes
into SMC processes and programs to ensure it continues to develop
responsive and affordable space capabilities.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. 58) The U.S. Air Force announced late last year that
certified New Entrants would be allowed to compete along with ULA for
up to 14 rocket cores through FY17. Given that the incumbent provider
currently receives over $1.2B annually in cost-plus payments under the
Launch Capability contract line, how does the Air Force intend to
ensure that the competition will occur on a level playing field when
the incumbent competes against New Entrants? What specific actions will
the Air Force take to ensure that the incumbent properly allocates ELC
payments in a competition against New Entrants? Will ULA be allowed to
bid only a launch service price (marginal price) when it competes
against a New Entrant's full price, since the Government is paying for
ULA's fixed costs?
General Shelton. We have not yet determined the specific methods to
address Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Launch Capability
(ELC) costs in the New Entrant competitions. However, they will be
addressed in the Source Selection Plan. The details of the competition
are currently being developed and will ensure the best value for the
Government among all certified providers and will be conducted in
accordance with Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations.
Mr. Garamendi. 59) Given that the Air Force and, to some extent,
the National Reconnaissance Office currently fund infrastructure and
other facility support costs for the incumbent provider, can you help
us understand why the funding of fixed costs requires a cost-plus
contract? What infrastructure requirements are unknown at this time?
General Shelton. The Phase 1 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) Launch Capability (ELC) efforts will continue under the Cost
Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) construct. The EELV program requires
operational flexibility to meet its National Security Space (NSS)
mission. ELC provides the program flexibility to manage changes to
mission requirements without Request for Equitable Adjustments (REAs)
or schedule penalties (e.g., launch slips due to satellite vehicle
acquisition issues, first time integration delays or anomaly resolution
from a previous mission). The Air Force is examining options to
restructure ELC to allocate appropriately the discrete and unambiguous
costs to the launch vehicle and each individual payload customer. The
plan is to incorporate these adjustments into the Phase 1 contract and
consider them for future acquisition phases of the program. Range
requirements are considered to be sufficiently mature for a fixed-price
contract and, as a result, the Government is in source selection now to
select a range provider on a fixed-price incentive fee vehicle.
Mr. Garamendi. 60) Space launch procurement is the single largest
line item in the Air Force space budget. The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has repeatedly argued that the Air Force can generate
significant savings by reintroducing competition into its space launch
procurement program. What savings do you
envision in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program associated
with
competition?
General Shelton. Based on the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE) independent cost
estimate (ICE), implementation of the Air Force Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle acquisition strategy in FY13 is projected to save $1.1B
over the Future Years Defense Program as compared to the FY12 budget
assumptions from FY13-18. These savings were factored into the FY14 Air
Force budget submission.
Mr. Garamendi. 61) The Launch Capability cost-plus contract
structure was instituted in 2006 as a measure to achieve ``assured
access'' for the Government by maintaining the industrial base capacity
of the only remaining domestic company capable of conducting space
launch. Air Force has now recognized the existence of multiple new
providers. Once these New Entrants are certified and competing for all
launches in the program, does the DOD have a plan to phase out the ELC
cost-plus contract?
General Shelton. The specific method in which the current incumbent
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Launch Capability (ELC) and
EELV Launch Services (ELS) costs will be competed with new entrants has
yet to be determined, but will be addressed in the Source Selection
Plan. The details of the competition are being developed and will
ensure the best value for the Government among all certified providers
and will be conducted in accordance with Federal Acquisition
Regulations.
Mr. Garamendi. 62) I would like more information on space-based
infrared systems. What is its capability and purpose?
General Shelton. Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) is an
infrared-sensing satellite that supports four missions: Missile Warning
(MW), Missile Defense (MD), Battlespace Awareness (BA), and Technical
Intelligence (TI).
Missile Warning: SBIRS provides reliable, unambiguous, timely, and
accurate MW information to the Missile Warning Center (MWC), North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), National Command Authority
(NCA), Combatant Commanders, and allies. This mission includes both
global and theater functional requirements to support strategic and
theater ballistic MW, and the notification and implementation of
passive defense and force posturing.
Missile Defense: SBIRS supports MD by providing missile event
queuing to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) systems. The MD mission
includes both national and theater functional requirements to support
active MD and attack operations against hostile forces.
Battlespace Awareness: SBIRS provides non-missile threat warning
data, in support of Battlespace Awareness for battle damage assessment
and intelligence information for land, sea, air, and space decision
support to Combatant Commanders, Joint Task Force Commanders, and other
users.
Technical Intelligence: SBIRS supports the National Geospatial
Agency (NGA) TI mission by providing threat performance and infrared
(IR) target signature data to warfighters and weapons developers;
provides target classification and identification profiles and
algorithms to support SBIRS operational missions; and monitors and
provides policymakers and other users' information on observed military
tactics, new foreign technology development, arms control compliance,
and proliferation
activities.
Mr. Garamendi. 63) Given that the Air Force and, to some extent,
the National Reconnaissance Office currently fund infrastructure and
other facility support costs for the incumbent provider, can you help
us understand why the funding of fixed costs requires a cost-plus
contract? What infrastructure requirements are unknown at this time?
Ms. Sapp. The AF is currently negotiating the Launch Capability
contract with the incumbent provider, and would be better suited to
respond with specific details of the contract structure.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE
Mr. Bridenstine. 64) DOD is currently evaluating options to move us
away from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. Can you share
with us the status of this ``architecture study''? When can members of
the committee expect a final decision on the way forward?
Mr. Loverro. A comprehensive Analysis of Alternatives for a
replacement capability for the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
(DMSP) is currently ongoing as part of a study on DOD's Space-Based
Environmental Monitoring (SBEM) capabilities. The first phase of the
study included an analysis of military utility and effectiveness, and
was completed in March 2013. The current Analysis of Alternatives work,
which is scheduled to be completed at the end of June 2013, will help
guide the Department's strategy at the end-of-life of DMSP. The study's
final report is expected to be completed by August 2013.
Mr. Bridenstine. 65) The Department has implemented an interesting
capacity-sharing process for the Wideband Global SATCOM constellation.
I think that signing Memorandums of Understanding with partner nations
is a ``win-win'' for the U.S. and these countries. Can you talk about
the cost savings associated with the MOU-model of satellite operation?
Do you intend to use this model for other national security space
systems?
Mr. Loverro. The Department's partnership with six countries on
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) has expanded the WGS constellation size
and capacity, contributing to interoperability between participating
nations, improving the ability of the United States and partner nations
to perform space-enabled missions, and increasing the inherent
resilience of this system. In November 2007, we signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with Australia, resulting in the purchase of the
sixth WGS satellite. In January 2012, a second MOU, signed with Canada,
Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, resulted in the
purchase of an additional 10th satellite. Together with our six
international partners, we have invested $10 billion in this system,
expanding capability at minimal cost to the U.S. Air Force. The WGS
agreements leverage $1.3 billion in partner funds while providing over
40 percent more capacity for U.S. warfighters.
We believe this model is one of many possible partnering models to
help reduce system cost while increasing resilience. Different but
similar arrangements have been negotiated with the government of
Australia to emplace a C-band Space Surveillance Radar there with part
of the cost borne by the United States and part by Australia. We also
envision a joint operating model for that system. We hope to extend
that model with the conclusion of an MOU on DARPA's space surveillance
telescope. We anticipate additional opportunities in the position,
navigation, and timing mission areas, as well as commercial remote
sensing. While these will differ in character to the WGS MOU, they seek
the same goal of enhancing U.S. and allied capabilities at reduced
cost, and with increased resilience, by appropriately sharing space
capabilities. We are also interested in exploring if this model can be
extended to the commercial world, especially in the SATCOM arena as
opposed to the expensive short-term lease arrangement we now use.
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