[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-116]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 8, 2012
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
Tim Morrison, Professional Staff Member
Steve Kitay, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Aaron Falk, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, March 8, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request for National Security Space
Activities..................................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, March 8, 2012.......................................... 21
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2012
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 4
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Klinger, Gil I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Space and
Intelligence................................................... 7
Sapp, Betty J., Principal Deputy Director, National
Reconnaissance Office.......................................... 9
Schulte, Amb. Gregory L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Space Policy................................................... 6
Shelton, Gen William L., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Klinger, Gil I............................................... 66
Sapp, Betty J................................................ 75
Schulte, Amb. Gregory L...................................... 56
Shelton, Gen William L....................................... 28
Turner, Hon. Michael......................................... 25
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Letter to Chairman Turner from Hon. David S. Adams, Assistant
Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, Dated March 8, 2012................................. 87
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Franks................................................... 114
Mr. Langevin................................................. 115
Mr. Ruppersberger............................................ 116
Mr. Sanchez.................................................. 108
Mr. Turner................................................... 91
FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 8, 2012.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m. in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R.
Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. By 1:30 if my ranking member has continued to
be delayed, I will just break the rules and begin at that time,
and I do know that she is on her way, but that way at least we
can get started and get some of the statements on the record.
So we will start at 1:30 in a moment.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Turner. All right. It is 1:30, we are going to go ahead
and begin with just at least the process of receiving
statements, and then if my ranking member has not at that point
made it, we'll hold off on questions and recess, but we will at
least go through the process of entering statements into the
record, and I will begin with mine.
With that, good afternoon, and welcome to the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee hearing on the fiscal year 2013 budget
request for national security space activities. Our
distinguished witnesses this afternoon are General William
Shelton, Commander of Air Force Space Command; Ambassador Greg
Schulte, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy; Mr. Gil Klinger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Space and Intelligence Office; and Ms. Betty Sapp, Principal
Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
Thank you all for agreeing to appear before the
subcommittee and for your service.
I would like to start by congratulating you on the
significant accomplishments in the national security space over
the past year. Due to tremendous efforts of the military,
civilians, and contractors of the Department of Defense and
Intelligence Community, we have a number of new critical
capabilities in orbit. This could not have been accomplished
without the launch team's efforts, which continued an
impressive record of 49 out of 49 successful EELV [Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle] launches.
The NRO [National Reconnaissance Office] has completed
extremely aggressive and successful campaign of six launches in
7 months, and although we cannot talk here about the
capabilities that the NRO brings to the fight, the warfighter,
the Intelligence Community, and policymakers, they are all
significant benefits from these launches.
While there have been great strides, this year's space
hearing is especially important as we work to understand the
significant reductions to the space program and its future
impacts on national security. It is clear that space
capabilities are an essential element of our military and
intelligence construct. Space will continue to be a key enabler
of our national security as the U.S. maintains the ability to
operate in anti-access, anti-denial environments.
As such, in the new Defense Strategic Guidance, the
President and Secretary of Defense listed the ability to
operate effectively in space and cyberspace as a primary
mission area of the U.S. Armed Forces, yet the fiscal year 2013
budget request for Department of Defense space programs was
reduced by 22 percent from last year's request. I am concerned
that a significant portion of these funding cuts are taken from
research and development programs.
For example, the research and development in the evolved
advanced extremely high frequency satellite communications
program is reduced by over 75 percent. This investment is part
of a broader space acquisition strategy started last year,
formerly called evolutionary acquisition for space efficiency
designed to reinvest savings from a block buy into a stable
research and development program to lower risks for future
programs.
Further, the Department proposed to terminate two programs
that pushed the boundaries for small satellites and
experimental payloads, the Space Test Program and the
Operationally Responsive Space office. The Space Test Program
has driven innovation from the benchtops of defense
laboratories across the country to on-orbit space capabilities.
Many space programs that we rely on daily, such as GPS [Global
Positioning System], have their origins in the Space Test
Program. I am not satisfied with the justification that has
been provided for terminating the Space Test Program.
The Operationally Responsive Space office was established
by Congress in the defense authorization process to address the
need to rapidly reconstitute space capabilities under various
threat scenarios and the desire to shorten the lengthy space
acquisition cycle. The ORS [Operationally Responsive Space]
office has responded to urgent warfighter needs and delivered
critical capabilities. To date, I am not satisfied with the
Department's plan to support this important mission after the
proposed ORS termination.
I am pleased to see that the major spacecraft acquisition
programs appear to be sufficiently funded in the budget
request. Continued investment in core capabilities, such as
GPS, AEHF [Advanced Extremely High Frequency], WGS [Wideband
Global SATCOM], MUOS [Mobile User Objective System], and SBIRS
[Space-Based Infrared System] cross multiple services in the
Department. We must be conscious of the timing of our
investments and properly align the schedules to deliver the
spacecraft, ground segment, and user terminals in the most
effective manner possible, consistent with the needs of the
warfighter.
Assured access to space through our launch program remains
another priority for this subcommittee. The price of launch has
risen significantly in the past couple years, and the committee
will continue close oversight as we work to understand the Air
Force's new acquisition strategy for the EELV program. As
General Shelton noted in his written testimony, this strategy
will address industrial base viability and cost growth while
making provisions to leverage emerging competition.
Further, as directed in our fiscal year 2012 National
Defense Authorization Act, we look forward to the President's
plan for a national rocket propulsion strategy that includes
the Department of Defense, NASA [National Aeronautics and Space
Administration], and Intelligence Community efforts. The GAO
[U.S. Government Accountability Office] recently released a
report on duplication that noted the space launch acquisition
process for NASA and DOD [Department of Defense] duplicate one
another and may not fully leverage the Government's investment.
In your opening testimonies we would appreciate hearing
about collaboration in space launch activities across the
Government to reduce duplication and leverage investments.
Regarding space policy, I support the Administration's
decision not to sign on to the draft European Code of Conduct
for outer space activities. However, I am concerned that the
stated agreement, with elements of this code of conduct and
intention to negotiate something similar, could establish the
foundation for a future arms control regime that binds the
United States without the approval of Congress, which would
bypass the established constitutional processes by which the
United States becomes bound by international law.
Additionally, I have significant policy and operational
concerns with the EU [European Union] Code of Conduct with
regard to our own national security. Earlier today, I received
a written response from the Administration which was
unsatisfactory and leaves no choice but to legislate in the
National Defense Act. The letters that we received will be
included as part of the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 87.]
Lastly, as policymakers, we rely on the assessments
provided by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
NASIC, to understand foreign space threats. It is clear that as
our dependency on space programs increases and threats continue
to develop, our space situational awareness is critical, and
the space constellation and ground network must be resilient.
NASIC is our first line of all-source intelligence analysis
on space threats to form U.S. policy decisions. There are many
aspects to this important area of national security, and we
look forward to working together to reach enduring solutions.
Thank you again for the panel being with us today. You each
possess a tremendous amount of expertise and you bring a
tremendous amount of credibility also to the information that
you provide us, as we look to our Nation's space policies and
capabilities, and our Nation is better off because of all your
services, and I greatly appreciate it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Turner. With that, I would like to recognize and turn
to my ranking member, Loretta Sanchez.
STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry for having
been delayed in getting here. Part of the problem was my
schedule said it was in 2118, so I walked into a BRAC hearing,
quickly looked around, and said these are not my kind of
people. No, just kidding. Missed you, Mr. Chairman, so I knew
it couldn't be our meeting.
First of all, thank you, Chairman Turner, and I'd like to
join the chairman in welcoming General Shelton, Ambassador
Schulte, Mr. Klinger, and Principal Deputy Director Sapp to
this hearing on the fiscal year 2013 budget request for
national security space activities. Thank you all again for
your service to our country and for appearing before our
committee. Again, I apologize for my delay.
Our military superiority and way of life depend on space
assets for secure communication, navigation, missile warning,
weather prediction, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
so many things. And as we all know, space has become
increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.
Our first priority remains to ensure that we preserve and
protect our space assets in an increasingly fragile
environment, and in this context, quite the opposite of my
chairman here, I am encouraged that the Administration has
announced plans to at least enter into an international
discussion on the Code of Conduct for Space, one, of course,
that would meet U.S. requirements and establishes a norm of
recognized responsible behavior.
It becomes increasingly necessary to promote and to protect
the peaceful use of space as additional countries gain access
to space. And as you know, that is one of the areas over the
years that I have been really cognizant of, not weaponizing
space or not doing an arms race in space.
Second, the challenge of protecting our advantage in space
is all the more difficult in a fiscally constrained budget
environment. And under the Budget Control Act, we must get our
fiscal house in order, and we have got to do a lot more with a
lot less.
Reducing costs in the satellite and launch business, while
preserving mission assurance, presents unique challenges. So I
know you all have been working very hard on this, and I thank
you for your contributions in working towards getting this
under control.
I am pleased that we have made progress in reducing costs
through a block-buy, fixed-price contract approach for
acquisition and driving toward increased competition in launch.
However, using commercially available technology and services
and improving synchronization between the procurement of
satellites and corresponding ground station capabilities remain
important opportunities to drive down the costs and to maximize
our efficiency. And, sustaining efficient acquisitions and
operations requires facilitating the development and the
testing of these new technologies.
I am concerned that the Space Test Program, which was
crucial to the development of GPS and several key
communications satellites in the military that our military
relies on today, has been canceled. So, I would like you to
speak to that a bit.
And, last, I would also like to hear your thoughts about
preserving the space industrial base to protect needed
satellites, ground capability, software and launch vehicles.
The required and much delayed 1248 report will provide
important analysis to reform expert control regulation.
Progress in this area will help U.S. industry be more
competitive while balancing the need to protect sensitive
technology. But, we must also always look at the risks to our
industrial base of updating overly restrictive export control
regulations.
So, I look forward to your testimony on these important
budget issues, and again I thank you for being before us today,
and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. We will begin now with oral
statements as a summary to the written statements. I will ask
that each of the panel members limit their comments to a 5-
minute period.
And, we will begin with General Shelton.
STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, Representative Sanchez, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it's an honor to
appear before you today as the commander of Air Force Space
Command. It's also my privilege to appear before you alongside
these colleagues from the national security space business.
In line with the recently released Department of Defense
Strategic Guidance, the men and women of Air Force Space
Command protect our national interests by maintaining a
singular focus, and that is providing vital space and
cyberspace capabilities to the warfighter and to our Nation.
Assured access to space and cyberspace is foundational to the
conduct of military operations and is crucial to the Nation's
ability to project power in areas in which our access and
freedom to operate are challenged.
Accordingly, the fiscal year 2013 President's budget
invests in programs that enhance the resiliency and
effectiveness of our space capabilities; namely, missile
warning, positioning navigation and timing, satellite
communications, space situational awareness, and space launch.
There is an overall reduction in funding levels in the
space budget, but that is primarily due to fact-of-life
programmatic changes. First, several programs will ramp down
developmental activity as they transition to procurement, and
this is a good news story. Second, Congress funded two wideband
global satellites in fiscal year 2012, so there is no need to
fund a satellite in this year's budget. And, third, there is no
longer funding for the Defense Weather Satellite System since
this program was canceled in the Fiscal Year 2012
Appropriations Act.
In addition to these fact-of-life changes, we made some
very difficult budget decisions, leading to cuts to some
modernization programs and restructuring our approach to
Operationally Responsive Space and space tests.
We are also pursuing acquisition efficiencies through the
efficient space procurement actions for the Advanced Extremely
High Frequency program and the Space-Based Infrared System.
Finally, we remain committed to working closely with our
partners in the National Reconnaissance Office and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration to bring stability and
predictability to our launch programs.
I thank the committee for your continued and steadfast
support of Air Force Space Command and national security space
programs, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Shelton can be found in
the Appendix on page 28.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Mr. Schulte.
STATEMENT OF AMB. GREGORY L. SCHULTE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SPACE POLICY
Mr. Schulte. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez,
subcommittee members, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
When I testified here 1 year ago, the Secretary of Defense and
the Director of National Intelligence had just issued the first
ever National Security Space Strategy. That strategy aims to
protect the advantages we derive from a domain that is
increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.
DOD's new strategic guidance was informed by our space
strategy and reinforces its key tenets. Both documents stress
the importance of operating effectively in space, promoting
responsible behavior, operating when possible with coalition
and allied forces, and increasing the resilience of our space-
based capabilities.
I'd like to touch briefly on three important aspects of the
space strategy.
First, the National Security Space Strategy and the new
Defense Guidance both stress the need for resilience in our
space capabilities in response to emerging anti-access area
denial challenges. Resilience contributes to deterrence of
attacks on our space assets. Resilience also enables us to
continue vital missions, even in a degraded space environment.
Resilience is not the property of a single system. Rather, it
is the ability of the whole architecture to provide functional
capabilities necessary for mission success despite
environmental adversity or hostile action. Resiliency can be
achieved in a variety of ways. Examples include hosted
payloads, commercial augmentation, international cooperation,
and backup capabilities in other domains.
Promoting responsible behavior in space is a second key
aspect of our strategy. The Department of Defense is playing
the leadership role, including by providing countries and
companies across the globe with warnings of potential
collisions in space. We support the State Department's efforts
to work with the European Union and other spacefaring countries
to develop an international code of conduct for space
activities. A widely subscribed code can encourage responsible
space behavior and single out those who act otherwise, while
reducing risk of misunderstanding and misconduct.
The EU's draft is a promising basis for an international
code. It focuses on reducing the risk of creating debris and
increasing transparency of space operations. It is not legally
binding and recognizes the inherent right of self-defense. It
addresses behavior rather than unverifiable capabilities, and
better serves our interests than the legally binding ban on
space weapons proposed by others.
As we participate in the development of an international
code, the Department is committed to ensuring that it advances
our national security. We are also committed to answering your
questions and keeping you informed.
Energizing our space industrial base is a third key aspect
of our new strategy. We can help energize our industrial base
by allowing U.S. industry to compete internationally for the
sale of satellites and technologies that are already widely
available.
Last year, the Department of Defense and the State
Department provided an interim assessment of space export
controls. That assessment concluded that commercial
communication satellites and related components, with a few
exceptions, can be moved from the U.S. munitions list to the
commerce control list without posing an unacceptable security
risk. The forthcoming final report will identify additional
items that we believe could be safely moved.
Indeed, moving widely available items off the munitions
list will allow the Government to focus its controls and
enforcement on those technologies that are most sensitive and
most critical to our national security.
This approach, higher fences around fewer items, will
require new legislation. Your support can help energize our
industrial base and thereby enhance our national security.
Giving our industrial base new commercial opportunities is
particularly important at a time of defense spending
constraints.
In conclusion, the Department continues to implement the
National Security Space Strategy. We need your support to
deploy necessary capabilities, increase their resilience, and
protect the industrial base so important to our national
security. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schulte can be found in the
Appendix on page 56.]
Mr. Turner. Mr. Klinger.
STATEMENT OF GIL I. KLINGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, SPACE AND INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Klinger. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Sanchez, and members of the subcommittee, it is my pleasure to
be before you today. It's also my pleasure to be part of this
distinguished panel representing the spectrum of disciplines
that are key to ensuring the success of our space acquisition
programs.
Chairman Turner, you already outlined the number of
successful launches we have had in recent years. I would just
echo some of the points that you made that these successes
reflect the combined efforts of a Government and industry team
which has significantly improved and modernized our space
capabilities across all mission areas. The support of Congress
has been instrumental in achieving all of these successes.
The environment in which we operate continues to evolve and
transform. This transition has rippled through our space
acquisition system, which historically focused on performance-
driven, edge of technology and engineering capacity. We
consistently look to push the edge of the art and science of
the possible.
Acquisition of space capabilities frequently and
consistently had a first and often unfettered call on the
resources of the Defense Department and Intelligence Community
as compared to many other capability areas. We simply no longer
have this luxury. Space capabilities are now integrated and
inextricably bound up in the nervous system of U.S. military
forces and intelligence capabilities. Often, maintenance and
continuity of service have become as or more important than
pushing the envelope to achieve new performance capabilities.
In fact, many of our space capabilities have become the dial
tone of national security, and like the dial tone of our
telephones, we take their availability and presence for
granted, noticing only when there is an unplanned service
interruption. This reality places a special responsibility on
those of us who work in space acquisition to improve the
timelines of delivery of new capabilities.
We also must focus on ensuring our space architectures are
sufficiently robust and resilient to operate through natural
and manmade threats. To ensure our dial tone is uninterrupted,
we are recapitalizing virtually all of our space lines of
business, and doing so at precisely a time of sharply
constrained resources and as the Nation remains at war.
Here are some of the things that we are doing. We are
putting greater scrutiny on executing oversight earlier in the
acquisition process so program managers can achieve authority
to proceed early and then focus their energies on program
execution rather than coming back to respond to oversight that
has more limited value.
We are using fixed-price contracts, more innovative
contracting, and evolutionary upgrades where those make sense.
As only one example, by taking advantage of a maturing
production line and risks that have been well-managed and
retired from other programs, we are incorporating contract
restructures into our GPS III and Advanced EHF-5 and -6
satellite programs. We are pursuing a block-buy for Advanced
EHF-5 and -6 and developing a plan to use the savings to
improve the capability of military satellite communications
overall.
In GPS III we're modifying the acquisition strategy from a
cost-plus to a fixed-price contract. The Air Force is also
modifying its approach to the follow-on to the first block of
GPS III by providing on-ramps to add capabilities when mature
and affordable. This is extremely important as we plan ahead to
maintain the resources to protect our seed corn of promising
technologies.
We intend to use competition where and when it makes sense:
when the United States Government has a firm and stable
understanding of its requirements; when there is more than one
industrial vendor with domain knowledge of the capability that
we seek to acquire; and when the calculated benefits of the
competition outweigh the inevitable costs that sometimes
accrue.
We are stressing affordability even in our ongoing
programs. We are stressing with our industrial partners to
place as much emphasis on engineering for cost control and
affordability as we have historically placed on engineering for
performance. Let me repeat that. We must place as much emphasis
on engineering for cost control and affordability as we have
historically placed on engineering for performance. For us,
this is no longer a question of can we do something. The
question before us now is, how well do we have to do something
and the proportionality or the degree to which we must do it.
This is a fundamentally different business model for many of us
in the space acquisition community. At the same time, we must
maintain essential industrial capacity and acquisition program
stability and evaluate the opportunities to leverage commercial
partnerships where prudent.
Thank you for the opportunity to present the Department's
efforts to achieve a balanced space acquisition process while
protecting the stewardship of our resources, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Klinger can be found in the
Appendix on page 66.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Ms. Sapp.
STATEMENT OF BETTY J. SAPP, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Ms. Sapp. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today. On behalf of Director Carlson, it
is my pleasure to appear alongside our mission partners from
the Department of Defense to discuss national security space
activities.
I'd like to start with a few words about the state of the
NRO today. As Chairman Turner mentioned, last year with our Air
Force mission partners, we executed the most aggressive launch
campaign in more than 25 years at the NRO, launching six
satellites in 7 months. This year with the same determination,
the same strong partnership with the Air Force launch
community, we will launch 4 satellites in 5 months.
Delivering programs on cost and schedule is a matter of
critical importance to our national security. It is a part of
keeping our faith with the warfighters in terms of meeting our
commitments. Evolutionary acquisition practices have been used
successfully for decades by the NRO. Those have helped us meet
those acquisition commitments. They've been fundamental to
reaching an all green scorecard for NRO acquisition. Yes,
today, every single NRO acquisition program is green for cost,
schedule, and performance.
The NRO financial system is also sound. The best evidence
of this is that for the third year in a row we have sustained a
clean audit opinion from an outside independent auditor. We are
also proud of what we do to support our troops in the field.
Although the specifics of much of what we do cannot be
discussed in this forum, I can tell you that the NRO has
developed and deployed more than 25 reference emitters, which
have since been used more than 13,000 times. These emitters
have greatly improved the capability of CENTCOM, for example,
to precisely geolocate threats, allowing U.S. and coalition
military forces to be extremely precise in targeting those
threats.
We not only design and deploy systems to support our
troops, but also help to train the troops to use them
effectively as they go off in harm's way. The men and women of
the NRO stationed around the globe strive to make a difference
for the troops every single day.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today. Again, on behalf of
General Carlson, I thank you for your continued support of the
NRO, and I stand ready to answer any of your questions. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sapp can be found in the
Appendix on page 75.]
Mr. Turner. Alright. Thank you so much.
General Shelton, thank you again for your being a champion
of protection of our defense access to GPS. Last year Congress
enacted a provision that prohibited the Federal Communications
Commission, FCC, from giving the commercial company
LightSquared the authority to proceed on its proposed network
until the FCC resolved concerns about widespread harmful
interference with GPS receivers of the Department of Defense.
On February 14th the FCC issued a statement that concluded that
there is no practical way to mitigate potential interference at
this time. The Commission is waiting on a response from
LightSquared. General Shelton, is this an isolated matter or
are there further steps needed to ensure DOD'S spectrum
continues to be safeguarded in the future?
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, first, thank you and the
members of this committee for your help in protecting that part
of the spectrum that GPS depends upon. As we go forward--this
is, again, a physics problem--that part of the spectrum has to
be protected. Whether that is by policy within the FCC, whether
that is by legislation, there is no question that we have to
protect that part of the spectrum.
Mr. Turner. Good, thank you. The Space Test Program has
been a national capability since 1965. The program is designed
to allow engineers and scientists and defense laboratories and
universities to focus on developing leading-edge, state-of-the-
art capabilities while the Space Test Program initiates and
delivers these payloads to orbit. To quote the program office,
``Most DOD space systems flying today started as STP
experiments or were directly impacted by STP experiments.''
General Shelton, considering the value that this program
has provided, can you please explain why the program was
canceled and what the long-term impacts are.
And, Mr. Klinger, to account for the STP termination, are
the budgets for the laboratories across the Department being
increased to account for the expanded mission of launching
their payloads? General.
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, as we looked at the range of
things that we do across the space portfolio, and we were asked
to contribute certainly our share of the $487 billion reduction
as part of the Budget Control Act, Space Test Program came up
as one of the things that we might be able to take risk in. The
reason for that is we have much space research going on in the
Air Force Research Laboratory. In fact, we have about $370
million in fiscal year 2012 being spent in the Air Force
Research Lab for space-related things.
We also have space-related research going on in Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA. We also have space
research going on in the Naval Research Lab. There is also work
going on inside the Army. As we looked at that across the
board, we felt like this was a place where we could take risk
and we had to contribute, again, our fair share as part of the
resource drawdown.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Klinger.
Mr. Klinger. Mr. Chairman, to follow up on General
Shelton's points, there's a diversified portfolio of space
research capabilities going on across the laboratory system in
the Department of Defense. If I may, I would like to take for
the record your question and get back to you with the specific
dollar figures so I can give you a more accurate answer and
picture of the situation.
Mr. Turner. That will be fine. However, our experience with
questions for the record is that they take a tremendous amount
of time for a response. I would hope that you would be able to
provide a quick response to that since we are hoping to get one
in the hearing.
Mr. Klinger. We will do that.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
General Shelton, I have a memorandum that I believe you are
being provided that is dated December 30, 2011, that states
that you are interested in the Missile Defense's Precision
Tracking Space System space situational awareness
possibilities. And, this is possibly 24 satellite low-earth
orbit constellation, and I would like if you could speak for a
moment about the space situational awareness benefits perhaps
of the Precision Tracking Space System that the Missile Defense
Agency is looking at. And, I also want to inform you that
General O'Reilly, just in a hearing that we had Tuesday, when
we inquired to him about this, asked whether or not, you know,
he would be working directly with you in coordinating this, he
said, ``Yes, sir, and that is how I responded back to General
Shelton, exactly that way.'' Although it was encouraging to me,
I want to ensure that these two systems, two programs, and
certainly our two generals are able to coordinate. So if you
could please comment on that.
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, there is an exciting
possibility here if we go forward with the PTSS [Precision
Tracking Space System] program. That will fly, again, some
number of satellites yet to be determined, but up to 24.
Looking from an equatorial inclination, up above the Earth and
not only will it be able, because it is an infrared sensor, not
only will it be able to see missile launches and very
accurately report on those, but it will also be able to see
things flying in space. A wonderful space situational awareness
sensor, and lots of them in space.
So, if we can cooperate with the Missile Defense Agency, if
it takes a nickel more, so to speak, to get that capability on
PTSS, or maybe even you get it for free because of the inherent
capability, we just want to make sure that that's a design
parameter that is included to the maximum extent possible. We
don't want to drive them into a cost position that they don't
want to be in, but we do want to do everything we can to make
it an affordable capability as part of the inherent capability
in the system.
Mr. Turner. I am not going to ask necessarily did General
O'Reilly say yes, sir, in response to your memo as he said, but
have you received a response to the memo that is satisfactory?
Do you believe that General O'Reilly and the Missile Defense
Agency will be responding to what clearly is a very important
issue that you have raised?
General Shelton. I do, Mr. Chairman. I did get a response,
and it is about a three paragraph response but, summarized,
said, yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. Excellent, excellent. Turning now to my ranking
member, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay.
General Shelton, Mr. Klinger, Ambassador Schulte, as you
know, section 1248 of the fiscal year 2010 National Defense
Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State to carry out an assessment of the national
security risks of removing satellites and related components of
the United States munitions list. That report is now almost 2
years late.
In the meantime, the U.S. satellite industry, the
industrial base continues to struggle to keep pace with the
global competition in what is intensely really an international
market. So, a study on the health of the space industrial base
entitled ``U.S. Industrial Base Analysis for Space Systems,''
conducted by the Tauri Group under contract to OSD industrial
policy, cites 11 space technologies of high risk due to the
absence of U.S. suppliers or a single U.S. supplier. Prudent
changes to overly restrictive export control regulations could
have a significant impact on the health and the sustainability
of our United States satellite industry.
So, can you tell me again when the section 1248 report will
be delivered and do you think that there will be significant
movement in our ability to actually get some export going so
that we can hold onto our lead in this industry?
Mr. Schulte. Representative Sanchez, we share your concern
about the industrial base, and we are--part of the strategy
that we have, a key part of it is to energize that industrial
base, and there are ways you can do that through what you buy
and how you buy it. And Gil Klinger, Mr. Klinger, has talked
about that a little bit, but we also believe that space export
control reform has to be a key part of how we energize our
industrial base to allow our industry to compete on the
international market in the sale of items and technologies that
are already widely available and therefore would not hurt our
national security. So, we support export control reform that
would allow that to proceed. We will need your help in that
regard.
We issued the--yes, ma'am, we are late on the 1248 report,
perhaps even later than we are sometimes on QFRs. I apologize.
We had the initial 1248 report come out last year, and in that
report we indicated a judgment by the Department of Defense and
Department of State that commercial satellites and their
components, with a couple of exceptions, could, in fact, be
moved off of the U.S. munitions list. We owe you the final
report, which is forthcoming, and we anticipate that that final
report will indicate other items in what we call category 15,
the space items, that can be moved off of the munitions list
onto the commerce control list. For that to actually happen, it
does require legislation. Unlike in any other industry area,
this is one where the export control is legislated, so we will
need your help in that regard.
But our goal is to allow, with your support, is to allow
industry to be competitive on the international market in areas
where technology is already widely available, and then
concentrate our controls, our licensing, and our enforcement on
those technologies that are truly sensitive, and by building
higher fences around higher walls, we think--I am sorry, higher
fences around fewer items--we think we can accomplish two
things: help our industry and thereby help our national
security.
Ms. Sanchez. So when you say ``forthcoming,'' what does
that mean?
Mr. Schulte. Oh, ma'am, I would like to tell you it is next
week. It is in coordination at this point. Hopefully it will be
here soon.
Ms. Sanchez. So forthcoming and it will be here soon; what
does that mean, Ambassador? Can I expect it in a month, 2
months, 6 months, 2 years, 4 years?
Mr. Schulte. I would hope closer to the first part of that
range. Our goal is to get it to you as soon as we can. I should
just say, if I may, it's taken longer than anticipated in part
because we have had to survey all of the items in category 15
and, believe it or not, there are hundreds of thousands of
items in category 15. So it has required a very thorough scrub
to make sure that we are presenting the best possible
assessment to you, but we do hope that report will come to you
very soon.
Ms. Sanchez. Great, we'd like to see it. I know that our
ranking member, Mr. Smith, is very interested in this also, and
I think that he or I would carry legislation to allow some of
this to happen. I know that he and I were the only ones many,
many years ago when I think it was maybe our first or second
year on this committee, and we came in together, where we had
the encryption fights and he and I were, I think, the only
votes to try to loosen up some of that encryption because, you
know, coming from States like Washington and California where
this is predominant, we lose our ability to compete if we don't
have a market for what we're making. Or, if we have an
artificial market because we are only supplying to our
companies or to our defense system, we are still losing our
creative and competitive and innovative edge. So, I really
believe that this is a very important issue, and I am sure--I
don't want to speak for Mr. Smith because he is not in this
hearing--but, I know the fight we had many, many years ago on
encryption, and I believe he feels the same way about this,
that there are some things that we can make a market for by
export that is already out there or the equivalent, and we
would like to see that be a priority.
I want to go back to the EU Code of Conduct. Ambassador,
you know, there is a real, I don't want to say fear, but
there's definitely different ideas of what sitting down and
negotiating on this code of conduct is about. Can you talk a
little to the--maybe to the cost and the benefits of entering
into negotiations with the EU on the EU Code of Conduct, and
what are the risks that we run of not doing something like
that? And, will our military operations and needs be protected?
Mr. Schulte. Ma'am, we judge that a code of conduct, not
the EU code per se, but a code of conduct can actually serve
the interests of our national security and strengthen our
security. We asked the joint staff to conduct an operations
assessment of the existing EU draft, and then based upon that
assessment we came up with a mitigation strategy that included
some changes to the code, a subscription statement if we
subscribe at some point, and some internal guidance that in our
judgment would make sure that a code would be fully supportive
of our national security.
We have briefed the operation assessment and the mitigation
strategy in detail to your staff. But we judge, you know, the
State Department, we will be there with the State Department in
those negotiations, and before a code is finally adopted or
agreed to, we will conduct another full operations assessment
with mitigation strategy to make sure it is acceptable to us.
Some of the concerns we have heard about the code, and they
are all legitimate, and we have tried to address them. One
concern is, is this arms control by the back door? This is not
arms control. I mean, this is a voluntary code. It is not
legally binding. In fact, one advantage to the code is right
now Russia and China have been proposing a legally binding arms
control agreement that we don't think would serve our national
interests, and this allows us to change the narrative in the
international discussions, and it takes us off effectively the
defensive, and it has us talking about how do we promote
responsible behavior.
Another concern that has been raised about the code is
could it somehow limit our missile defense capabilities,
particularly if we wanted to put some in space? And the answer
to that is no. The code specifically focuses on behavior, not
unverifiable capabilities. So we have been very careful to make
sure that it is in line with our practices, it is in line with
our planning, and it would support our national security.
If I could, just briefly: one of the benefits is changing
the narrative. Another benefit is to encourage all the new
entrants into the space field to act responsibly, to follow the
type of procedures we do and make sure they don't create the
debris or they don't operate matters that risk
misunderstanding, again with the objective of helping to
protect space, which effectively is part of the global commons.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, I have a lot more questions, but
I'll----
Mr. Turner. We will do a second round of questions.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Heinrich.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman. General Shelton and Mr.
Klinger, I am deeply concerned about the budgetary cuts to
small satellite programs such as Operationally Responsive Space
and the Space Test Program in fiscal year 2013. These
relatively small satellite programs require marginal
investments, and given the increasingly competitive environment
in space and the high cost of procuring traditional
multibillion-dollar satellites, I fear they are penny-wise and
pound-foolish cuts.
It makes no sense to me that the Department, in an attempt
to lower costs, has proposed terminating a program whose whole
purpose was to lower cost. Specifically, the Department's
proposed fiscal year 2013 budget calls for the ``. . .
restructure of Operationally Responsive Space, ORS, program in
order to provide more responsive and timely space capabilities
to the warfighter,'' yet the ORS program was terminated.
Can you please explain to me why this program is being
canceled, what plans the Air Force has to sustain the ORS
mission, and how it intends to provide more responsive and
timely space capabilities to the warfighter without the ORS
mission and funding?
General Shelton. Yes, sir. First point I would make is that
the concept of ORS is not going away. It is continuing, but it
is continuing across our programs. As opposed to having a
dedicated program office that is going to work ORS and produce
individual satellites, we will have ORS concepts spread across
all of our satellite programs, and I think you will see those
concepts come out in the future as we look at alternative
architectures and things like that.
There are people still working at Kirtland Air Force Base,
working together just like they have been on ORS concepts. The
space development and test division that's there will continue
to work ORS concepts on behalf of all of the Space and Missile
Systems Center, which is headquartered in Los Angeles. So that
linkage, which has always been tight, will continue. It is just
that we won't have a dedicated office.
As we looked, again, across our entire portfolio, and we
had to come up with these Budget Control Act reductions, this
was one of the victims of the Budget Control Act reductions.
But, at the same time, the concept still continues to live. So,
I think it is a win-win, given the environment.
Mr. Heinrich. General, as you know, the ORS imaging
satellite was launched in June of 2011 in response to a
requirement in support of U.S. Central Command. It is my
understanding that ORS-1 has met and exceeded CENTCOM's [U.S.
Central Command] expectations.
Can you speak a little more on what the warfighter's
response has been to this reconnaissance asset?
General Shelton. Yes, sir. We got a letter from their
intelligence officer, basically their J2, that said they were
extremely impressed with the imagery that they had gotten from
ORS-1. They were not only happy with the responsiveness of it,
but they were happy with the quality of the imagery that they
were getting, and it was a warfighting advantage, no question.
Mr. Heinrich. I want to quickly reiterate Chairman Turner's
concerns about the Space Test Program and sort of follow up
with a follow-up question to the ones that he raised.
Did the Air Force coordinate with the affected Government
laboratories and organizations that have also benefited from
this program over the years, so that they could properly plan
for the change in fiscal year 2013 budget request?
General Shelton. I think that the coordination that maybe
we would have wanted to occur did not occur, and the reason for
that was as we got to the final balancing at the end of the
President's budget exercise, we flat just didn't have the time,
plus there was a lot of closed-door sessions that finalized
that submission. That coordination is going on now. We are
determining how we will spread the work. We are determining how
we will gain the same sorts of advantages we got from the Space
Test Program, albeit by other organizations.
Mr. Heinrich. That was not exactly the answer I was hoping
for, but Mr. Chairman, I will yield back to you.
Mr. Turner. We are going for a second round, and I have got
a couple questions. This one is to General Shelton and Ms.
Sapp. On December 20th, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman Wolf,
and I wrote to the Secretary of State inquiring about the
status of a pending investigation of the suspected illegal
export of commercial satellite technology to China. I will read
you the first paragraph of the letter to give you some
reference.
We write to Secretary Clinton stating that ``. . . we seek
your prompt response on a matter of continuing concern of ours,
efforts to protect the United States from the increasingly
aggressive activity in space of the People's Republic of China.
One important and often overlooked part of the U.S. capacity to
ensure our security in space is the export control regime,
specifically the International Traffic in Arms Regulation,
ITAR, which is the responsibility of the Department of State.
We are concerned that the Department is not moving aggressively
enough to punish violations of this regime.''
Are the two of you familiar with this letter?
General Shelton. I have seen the letter, yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. Good. What I would like to know is, are you
familiar with the State Department position that the Department
is further--excuse me, are you familiar with the State
Department's position that ``. . . the Department is further
troubled by the perception of Thales' continued lack of
cooperation, particularly given the SB-4000 C2 was not, in
fact, ITAR-free and was exported to China; and can China's
counterspace programs benefit from U.S. technology and we not
make certain that China isn't able to obtain that technology''?
If you would give me your thoughts on both the letter and
the issue of exporting in violation of ITAR, what that means to
the Chinese systems.
General Shelton. All I was going to say is I'm, really not
as familiar with the issue. I am familiar with the letter, but,
Mr. Chairman, I couldn't really comment on the details of the
issue.
Ms. Sapp. I am afraid I could not as well. I have seen the
letter, but I am not familiar with what has been done in
response.
Mr. Turner. Can I ask if both of you, upon reading the
letter, had concerns about the circumstances that were laid,
set out in the letter?
General Shelton. Certainly anything that would offer a
comparative advantage would be of concern.
Mr. Turner. Ambassador, you were raising your hand, so I
will call on you.
Mr. Schulte. If that is okay, sir. I am familiar with the
letter, and we know that the State Department is investigating
that case. But, the leakage of sensitive technology to
countries like China has, of course, been foremost in our mind
as we thought about export control reform, and so in the 1248
reports that we are providing you, the Department of State and
Department of Defense are proposing moving from the munitions
list to the commerce control list only space items that are
already widely available; and we are not proposing removing the
Tiananmen Square sanctions that would remain in place even with
export control reform, meaning that items still on the
munitions list could not be exported to China and also meaning
that we would not allow the launch of satellites from Chinese
launch vehicles.
Finally, we have also proposed, the Administration has also
proposed in the case of China for those items moved off the
munitions list that we still have restrictive licensing and
export controls on those. So, we are very conscious of China,
and we have developed our export control proposals with China
very much in mind. In fact, we believe that to the extent that
we focus on those technologies that are most sensitive, we can
increase the focus of our export control and enforcement
efforts to avoid situations like this in the future.
Mr. Turner. Well, tell me about the statement of the State
Department's position, ``The Department is further troubled by
the perception of Thales' continued lack of cooperation, given
that the export was, in fact, not ITAR-free, and was exported
to China.''
You are in a situation where an export appears to be in
violation, and you are not getting a whole lot of cooperation,
it appears. Tell me what the State Department is currently
doing and your thoughts then on that matter.
Mr. Schulte. Sir, despite being an Ambassador, I shouldn't
try to talk for the State Department. I know that they have
come, Frank Rose, my colleague there, has come to brief your
staff, but we're clearly concerned at any leakage of sensitive
technology to China, and support all enforcement efforts there.
Mr. Turner. Well, Ambassador, let's turn to the issue now
of the code of conduct. I obviously have constitutional
concerns. The whole purpose in the Constitution of having
Senate confirmation is that so one individual would never have
the ability, power, or authority to internationally bind us by
law that would in any way restrict our rulemaking, our
lawmaking.
The code of conduct, as I understand it, would, although
perhaps be proposed as nonbinding, in fact would have
regulations that would be promulgated and would, in fact,
restrict activities that the United States is doing. So, there
are serious concerns that people have with respect to a back
door.
So, my first question is, if Russia and China don't join,
since those are two of the states most capable of generating
debris in outer space, what have we accomplished? And, isn't it
true that one of the reasons China didn't test an ASAT [Anti-
Satellite weapon] again after 2007, the one that created all
the debris, was that the international outcry was so great that
it didn't want to risk that again, meaning that there was an
effect upon Chinese behavior, and in 2007 there was no code of
conduct. So, your thoughts on Russia and China?
Mr. Schulte. Sir, I was actually in Vienna working with the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space when the Chinese
tested, and the Chinese Ambassador, who is my colleague, was
clearly embarrassed and had no talking points for about a week
after that happened.
That said, the Chinese continue to develop a very broad
range of counter space capabilities, including ones that could
cause debris. They've tested additional systems but in a way
that has minimized debris. Our concern is that there are more
and more countries, including China, that are developing space
capabilities, and to protect the long-term sustainability of
space we think that a code, not the EU's current code, but that
a code, if properly negotiated and if we evaluate it and agree
it's acceptable, can actually help to protect the long-term
stability of space by encouraging responsibility----
Mr. Turner. Let's stop there for a second. I love the fact
that you use the words ``properly negotiated.''
Mr. Schulte. Right.
Mr. Turner. Please tell me why that would not involve the
Senate.
Mr. Schulte. A code of--sir, a code of conduct is a
voluntary code. An example of that, for example, is The Hague
Code of Conduct, which was negotiated by the last
administration and subscribed to by them.
Mr. Turner. Actually, let's discuss that because you have
used that as an example before. You've pointed to The Hague
Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation to
suggest that the Bush administration favored this nonbinding
approach and therefore that it must be fine. You measure the
goodness of the policy on whether the Bush administration
favored it as a course of action, and I am confused. The joint
staff analysis we have states that if the United States were to
make a good-faith effort at implementing the requirements of
such a code, your code, the one that you want to pursue, there
may be adverse operational impacts on U.S. military and
Intelligence Community space operations. There is a straight-up
admission that our current operations would be impacted.
What impact on U.S. military and intelligence operations
was there from The Hague Code of Conduct? What binding
regulations were issued on the Department of Defense and IC as
a result of U.S. subscription to The Hague Code, and can you
provide any copies of such regulations that came out of The
Hague Code? Apparently when you responded to a staff inquiry on
this, you referred to an Ambassador Bolton speech. Obviously
that is an insufficient answer, and we would like you to answer
more directly.
And, what was it that the U.S. was doing in 2002 that it no
longer did as a result of subscription to The Hague Code? Were
we proliferating ballistic missiles before the code? But yet,
and I want to make it very, very clear, the questions are being
asked to you because when we look at the unclassified excerpt
from the Executive Summary of the Joint Staff Operations
assessment of the draft EU code, it states, ``If the United
States were to make a good-faith effort at implementing the
requirements of the draft code, there could be operation
impacts on U.S. military space operations in several areas.''
So to do your comparison, the code of conduct with respect
to space has an impact on operations that we are doing, would
have regulations promulgated under it, and according to your
description of it, would bypass the Senate, the nonbinding
Hague Code had no such regulations, impacted no such operations
of the United States, and, you know, clearly did not result in
a shift of any policy or operations of the United States. They
are really not comparative, are they?
Mr. Schulte. Mr. Chairman, with The Hague Code of Conduct,
as you said, I am not aware of any regulations that were issued
afterwards to change our behavior. There was a procedure put in
place whereby we started to notify the launches of ICBMs
[Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles] and SLBMs [Submarine-
Launched Ballistic Missiles] and space launches. And, by the
way, as part of that procedure we also put in place a mechanism
so that in rare exceptions if we thought it didn't serve our
national security interests to make those notifications, we
could not make them, and in many ways that is sort of--that is
similar----
Mr. Turner. So a courtesy rather than a regulation, rather
than as this statement is, that the code you are advocating
for, that it would impact U.S. military space operations in
several areas?
Mr. Schulte. Well, what we have--so we put in a procedure
to notify. In a way, that was the only impact, and we made sure
there is an exception clause. With an International Code for
Outer Space Activities, we asked the joint staff to conduct
that operations assessment, and based upon that we worked with
them to come up with a mitigation strategy. And part of the
strategy is to make sure that we make clear in developing the
code and in subscribing to the code, should we get to that
point, that this is a voluntary code and that we will carry it
out consistent with our national security interests.
Mr. Turner. I have to tell you once again, as I said in my
opening statement, anything that the Administration does that
is a negotiation in the establishment of an international code
that is going to have an impact on our military operations, I
believe, and I think we believe, I believe this Congress is
going to believe, ought to constitutionally include the Senate.
And, it is going to be a subject matter that we will be taking
up with the National Defense Authorization Act.
Turning to my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Chairman Turner. General Shelton,
will sensors that can improve detection of a nuclear detonation
be incorporated into the SBIRS satellite? Why or why not? What
is the cost? And when can we expect the report on this issue
that is due to Congress?
General Shelton. Miss Sanchez, I am trying to recall where
we are in the decision process on that, but I believe we have
decided that we do not need to include those sensors on SBIRS
satellites, and that is because we've got sufficient capability
on other satellites, including GPS satellites that have a very
robust nuclear detonation detection system on them. As far as
the report, when the report might be here, I can't comment on
that. Maybe someone else on the table here.
Apparently we are all shaking our heads. We'll take that
one for the record if you don't mind.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay, and if you could get back to me in a
timely manner, because I do agree with Mr. Turner, when we ask
for things for the record, we rarely get them. Sometimes we get
them a couple years later.
Ms. Sanchez. General Shelton and Ms. Sapp, launch is
becoming much more expensive, and although United Launch
Alliance has an excellent track record for successful launches,
it currently has a monopoly on our launch services. New
entrants such as SpaceX may be able to compete if they can
prove reliability and mission assurance.
I know we had a track that we were going down to try to
include, hopefully, some sort of competition into the arena.
But with the current acquisition plan, will it allow new
entrants to compete in 2015 if they can prove mission
assurance? And if not, what's the earliest time that the new
entrants would be able to compete?
General Shelton. Ma'am, our strategy is defined; our
acquisition approach is still being defined. We have asked
United Launch Alliance to provide a matrix of costs that would
include anywhere between 6 to 10 boosters over a period of 3 to
5 years, and we are looking at that, where the sweet spot might
be there not only for cost but also in readiness of these new
entrants that enter into competition. During that period,
regardless of what that period is, we will continue to track
the progress of SpaceX and Orbital and others that are building
new boosters, to see if some of them might be ready for, even
during this initial period, to compete for launches.
There are two launches specifically that we have set aside
that we think people might be able to compete for during that
time. If that occurs, great, we will use those as certification
opportunities for them, at least on the path towards
certification. But it is really up to the new entrants, their
technical progress, their ability to show that they are ready
to take national security payloads. And, as we come through
that process, we are pretty risk-averse in terms of national
security payloads, but these two that we have set aside we
believe that we can take a little bit more risk.
Ms. Sanchez. And so the current budget cuts that are
projected over those next 2 to 3, 4 years, are they not--they
are not going to impact the schedule? I think you and I sat
down, or somebody sat down with the whole schedule of where
those sweet spots would be, so nothing has changed with respect
to that because of the budget constraints?
General Shelton. No, Ma'am. Nothing has changed. We are
still on track for those two launches for sure, and then we are
developing again our acquisition approach to the continuation
of the EELV.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, General. I have a couple more
questions for the record.
Mr. Turner. I just have one more question.
On second thought, we will have questions perhaps for the
record also. I want to thank you again for both your patience,
your participation, and your leadership. And, General, thank
you again for your work on GPS and ensuring that that will
continue to be an asset for the Department of Defense. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 2:34 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 8, 2012
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 8, 2012
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Michael Turner
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request for National Security Space Activities
March 8, 2012
Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee's hearing on the Fiscal Year 2013 budget
request for national security space activities. Our
distinguished witnesses this afternoon are:
LGeneral William Shelton, Commander of Air
Force Space Command;
LAmbassador Greg Schulte, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy;
LMr. Gil Klinger, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense, Space and Intelligence Office; and
LMs. Betty Sapp, Principal Deputy Director of
the National Reconnaissance Office.
Thank you all for appearing before this subcommittee.
I would like to start by congratulating you on the
significant accomplishments in national security space over the
past year. Due to tremendous efforts of the military,
civilians, and contractors of the Department of Defense and
Intelligence Community, we have a number of new critical
capabilities on orbit. This could not be accomplished without
the launch teams' efforts, which continued an impressive record
of 49 out of 49 successful EELV launches.
The NRO has completed an extremely aggressive and
successful campaign of 6 launches in 7 months. And although we
cannot talk here about the capabilities that the NRO brings to
the fight, the warfighter, intelligence community, and
policymakers are all significantly benefiting from these
launches.
While there have been great strides, this year's space
hearing is especially important as we work to understand the
significant reductions to the space program, and its future
impact on national security.
It is clear that space capabilities are essential elements
of our military and intelligence construct. Space will continue
to be a key enabler of our national security as the U.S.
maintains the ability to operate in anti-access, anti-denial
environments. As such, in the new Defense Strategic Guidance,
the President and Secretary of Defense listed the ability to
operate effectively in space and cyberspace as a primary
mission area of the U.S. Armed Forces. Yet, the fiscal year
2013 budget request for Department of Defense space programs
was reduced by 22 percent from last year's request.
I am concerned that a significant portion of these funding
cuts are taken from research and development programs. For
example, the research and development in the Evolved Advanced
Extremely High Frequency satellite communications program is
reduced by over 75 percent. This investment is part of a
broader space acquisition strategy started last year, formerly
called Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency, designed
to reinvest savings from a block buy into a stable research and
development program to lower risk for future programs.
Further, the Department proposed to terminate two programs
that push the boundaries for small satellites and experimental
payloads--the Space Test Program and the Operationally
Responsive Space office. The Space Test Program has driven
innovation from the bench-tops of defense laboratories across
the country to on-orbit space capabilities. Many space programs
that we rely on daily, such as GPS, have their origins in the
Space Test Program. I am not satisfied with the justification
that has been provided for terminating the Space Test Program.
The Operationally Responsive Space office was established
by Congress in the Defense Authorization process to address the
need to rapidly reconstitute space capabilities under various
threat scenarios and the desire to shorten the lengthy space
acquisition cycle. The ORS office has responded to urgent
warfighter needs, and delivered critical capabilities. To date,
I am not satisfied with the Department's plan to support this
important mission after the proposed ORS termination.
I am pleased to see that the major spacecraft acquisition
programs appear to be sufficiently funded in the budget
request. Continued investment in core capabilities, such as
GPS, AEHF, WGS, MUOS, and SBIRS, remains one of the top
priorities. Yet, as some program acquisitions cross multiple
services in the Department, we must be conscious of the timing
of our investments and properly align the schedules to deliver
the spacecraft, ground segment, and user terminals in the most
effective manner possible, consistent with the needs of the
warfighter.
Assured access to space through our launch program remains
another priority for this subcommittee. The price of launch has
risen significantly in the past couple years, and the committee
will continue close oversight as we work to understand the Air
Force's new acquisition strategy for the EELV program. As
General Shelton noted in his written testimony, this strategy
will address industrial base viability and cost growth while
making provisions to leverage emerging competition. Further, as
directed in our Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization
Act, we look forward to the President's plan for a National
Rocket Propulsion strategy that includes the Department of
Defense, NASA, and Intelligence Community efforts. The GAO
recently released a report on duplication that noted the space
launch acquisition processes for NASA and DOD duplicate one
another and may not fully leverage the Government's investment.
In your opening testimonies, we would appreciate hearing about
collaboration in space launch activities across the Government
to reduce duplication and leverage investments.
Regarding space policy, I support the Administration's
decision not to sign onto the draft European Union Code of
Conduct for Outer Space Activities. However, I am concerned
that your stated agreement with elements of this Code of
Conduct and intention to negotiate something similar could
establish the foundation for a future arms control regime that
binds the United States without the approval of Congress, which
would bypass the established constitutional processes by which
the United States becomes bound by international law.
Additionally, I have significant policy and operational
concerns with the EU Code of Conduct with regard to national
security. Earlier today, I received a written response from the
Administration, which was unsatisfactory and leaves no choice
but to legislate in the National Defense Authorization Act. The
letters will be added as part of the record.
Lastly, as policymakers, we rely on the assessments
provided by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center
(NASIC) to understand foreign space threats. It is clear that
as our dependency on space systems increases and threats
continue to develop, our space situational awareness is
critical, and the space constellation and ground network must
be resilient. NASIC is our first line of all-source
intelligence analysis on space threats to form U.S. defense
policy decisions. There are many aspects to this important area
of national security and we look forward to working together to
reach enduring solutions.
Thank you again for being with us today. You each possess a
tremendous amount of expertise and insight on our Nation's
space policy and capabilities, and our Nation is better off as
a result of your service. I look forward to your testimony.
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 8, 2012
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 8, 2012
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. 1) General Shelton, if provided with the authorization
and appropriation for the Efficient Space Procurement block buy of two
Space Based Infrared Systems, what are the expected cost savings and
the plan to reinvest those savings into modernization initiatives for
future missile warning satellites? Further, how can we be assured those
savings don't become a bill payer as seemed to happen to the AEHF
savings in the FY13 budget request?
General Shelton. 1) The staff of the Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense estimates
projected savings of $521M through implementation of Efficient Space
Procurement for Spaced Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) Geosynchronous
Earth Orbit Satellites 5 and 6. We applied $289M of this savings across
the Future Years Defense Program for the SBIRS modernization
initiatives. The remaining projected savings were applied to higher DOD
priorities. The SMI funding is set at an affordable level to produce
and sustain current Program-of-Record systems and to invest in
affordable alternatives for evolving current capability. The SMI plan
is based on strategic guidance, an established architectural path,
documented requirements and a solid program execution plan.
Mr. Turner. 2) General Shelton, the GAO found that satellites,
ground control systems, and user terminals in most of DOD's major space
system acquisitions were not optimally aligned, leading to
underutilized satellites and limited capability provided to the
warfighter, in some cases for periods measured in years. What is DOD
doing to address the synchronization problems, particularly with GPS M-
Code user terminals, AEHF Family of Beyond the Line of Sight Terminals,
SBIRS staring sensor, and Navy MUOS JTRS terminals? Has OSD or the Air
Force measured the cost in terms of delay or inefficiencies? What is
the plan to close these gaps and more efficiently plan to fully utilize
the resources available?
General Shelton. 2) The Air Force coordinates fielding schedules
with Combatant Commands for all weapons systems. This interaction is
critical toward mitigating the impact of capability delays, which
cannot be quantified in terms of cost alone.
Air Force Space Command is focused on delivering advanced
Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT), protected satellite
communications, and missile detection/missile warning capabilities to
the warfighter. In November 2011, the DOD approved an incremental
acquisition strategy for the next generation of Military GPS User
Equipment (MGUE) capable of exploiting the newest, most advanced
military GPS signal. Current GPS enterprise acquisition schedules show
the 24th Military-code capable satellite launching by FY18, with full
rate production of the first units of Increment MGUE in FY17.
With the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program,
synchronization is improving due to the successful upgrade of the
Army's Secure Mobile Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal and the Navy
Multi-band Terminal. The Air Force is restructuring the Family of
Beyond Line of Sight Terminals program. With this restructure, we are
pursuing the highest priority terminals first to ensure protected
communications for the air (E-4B and E-6B) and ground command post
terminals with Presidential and National Voice Conferencing
capabilities.
Finally, the first Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS)
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit satellite is undergoing a rigorous
operational certification process. Preliminary test results show the
space vehicle is meeting or exceeding performance requirements. The
staring sensor is undergoing preliminary calibrations--at the payload
level, it is detecting targets 25% dimmer than expected and the data
are being shared with the research and development and Technical
Intelligence communities. The DOD funded initiatives, separate from the
program of record, will deliver interim capabilities to process the
data from the staring sensor in FY15/16. The sensor will contribute to
the most stressing missile warning/missile defense performance
requirements with full mission operations after acceptance of the final
SBIRS Increment 2 ground system in FY18.
Mr. Turner. 3) General Shelton, what is the purpose and value of
the Counter Space Technology List (CSTL) developed by the State
Department and the Aerospace Corporation? Should the CSTL be integrated
into the export control reform process?
General Shelton. 3) The Counterspace Sensitive Technology List
(CSTL) is an ongoing research and analytical project, intended as a
technical information aid to support export licensing and
nonproliferation decisions. As such, we understand it is a proven
reference tool. It was one of the many references used by the members
of the Category XV Technical Working Group to develop and justify the
technical performance parameters recommendations in the proposed update
to United States Munitions List Category XV Spacecraft Systems and
Associated Equipment published as Appendix 1 of the final 1248 Report.
The Department of Defense, through the Defense Technology Security
Administration, and other departments and agencies are working with the
State Department to ensure the completeness of the CSTL.
Mr. Turner. 4) The Operationally Responsive Space office is
proposed for termination in the fiscal year 13 budget. Please explain
why this program is being cancelled, what plans the Air Force has to
sustain the ORS mission and how this will provide more responsive and
timely space capabilities to the warfighter?
General Shelton. 4) We plan to restructure the ORS program to
incorporate the ORS tenants of responsiveness and resiliency across our
space programs, to include programs such as the Advanced Extremely High
Frequency Satellite, Space Based Infrared Systems, Global Positioning
System III Operational Control Segment, Space Control Technology
Insertion, and Technology Transfer programs. Beginning in 2013, we plan
to meet warfighter needs for responsive space capabilities through
programs of record and mechanisms such as the Joint Urgent Operational
Needs process.
The Space and Missile Systems Center's Space Development and Test
Directorate is sustaining the ORS-1 space vehicle and ground components
through the life of the system--with approximately $7M/year of Overseas
Contingency Operations funds.
Mr. Turner. 5) The Space Test Program has been a national
capability relied on by laboratories and universities since 1965. Many
critical space-based programs, such as GPS, have their origins in
technology that was launched on STP missions. Please explain why the
Department is requesting to cancel this critical program that provides
the seed corn for future capabilities. Is there any other R&D
organization that performs the mission of STP, integrating and
launching payloads across the Department and coordinating experiments
to fly aboard the International Space Station? Further, did the Air
Force coordinate with the affected Government laboratories and
organizations so they could properly plan for this in the FY 13 budget
request?
General Shelton. 5) The Space Test Program funding was eliminated
due to higher Department of Defense priorities. We are coordinating
with affected agencies to ensure space experiment work continues under
the auspices of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Air
Force Research Laboratory and other Service research laboratories.
Mr. Turner. 6) The Secretary of Defense in the Annual Industrial
Capabilities Report to Congress, dated September 2011, highlighted
DOD's concern for the U.S. Liquid Rocket Propulsion Industrial Base
(LRPIB), and specifically the Air Force Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) program's reliance on Russian engines. What are your
perspectives on the need to invest in domestic liquid rocket engines
for use on our critical National Security Space launch missions? What
must be done and when in order to preserve the critical U.S. liquid
rocket engine industrial base and the unique science and engineering
capability that supports this industrial base?
General Shelton. 6) The Air Force is operating engines designed
decades ago. In many instances, these engines are operating near the
upper-margin of the performance capabilities--this is a mission
assurance concern.
We are pursuing several avenues to modernize rocket engine
technology. First, we are looking toward design of an upper stage with
increased performance margins. Second, the Air Force Research
Laboratory is developing next-generation technologies to include a new,
domestically produced hydrocarbon main engine for eventual
incorporation into the existing launch vehicle fleet. Finally, we are
monitoring the progress of civilian companies entering the commercial
unmanned and manned spaceflight markets.
In addition, both the Air Force EELV acquisition and new entrant
strategies contribute to the preservation of the LRPIB and the science
and engineering capability supporting the industrial base. The steady-
state procurement rates of the acquisition strategy fosters efficient
execution and enables companies to retain workforce expertise,
providing stability and predictability to the EELV program, and thus to
the LRPIB. The New Entrant Strategy encourages competition, which also
contributes to the LRPIB.
Mr. Turner. 7) Should the launch schedule slip, as has historically
been the case, how will the excess inventory the Air Force builds up
effect competition from New Entrants? How much generally are the
storage costs per booster, and who pays those costs?
General Shelton. 7) Most upcoming Air Force launches are recurring
flights for programs that have already launched satellites supporting
their respective missions; therefore, these satellites are very
similar, if not identical, to their predecessors. This reduces the
chance of development or production delays, and increases the
likelihood these satellites will launch on schedule. We do not foresee
a need to store launch vehicles. In addition, we are working the Atlas
``white tail'' concept to provide a common booster core for Atlas
rockets, and the Delta Fleet Standardization to introduce a common RS-
68 engine across all Delta IV variants. These two efforts will increase
booster assignment flexibility and reduce launch delays.
Mr. Turner. 8) What is the status of the new acquisition strategy
for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, and what is the specific
information that will be gathered to inform the final decision the
block buy contract? What are the expected savings from the new
strategy?
General Shelton. 8) The EELV Acquisition Strategy, approved
November 24, 2011, addresses the challenges of lowering costs while
maintaining mission success through an annual booster commitment and
infusing competition into the program. The success of this strategy is
based on obtaining accurate information prior to contract award.
The FY13 Phase 1 Buy request for proposal requires United Launch
Alliance to price both ranges in periods of performance, three to five
years for hardware and up to seven years for capability, and quantities
of six to ten ``core'' launch vehicles per year with the ability to
launch eight to ten missions per year. This approach allows the
government to balance launch vehicle production rate and length of
commitment decisions. It enables the government to secure the best
price per launch service (includes launch vehicle and associated launch
support), and provides stability and predictability for the EELV
program. Savings from the new strategy will depend on the delivered
proposal and the final rate and quantity of launch services selected by
the Air Force.
Mr. Turner. 9) When do you assess that a new entrant will meet the
established criteria for national security space EELV-class launches?
General Shelton. 9) We expect at least one new entrant ready to
compete for launches in the FY16-17 timeframe. The Air Force conducted
a New Entrant Industry Day on December 1, 2011, with 100 attendees
representing 15 aerospace companies and their affiliates and five
government partners. Breakout sessions involved discussions with four
potential new entrants. To date, the Air Force has received one
Statement of Intent (SOI) for certification and we expect additional
SOIs later this year. We are in the process of evaluating the SOI
received and do not have a projected certification date yet.
No new entrant has a demonstrated capability to launch EELV-Class
payloads. To facilitate the certification of potential new entrants,
the Air Force identified two opportunities on which new entrants may
bid: the Space Test Program-2 and the Deep Space Climate Observatory.
These EELV-class missions will provide an opportunity for potential new
entrants to prove their capability for certification. The certification
timeline depends on the new entrants; specifically, their technical
progress, the quality and sufficiency of the data they provide and a
successful flight history. The Air Force is committed to certifying new
entrants for EELV launches as soon as feasible.
Mr. Turner. 10) GAO recently released its annual report on
duplication, overlap, and fragmentation and reported that ``Space
launch acquisition processes for NASA and DOD are not formally
coordinated, duplicate one another, and may not fully leverage the
Government's investment because the Government is not acting as a
single buyer.'' Please identify cost savings opportunities and identify
what is being done to reduce duplication and leverage investments?
General Shelton. 10) The Air Force is collaborating with NASA to
find common solutions for launch needs. In 2010, NASA and the Air Force
conducted a joint study to assess the feasibility of a mutual liquid
oxygen and kerosene engine for EELV and the Space Launch System. The
Liquid Propulsion Steering Group was created in February 2012 to act as
an advisory board responsible for integrating Air Force liquid rocket
propulsion requirements with the propulsion needs of external
organizations and agencies. We are incorporating NASA's engine
requirements for a Cryogenic Propulsion Stage as we explore options for
replacing the EELV upper stage engine. At the technical level, we are
active participants in each other's design reviews, and DOD and NASA
are working together on the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act
National Rocket Propulsion Study.
Mr. Turner. 11) There are potential program areas where the DOD and
NASA may have common or similar requirements for evolving space launch
capabilities. These include high-thrust liquid oxygen--kerosene rocket
propulsion systems/boosters for use on next-generation EELV and NASA's
Space Launch System (SLS) Advanced Booster. How have the DOD and NASA
collaborated toward establishing common requirements whereby a common
liquid booster could be established for use on both programs? Are there
active efforts between the DOD and NASA to coordinate Research and
Development roadmaps so that maximum space launch benefits can be
obtained? If yes, please describe some examples of these coordinated
actions and ongoing collaborations.
General Shelton. 11) The Air Force continues to collaborate with
NASA to find common solutions for launch needs. In 2010, NASA and the
Air Force collaborated on an extensive study to assess the feasibility
of a mutual liquid oxygen and kerosene engine for EELV and the Space
Launch System. In February 2012, the Liquid Propulsion Steering Group
was created to act as an advisory board responsible for integrating Air
Force liquid rocket propulsion requirements with the propulsion needs
of external organizations and agencies. We are incorporating NASA's
engine requirements for a Cryogenic Propulsion Stage as we explore
options for replacing the EELV upper stage engine. At the technical
level, we are active participants in each other's design reviews, and
DOD and NASA are working together on the FY12 National Defense
Authorization Act National Rocket Propulsion Study.
Mr. Turner. 12) What is DOD doing, or planning to do, to define and
assess its mission assurance costs and activities, and to what extent
will the new acquisition strategy protect against overly high launch
vehicle prices compared with mission assurance changes/efficiencies
resulting from these assessments? Further, please outline how mission
assurance for national security space missions differs from commercial
space missions.
General Shelton. 12) Mission assurance is a rigorous, continuous
technical and management process employed over the life-cycle of a
launch system to ensure mission success. There are two distinct facets
to mission assurance. Integrated mission assurance is accomplished by
the organizations involved in the launch vehicle design, production,
testing and launch processing. Independent mission assurance, a crucial
component of the success of National Security Space launches, is often
identified with ``mission assurance costs.'' This effort includes a
number of technical reviews and analyses tailored for each mission,
enabling a launch readiness independent assessment. It comprises less
than 5% of the launch enterprise total costs, yet its value to the
overall enterprise is hard to overstate. In fact, the Space Launch
Broad Area Review, conducted just over ten years ago, recommended we
return to in-depth mission assurance following a series of launch
failures.
The Air Force will continue to encourage efficiencies without
impacting mission success. The current launch capability contract,
signed June 2011, includes a mission success performance incentive
ensuring focus on mission requirements and a cost control incentive
motivating the contractor to find efficiencies within its operations.
The principal difference between mission assurance requirements for
national security space missions and commercial missions is summarized
by the impact realized by a launch failure. Most, if not all,
commercial launches are privately insured, and launch failures
represent lost revenue. National Security Space launches are
indemnified by the U.S. Government, and launch failures represent a
significant cost to the taxpayers, as well as the mission impact of the
loss of that particular satellite--a loss that could take many years to
overcome.
Mr. Turner. 13) Does DOD plan to develop its own price estimates
for varying block buy quantities and contract lengths, or will it
solely rely on the price proposals from United Launch Alliance?
General Shelton. 13) Yes. The Air Force will follow Federal
Acquisition Regulation Part 15 negotiation processes to develop and
negotiate fair and reasonable prices. Auditors from the Defense
Contract Audit Agency will support the Air Force negotiation team. In
addition, a joint team composed of the National Reconnaissance Office
Cost Analysis Improvement Group and the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency
is performing analyses of costs for the RS-68 main engine, RL-10 upper
stage engine, systems engineering, program management and launch
operations. Data gathered from these reviews will inform the Air Force
negotiating position.
Mr. Turner. 14) Can you discuss any Department efforts to establish
a longer-term plan for MILSATCOM? What is the projected demand in
narrowband, wideband, and protected communications and how does the
Department plan to meet it? What is the Department doing to ensure it
is procuring Ku-band commercial satellite communications in the most
efficient manner?
General Shelton. 14) In the near term, we are maximizing our use of
Ku-band commercial satellite communications by using the Defense
Information Systems Agency's Future Commercial Satellite Communications
Services Acquisition contract. In the longer term, we have analyzed
future demand for these capabilities based on approved Defense Planning
Scenarios. We are now executing the third and final phase of the
Resilient Basis for Satellite Communications in Joint Operations Study
to determine the best architectures to meet the future demand. The
architectures under consideration include combinations of traditional
military communication satellite systems and those acquired through
innovative commercial lease/buy opportunities.
Mr. Turner. 15) What is the right balance of organic space
capability and commercially leased or hosted capability? How much of
our space capability is currently being provided by commercial
providers? How can we increase the opportunities for hosted payloads to
save costs and bring capability online more quickly?
General Shelton. 15) In accordance with the 2010 National Space
Policy, the Air Force is pursuing commercial space capabilities to the
``maximum extent possible'' when those capabilities meet our
requirements and are cost-effective. We are investigating opportunities
to augment military space capabilities such as environmental
monitoring; Positioning, Navigation and Timing; space-based imagery;
and launch with commercial services. In addition, the Space and Missile
Systems Center's Hosted Payload Office is identifying cost-effective
hosting opportunities in the commercial market and developing an
efficient business approach and contract vehicle for hosted payloads.
Their efforts will lead to recommendations for the future.
Mr. Turner. 16) As the responsible steward of GPS, what does the
Air Force see as the future of GPS in a fiscally constrained
environment? What alternative methods and technologies are being
evaluated to cost-effectively meet the GPS mission?
General Shelton. 16) Air Force Space Command is moving forward with
cost-efficient strategies while balancing warfighter needs and the
mandate to preserve GPS as the world's Positioning, Navigation and
Timing gold standard. We are pursuing studies in Ground Segment
automation and dual manifest launches for manpower and launch cost
savings. The Department of Defense's recent GPS Enterprise
Modernization Analysis of Alternatives is on-going and will identify
cost-effective capability modernization alternatives. In the longer-
term, we are tracking innovative technology alternatives, such as
terrestrial-based augmentation and highly-accurate inertial navigation,
for potential inclusion into the GPS Enterprise as these technologies
mature.
Mr. Turner. 17) The Department requested only $2M in FY13 for
``Weather Satellite Follow-On'' efforts, and projected no money after
that in the Five Year Defense Plan. While we recognize that the
Department is relying on the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
to meet its near-term needs, what is the longer term plan to meet this
critical mission area?
General Shelton. 17) The Air Force is extending Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) operations until 2025 by
transitioning to a single string orbit and launching the remaining two
DMSP satellites in an on-demand basis. In preparation for a follow-on
to DMSP, we are validating the future capabilities required and
conducting a study to identify the optimum approach for the follow-on
program.
Mr. Turner. 18) We have heard a lot about the need for resiliency
of our space systems. How do we measure resiliency of an architecture?
Do we have a way to model resiliency to evaluate our current systems,
their strengths and weaknesses and determine what is sufficient?
Compare current systems to future concepts? What are the most important
steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space systems that are
resilient to threats?
General Shelton. 18) Resiliency of space systems can be measured by
an architecture's ability to resist an attack by avoiding damage or
degradation, absorbing damage but maintaining structure and key
functions and reconstituting to pre-event status.
While the models for measuring resiliency for each space capability
area differ, the Department of Defense does have a standard framework
for assessing a functional architecture. This framework consists of
identifying the anticipated threat, the minimum and desired levels of
mission performance, the risk of not meeting these performance levels,
the consequence to the mission of not meeting a given performance level
and the duration over which a performance shortfall is tolerable.
In the past, the threats to our spacecraft were not as concerning,
so National Security Space programs built robustness into individual
systems. Due to the current and increasing future threats, our concepts
for providing resilient architectures include disaggregating
capabilities on multiple satellites, non-traditional orbital regimes,
hosting payloads on other satellites and integrating allied nation
space and cyberspace capabilities.
Mr. Turner. 19) Discuss the progress of the Space Protection
Program. What have been its accomplishments since its establishment in
2008 and, what space protection areas continue to need the greatest
attention? What is your assessment of how the defense and intelligence
community have worked together to support the activities of this
office?
General Shelton. 19) Since 2008, the Space Protection Program
(SPP), a joint Air Force Space Command and National Reconnaissance
Office Program, has energized the National Security Space community to
implement strategies to improve resiliency and mission assurance. They
delivered the Capabilities and Dependencies database, enabling United
States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to calculate the operational
consequences of multiple space systems losses. In addition, several
National Security Space programs have integrated protection
capabilities into program baselines.
This year, marks the culmination of several major efforts. SPP is
completing testing of techniques that will allow USSTRATCOM to ensure
communications capabilities in a highly contested environment. They are
also working with United States Pacific Command and USSTRATCOM to
incorporate new Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for enhancing
deployed systems survivability. Furthermore, this summer, SPP will
complete an effort with multiple Services and agencies to demonstrate
the effectiveness of various defeat capabilities and laying the
groundwork for integrating those capabilities into operational
architectures.
The Department of Defense and Intelligence Community continue to
work in close coordination to develop and improve mission assurance
capabilities. Of note, SPP is integrating a set of Title 10 and Title
50 response options involving the entire protection community to
endorse performance requirements for the Space Situational Awareness
architecture in a representative threat environment. The results will
be delivered in approximately three months. These efforts, along with
an associated effort to better define Indications and Warning support
to space operations, indicate the coordination in the National Security
Space community is strong and productive.
Mr. Turner. 20) What efforts and long-term planning is the
Department engaged in to ensure its spectrum continues to be
safeguarded in the future?
General Shelton. 20) The Air Force is engaged in multiple efforts,
internationally and nationally, to ensure we continue to provide
spectrum access capabilities to the Joint fight. At the same time, we
recognize spectrum also fuels consumer and business wireless services
and provides economic benefits to the Nation.
Internationally, the Air Force was a key participant and
contributor in the United States preparation for and attendance at the
United Nation's International Telecommunications Union World Radio
Communication Conferences (WRC). At WRC-12, significant gains were made
regarding spectrum for unmanned aerial systems command and control,
contributing toward congressionally directed efforts to integrate
unmanned aircraft operations into the National Airspace System. The
Conference also identified 300 additional megahertz of globally
harmonized spectrum for radar use to support the development and
operation of advanced synthetic aperture radars.
Nationally, the Air Force is heavily involved in the presidentially
directed and National Telecommunications and Information Administration
led effort to identify 500 megahertz of additional spectrum for
broadband wireless use. Our approach is straightforward: if we can
prevent impacts to Air Force capabilities, we will not oppose
repurposing of spectrum. Preventing impacts is dependent upon the
availability of alternate spectrum, payment of our costs through the
Spectrum Relocation Fund, and the time required making the transition.
We are also working closely with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Chief Information Officer on the development of a Department
of Defense Long Term Spectrum Strategy to address how the Department
will address the continuing pressures on our spectrum access.
Mr. Turner. 21) What is the acquisition strategy for the Joint
Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS) program? How will the
strategy leverage existing investments in commercial and Government
capabilities?
General Shelton. 21) The JMS acquisition strategy leverages
existing government off the shelf (GOTS) and commercial off the shelf
(COTS) products to the maximum extent possible, producing a very cost-
effective procurement process. The JMS Program Office conducted market
research to identify and assess the existing government and commercial
capabilities that meet the Joint Requirements Oversight Council-
approved JMS requirements. No existing COTS solutions exist that will
fully satisfy these requirements. The program office will procure
appropriate COTS products that satisfy subsets of these requirements
through fixed-price contracts and will use Multiple-award Indefinite
Delivery Indefinite Quantity contracts to procure those capabilities
needing additional development work to meet the remaining requirements.
Mr. Turner. 22) What is the purpose and value of the Counter Space
Technology List (CSTL) developed by the State Department and the
Aerospace Corporation? Should the CSTL be integrated into the export
control reform process?
Mr. Schulte. 22) The Counterspace Sensitive Technology List (CSTL)
is an ongoing research and analytical project, intended as a technical
information aid to support export licensing and nonproliferation
decisions. As such, it has proven to be an invaluable reference tool.
It was one of the many references used by the members of the Category
XV Technical Working Group to develop and justify the technical
performance parameters recommendations in the proposed update to USML
Category XV Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment published as
Appendix 1 of the final 1248 Report. DOD, through the Defense
Technology Security Administration (DTSA), and other departments and
agencies are working with the State Department to ensure the
completeness of the CSTL.
Mr. Turner. 23) What is the right balance of organic space
capability and commercially leased or hosted capability? How much of
our space capability is currently being provided by commercial
providers? How can we increase the opportunities for hosted payloads to
save costs and bring capability online more quickly?
Mr. Schulte. 23) The Counterspace Sensitive Technology List (CSTL)
is an ongoing research and analytical project, intended as a technical
information aid to support export licensing and nonproliferation
decisions. As such, it has proven to be an invaluable reference tool.
It was one of the many references used by the members of the Category
XV Technical Working Group to develop and justify the technical
performance parameters recommendations in the proposed update to USML
Category XV Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment published as
Appendix 1 of the final 1248 Report. DOD, through the Defense
Technology Security Administration (DTSA), and other departments and
agencies are working with the State Department to ensure the
completeness of the CSTL.
Mr. Turner. 24) We have heard a lot about the need for resiliency
of our space systems. How do we measure resiliency of an architecture?
Do we have a way to model resiliency to evaluate our current systems,
their strengths and weaknesses and determine what is sufficient?
Compare current systems to future concepts? What are the most important
steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space systems that are
resilient to threats?
Mr. Schulte. 24) Resilience is the ability of an architecture to
support the functions necessary for mission success in spite of hostile
action or adverse conditions. An architecture is ``more resilient'' if
it can provide these functions with higher probability, shorter periods
of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios,
conditions, and threats. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or
alternative government, commercial, or international capabilities.
This definition and an associated methodology were developed by the
Department and reviewed by the Defense Space Council. The basic
evaluation methodology relies on system-of-systems fault analysis
against different types and levels of threats. This is then
supplemented with performance satisfaction analysis to determine the
degraded level of capability against any adverse circumstance. The on-
going Resilient Basis for SATCOM (RBS) Study and Joint Overhead
Persistent Infra-Red Space Trade Study (JOIST) are the first
architectural-level studies to assess resilience.
As we look to the future, the most important steps we can take to
enhance resilience are to adopt a payload-centric acquisition approach,
coupled with greater international collaboration and smaller, simpler,
more affordable, incremental, disaggregated mission satellites and
hosted payloads. This more diverse, distributed, complex targeting
approach denies adversaries the benefit of attack and imposes an
unacceptable cost and complexity on their attack calculus.
Mr. Turner. 25) Discuss the progress of the Space Protection
Program. What have been its accomplishments since its establishment in
2008 and, what space protection areas continue to need the greatest
attention? What is your assessment of how the defense and intelligence
community have worked together to support the activities of this
office?
Mr. Schulte. 25) The Space Protection Program (SPP) has made
important recommendations on how to reduce certain vulnerabilities in
key space systems/constellations and identified ways to maintain our
strategic advantage. Since 2008, the SPP has provided threat
assessments, expanding upon intelligence assessments to include
engineering judgments, technical analysis of suspected threat systems,
and concepts to mitigate certain threats. In addition, the SPP
supported development of the National Security Space Strategy, the
Space Protection Strategy (SPS), which identifies protection
priorities, and other key efforts in the department.
We remain focused on multiple mission priorities, including efforts
to enhance the resilience of our Missile Warning, ISR, and
Communications architectures. DOD worked collaboratively with the
Intelligence Community (IC) to establish the SPP, and we continue to
work with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to assess the
scope, functions, organization, and resources of the SPP, with a view
towards building an enduring organization for resilience and mission
assurance, increasing its effectiveness across the U.S. space
enterprise, and integrating a closer working relationship among DOD,
the IC, and civil agencies.
Mr. Turner. 26) What efforts and long-term planning is the
Department engaged in to ensure its spectrum continues to be
safeguarded in the future?
Mr. Schulte. 26) The use of the electromagnetic spectrum continues
to be a critical enabler of our warfighting capabilities. We are
sensitive to the competing spectrum demands resulting from the
Department's increasing reliance on spectrum-dependent technologies and
the rapid modernization of commercial mobile devices on a national and
international scale. Recognizing that the demand for spectrum will
continue to increase, the Department has long-term initiatives aimed at
using and managing our spectrum more efficiently, identifying and
investing in spectrally efficient technologies that afford us combat
advantages, and advancing the interoperability of spectrum use and
management with our coalition partners, and with Federal, State, and
commercial entities.
Mr. Turner. 27) The GAO found that satellites, ground control
systems, and user terminals in most of DOD's major space system
acquisitions were not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized
satellites and limited capability provided to the warfighter--in some
cases for periods measured in years. What is DOD doing to address the
synchronization problems, particularly with GPS M-Code user terminals,
AEHF Family of Beyond the Line of Sight Terminals, SBIRS starring
sensor, and Navy MUOS JTRS terminals? Has OSD or the Air Force measured
the cost in terms of delay or inefficiencies? What is the plan to close
these gaps and more efficiently plan to fully utilize the resources
available?
Mr. Klinger. 27) Synchronization of schedules between space and
ground components is recognized as an issue that limits some users from
fully utilizing on-orbit capabilities. Launch schedules are such that
the space components are required to maintain current capabilities
while also affording enhanced capabilities requiring expanded ground
processing or alternative user equipment in some cases. The Department
is currently assessing ways to more efficiently bring ground component
utility to more optimal levels. The following address the specific
systems identified.
The Air Force is focused on delivering new Positioning, Navigation
and Timing (PNT) capabilities as quickly and cost effectively as
possible. Providing a new PNT capability, such as military-code (M-
code), to warfighters requires populating the GPS constellation with
modernized satellites (GPS IIR-M, IIF & III), fielding a control
segment capable of providing C2 of new capabilities (OCX), as well as
providing DOD GPS users with an industrial base to acquire M-code
capable GPS receiver technology (MGUE). By FY18, the GPS constellation
will be populated with the 24th M-code satellite, OCX will have
transitioned to operations and sufficient development and operational
testing and evaluation will have been accomplished to support a Full
Rate Production decision for fielding MGUE.
The Department has struggled to deliver the FAB-T program and
synchronize with the AEHF satellite to take advantage of the new
capabilities. The first AEHF satellite achieved orbit last year and is
completing operational check out. We are in the process of
restructuring the FAB-T program to reduce continued cost and schedule
risk and now expect to deliver the first FAB-T in FY15. The restructure
includes putting an alternate source for the highest priority
capabilities, especially those on command and control platforms, on
contract in 2012 to address development schedule risk. The restructure
also includes conversion of the current development contract to a fixed
price contract for the development, and fixed price options for
production.
Other AEHF terminals, the Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT), Air Force
Minuteman MEECN Program Upgrade (MMPU) and Army Secure Mobile Anti-jam
Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T), are being fielded now, and will
be able to utilize the full AEHF capability as soon as it becomes
available for operational use. Since AEHF and all existing EHF
terminals are also compatible with the legacy Milstar waveform, the
AEHF satellite resources will be utilized when available. The
operational cost is some users having to delay the migration to higher
data rates and use of specific capabilities requiring the higher rates.
The space component of SBIRS GEO-1 is ahead of the ground in the
use of both scanning and staring sensors. Scanners represent the legacy
detection schema and retain a place in future on-orbit architectures.
Staring sensors are a more robust capability for which the current
ground processing is being expanded and will be fully implemented by
2018. During the interim period the scanner data continue to be of use
as a result of data processing efforts within the USAF.
Regarding MUOS, in July 2011 the USD(AT&L) directed a Red Team be
established to determine the viability and probability of success of
fielding the MUOS terminal/waveform capability. A goal of the Red Team
was to assess the synchronization of the MUOS satellite and the JTRS
ground terminal. The Red Team presented results of the assessment in
November 2011 and USD(AT&L) directed they be implemented. A directive
specifying timelines to accomplish Red Team tasks as well as
determining service integration responsibilities is currently being
reviewed by USD(AT&L).
Mr. Turner. 28) The Operationally Responsive Space office is
proposed for termination in the fiscal year 13 budget. Please explain
why this program is being cancelled, what plans the Air Force has to
sustain the ORS mission and how this will provide more responsive and
timely space capabilities to the warfighter?
Mr. Klinger. 28) With the successes of the Operationally Responsive
Space (ORS) programs, the Department decided to incorporate the concept
of operationally responsive space into the Air Force Space & Missile
Systems Center (SMC) to increase resiliency, survivability and
flexibility across all DOD space programs.
Transition efforts are underway to fully integrate responsive space
principles into space architectures and Space Modernization Initiatives
to:
Develop enablers to ensure resilience, survivability and
flexibility
Explore space mission augmentation options
Incorporate responsiveness into Research and Development
(R&D) efforts across other platforms
Integrate lessons learned from ORS accomplishments.
By integrating responsive space into the mission area platforms in
both R&D and acquisition practice, the Department will continue to
provide responsive and timely space capabilities to the warfighter.
Additionally, the Joint Staff has an extremely responsive and
proven Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) and newer Joint Emergent
Operational Needs (JEON) process which will continue to provide
responsive capabilities to Combatant Commander urgent needs.
Mr. Turner. 29) The Space Test Program has been a national
capability relied on by laboratories and universities since 1965. Many
critical space-based programs, such as GPS, have their origins in
technology that was launched on STP missions. Please explain why the
Department is requesting to cancel this critical program that provides
the seed corn for future capabilities. Is there any other R&D
organization that performs the mission of STP, integrating and
launching payloads across the Department and coordinating experiments
to fly aboard the International Space Station? Further, did the Air
Force coordinate with the affected Government laboratories and
organizations so they could properly plan for this in the FY 13 budget
request?
Mr. Klinger. 29) Current fiscal constraints have resulted in the
need to terminate STP in order to reallocate funding to higher
priorities. While no other organization currently provides DOD-wide
space access services or coordinates DOD experimentation aboard the
International Space Station, spaceflight opportunities, both dedicated
and rideshare, will still be available to the DOD science and
technology community. Additionally, the DOD Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration Program has several space capabilities and launch
demonstrations planned.
DOD organizations will continue to invest in research and
development of advanced space technologies, and will develop and fund
their own space-access means and capabilities. While the desired
coordination with affected government laboratories and organizations
did not occur due to time constraints during the final balancing of the
President's Budget. The FY13 budget request includes funds for STP to
operate throughout FY13 and the Department is coordinating an approach
to provide future space access for DOD experiments.
Mr. Turner. 30) To account for the Space Test Program termination,
are the budgets for the laboratories across the Department being
increased, in the FY13 PB and the FYDP, to account for the expanded
mission of launching their payloads? If so, by how much? If not, how
will this ongoing requirement be met in the future?
Mr. Klinger. 30) Budgets for DOD laboratories were set
independently from the STP termination decision. The Air Force Research
Laboratories, Naval Research Laboratories, Army Space and Missile
Defense Command, Defense Advance Research Project Agency, National
Reconnaissance Office, and other DOD organizations will continue to
make significant investments in space related research, including the
space access costs.
Mr. Turner. 31) The Secretary of Defense in the Annual Industrial
Capabilities Report to Congress, dated September 2011, highlighted
DOD's concern for the U.S. Liquid Rocket Propulsion Industrial Base
(LRPIB), and specifically the Air Force Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) program's reliance on Russian engines. What are your
perspectives on the need to invest in domestic liquid rocket engines
for use on our critical National Security Space launch missions? What
must be done and when in order to preserve the critical U.S. liquid
rocket engine industrial base and the unique science and engineering
capability that supports this industrial base?
Mr. Klinger. 31) There are several reasons why it is urgent that we
readdress our current investment in liquid rocket engines. First, the
upper stage engine used on the Delta IV is no longer in production. We
have a stockpile that will last several years, but we must restart the
line or replace this engine. Atlas V uses a similar upper stage that,
although still in production, is also scheduled to stop production. The
Department needs to collaborate with the United Launch Alliance to
determine the way-ahead. Resolution of continued upper stage liquid
rocket engine availability is most urgent.
Second, as you noted, we depend on the Russians to provide RD-180
boost engines for the first-stage of the Atlas V; this approach has
obvious concerns. Investment in development of a domestically-produced,
hydrocarbon-fueled, staged-combustion boost engine with similar or
better performance than the RD-180 would eliminate this dependency and
give a much-needed injection of capital to our liquid rocket engine
industrial base. We mitigate this dependency today with a stockpile of
RD-180 engines to allow us sufficient time to react, if needed. The DOD
and NASA are collaborating on a study of liquid rocket engine
alternatives for both first- and upper-stage that was commissioned by
the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The DOD will use the results of this
study to inform budget requests that will be sent to the Congress for
FY 2014. NASA intends to leverage the results of this study in their
own roadmap, which will be expressed in the National Rocket Propulsion
Strategy.
Mr. Turner. 32) Should the launch schedule slip, as has
historically been the case, how will the excess inventory the Air Force
builds up effect competition from New Entrants? How much generally are
the storage costs per booster, and who pays those costs?
Mr. Klinger. 32) Our analysis of satellite readiness for launch
indicates that the rate of 6-10 cores per year over 3-5 years that is
anticipated under the Air Force EELV acquisition strategy is
insufficient to meet the expected demand. Although we have experienced
launch delays in the past, circumstances that led to lower than
expected launch rates no longer exist. We are entering a period during
which several National Security Space programs that involve
constellations of satellites are now in full-scale production, so we
anticipate a full launch manifest for the foreseeable future.
The Department's contractor does not produce or store excess launch
vehicles. They acquire some long-lead materials and stockpile them at
their expense, but the factory adjusts production to match confirmed
deliveries to the launch site as the satellites arrive for integration
and launch preparation. If an already-ordered launch were indefinitely
delayed, the factory would adjust production to match the revised
manifest and any cores already in production for the delayed launch
would be reassigned to the next suitable mission.
Mr. Turner. 33) What is the status of the new acquisition strategy
for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, and what is the specific
information that will be gathered to inform the final decision the
block buy contract? What are the expected savings from the new
strategy?
Mr. Klinger. 33) The EELV acquisition strategy was approved by the
Air Force Acquisition Executive on November 24, 2011, and the Air Force
released a request for proposal March 23, 2012 requesting cost
proposals that cover a range of launch rates and durations. From that
data and our own independent analysis, the Department will award the
first block-buy contract at the rate, duration, and with termination
conditions that, together, offer the most advantageous terms to the
Government. Actual savings will not be known until we receive and
assess the proposal later this summer.
Mr. Turner. 34) When do you assess that a new entrant will meet the
established criteria for national security space EELV-class launches?
Mr. Klinger. 34) Only one potential new entrant, the Space
Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), has stated an intention
to qualify for future National Security Space (NSS) launch missions,
and based on their current DOD- and NASA-funded launches, combined with
their commercial launches and assuming the success of these missions,
we expect them to achieve certification to compete for future NSS
missions by 2017. SpaceX has said they will be certified by 2014. Their
estimate assumes no anomalies, which would be a first for a new launch
vehicle (Falcon 9D), and this forecast does not take into consideration
additional mission assurance measures that SpaceX will be required to
implement throughout their supply and construction chain before they
can be awarded an EELV-class launch mission.
Mr. Turner. 35) GAO recently released its annual report on
duplication, overlap, and fragmentation and reported that ``Space
launch acquisition processes for NASA and DOD are not formally
coordinated, duplicate one another, and may not fully leverage the
Government's investment because the Government is not acting as a
single buyer.'' Please identify cost savings opportunities and identify
what is being done to reduce duplication and leverage investments?
Mr. Klinger. 35) As the DOD's lead for National Security Space
(NSS) launches, the Air Force manages the NSS launch manifest and
launch service acquisitions in coordination with NASA to leverage our
combined buying power and acquire the best contract terms for the U. S.
Government (USG). The DOD believes the USG launch customer community
(DOD, NRO, and NASA) should collectively negotiate the number of launch
vehicles and services based on the total USG demand to achieve an
economy of scale. The DOD and NRO, for example, have an existing
memorandum of understanding and collectively procure launch services
with DOD, specifically Air Force Space Command, acting as the lead
agent. Current policy encourages agencies to use another agency's
contract vehicle if the scope and terms of the providing agency's
contract meet the supported agency's needs. However, NASA awarded the
Launch Services II contract to meet their specific space launch
requirements, which are not the same as the NSS requirements.
Mr. Turner. 36) There are potential program areas where the DOD and
NASA may have common or similar requirements for evolving space launch
capabilities. These include high-thrust liquid oxygen--kerosene rocket
propulsion systems/boosters for use on next-generation EELV and NASA's
Space Launch System (SLS) Advanced Booster. How have the DOD and NASA
collaborated toward establishing common requirements whereby a common
liquid booster could be established for use on both programs? Are there
active efforts between the DOD and NASA to coordinate Research and
Development roadmaps so that maximum space launch benefits can be
obtained? If yes, please describe some examples of these coordinated
actions and ongoing collaborations.
Mr. Klinger. 36) The Air Force is working with NASA to explore the
potential of a partnership to develop a new upper-stage, liquid-fueled
engine for use in both the Air Force's Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) and NASA's Space Launch System (SLS). Under the
Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology program (or
IHPRPT), an Air Force-NASA project, a suite of physics-based modeling
and simulation tools used to develop upper-stage engines has been
deployed for use by the DOD and NASA. IHPRPT also develops components
for a staged-combustion, hydrocarbon-fueled main booster. The Air Force
Research Laboratory at Edwards Air Force Base is scheduled to conduct a
demonstration firing of a sub-scale prototype of an engine built with
these components in FY 2020.
Building on these efforts, the DOD and NASA are collaborating on a
study of liquid rocket engine alternatives for both first- and upper-
stage that was commissioned by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The DOD
will use the results of this study to inform budget requests that will
be sent to the Congress for FY 2014. NASA intends to leverage the
results of this study in their own roadmap, which will be expressed in
the National Rocket Propulsion Strategy that the DOD is co-developing
with NASA. The National Rocket Propulsion Strategy was directed in
Section 1095 of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.
Mr. Turner. 37) What is DOD doing, or planning to do, to define and
assess its mission assurance costs and activities, and to what extent
will the new acquisition strategy protect against overly high launch
vehicle prices compared with mission assurance changes/efficiencies
resulting from these assessments? Further please outline how mission
assurance for national security space missions differs from commercial
space missions.
Mr. Klinger. 37) Mission assurance activities consume approximately
5% of the EELV program budget. Each launch is unique and only those
activities that contribute to the reliability of each launch are
funded. The Air Force reviews mission assurance activities annually to
prune away any that do not materially contribute to reducing the risk
associated with all launch missions.
The new EELV acquisition strategy seeks to control costs by
achieving an economic order quantity, not through elimination of
mission assurance measures.
Commercial space missions are profit driven endeavors. As such,
they can buy down their financial risk through insurance or negotiate
it to the developer by purchasing only assets on orbit. National
Security Space (NSS) missions are not profit driven, but rather seek to
provide unique sensor, navigation, and communications capabilities to
meet the needs of warfighters in combat or intelligence needs of
national policy makers. In a few cases, we have purchased services from
commercial vendors to fill gaps in NSS capabilities, namely;
communications and commercial imagery. But, only in those unique
instances does an NSS mission begin to resemble a commercial model. For
most NSS missions, there is no replacement option for the unique
capabilities provided by the payload, so we impose higher mission
assurance standards to reduce the risk of launch for these missions.
The savings that might be realized from reducing mission assurance
activities is insignificant compared to the opportunity cost of losing
a critical NSS payload.
Mr. Turner. 38) The defense and intelligence user communities
conducted a study in 2010 to jointly identify near-term ground
investment opportunities that can lead to a more unified and
interoperable Overhead Persistent Infrared ground architecture. What
improvements are being made to capitalize on opportunities for data
sharing and fusion? Can you identify any areas of improvement for the
community to work more collectively on OPIR exploitation?
Mr. Klinger. 38)--What improvements are being made to capitalize on
opportunities for data sharing and fusion? Answer: The on-going
acquisition of JOG solutions provides a premier example of Intelligence
Community (IC) and Department of Defense (DOD) cooperation in
transforming OPIR stovepipes into an interoperable OPIR enterprise for
the National System for Geospatial Intelligence (NSG). JOG solutions
will deliver several critical capabilities to take full advantage of
the IC and DOD's OPIR systems. Most all of these solutions provide
improved data product sharing and fusion.
Commitment and support to JOG at all levels continues to be
outstanding. JOG acquisition realized a major milestone when the senior
leaders of the IC and DOD agencies partnering in JOG committed their
full support. This strong collaboration led to a JOG Memorandum of
Agreement, signed by the Directors, National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA) and Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and the Secretary of the
Air Force on 30 September 2011. The JOG team received Phase-B-
equivalent approval from the Joint (Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and Assistant Director of
National Intelligence for Acquisition, Technology, and Facilities)
Intelligence Acquisition Board on 5 October 2011.
Almost all the JOG solutions enable data sharing and fusion. Of the
23, seven materiel solutions are receiving initial funding in FY12:
Mission Scheduling, OPIR Enterprise Mission Management (OEMM), Real-
time Transfer Service (RTS), Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
Wideband Data Distribution, Data Standards Development, Fast-Frame
Processing for Battlespace Awareness/Space Situational Awareness
Reporting (BA/SSA), and Joint Operations for BA/SSA. All seven enable
data sharing and fusion.
JOG solutions are grouped into three packages with deliveries
scheduled for FY14, FY17, and FY20. Several solutions provide initial
capabilities in early deliveries, with full capabilities in later
deliveries. In addition to the seven solutions previously mentioned,
the following capabilities also support data sharing and fusion: OPIR
Real-time Message Formats, Real-time Web Reporting, and Full Frame
Processing for Missile Defense, Joint OPIR Data Archive, Cobra Brass-F
and SBIRS Geolocation Accuracy Improvements, and Enhanced Scene-based
Products.
--Can you identify any areas of improvement for the community to
work more collectively on OPIR exploitation? Answer: The IC and DOD
communities' team on establishing joint OPIR policy through the
recurring OPIR Working Group. Operationally, the two collaborate though
the Joint OPIR Planning Cell. We look forward to USSTRATCOM formally
approving the implementation of the Joint OPIR Priority Framework,
which will provide unified priority guidance for DOD and IC tasking of
OPIR satellites. Additionally, USSTRATCOM and NGA continue to
collaborate on defining OPIR support to the BA capability, which will
further support the acquisition of JOG solutions.
Summary: JOG represents a major step forward for OPIR development
and integration into the NSG. Solutions will provide users with new,
high-value capabilities and support the delivery of an interoperable
OPIR ground architecture for the joint IC and DOD community. NGA, Air
Force, and MDA collaboration to acquire these solutions is outstanding;
the team is off to a good start delivering OPIR capabilities that
better serve all our OPIR users.
Mr. Turner. 39) Can you discuss any Department efforts to establish
a longer-term plan for MILSATCOM? What is the projected demand in
narrowband, wideband, and protected communications and how does the
Department plan to meet it? What is the Department doing to ensure it
is procuring Ku-band commercial satellite communications in the most
efficient manner?
Mr. Klinger. 39) Question 1: Can you discuss any Department efforts
to establish a longer-term plan for MILSATCOM?
Answer: The Department of Defense Fifteen-Year Defense Space
Systems Investment Strategy for Fiscal Years 2012-2026, August 16, 2011
is the Department's long-range space systems investment strategy. It is
consistent with the FY 2012 President's Budget and reflects 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review, the 2010 National Space Policy and the 2011
National Security Space Strategy. The resilient and diversified
approach to SATCOM capability acquisition offers operational
flexibility in providing near-term surge needs as well as ensuring
long-term availability of military communications in diverse wartime
scenarios. Through ongoing studies and AoAs the Department is assessing
the MILSATCOM architecture and outlining a strategy for development/
procurement of long-term MILSATCOM.
Question 2: What is the projected demand in narrowband, wideband,
and protected communications and how does the Department plan to meet
it?
Answer: The Department is currently assessing the projected demand
for space communications assets. Resource Management Decision 700, 25
January 2011, tasked the Executive Agent for Space, in coordination
with the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, USD (Intelligence), Assistant Secretary of Defense
(NII), Joint Staff, United States Strategic Command, Director Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation, Director National Reconnaissance
Office and the Military Services to conduct a study to assess the
future of satellite communications in context of the National Security
Space Strategy. This study encompasses the nuclear, contested and
benign operating environments. This study's end-state objective is:
A comprehensive cost/benefit (warfighting effectiveness
metric) analysis across the span of alternatives associated with
mitigating the gaps identified in the Joint Space Communications Layer
Initial Capability Document.
Identify preferred alternatives for near and long term
needs.
Fully consider cost, schedule and performance trades.
Include a roadmap for transition from near to long-term
solutions.
Question 3: What is the Department doing to ensure it is procuring
Ku-band commercial satellite communications in the most efficient
manner?
Answer: The Future Commercial Satellite Services Acquisition (FCSA)
strategy (that includes all Ku band commercial satellite
communications) has increased competition sevenfold, opening
competition to more than 20 satellite vendors. We have already seen
that this additional competition is providing better pricing. The
transition for fixed satellite services (FSS) began last year, and
mobile subscription services (MSS) transition begins this year. The
government is in a better position today than yesterday in competing
COMSATCOM requirements.
Mr. Turner. 40) What is the right balance of organic space
capability and commercially leased or hosted capability? How much of
our space capability is currently being provided by commercial
providers? How can we increase the opportunities for hosted payloads to
save costs and bring capability online more quickly?
Mr. Klinger. 40) As a consumer in the commercial satellite industry
marketplace, DOD is engaged and proactive in formulating commercial
satellite communication (COMSATCOM) investment and acquisition
strategies to satisfy military operational requirements. Commercial
leased or hosted capabilities have been an integral part of our SATCOM
capability for years; leased COMSATCOM provides the predominance of
CENTCOM communications, and is anticipated to continue while U.S.
Forces remain active in the CENTCOM AOR.
In FY12, the Department directed the replacement of satellite
communications leases purchased with Overseas Contingency Operations
funds with a multiple option-year leases through the Defense
Information Systems Agency's Future Commercial Satellite Communications
Services Acquisition (FCSA). FCSA Service Areas include: Custom end to
end SATCOM solutions (CS2), ``Plug-in'' subscription services ($/month,
$/minute, $/MB), and higher transponder capacity.
The balance between COMSATCOM and MILSATCOM is based on the
uniqueness of certain military requirements. Military requirements span
a broad range, some of which are typical of commercial uses and some
are atypical (e.g., jamming protection, anti scintillation, nuclear
survivability, communications on the move (COTM)). For this reason, DOD
space system acquisitions meet military requirements, while commercial
space system acquisitions meet market demands, although some future
commercial offerings may be beneficial to the wideband military market
(e.g., commercial Ka band for support to disadvantaged users).
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) risks and proper DOD
approvals must be considered before implementing any of these atypical,
military-specific requirements on COMSATCOM.
Hosting DOD payloads on commercial satellites offer great potential
to augment, diversify, reconstitute DOD capabilities, more frequently,
and create resilience in an affordable way. However, there are several
challenges we must overcome:
In order to maximize opportunities in hosted payloads, a
common interface standard must be instituted on all commercial
satellites so that: (1) the DOD could rapidly host the payload on
commercial launches to orbit locations of interest to the DOD, and (2)
the DOD could compete the hosting of the payloads across multiple
satellite operators.
Commercial satellite orbit locations would require
clearances to operate at frequencies assigned for military/government
operations. In addition, ITAR issues may limit launch opportunities to
U.S. owned or ``friendly'' foreign owned companies.
Hosted payloads, by their nature, are tenants on a
commercial satellite. The DOD would need assurances that the hosted
payload would not be shut down if there were issues such that operating
the hosted payload conflicted with the other revenue producing payloads
on the satellite. Commercial Remote Sensing is provided through firm-
fixed price Service Level Agreements. The balance between government
and commercial systems is, once again, derived from the requirements
which are either uniquely time-sensitive, military/intelligence or
global, unclassified, shareable and delivered on-demand. Several
challenges highlight the need to reevaluate the balance between
government and commercial remote sensing:
Foreign industry's momentum in providing increasingly
greater electro-optical resolution
Foreign government-subsidized synthetic aperture
radar and multi-spectral capabilities which do not exist in the
U.S. commercial space industry
Increasing demand for full-motion video, as a result
of the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems.
The future opportunities for commercial remote sensing will depend
on the U.S. data providers' ability to remain viable in the market
place with an increasing number of competitors, not only from emerging
space-faring nations, but with expanding capabilities of our Allies.
Mr. Turner. 41) The Department requested only $2M in FY13 for
``Weather Satellite Follow-On'' efforts, and projected no money after
that in the Five Year Defense Plan. While we recognize that the
Department is relying on the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
to meet its near-term needs, what is the longer term plan to meet this
critical mission area?
Mr. Klinger. 41) The Department is moving forward with an analysis
of current and potential future capability gaps created in the wake of
the recent Defense Weather Satellite System termination and the
upcoming projected end-of-life for the DMSP. A Defense Space Council
(DSC) study will be accomplished in order to inform a Material
Development Decision in late July 2012 and provide input to frame an
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The DSC study is also expected to be
the basis for the Department's request for funding in FY 2014 to
support continued sensor development and risk reduction activities
initiated with the $125M Congress provided in the FY 2012 NDAA. The AoA
will commence late in 4QFY12 and will inform budget submissions for FY
2015 and beyond.
Mr. Turner. 42) We have heard a lot about the need for resiliency
of our space systems. How do we measure resiliency of an architecture?
Do we have a way to model resiliency to evaluate our current systems,
their strengths and weaknesses and determine what is sufficient?
Compare current systems to future concepts? What are the most important
steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space systems that are
resilient to threats?
Mr. Klinger. 42) The Department has defined space resilience.
``Resilience is the ability of an architecture to support the functions
necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or adverse
conditions. An architecture is `more resilient' if it can provide these
functions with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced
capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and
threats. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative
government, commercial, or international capabilities.''
The Department has initiated integrating the resilience definition
and we're in the early stages of applying an evaluation methodology
into space architecture development for overhead persistent infrared,
wideband and protected communications, and space control. Promulgating
the resilience definition and methodology throughout the Department's
processes will enable a common framework to make important trades
between performance, affordability, and resilience.
The most important steps that the Department is undertaking to move
towards space architectures innately more resilient to emerging threats
are: 1) continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness
of critical space-based capabilities, 2) continuing to work with
domestic and international allies and partners, 3) invest in advanced
capabilities to defend operational capability and improve resiliency in
space.
Mr. Turner. 43) Discuss the progress of the Space Protection
Program. What have been its accomplishments since its establishment in
2008 and, what space protection areas continue to need the greatest
attention? What is your assessment of how the defense and intelligence
community have worked together to support the activities of this
office?
Mr. Klinger. 43) The Space Protection Program (SPP) has conducted
several important analyses addressing certain vulnerabilities across
space systems and constellations since its inception in 2008. The
program has conducted engineering assessments and technical analysis of
suspected threat systems to develop and recommend concepts to mitigate
those threats. In addition, the SPP has supported analysis of several
Air Force programs, making recommendations on technology transition and
operational development to meet the threat baseline.
We remain focused on understanding the operating environment and
response trade space to evolve vital space missions into a more
resilient and integrated architecture. OSD is working with the DNI to
assess the scope, functions, organization, and resources of the SPP to
ensure we have an enduring organization for resilience, survivability,
and space service assurance; and increase effectiveness across the U.S.
space enterprise with close working relationships among DOD and IC.
Mr. Turner. 44) What efforts and long-term planning is the
Department engaged in to ensure its spectrum continues to be
safeguarded in the future?
Mr. Klinger. 44) The use of the electromagnetic spectrum continues
to be a critical enabler of our warfighting capabilities. We are
sensitive to the competing spectrum demands resulting from the
Department's increasing reliance on spectrum-dependent technologies and
the rapid modernization of commercial mobile devices on a national and
international scale. Recognizing that the demand for spectrum will
continue to increase, the Department has long-term initiatives aimed at
using and managing our spectrum more efficiently, identifying and
investing in spectrally efficient technologies that afford us combat
advantages, and advancing the interoperability of spectrum use and
management with our coalition partners, and with Federal, State, and
commercial entities.
Mr. Turner. 45) Is there a requirement for commercial imagery, and
if so, what is it? How does the Department quantify the amount of
commercial satellite imagery needed to support the requirements of the
warfighter? How does the Department plan to address these needs? What
is the longer-term plan?
Mr. Klinger. 45) Yes there is a requirement for Commercial Imagery
(CI). From the time commercial imagery satellite capabilities first
became available, these capabilities have provided a valuable
complementary source of imagery products to those obtained through
National Technical Means (NTM). The current requirement includes
products for imagery analysis that supplements information from NTM, as
well as for Foundation Based Operations and Safety of Navigation (FBO/
SoN) data. FBO/SoN products include data to develop and update
aeronautical and maritime charts, maps, and other foundation data used
both in intelligence reporting and operational planning documents. CI
systems can fulfill the bulk of the FBO/SoN requirements, while high
resolution NTM fulfill the bulk of detailed imagery for analysis
supporting intelligence, targeting, and decision making by senior
leaders. In reality, both CI and NTM can, and are, used to support the
two mission areas to a limited extent depending on timeliness, mission
and tasking priorities, and other operational constraints such as cloud
cover. The overall demand for imagery continues to grow, and commercial
imagery is an essential means to meet some of the demand. The
commercial imagery contracts are negotiated to provide imagery volumes
based on capacity of the commercial satellites and acceptable return on
investment by the Department.
The Department is currently refining its approach to addressing
these needs by conducting a joint USD(I)-ODNI led Commercial Imagery
Study that assesses satisfaction of the existing demand for Commercial
Imagery. The Department will use the results from this analysis effort
to ensure both DOD and ONDI are making the optimized, affordable
investment to satisfy the warfighter needs to the greatest degree
possible. The final report is due out in late April to OMB.
Additionally, the Joint Staff J-8 is performing a consolidated ISR
Study that includes an assessment of Commercial Imagery requirements
which will determine to what degree military CI requirements are being
met today, as well as those anticipated in the near term.
The longer term plan is for the Department to continue to work
closely with the DNI to ensure the USG can meet the needs of the
warfighter through an optimum balance of investments in both NTM and
CI. The CI investments in future years will be thoroughly analyzed
against all other mission priorities within the Department and
resourced appropriately.
Mr. Turner. 46) What is the purpose and value of the Counter Space
Technology List (CSTL) developed by the State Department and the
Aerospace Corporation? Should the CSTL be integrated into the export
control reform process?
Ms. Sapp. 46) The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is not a key
participant in developing the CSTL; respectfully defer this question to
the State Department.
Mr. Turner. 47) The Defense Space Council, established last year,
was designed to provide strategic guidance, planning, and architecture
assessment. From the perspective of the NRO, can you describe how the
Defense Department and Intelligence Community are cooperating,
conducting planning, and leveraging investments?
Ms. Sapp. 47) The NRO continues to collaborate with the Department
of Defense (DOD) and Intelligence Community (IC) in forums such as the
Defense Space Council (DSC). One of the core functions of the DSC is to
assess and guide requirements, plans, programs, and architectures
within the DOD and to promote cooperation between Defense and
Intelligence space sectors. This forum, and others such as the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, provides the IC and the DOD
opportunities to synchronize activities of mutual interest. More
specifically, there is considerable cooperation, planning, and
leveraging of investments through the acquisition and annual budget
processes. The DOD, the Director of National Intelligence and the
functional managers for signals intelligence (National Security Agency)
and geospatial intelligence (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency)
routinely work closely together to cooperate and conduct planning on
those systems in acquisition, and proposed future systems to meet
intelligence needs. In addition, during the annual budgeting process
investment leveraging is performed through joint studies and also
through jointly funded acquisitions where both the intelligence and
defense communities benefit from dual investments in key capabilities.
Mr. Turner. 48) When do you assess that a new entrant will meet the
established criteria for national security space EELV-class launches?
Ms. Sapp. 48) Based on continued interaction with National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Air Force, combined
with our ongoing efforts with several new entrants, the NRO is
encouraged by the development and looks forward to seeing new entrants
compete for launches as early as Fiscal Year (FY) 2014. This progress
is consistent with goals outlined in the new entrant strategy.
Mr. Turner. 49) What is the NRO doing to determine the viability
and readiness of new entrants performing launches for NRO missions?
Ms. Sapp. 49) In the past year, the NRO completed mission
integration and security related studies with two new entrant providers
(SpaceX and Orbital Sciences Corp). In concert with the Air Force, the
NRO is awarding follow-on efforts to one new entrant provider (SpaceX)
for defining integration requirements for the NRO Launch-79 (NROL-79)
mission. The NROL-79 launch vehicle is currently scheduled for a FY
2017 launch date.
In addition to these early integration studies, the NRO is also
participating, with NASA and the Air Force, in new entrant technical
design reviews to better understand the new entrant providers'
processes and designs.
Mr. Turner. 50) GAO recently released its annual report on
duplication, overlap, and fragmentation and reported that ``Space
launch acquisition processes for NASA and DOD are not formally
coordinated, duplicate one another, and may not fully leverage the
Government's investment because the Government is not acting as a
single buyer.'' Please identify cost savings opportunities and identify
what is being done to reduce duplication and leverage investments?
Ms. Sapp. 50) The Air Force is the executive agent for launch and
NRO respectfully defers to them to respond to this question.
Mr. Turner. 51) What is DOD doing, or planning to do, to define and
assess its mission assurance costs and activities, and to what extent
will the new acquisition strategy protect against overly high launch
vehicle prices compared with mission assurance changes/efficiencies
resulting from these assessments? Further please outline how mission
assurance for national security space missions differs from commercial
space missions.
Ms. Sapp. 51) This question is deferred to the DOD.
Mr. Turner. 52) What is the right balance of organic space
capability and commercially leased or hosted capability? How much of
our space capability is currently being provided by commercial
providers? How can we increase the opportunities for hosted payloads to
save costs and bring capability online more quickly?
Ms. Sapp. 52) This question is deferred to the DOD.
Mr. Turner. 53) We have heard a lot about the need for resiliency
of our space systems. How do we measure resiliency of an architecture?
Do we have a way to model resiliency to evaluate our current systems,
their strengths and weaknesses and determine what is sufficient?
Compare current systems to future concepts? What are the most important
steps the U.S. needs to take in order to create space systems that are
resilient to threats?
Ms. Sapp. 53) How do we measure resiliency of an architecture?
Answer: (U//FOUO) Regarding NRO systems, resilience describes how the
architecture responds to an unexpected disturbance (launch failure,
counter space activities, mission disruption, etc.) So, resilience
should provide the level of system adaptability to threat degradation
and loss in terms of quickly NRO capabilities ``bounce back'' or
recovers in collection capacity and how long it takes to do so--to
include the time it takes the constellation to be re-optimized after a
given loss or perturbation.
Do we have a way to model resiliency to evaluate our current
systems, their strengths and weaknesses and determine what is
sufficient? Answer: (U//FOUO) The NRO is developing modeling techniques
to predict and visualize system performance. Research is ongoing to
determine the best combination and use of these techniques. Key guiding
principles include: interoperability, to support optimizing the
collective response to threats; resiliency metrics inherently tied to
architecture performance; and linking predictive awareness and
resiliency.
Compare current systems to future concepts? Answer: (U//FOUO) The
NRO is pursuing future architecture concepts that are both effective
and resilient, while also consistent with cost constraints. Comparisons
between specific current and future systems are classified, and can be
discussed in a different forum.
What are the most important steps the U.S. needs to take in order
to create space systems that are resilient to threats? Answer: (U//
FOUO) Resiliency from an architecture perspective is by far the most
creditable and cost effective approach to maintaining the flow of vital
information from national systems. This is a holistic approach where
future architectures are a dynamic resilient ``system'' capable of
being reorganized to ``buyback'' mission capability under variable
stressing conditions, thus preserving essential capability.
Mr. Turner. 54) Discuss the progress of the Space Protection
Program. What have been its accomplishments since its establishment in
2008 and, what space protection areas continue to need the greatest
attention? What is your assessment of how the defense and intelligence
community have worked together to support the activities of this
office?
Ms. Sapp. 54) Since 2008, the Space Protection Program (SPP), a
joint NRO and Air Force Space Command Program, has energized the
national security space community to implement strategies to improve
resiliency and mission assurance for military and national security
space architectures. They delivered the Capabilities and Dependencies
database, enabling United States Strategic Command to calculate the
operational consequence of multiple space system losses. In addition,
several national security space programs have integrated protection
capabilities into program baselines.
The Intelligence Community and Department of Defense continue to
work in close coordination to develop and improve mission assurance
capabilities. Of note, SPP is integrating a set of Title 10 and Title
50 response options involving the entire protection community to
endorse performance requirements for the space situational awareness
architecture in a threat environment. They will deliver these results
to the Director of the NRO, and the Commander of Air Force Space
Command in three months. These efforts, along with an associated effort
to better define indications and warnings support to space operations,
indicate the coordination is strong and productive.
SPP will continue its efforts to better protect our space-enabled
capabilities and to incorporate protection into the requirements
processes and operational plans.
Mr. Turner. 55) What efforts and long-term planning is the
Department engaged in to ensure its spectrum continues to be
safeguarded in the future?
Ms. Sapp. 55) This question is deferred to the DOD.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. 56) Will sensors that can improve detection of a
nuclear detonation be incorporated into the SIBRS satellite? Why/why
not?
What is the cost?
When can we expect the report on this issue that is due
to Congress?
General Shelton. 56) The Department of Energy conducted a study to
assess if more affordable United States Nuclear Detonation Detection
System (USNDS) space and ground architectures are possible. Six options
were analyzed, two of which involved hosting USNDS sensors on SBIRS,
beginning with Geosynchronous Earth Orbit Satellite 7.
The study out-brief and decision process is underway.
Ms. Sanchez. 57) Could you give us your thoughts on the way forward
for JMS and why this is an urgent need?
Why is a developmental path that might be more expensive
and take longer to develop being pursued when commercial-off-the-shelf
capability may provide an earlier and cheaper solution? Are there any
plans for testing commercial capability?
General Shelton. 57) Our legacy Space Situational Awareness
processing system, the Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC), is far
beyond its useful life expectancy. Its limited capacity impairs our
ability to conduct daily operations and it is not able to incorporate
our next-generation sensors. These factors make the near-term
replacement of SPADOC critical.
The JMS acquisition strategy leverages existing government off the
shelf (GOTS) and commercial off the shelf (COTS) products to the
maximum extent possible, producing a very cost-effective procurement
process. The JMS Program Office conducted market research to identify
and assess the existing government and commercial capabilities that
meet the Joint Requirements Oversight Council-approved JMS
requirements. No existing COTS solutions exist that will fully satisfy
these requirements. The program office will procure appropriate COTS
products that satisfy subsets of these requirements through fixed-price
contracts and will use Multiple-award Indefinite Delivery Indefinite
Quantity contracts to procure those capabilities needing additional
development work to meet the remaining requirements.
Ms. Sanchez. 58) A piece of cloth that was left in the fuel line by
the contractor during the manufacturing process led to a 14-month delay
in AEHF reaching its intended orbit, which in turn cause delay to the
next two AEHF satellite launches. While the total contract was worth
nearly $8 billion, the contractor's award fee was only reduced by $19
million for this mistake. Prior to this problem, GAO reported that AEHF
suffered a $250 million cost overrun and 2-year delay in launch due to
parts quality problems.
To what extent is DOD and the Air Force considering using
more effective incentives to reduce parts quality problems, especially
considering the challenges and delays associated with getting the first
AEHF satellite to its intended orbit?
How does the Air Force quantify the cost of delays in
procuring specific capability to the warfighter?
General Shelton. 58) Following the launch of AEHF-1, the MILSATCOM
Program Office restructured the prime contractor incentive plans for
AEHF 1-4 and incorporated similar incentives in the AEHF-5/6 contract
to be awarded later this year. These incentive plans address lessons
learned from the AEHF-1 on-orbit anomaly, reflect an increased focus on
cost control and account for the shift in program focus as it
transitions from development to production. The plans ensure any
additional costs associated with AEHF parts problems leading to
contractor-induced schedule delays will have a negative impact to the
contractor's fee.
Ms. Sanchez. 59) What will the cost savings be from entering into a
fixed-price contract to procure two AEHF satellites (as part of its
EASE approach) relative to the cost of procuring two such satellites
separately? If so, what are the anticipated savings?
General Shelton. 59) In 2009, Air Force Space Command estimated the
cost of purchasing AEHF Space Vehicle (SV) 5 in FY12 and AEHF SV 6 in
FY14 was $1.95B per space vehicle. With the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics approved acquisition
strategy for an Efficient Space Procurement block-buy of AEHF SV 5/6,
the estimated price for each space vehicle is $1.55B. This approach has
a potential savings of approximately $400M per space vehicle.
Ms. Sanchez. 60) What do you see as the major challenges ahead?
General Shelton. 60) Threats in the space domain are increasing
while our ability to maintain and improve foundational space
capabilities to meet warfighter requirements is challenged by resource
constraints. Threats range from environmental factors, such as the
increasing volume of orbital debris, to deliberate actions by potential
adversaries. Even in a declining budget environment, we must provide a
foundational level of space capability if our Nation is to preserve its
current ability to defend U.S. interests globally.
Ms. Sanchez. 61) We understand you have asked ULA to provide
pricing over a range of scenarios from 6 boosters per year for 3 years
up to 10 boosters a year for 5 years. How will the Government ensure
that ULA's pricing is fair, reasonable, and accurate, given Defense
Contract Auditing Agency and GAO's findings that ULA's cost information
is often erroneous? Is the Air Force conducting an independent review
of this information?
General Shelton. 61) The Air Force will follow Federal Acquisition
Regulation Part 15 negotiation processes to develop and negotiate fair
and reasonable prices. Auditors from the Defense Contract Audit Agency
will support the negotiation team. In addition, a joint team composed
of the National Reconnaissance Office Cost Analysis Improvement Group
and the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency is performing analyses of costs
for the RS-68 main engine, RL-10 upper stage engine, systems
engineering, program management and launch operations. Data gathered
from these reviews will inform the Air Force negotiating position.
Ms. Sanchez. 62) What contracting structure will the Air Force
pursue? Has Air Force determined a quantity or duration for the next
EELV acquisition, and will this decision impact the request for FY13?
General Shelton. 62) The EELV Acquisition Strategy, approved
November 24, 2011, restructures the program to address the challenges
of lowering costs while maintaining mission success and stabilizing the
industrial base. It allows for the accumulation of sufficient pricing
information supporting the Air Force decision on quantity and contract
length and is based on multiple phases. The first phase request for
proposal was released March 23, 2012. This phase begins in FY13 and
involves an annual commitment of launch services with concurrent
opportunities to certify new entrants. The request for proposal
requires the contractor to provide prices for a range of quantities,
from six to ten cores, over a contract period of three to five years.
Specific decisions about unit quantities and contract duration are
scheduled for summer 2012, allowing the Air Force the opportunity to
balance contractual commitments with operational requirements, budget,
cost reductions and the potential for competition. The FY13 Phase 1 Buy
contract will include a cost-plus incentive fee provision for Launch
Capabilities and a firm-fixed price provision for Launch Services. We
project full and open competitions for the follow-on phases.
Ms. Sanchez. 63) Can you outline, specifically, the work product
that is included in so-called mission assurance costs? Are there
efficiencies the Air Force can achieve in this area?
General Shelton. 63) Mission assurance is a rigorous, continuous
technical and management process employed over the life-cycle of a
launch system to ensure mission success. There are two distinct facets
to mission assurance. Integrated mission assurance is accomplished by
the organizations involved in the launch vehicle design, production,
testing and launch processing. Independent mission assurance, a crucial
component of the success of National Security Space launches, is often
identified with ``mission assurance costs.'' This effort includes a
number of technical reviews and analyses tailored for each mission,
enabling a launch readiness independent assessment. It comprises less
than 5% of the launch enterprise total costs, yet its value to the
overall enterprise is hard to overstate. In fact, the Space Launch
Broad Area Review, conducted just over ten years ago, recommended we
return to in-depth mission assurance following a series of launch
failures.
The Air Force will continue to encourage efficiencies without
impacting mission success. The current launch capability contract,
signed June 2011, includes a mission success performance incentive
ensuring focus on mission requirements and a cost control incentive
motivating the contractor to find efficiencies within its operations.
Ms. Sanchez. 64) What is the current backlog of Air Force booster
cores purchased from ULA for 35 missions that have not yet launched?
Given this backlog of orders, why have prices increased so
significantly?
General Shelton. 64) Many factors contribute to the increasing
costs of EELV boosters. Examples include buying boosters one at a time,
production breaks, production rework, subsequent recertification,
annual inflation and a reduced supplier business base (particularly
from propulsion system suppliers). The backlog includes all missions
from the National Security Space partners. The National Reconnaissance
Office, Navy, Air Force, and Australia have 32 rocket booster cores on
order to support 28 mission launches. This includes Delta IV Heavy
missions which require more than one core. Of the 32 cores, 17 are in
the production flow for launches in FY12 and FY13. Another 9 cores are
projected to launch in FY14. The remaining cores are projected to fly
out by FY16, exhausting the backlog. The backlog does not affect the
current vehicle pricing as the program's initial inventory of
components and smaller follow-on lot quantity buys are being depleted.
Ms. Sanchez. 65) What types of ``off-ramps'' are you considering to
the block buy, if/when a New Entrant is qualified?
General Shelton. 65) To facilitate potential new entrant
certification, we identified two missions on which new entrant launch
providers may bid: the Space Test Program--2 and the Deep Space Climate
Observatory. These Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle class-missions
will provide an opportunity for potential new entrants to gain
satellite launch experience facilitating vehicle certification. Once a
new entrant is certified, we will compete launch services not covered
under the FY13 Phase 1 Buy. When this phase expires and new entrants
are certified, we intend to conduct future acquisitions in a full and
open competition for launch services.
Ms. Sanchez. 66) How will the cost of ULA launches versus new
entrants be compared given that the Government is funding the ULA
overhead?
General Shelton. 66) Air Force Space Command is developing the
competition approach for missions above the FY13 Phase 1 Buy contract
amounts. If new entrants are certified when this period expires, the
Air Force will conduct a full and open competition using an on-orbit
pricing approach that aggregates all aspects of mission costs into
firm-fixed-price contracts.
Ms. Sanchez. 67) Should the launch schedule slip, as has
historically been the case, how will the excess inventory the Air Force
builds up effect competition from New Entrants? How much generally are
the storage costs per booster, and who pays those costs? Is the Air
Force working with the contractors to decrease the cost of storage and
ensure that the price is reasonable given the requirements?
General Shelton. 67) Most upcoming Air Force launches are recurring
flights for programs that have already launched satellites supporting
their respective missions; therefore, these satellites are very
similar, if not identical, to their predecessors. This reduces the
chance of development or production delays, and increases the
likelihood these satellites will launch on schedule. We do not foresee
a need to store launch vehicles. In addition, we are working the Atlas
``white tail'' concept to provide a common booster core for Atlas
rockets, and the Delta Fleet Standardization to introduce a common RS-
68 engine across all Delta IV variants. These two efforts will increase
booster assignment flexibility and reduce launch delays.
Ms. Sanchez. 68) As you know, Section 1248 of the FY2010 National
Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State to carry out an assessment of the national security
risks of removing satellites and related components from the United
States Munitions List. That report is now almost 2 years late. When
will the Section 1248 report be delivered? What month can we expect
delivery? What are the risks the U.S. space industrial base of not
moving some of our Nation's commercial satellite products off of the
U.S. munitions list? Is DOD conducting a review of these risks?
Mr. Schulte. 68) The Section 1248 report will be delivered to
Congress on April 18, 2012. The report identifies some categories of
satellites that can be moved from the U.S. Munitions List (USML) to the
Commerce Control List (CCL) without undue risk to national security.
Further, the report finds that U.S. national security interests would
be best served by normalizing controls on satellites and related
components, to enable the development of flexible and timely responses
to rapid technological changes, consistent with existing authorities
for all other strategic trade controls. These changes would facilitate
cooperation with U.S. Allies and export control regime partners,
strengthen the competitiveness of sectors key to U.S. national
security, and increase U.S. exports, while maintaining robust controls
where appropriate to enhance our national security. Ultimately,
implementing the report's recommendations will help energize the
industrial base, a key objective of the National Security Space
Strategy, and build higher fences around fewer items, the goal of the
Administration's Export Control Reform Initiative.
Ms. Sanchez. 69) What are the costs and benefits of entering into
negotiations on the EU Code of Conduct? And what are the risks of not
doing so? Will our military operations and needs be protected?
Mr. Schulte. 69) An International Code of Conduct could enhance
U.S. national security by promoting responsible behavior in a domain
that is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. As more
countries and companies field space capabilities, it is in our interest
that they act responsibly and that the safety and sustainability of
space are protected. A widely subscribed Code could encourage
responsible space behavior and single out those who act otherwise,
while reducing the risk of mishaps, misunderstandings, and misconduct.
Debris mitigation standards, guidelines for reducing radiofrequency
interference, and shared space situational awareness could help protect
space and the advantages we derive from its use.
We are committed to ensuring that any Code would not limit, but
rather strengthen, U.S. national security. The EU draft is not legally
binding, recognizes the right of individual and collective self-
defense, and is a good foundation for an International Code. A Code
would focus on activities, rather than unverifiable capabilities. The
U.S. Government has been closely consulted by the EU on its draft, and
we will continue to shape an International Code through active
participation in international discussions. DOD assessed the draft EU
Code's operational impact and is developing steps to ensure that a
final International Code fully supports U.S. national security
interests. We are committed to keeping Congress informed as we progress
through the long-term Code development process.
Ms. Sanchez. 70) What do you see as the major challenges ahead?
Mr. Schulte. 70) We are challenged by a space environment that is
increasingly congested, with more than 22,000 trackable man-made
objects in orbit; contested, by an ever-increasing number of man-made
threats; and competitive, as the U.S. competitive advantage and
technological lead in space erode. The National Security Space Strategy
(NSSS) addresses these challenges, but must be implemented in the
context of a fourth ``c''--constrained. As we develop future
architectures, the growing challenges associated with the budget
deserve our attention as much as the growing challenges in space.
Ms. Sanchez. 71) As you know, Section 1248 of the FY2010 National
Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State to carry out an assessment of the national security
risks of removing satellites and related components from the United
States Munitions List. That report is now almost 2 years late.
A) When will the Section 1248 report be delivered? What month can
we expect delivery?
B) What are the risks the U.S. space industrial base of not moving
some of our Nation's commercial satellite products off of the U.S.
munitions list?
C) Is DOD conducting a review of these risks?
Mr. Klinger. 71) A) The Section 1248 Report was delivered to
Congress on/about 19 April 2012.
B) We recognize that it is in our national security interest to
maintain a robust space industrial base; our goal is to modify the
controls placed on those satellites and related components that are
widely available, while focusing stricter controls on those space
technologies critical to our national security.
The rapid pace of technological development in the field of space
exploitation poses unique challenges and risks to the space industrial
base. Therefore, U.S. national security interests would be best served
by normalizing controls to enable the development of flexible and
timely responses to these technological changes, consistent with the
President's existing authority for all other strategic trade controls.
C) DOD Analysis is based on the Export Control Reform USML rewrite
process approved by the Deputies Committee.
a) This systems engineering approach defines the most
critical end items, components and technologies that provide
the U.S. military its fighting edge (e.g., mission systems on
airframes), and assesses risk.
b) Comprehensive deliberations among operators and subject
matter experts resulted in realistic determinations on what are
important for military or intelligence operations and what
should be controlled on the USML.
c) Conversely, items that were designed for military end-use
but are identical to those used in dual-use purposes, or do not
provide unique military or intelligence capability, were deemed
to no longer require control on the USML and were moved to
Commerce controls.
Ms. Sanchez. 72) A piece of cloth that was left in the fuel line by
the contractor during the manufacturing process led to a 14-month delay
in AEHF reaching its intended orbit, which in turn cause delay to the
next two AEHF satellite launches. While the total contract was worth
nearly $8 billion, the contractor's award fee was only reduced by $19
million for this mistake. Prior to this problem, GAO reported that AEHF
suffered a $250 million cost overrun and 2-year delay in launch due to
parts quality problems.
A) To what extent is DOD and the Air Force considering using more
effective incentives to reduce parts quality problems, especially
considering the challenges and delays associated with getting the first
AEHF satellite to its intended orbit?
B) How does the Air Force quantify the cost of delays in procuring
specific capability to the warfighter?
Mr. Klinger. 72) A) The Air Force has taken strong steps to apply
appropriate incentives to the AEHF contract, as well as with other
contracts. The most important method is the contract type and
incentive. Fixed price contracting reduces the government's financial
liability, and the incentive structure motivates the desired
performance. For AEHF-1, the program manager restructured the remaining
fee on that effort, eliminating $15 million and shifting incentives to
motivate cost performance. Additionally, the contractor conducted a
thorough investigation of the root cause and applied their best efforts
to ensure no propulsion problems will reoccur on subsequent satellites.
B) With respect to warfighter delays, the Air Force coordinates
very closely with the using Combatant Commands on the fielding
schedules for all space and other weapons systems. This interaction is
critical toward mitigating the impacts of any capability delays, which
often cannot be quantified in terms of cost alone.
Ms. Sanchez. 73) In 2009, the GAO found that satellites, ground
control systems, and user terminals in most of DOD's major space system
acquisitions were not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized
satellites and limited capability provided to the warfighter--in some
cases for periods measured in years. Examples include: the MUOS
satellite which relies on the troubled Joint Tactical Radio System
(JTRS) program for the new MUOS waveform and radio terminals. The GPS
satellites in orbit that contain the modernized military M-code signal
designed for anti-jamming and anti-spoofing but which the warfighter
will not be able to take advantage of until user terminals go into
production. And the SBIRS-GEO satellite was launched with a starring
and scanning sensor. While the GEO-1 satellite is currently on orbit
with both sensors, the staring sensor will not be utilized for missile
warning and missile defense for another six years due to a lag in
ground capability.
What improvements are being made to maximize use of the
available capacity and reduce costs due to inefficiencies?
Mr. Klinger. 73) When OSD(AT&L) recertified the SBIRS program in
2005 following a Nunn-McCurdy breach, the Air Force was directed to
prioritize development of essential capability to perform the missile
warning mission, supported by the GEO scanning sensor, over other
mission areas.
SBIRS GEO-1 was launched in May 2011, and upon certification later
this year, the SBIRS GEO-1 scanning sensor will provide missile warning
performance that exceeds that of the legacy Defense Support Program
(DSP). The SBIRS GEO-1 staring sensor is also undergoing initial sensor
calibration. Today Overhead Persistent Infra-Red (OPIR) Research &
Development (R&D) and Technical Intelligence (TI) users are receiving
staring sensor data. Consistent with stakeholder direction and
priorities, fully-calibrated staring sensor operations in support of
Missile Warning (MW) and Missile Defense (MD) missions have been
deferred until the final Increment 2 ground delivery in FY18. The
remaining work to operationalize the staring sensor for the MW and MD
missions is in ground system functionality which provides automated
tasking and tuning to meet some of the most stressing ORD requirements.
While the SBIRS ground development is phased to optimally manage
risks within budget constraints and established operational priorities,
the program is continuing to examine options to accelerate increments
of staring sensor calibration and mission processing to support Missile
Warning and Missile Defense prior to FY18. Additionally, as part of the
Air Force, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Missile Defense
Agency Joint OPIR Ground architecture (JOG), the DOD funded initiatives
to process SBIRS GEO starer data separately from the SBIRS program of
record with deliveries planned in FY15/16.
Ms. Sanchez. 74) What do you see as the major challenges ahead?
Mr. Klinger. 74) The environment in which we operate evolves and
transforms: while space was not a benign environment during the Cold
War, even that threat environment has been transformed. U.S. space
capabilities are subject to a host of new threats including kinetic
threats, non-kinetic threats such as jamming, and cyber threats
originating from both state and non-state actors.
Our space acquisition system has historically focused on
performance driven, edge-of-technology and engineering capacity; we
consistently looked to push the edge of the ``art and science'' of the
possible. We could afford this approach because the ``addressable
market'' for most of these capabilities was relatively small as
compared to the overall size of U.S. military forces and intelligence
users, and these users were often more than not homogenous in their
needs and demands. Acquisition of space capabilities frequently and
consistently had a ``first and often unfettered'' call on the resources
of the Defense Department and Intelligence Community as compared to
many other capability areas.
We simply no longer have this luxury; space capabilities
are now integrated and inextricably bound up in the ``nervous system''
of U.S. military forces and intelligence capabilities; users of U.S.
national security space capabilities are both numerous and diverse in
their requirements. Often, maintenance and continuity of service have
become as or more important than pushing the envelope to achieve new
performance capabilities. This reality is pressing us to improve the
timelines of delivery of new capabilities. We also must focus on
ensuring our space architectures are sufficiently robust and resilient
to operate through natural and man-made threats.
To ensure continuity of service is uninterrupted, we are
recapitalizing virtually all of our space ``lines of business'' at
precisely a time of sharply constrained resources. We are stressing
affordability even in ongoing programs and stressing with our
industrial partners to place as much emphasis on engineering for cost
control and affordability as we have historically placed on engineering
for performance.
For industry, our challenge is to plan for more reliable
and stable demand, more predictable opportunities for introducing new
upgrades to technology, and more stability at the prime and second/
third tier suppliers. Determining how much, what kind of capabilities
can we afford to invest in to maintain a viable industrial and
technology base, while maintaining continuity of service is a critical
challenge.
Ms. Sanchez. 75) Can you outline, specifically, the work product
that is included in so-called mission assurance costs? Are there
efficiencies the Air Force can achieve in this area?
Mr. Klinger. 75) Mission assurance activities consume approximately
5% of the EELV program budget. Products that result from this work
include the following: hardware pedigree review reports; quality
assurance inspection reports; booster-to-satellite integration
inspection, testing, and progress reports; systems engineering
oversight and reporting for launch vehicle structures, avionics,
propulsion systems; launch site operations inspections and reports;
final flightworthiness certification reports; and business/program
management reports. Each launch is unique and only those activities
that contribute to the reliability of each launch are funded. In
addition, the Air Force reviews mission assurance activities annually
to prune away any that do not materially contribute to reducing the
risk associated with all launch missions.
Ms. Sanchez. 76) What do you see as the major challenges ahead?
Ms. Sapp. 76) There are multiple challenges ahead. Despite a
constrained budget environment, system fragility and other external
factors, the NRO must continue to provide the nation with critical
overhead reconnaissance capabilities. To ensure uninterrupted support
to operations over the long term, the NRO is implementing an organized,
considered, and achievable plan to build a robust and adaptable
architecture and culture. By working with mission partners, the NRO is
laying the foundation for an optimized overhead intelligence
collection, collaboration, and synthesis construct that will ensure
decision advantage for the nation now and in the future.
Looking Forward: While the challenges the NRO faces are formidable,
they are by no means insurmountable. Specific initiatives intended to
implement the organizational, management, and business process changes
necessary to address these issues include a decoupling of space and
ground systems specifically intended to accelerate the delivery of new
capabilities in response to rapidly changing, time-critical user needs.
This decoupling will consolidate common functions and processes that
will translate directly into enhanced technical and operational
flexibility and reduced costs.
These changes will also help address the consequences of the
acquisition reform era of the 1990s. One result of acquisition reform
was the loss of a generation of project managers and systems engineers.
While most of our engineering workforces are superbly qualified
technically, many lack the extensive hands-on project management
experience people previously had in these positions. This loss, coupled
with the retirement surge in all government agencies, creates a
particularly challenging workforce environment for the NRO. To address
these challenges, we continually work to strengthen ties to parent
organizations. This includes a focus on engineers, project managers,
contracting officers, and program control officers to ensure the NRO
workforce has the specific skills needed to effectively execute its
mission.
Lastly, the NRO has returned to a more disciplined acquisition
process that will reverse the negative effects of acquisition reform.
This places renewed emphasis on systems engineering to capture and
apply acquisition lessons learned. The NRO is collaborating with the
Air Force and The National Aeronautics and Space Administration to
promote strategies that will stabilize the space industrial base. We
are collaborating with other space organizations on a strategy that
ties the long- term health of the space industrial base to the long
term viability of our overhead architecture and its ability to support
national needs.
The NRO has a history of resolving seemingly insurmountable
technical problems to address the nation's highest priority
intelligence needs. The changes being implemented today represent the
organization's comprehensive approach to continuing its strong
acquisition management performance, and approach to ensure the NRO
continues its tradition of excellence.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. 77) We are just beginning to experience a wave of
powerful solar storms as the sun approaches solar maximum. Without
advanced warning systems, geomagnetic flux has the potential to disrupt
virtually every major public infrastructure system, including power
grids, GPS, transportation, and telecommunications before we can take
any effective protective action. Our Nation currently relies on a
single, failing satellite to provide these warnings, the Advanced
Composition Explorer (ACE), which is more than 10 years beyond its
design life. To replace ACE, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) in FY2012 is beginning work on refurbishing a
decade-old spacecraft, DSCOVR, which the Air Force plans to launch.
What are the Air Force's launch procurement plans for DSCOVR? When will
the RFP be issued? What is the expected timing of the launch? Will this
launch occur before ACE's expected demise and during the current solar
maximum period?
Mr. Klinger. 77) The USAF plans to execute DSCOVR launch services
via the Orbital-Suborbital Program-3 (OSP-3) contract, managed by the
Space and Missile Systems Center's (SMC) Space Development and Test
Directorate (SMC/SD). The OSP-3 RFP is scheduled for release in April
2012, with contract award(s) planned for September 2012. The DSCOVR
mission has been identified as a commercial new entrant launch
opportunity and could support potential certification of new launch
vehicle. DSCOVR is planned for a late FY2014 launch, but specific
launch dates are dependent upon contractor proposals received in
response to the OSP-3 RFP. It is unknown when the ACE spacecraft will
become non-operational and current NASA estimates indicate solar
maximum should occur in the spring of 2013. DSCOVR launch schedule is
driven by the timelines required for satellite refurbishment, which
will continue throughout FY2013, and launch-vehicle ordering and
processing.
Mr. Franks. 78) DSCOVR has only a 2-year satellite design life.
Yet, access to sustained operational space weather data is critical for
defense and national security, as well as our Nation's economic
infrastructure. What is the fallback plan in the event of either ACE's
or DSCOVR's technical failure? Shouldn't we be planning for a DSCOVR
follow-on satellite procurement now?
Mr. Klinger. 78) The Department of Commerce (DOC) through the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has plans to
include a commercial partner in some of the activities for DSCOVR. NOAA
is considering commercial data purchase of both solar wind and Coronal
Mass Ejection (CME) imagery in the future. The DOD is a member of the
National Space Weather Program which has endorsed DSCOVR as a near-term
solution given ACE's age. The DOD currently uses the data from ACE to
support customers and is supporting the DSCOVR launch in order to
continue this valuable data being obtained from Lagrange 1.
Mr. Franks. 79) Last year, this committee, in its version of the
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act, stated of DSCOVR: ``The
committee is also aware of commercial data purchase solutions that
could meet the Government's space weather data needs by fiscal year
2014 . . . . The committee encourages the Department of Defense to work
with the NOAA to consider a competitively acquired commercial
solution.'' Are you aware of any plans by the Air Force or NOAA to
pursue a commercial solution as a follow-on to DSCOVR? What are your
feelings about the commercial industry being able to fulfill this
mission requirement?
Mr. Klinger. 79) The Air Force is supporting the launch of DSCOVR.
The DOD participates in the National Space Weather Program and shares
the national view that space weather data from Lagrange 1 is important.
The options for a follow-on to DSCOVR are many and varied. All feasible
options will be considered in light of the current fiscally constrained
environment that impacts both the Department of Commerce and DOD.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. 80) General Shelton and Mr. Klinger, Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) had been a major priority for the Department
since 2006. Can you explain why this program is being terminated? What
plans if any does the Air Force have to sustain the ORS mission? And,
on a point I believe is absolutely critical, how will this provide more
responsive and timely space capabilities to the warfighter?
General Shelton. 80) We plan to restructure the ORS program to
incorporate the ORS tenants of responsiveness and resiliency across our
space programs, to include programs such as the Advanced Extremely High
Frequency Satellite, Space Based Infrared Systems, Global Positioning
System III Operational Control Segment, Space Control Technology
Insertion, and Technology Transfer programs. Beginning in 2013, we plan
to meet warfighter needs for responsive space capabilities through
programs of record and mechanisms such as the Joint Urgent Operational
Needs process.
The Space and Missile Systems Center's Space Development and Test
Directorate is sustaining the ORS-1 space vehicle and ground components
through the life of the system with approximately $7M/year of Overseas
Contingency Operations funds.
Mr. Langevin. 81) How will you support the ORS-1 satellite launched
only 9 months ago with the termination of the Operationally Responsive
Space Office?
General Shelton. 81) Our Space and Missile Systems Center's Space
Development and Test Directorate is the acquisition and sustainment
manager for ORS-1. ORS-1 sustainment is funded through Overseas
Contingency Operations funds, at approximately $7M/year. The
Directorate is prepared to support the space vehicle and ground
components and deliver vital capabilities to the warfighter through the
life of the system.
Mr. Langevin. 82) General, as I mentioned last year, I remain
concerned about the increasing challenges of U.S. access to space. What
options are and should be considered to lower the cost of access to
space?
General Shelton. 82) To reduce the overall cost of access to space
in the near-term, the Air Force is pursuing a strategy based upon
procuring a planned number of cores and launches each fiscal year and
the introduction of competition. Steady rate procurement allows the
contractor to pursue economic order quantity buys, make investments to
reduce overall cost and to take advantage of manufacturing learning
curves. New entrant provisions to compete for Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle class missions will reduce risk and provide the opportunity to
decrease program costs.
Over the long-term, we will continue to explore ways to provide
lower cost launch capability. We are looking outside the current
paradigm to achieve dramatic savings. Along those lines, we are
partnering with the Air Force Research Lab in the development of next
generation technologies and a new domestically produced hydrocarbon
main engine. We are also pursuing disaggregated architectures for our
space systems as well as encouraging commercial providers to find new/
innovative ways to access space.
Mr. Langevin. 83) What is the Air Force doing to ensure newer
entrants like SpaceX have access to the space launch business and the
ability to compete for DOD space launch contracts?
General Shelton. 83) The process is in place to provide new
entrants the opportunity to compete for National Security Space
launches. The Air Force, National Reconnaissance Office and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration released the New Entrant
Certification Strategy in October 2011. It defines the coordinated
certification strategy for commercial new entrant launch vehicles and
it is anchored on the existing National Aeronautics and Space
Administration model. The United States Air Force Launch Services New
Entrant Certification Guide also was released in October 2011. The
guide provides the Air Force's risk-based approach to certify new
entrant launch companies for Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
missions, and it lists the criteria any new entrant must meet.
To facilitate the certification of potential new entrants, Air
Force Space Command identified two missions on which new entrant launch
providers may bid: the Space Test Program--2 and the Deep Space Climate
Observatory. These Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle-class missions
will provide an opportunity for potential new entrants to gain
experience in satellite launch to facilitate vehicle certification.
Once a new entrant is certified, we will compete the launch services
needs not covered under the FY13 Phase 1 Buy. When this phase expires
and new entrants are certified, we intend to conduct future
acquisitions in a full and open competition for launch services.
Mr. Langevin. 84) General Shelton and Mr. Klinger, Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) had been a major priority for the Department
since 2006. Can you explain why this program is being terminated? What
plans if any does the Air Force have to sustain the ORS mission? And,
on a point I believe is absolutely critical, how will this provide more
responsive and timely space capabilities to the warfighter?
Mr. Klinger. 84) With the successes of the Operationally Responsive
Space (ORS) programs, the Department decided to incorporate the concept
of operationally responsive space into the Air Force Space & Missile
Systems Center (SMC) to increase resiliency, survivability and
flexibility across all DOD space programs.
Transition efforts are underway to fully integrate responsive space
principles into space architectures and Space Modernization Initiatives
to:
Develop enablers to ensure resilience, survivability and
flexibility
Explore space mission augmentation options
Incorporate responsiveness into Research and Development
(R&D) efforts across other platforms
Integrate lessons learned from ORS accomplishments.
By integrating responsive space into the mission area platforms in
both R&D and acquisition practice, the Department will continue to
provide responsive and timely space capabilities to the warfighter.
Additionally, the Joint Staff has an extremely responsive and
proven Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) and newer Joint Emergent
Operational Needs (JEON) process which will streamline JROC validation
to expedite satisfaction of Combatant Commander urgent needs.
Mr. Langevin. 85) How will you support the ORS-1 satellite launched
only 9-months ago with the termination of the Operationally Responsive
Space Office?
Mr. Klinger. 85) ORS-1 operations and sustainment responsibilities
including anomaly resolution, processing enhancements, configuration
control, and ground segment updates, will be assumed by the Air Force
Space & Missile Systems Center (SMC) through end of satellite life.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER
Mr. Ruppersberger. 86) Now that ORS-1 has been launched and
declared operational, how would you characterize the performance of
ORS-1 in fulfilling the Urgent Need it was originally intended to
satisfy? Given the plans for ORS funding to be discontinued in the
President's Budget Request, how will Urgent Needs be met in the future?
What process will remain in place to address Urgent Needs?
General Shelton. 86) The ORS-1 mission is successful in meeting the
United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM) requirements which it was
designed to satisfy. In a December 2011 memo, the USCENTCOM-
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Director stated,
``CENTCOM is extremely satisfied with ORS-1. It has met or exceeded its
projected capabilities and additional capabilities and applications
continue to unfold. ORS-1 provides superb collection considering its
design limitations and CENTCOM will continue to rely on its
capabilities as an integral component to our ISR architecture and
collection plan.''
We plan to restructure the ORS program to incorporate the ORS
tenants of responsiveness and resiliency across our space programs, to
include programs such as the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
Satellite, Space Based Infrared Systems, Global Positioning System III
Operational Control Segment, Space Control Technology Insertion, and
Technology Transfer programs. Beginning in 2013, we plan to meet
warfighter needs for responsive space capabilities through programs of
record and mechanisms such as the Joint Urgent Operational Needs
process.
Mr. Ruppersberger. 87) The Space Test Program has a distinguished
45-year history of fulfilling a requirement for low-cost access to
space for developmental technologies and science experiments. Given the
plans for dissolution of the Space Test Program as envisioned in the
President's Budget Request, how will this ongoing requirement be met in
the future?
General Shelton. 87) The Space Test Program funding was eliminated
due to higher Department of Defense priorities. The President's Budget
includes significant investment in space research by the Air Force
Research Laboratory, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and
other Service laboratories.
Mr. Ruppersberger. 88) As you know, the report directed by Section
1248 of the FY10 Defense Authorization was due to the defense
congressional committees in April 2010--almost 2 years ago. While the
Congress received an interim report on this topic last summer, it has
yet to receive the final report. In the meantime, the U.S. satellite
industrial base continues to struggle to keep pace with its global
competitors in what is an intensely competitive international
marketplace. In fact, a November 2011 study on the health of the space
industrial base, entitled ``U.S. Industrial Base Analysis for Space
Systems,'' conducted by The Tauri Group under contract to OSD AT&L
Industrial Policy, cites 11 space technologies of ``high risk'' due to
the absence of U.S. suppliers or a single U.S. supplier, and 17 areas
``at risk'' due to limited suppliers, suppliers with a potential to
create bottlenecks, those with workforce issues, and anticipated cost
increases. As our Nation moves into an era of austere Government
budgets, it would appear that sustaining our defense industrial base
through a period of shrinking budgets and programs is going to be of
even greater importance. Rather than sustaining portions of this
industrial base via the expenditure of funds, the satellite sector
appears to be one area where regulatory change could have a significant
impact on the health and sustainability production lines of crucial
importance to the most exquisite of our national defense systems. When
will the Section 1248 report be delivered? And, do you agree that
moving some of our Nation's commercial satellite products off of the
U.S. munitions list could have a significant positive impact on the
U.S. space industrial base? Do you believe that changing the current
statute is in fact a national security imperative in order to sustain
this industrial base?
Mr. Schulte. 88) The Section 1248 report will be delivered to
Congress on April 18, 2012. The report identifies some categories of
satellites that can be moved from the U.S. Munitions List (USML) to the
Commerce Control List (CCL) without undue risk to national security.
Further, the report finds that U.S. national security interests would
be best served by normalizing controls on satellites and related
components, to enable the development of flexible and timely responses
to rapid technological changes, consistent with existing authorities
for all other strategic trade controls. These changes would facilitate
cooperation with U.S. Allies and export control regime partners,
strengthen the competitiveness of sectors key to U.S. national
security, and increase U.S. exports, while maintaining robust controls
where appropriate to enhance our national security. Ultimately,
implementing the report's recommendations will help energize the
industrial base, a key objective of the National Security Space
Strategy, and build higher fences around fewer items, the goal of the
Administration's Export Control Reform Initiative.
Mr. Ruppersberger. 89) Recognizing the severe constraints of the
current fiscal environment, and given that some programs must be cut or
limited so that others can be funded, it appears that numerous small,
low-cost, innovative programs have been cut to preserve funding for a
few big-ticket programs with a history of cost overruns. Doesn't this
reward and perpetuate the wrong type of behavior and eliminate the
possibility of creating new models of program development and
execution?
Mr. Klinger. 89) With the challenge to balance $450B in budget cuts
across the years, all programs, big and small, were individually and
collectively assessed. No, DOD program escaped thorough examination.
Funding was cut from some small and large programs where the Department
determined adequate risk could be assumed. This year, the Department's
space initiatives and efficiencies include increasing, restructuring,
and where necessary terminating or delaying programs to better deliver
critical space capabilities. The Department's budget proposal continues
to pursue satellite block buys with incremental funding to avoid costly
production breaks, preserve the most critical industrial base
capabilities, and reduce non-recurring engineering costs for the
procurement of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space
Based Infrared System (SBIRS) replenishment.
The Department's Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative establishes
and requires major programs to be executed within ``Should-Cost''
estimates with accountability and consequences. Additionally, BBP
includes contracting initiatives increasing block buys or increasing
competition, where prudent, to find efficiencies and savings. These BBP
initiatives have been applied to large critical space programs such as
AEHF satellites system, SBIRS satellites, Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle, and the much used Global Positioning System in the FY13 budget
build. Initiatives are already underway to continue to ``reap'' savings
from BPP in large space programs as FY14 budget process begins.
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