[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-186]
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PHASED
ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO MISSILE
DEFENSE IN EUROPE
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 1, 2010
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
ROB ANDREWS, New Jersey TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
RICK LARSEN, Washington DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
BILL OWENS, New York
Bob DeGrasse, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Alejandra Villarreal, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, December 1, 2010, Status of Implementing the Phased
Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, December 1, 2010...................................... 35
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2010
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE
IN EUROPE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces..................... 1
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 2
WITNESSES
Macy, Rear Adm. Archer M., Jr., Director, Joint Integrated Air
and Missile Defense Organization, Joint Chiefs of Staff........ 9
Miller, Hon. James N., Ph.D., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense................. 5
O'Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense
Agency, U.S. Department of Defense............................. 7
Rose, Frank, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Space and Defense
Policy, U.S. Department of State............................... 11
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Langevin, Hon. James R....................................... 39
Macy, Rear Adm. Archer M., Jr................................ 64
Miller, Hon. James N., Ph.D.................................. 41
O'Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J................................. 50
Rose, Frank.................................................. 76
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security Affairs, U.S. Department
of State................................................... 81
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 85
Mr. Turner................................................... 86
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE
IN EUROPE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 1, 2010.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:16 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James R.
Langevin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Langevin. Good afternoon. The Strategic Forces
Subcommittee will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Langevin. Last year, on September 17th, President Obama
announced the new Phased, Adaptive Approach strategy, or the
PAA, for defending Europe and the United States against the
growing threat of a ballistic missile attack, particularly from
Iran. In his announcement, the President said, and I quote,
``Our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide
stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and
American allies.''
Last February, as part of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review signed by the Secretary of Defense, the PAA strategy was
expanded to address other regional missile threats.
Today, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee will review the
Administration's work on implementing the Phased, Adaptive
Approach over the last year. We will hear from four
distinguished witnesses:
Dr. Jim Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy;
Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly, Director of the
Missile Defense Agency;
Rear Admiral Archer Macy, Jr., Director of the Joint
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization for the Joint
Staff;
And, finally, Mr. Frank Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Space and Defense Policy.
I want to thank each of our witnesses for appearing today
and for your upcoming testimony. I also want to congratulate
our witnesses and the Administration as a whole for reaching
agreement during the recent Lisbon Summit on a strategic
framework for NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. This
framework establishes the objective of achieving, ``the
capability to defend our populations and territories against
ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective
defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the
Alliance.''
NATO-izing missile defense was a primary goal that my
predecessor, Chairwoman Tauscher, pressed for during her tenure
in this job. Hopefully the agreement reached at the Lisbon
Summit will pave the way for rapid implementation of the PAA
and open opportunities for sharing the burden of regional
missile defenses with our allies and friends.
Today, about a year and two months after the announcement,
the subcommittee will have an opportunity to hear from key
administration witnesses on efforts to implement the PAA. In
that regard, we asked our witnesses to address three key
questions:
First, what are the key technical milestones that we should
be watching for in each phase of the plan, and where do we
stand in achieving those milestones? More broadly, where do we
stand in defining the technical objectives and components for
each phase?
Second, where do we stand in completing the operational
plans and assessment of missile inventory requirements for each
phase of the PAA? Specifically, when can we expect to see the
results of the next Joint Capabilities Mix study?
Finally, where do we stand in defining the requirements for
basing elements of each phase of the PAA on European soil and
on completing the necessary agreements with each of the host
nations?
With that, I want to say thanks again to each of our
witnesses for making time to testify before the subcommittee
today, and we look forward to hearing your views on the
questions before the subcommittee today.
Before I turn the floor over to our ranking member, Mr.
Turner, for his opening statement, I would like to note that
this will be the last hearing of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee during the 111th Congress and, thus, my last
hearing as chairman. Let me just say that it has been a
pleasure to chair the subcommittee over the last year and a
half, and I would like to thank all of my colleagues for their
contributions to our work. Thank you.
But, specifically, I would like to thank the ranking member
for his partnership in this endeavor. We did not always agree
or see eye to eye, but I always valued his advice and counsel,
and I have certainly appreciated his support in this entire
process and his input. So thank you for that, Mike.
With that, the Armed Services Committee is a unique
institution in the House, and I am certainly proud to be part
of the bipartisan tradition we have maintained from its
hearings.
With that, I want to turn it over now to the ranking
member, Mr. Turner, for any questions or comments that he may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
our Chairman Langevin for his bipartisanship and spirit, and
his leadership of this subcommittee. We certainly know that in
the National Defense Authorization Act, there are a number of
issues that you affected very positively, and we greatly
appreciate your leadership, specifically in the area of
directed energy, and we certainly look forward to continuing in
the next Congress your important focus upon the issue of cyber
threats.
I would like to welcome Dr. Miller, Mr. Rose, Admiral Macy,
and General O'Reilly. Let me start with a statement on the
Phased, Adaptive Approach that I made last April at our missile
defense budget hearing.
I offered: There is an opportunity to gain bipartisan
support on these plans, but the committee must have confidence
that the PAA is the best approach for protecting the United
States and our European allies. Our ability to do effective
oversight and to hold the Administration accountable for its
implementation of the PAA is based on a continuous dialogue and
information exchange that must occur between the Administration
and our committee.
However, since the Administration's announcement over a
year ago, this committee has repeatedly sought greater detail
on plans, analysis, and resource requirements for the PAA. The
lack of responsiveness to those requests led to the bipartisan
legislative requirements that were placed in the House-passed
defense bill, seeking information and cooperation with
Congress.
I appreciate efforts by several of you over the last two
months to remedy this situation. I met with General O'Reilly in
October to discuss program plans, and yesterday the chairman
and I received a briefing on how the PAA decision was made.
We are beginning to get a greater insight into the PAA, but
there is still a lot we don't know yet. The Institute for
Defense Analyses was tasked to conduct an independent
assessment of the PAA and report to Congress by June 1st, 2010.
I understand the bulk of their work was completed last summer,
but the report is stuck in interdepartment coordination. I am
interested in finding when we should expect to receive this
report.
Also at our committee's request, the Government
Accountability Office, the GAO, conducted a review of the
European Phased, Adaptive Approach, EPAA, and concluded
although the EPAA identified four phases of capability and
timeframes for deployment, several key activities necessary to
establish an acquisition decision framework remain undefined.
These include finalizing EPAA architectures, systems,
quantities and locations, determining key top-level EPAA
acquisition decision points, and determining what constitutes
phase completion.
In short, the Department has a significant amount of work
ahead of it to translate its policy decision into a concrete,
implementable architecture.
We still have several outstanding questions on the details
of PAA, and I hope that our witnesses will address some of
those today in their testimony.
First, as stated by the White House last September, the PAA
approach was based upon an assumption that the long-range
missile threat is ``slower to develop.'' However, since then,
troubling new details have emerged on both North Korea and
Iran's long-range missile programs, and recent revelations show
that Iran has 19 BM-25 advanced ballistic missiles it acquired
from North Korea in its arsenals today that can reach Berlin
and Moscow.
I have previously stated my concern about a gap in the PAA
coverage for the United States. The ICBM [intercontinental
ballistic missile] threat from Iran could materialize as early
as 2015, according to the latest intelligence assessments, yet
the PAA is not planned to cover the United States until 2020.
Now, there would also appear to be a gap in defensive
coverage against ballistic missiles that can reach Western and
Central Europe. Do these threat assessments change your
approach in any way?
Second, the Administration has committed to a hedging
strategy for defense of the homeland in case the long-range
threat comes earlier or technical issues arise with the SM-3
[Standard Missile-3] Block IIA or IIB interceptors. Can our
witnesses today discuss the details of this strategy, including
any acquisition plans and key decision points necessary to
employ the hedge?
Third, the Administration's approach to missile defense in
Europe places emphasis on proven technology, yet we have since
learned that the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor will be a new
missile. The SM-3 Block IIA and Airborne Infrared System are
still in early design and development, and the PTSS [Precision
Tracking Space System] satellite system doesn't yet exist. The
GAO found that ``system schedules are highly optimized in
technology development, testing, production, and integration,
leaving little room for potential delays.'' So how are these
technological risks being addressed?
Fourth, when will the Department determine force structure
and inventory requirements for the PAA, and when will a total
cost estimate be completed? Our committee will be challenged in
assessing whether the budget is sufficient if we do not know
the required quantities and costs to implement the PAA.
Fifth, I would appreciate an update on the status of host
nation discussions for the land-based Aegis sites and forward-
based radar. NATO's endorsement of territorial missile defense
at the Lisbon Summit is very positive and I commend you and
your predecessors' efforts towards this outcome. I am also
interested in U.S. plans for NATO-izing the PAA as well as
plans for allies' contributions toward PAA.
Lastly, press reports continue to surface that indicate
that the U.S. and Russia are negotiating some sort of missile
defense agreement led by Under Secretary of State Tauscher and
her Russian counterparts. I remain concerned that the
Administration might allow Russia to shape its missile defense
plans, particularly for long-range missile defenses in Europe,
in exchange for Moscow's adherence to the New START [Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty. I would appreciate our witnesses
discussing the exact nature and scope of the missile defense
discussions that are ongoing with Russia.
On a final note, I want to once again thank Chairman
Langevin. I appreciate your leadership and look forward to
working with you on the important bipartisan oversight issues
that we face in the 112th Congress. And I want to thank our
witnesses here today for their contribution to what is the
important issues of our national security.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. I want to thank the ranking member.
Now we turn it over to our witnesses and ask each of them
to summarize their written statements in about five minutes.
The committee has received full written statements from each of
the witnesses, and without objection those statements will be
made part of the record.
With that, Dr. Miller, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PH.D., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Miller. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Turner,
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. It is a pleasure to join my colleagues, General
O'Reilly, Admiral Macy, and Mr. Rose.
As the chairman stated, in September of 2009, the President
approved what was a unanimous recommendation of the Secretary
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a Phased, Adaptive
Approach to missile defense in Europe. Since that time, the
Administration has made tremendous progress; most recently, as
noted, at the Lisbon Summit, where allies agreed to pursue a
territorial missile defense to protect NATO populations and
territories. We are here to provide the subcommittee with a
progress report, and in the interests of time we will all
briefly summarize our statements.
As you know, the European Phased, Adaptive Approach has
four phases. The Administration plans to deploy all four phases
and has made excellent progress on each over the last year.
Phase 1, which starts in 2011, will rely on the SM-3,
Standard Missile 3, Block IA interceptor, based on ships. We
have had a number of successful tests of this interceptor. It
remains in production. Some are deployed; 112 will be delivered
by fiscal year 2012.
The Navy continues to convert Aegis ships to have a
ballistic missile defense capability. We currently have 20 BMD-
capable ships, and will convert to a total of 37 by the end of
fiscal year 2015.
In early 2011, a BMD-capable Aegis ship carrying SM-3 Block
IA interceptors will be deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean
and Phase 1 of the EPAA will have started.
We still have one important phase, one test to accomplish.
We plan to deploy a forward-based radar in southern Europe in
2011. We are currently in discussions with potential host
nations, and while no decision has been made, we expect to meet
the deployment timeline in 2011.
In Phase 2, which starts in the 2015 timeframe, we will
continue with ship-based deployments and add a land-based
Standard Missile-3 site in Romania. Romania agreed to host U.S.
interceptors in February of this year and follow-on
negotiations are underway. We plan to deploy 24 SM-3
interceptors in Romania. During Phase 2, these interceptors
will be upgraded and we will add the improved Block IB of the
Standard Missile-3.
The Department of Defense is now developing the SM-3 Block
IIB. Some 180 of these missiles will be delivered by fiscal
year 2015 when Phase 2 starts, and 324 by fiscal year 2017.
In Phase 3, which starts in the 2018 timeframe, we will
deploy it at a land-based SM-3 site in Poland. Poland agreed to
host this site in October 2009, not long after we announced the
European Phased, Adaptive Approach. In July of 2010, Poland and
the United States signed a protocol amending our ballistic
missile defense agreement and, in addition, we have signed and
ratified a supplemental status of forces agreement with Poland.
In Phase 3, we will introduce another new variant of the
SM-3 missile, the IIA, which is currently in development in a
cooperative program with the Japanese. It will have its first
intercept test in 2014 and will enter service by 2018. We plan
to deploy 24 SM-3 interceptors in Poland. That means we will
have 48 land-based SM-3 interceptors deployed by Phase 3; 24 in
Romania and 24 in Poland. That is about five times the number
of interceptors planned under the previous third site approach.
We will also have additional reloads in storage, plus the ship-
based interceptors I referred to before.
Finally, Phase 4 will occur in the 2020 timeframe. The key
added capability for Phase 4 will be the next-generation SM-3
interceptor, the Block IIB. This interceptor will provide early
intercept capability against medium- and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles and, very importantly, against potential
ICBM threats from Iran or elsewhere in the Middle East.
The Missile Defense Agency is conducting concept
development and component technology development during this
fiscal year for the SM-3 Block IIB, and the request for
proposals for the concept development for this missile was
issued in October of 2010. So we are on track for all four
phases of the Phased, Adaptive Approach in Europe.
We have also made tremendous progress in NATO. Shortly
after the announcement of the European Phased, Adaptive
Approach in fall 2009, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen stated
his strong support. In December 2009, all NATO foreign
ministers unanimously welcomed the EPAA, and at the Lisbon
Summit, concluded about two weeks ago, NATO leaders agreed to a
new NATO mission: to protecting the Alliance's populations and
territories against ballistic missile attacks.
As part of the announcement of the EPAA last year, the
Administration welcomed Russian cooperation on missile
defenses. Seeking missile defense cooperation with Russia makes
good sense, but it is not new. President Reagan proposed such
cooperation with the Soviet Union in the 1980s; President G.W.
Bush pursued cooperation on missile defense with Russia
throughout his Administration.
Some have suggested recently that the U.S. proposal for
ballistic missile defense cooperation with Russia represents a
``secret deal.'' This is nonsense. There is no ``secret deal''
on missile defense nor negotiations for such a thing.
The Administration has told Congress repeatedly, including
in testimony, that we are pursuing missile defense cooperation
with Russia. These discussions are separate from New START
discussions that have taken place, and in conducting these
discussions the Administration has made clear to Russia, to
allies, to Congress, and to all others that the United States
will not agree to any limitations or constraints on U.S.
ballistic missile defenses and that the United States intends
to continue improving and deploying BMD systems to defend the
United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and
partners.
Finally, as we implement EPAA, we also continue to maintain
and improve our defenses of the homeland. The U.S. homeland is
currently protected against a threat of limited ICBM attack by
30 ground-based interceptors which will all be deployed by the
end of this fiscal year at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg
Air Force Base, California. So we have a capability today to
counter the projected threats from North Korea and Iran.
At the same time, because the threat is unpredictable, we
are hedging by completing Missile Field 2 in Alaska to allow
for rapid emplacement of up to eight additional ground-based
interceptors, and we are also continuing development of the
two-stage ground-based interceptor. And as I noted before, the
EPAA, the European Phased, Adaptive Approach, will also
contribute to the defense of the United States homeland.
In conclusion, the threat posed by ballistic missiles is
real and it is growing. As we said in our Ballistic Missile
Defense Review, it is growing both qualitatively and
quantitatively. Our missile defenses today are also very real,
and our capabilities are also growing, both qualitatively and
quantitatively.
We look forward to working with this subcommittee and with
Congress in implementing the European Phased, Adaptive Approach
and in implementing the rest of our missile defense efforts as
well.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Miller can be found in
the Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Dr. Miller. I want to thank you
for your testimony.
With that, I now recognize General O'Reilly for your
opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. PATRICK J. O'REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR,
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General O'Reilly. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin,
Ranking Member Turner, other distinguished members of the
subcommittee. It is my honor to testify before you today on the
status of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach, or EPAA, for
developing missile defense of our homeland, deployed forces,
and NATO European allies.
The Missile Defense Agency, or MDA, is committed to
disciplined management to efficiently create effective missile
defense in the four phases outlined by the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review.
Over the next decade, we are developing integrated missile
defense that will provide robust capability using advanced
sensors and a combination of interceptors for multiple
intercept opportunities against short-, medium-, intermediate-
range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, or SRBMs, MRBMs,
IRBMs and ICBMs.
During the past year, we have made significant progress in
implementing the EPAA, and I report to you that we are
executing all of our programs according to the EPAA timelines.
Our greatest priority remains strengthening homeland
missile defense. We continue to upgrade our ground-based
midcourse defense system, expand our sensor network, and
develop a new interceptor, the SM-3 IIB, which will add a layer
of defense against potential future ICBMs launched from current
regional threats.
During the past year, we emplaced the 30th ground-based
interceptor, or GBI, restarted the GBI production supply chain,
upgraded two of the original GBIs, conducted the first two-
stage GBI flight test, installed a training node at Fort
Greely, Alaska, upgraded the Thule, Greenland, early warning
radar, and planned the Clear early warning radar upgrade in
Alaska. Finally, we are on track to complete construction of
our missile fields at Fort Greely by February 2012.
Much progress has been made in 2010 developing the EPAA
Phase 1, which will provide initial protection of southern
Europe from existing SRBM and MRBM threats. During the past
year, we increased the number of BMD-capable ships to 20, we
delivered 26 SM-3 IA interceptors, and supported the Japanese
conducting the tenth intercept of an SRBM with the SM-3 IA
interceptor.
We intercepted the lowest altitude engageable target of the
Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system, delivered
a second THAAD battery, and began the initial production of 26
interceptors and two more THAAD batteries. Initially, we
demonstrated the integration of the AN/TPY-2 [Army Navy/
Transportable Radar Surveillance] radar with THAAD or Aegis in
eight flight tests and began refurbishment of an AN/TPY-2 radar
for deployment in southern or southeastern Europe next year.
Finally, we supported multiple interoperability demonstrations
with the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense
System.
EPAA development Phase 2 will be completed by 2015 and will
provide greater defense against larger missile raid sizes and
improve discrimination of ballistic missile threats, using
remote radars and the SM-3 IB and SM-3 IA interceptors at sea
and in a land-based or ashore configuration.
During the past year, we awarded the Aegis Ashore systems
engineering contract and supported a U.S.-Romanian site
selection team for the first deployed Aegis Ashore site. We
also have begun at-sea operational testing of the upgraded
Aegis fire control software for EPAA Phase 2 on the USS Lake
Erie.
EPAA development Phase 3 will be completed in 2018 and
provide defense against increasing raid sizes of SRBMs, MRBMs,
and intermediate-range ballistic missiles over large areas of
Europe, using the SM-3 IIA interceptors at sea and at Aegis
Ashore sites in Romania and Poland, Airborne Infrared, or ABIR,
remotely piloted vehicles and the Precision Tracking Space
System, or PTSS.
During the past year, we began ground testing the SM-3 IIA
interceptor components with the Japanese in preparation for
flight test in 2014. We conducted five ABIR flight tests
demonstrating missile tracking accuracy. We tracked missiles
from space with the Space Surveillance Tracking System, and
completed a concept review for the PTSS to support production
planning contracts starting in 2011.
EPAA development Phase 4 will be completed in 2020 and
provide early intercept capability against large raid sizes of
MRBMs and IRBMs and potential ICBMs from today's regional
threats.
During the past year, we completed the SM-3 IIB System
Concept Review and solicited three competitive concept
definition contracts of which one industry team will be
selected in 2013 to complete development and begin flight
testing of the SM-3 IIB in 2016.
Finally, in fiscal year 2010, the Missile Defense Agency,
in full collaboration with the developmental and operational
test communities, updated our test plans for the EPAA, which
include 72 flight tests and 107 ground tests over the next
decade.
I look forward to answering your questions, and thank you.
[The prepared statement of General O'Reilly can be found in
the Appendix on page 50.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
Before we go to Admiral Macy, we have a vote on right now.
I think we will be able to get through Admiral Macy's
testimony, and then we will recess and then go to vote. There
are five votes, and then we will return for Mr. Rose's
testimony and then go into questions.
With that, Admiral Macy, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. ARCHER M. MACY, JR., DIRECTOR, JOINT
INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
Admiral Macy. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin,
Ranking Member Turner, and other distinguished members of the
subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the
Phased, Adaptive Approach for ballistic missile defense along
with Dr. Miller, General O'Reilly and Mr. Rose.
I will summarize the operational benefits of the PAA as the
U.S. approach to missile defense which is responsive to both
congressional direction and the warfighters' needs. I will also
touch on the planning and analysis undertaken by the Joint
Staff to help guide decisions on maximizing combatant commander
war-fighting capability. Additional details are contained in my
submitted written testimony.
While a majority of our remarks today will address the
European Phased, Adaptive Approach in some detail, I want to
emphasize here that the PAA is a conceptual approach to
providing ballistic missile defense capability for the homeland
and our forces, allies, and partners in different regions,
circumstances, and times. It is a realignment and an
operational enhancement of our BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense
System] plans and is not a replacement. The realignment
provides us with a greater capability through a flexible and
adaptable approach which focuses on protecting those most at
risk today, while continuing to improve our capability against
future threats.
As has been noted by the Congress, the most pressing threat
for our deployed forces today is the increasing number of
short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. The PAA
addresses these issues head-on.
The U.S. cannot afford to build the number of launchers,
interceptors, and sensors it would take for each combatant
commander to have his own dedicated BMDS capability that can
address all the potential strikes that could be launched at any
time. What the PAA provides instead is a balanced investment
that has the capability to engage the range of threats, can be
tailored to the geography, political circumstances, and defense
capabilities of regional partners, and has the flexibility to
rapidly deploy more assets where and when they are needed.
The PAA concept provides the United States with an enhanced
capability to respond to regional threats worldwide, no matter
where they emerge, and to strengthen defense of the homeland.
The PAA is phased to advances in our own technical and
operational capabilities for ballistic missile defense, and it
is adaptive to trends and advances in potential adversarial
threats.
We speak of four phases in advances of our technical
capabilities. However, the same number and timing of
application of individual phases may not be applied in each
combatant commander's AOR [area of responsibility] the same
way. We are developing plans for phases for each AOR with the
European PAA currently being the most advanced, a majority of
which General O'Reilly has described.
I earlier alluded to the planning and analysis we have
underway to support PAA implementation, and as the chairman and
Mr. Turner noted, this includes the Joint Capabiliies Mix
study. We previously conducted JCM-1 in 2005-2006, and JCM-2 in
2007-2008. The latter was briefed to this subcommittee in
September of that last year.
The final report on the current assessment, JCM-3, which
focuses on the force requirements for the PAA, will not be
completed until March of 2011, so I do not have any results I
can discuss today. However, I think it is important to
understand what this study is, how it is being executed, and
the kind of results that will be produced. I will note that I
look forward to the opportunity next spring to discuss those
results with this subcommittee when they are available.
JCM-3 is examining our missile defense strategy in the PAA
to inform decisions on the number and type of sensors,
launchers, and interceptors we require. In order to determine
force needs at this level of granularity, we have to take into
account how the combatant commands intend to employ them, what
the threats are, and generally how the threat will be expected
to be employed.
The analysis is being executed by JIAMDO [Joint Integrated
Air and Missile Defense Organization], my organization, in
conjunction with representatives from the combatant commands,
the Missile Defense Agency, the services, and OSD [Office of
the Secretary of Defense] Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation, CAPE.
In parallel with the JCM-3 study, the Joint Staff, U.S.
Strategic Command, and the staffs of PACOM [United States
Pacific Command], EUCOM [United States European Command] and
CENTCOM [United States Central Command] are conducting formal
planning for how the PAA will be implemented in their areas of
responsibility. Further, EUCOM is working closely with NATO to
develop the concept of operations, command and control plans,
and planning factors for the implementation of the recent NATO
decision at Lisbon to incorporate missile defense as a core
element of the collective defense.
In conclusion, the Department is investing a significant
portion of its budget in missile defense and the PAA is
providing the necessary framework to ensure it is invested
effectively and wisely and, most importantly, meets the
warfighters' needs. We have established a solid process and an
analytic approach to monitor and guide the implementation of
the PAA, and we expect to develop and field the phases in the
most operationally effective and cost-efficient manner
possible.
Thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Macy can be found in the
Appendix on page 64.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral Macy.
As I said, we are going to recess right now. We will begin,
when we return, with Mr. Rose's testimony, and then go into
questions. With that, the subcommittee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Langevin. The committee will come to order. I want to
thank our witnesses for their patience. With that, I want to
resume now by turning the floor over to Mr. Rose, last but not
least. We look forward to your testimony.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF FRANK ROSE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SPACE
AND DEFENSE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Rose. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Turner,
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today on the Obama administration's efforts to
implement the European Phased, Adaptive Approach, or EPAA.
As many of you know, I worked for this subcommittee for two
and a half years, and this is my first opportunity to sit on
the other side of the table and testify. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Under Secretary Tauscher sends her regrets that she could
not participate in person. Instead, she has prepared a
statement and has asked that it be included in the record of
today's hearing.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus my opening remarks
today on the progress we have made in implementing the EPAA
over the past year. Last year, President Obama committed the
United States to a comprehensive new plan to provide missile
defense protection to our NATO Allies and the United States.
This plan will defend against the existing short- and medium-
range threat and evolve as the threat evolves. This plan has
opened up new opportunities for cooperation with our Allies and
has enhanced NATO's Article 5 commitment to collective defense.
At the Lisbon summit two weeks ago, NATO agreed to develop
a missile defense capability to defend its territory,
populations, and forces against ballistic missile attack. In
the summit declaration, NATO heads of state and government
stated, ``The threat to NATO European populations, territory,
and forces posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is
increasing. As missile defence forms part of a broader response
to counter this threat, we have decided that the Alliance will
develop a missile defence capability to pursue its core task of
collective defence.''
Additionally, the Alliance agreed to expand its missile
defense command and control system to include territorial
missile defense. This will enable voluntary national
contributions from the United States and other NATO Allies to
plug into the overall NATO capability.
Finally, the Alliance welcomed the EPAA as an important
national contribution to this NATO capability.
Mr. Chairman, it is important to know that while NATO has
been involved in missile defense since the late 1990s, that
work has been strictly limited to defending its military forces
from ballistic missile attack, not defending its territory and
populations. It has been a long-standing bipartisan goal of the
United States to expand the Alliance's work on missile defense,
to include defense of territory and populations. Therefore, the
significance of NATO's decision on missile defense at Lisbon
should not be underestimated. It is a major diplomatic victory
for the United States and the Alliance as a whole.
In addition to the recent success at NATO, we have also
made significant progress in implementing the bilateral
agreements that are necessary to deploy elements of the EPAA in
Europe.
On the deployment of the Phase 1 radar in southeastern
Europe, once agreement on a location has been reached, we are
prepared to immediately begin formal negotiations on a basing
agreement.
For Phase 2, Romania has agreed to host a land-based SM-3
site. We began negotiations on a basing agreement in June of
this year, and are making excellent progress towards a final
document. The United States and Romania already have a
supplemental Status of Forces Agreement in force.
Finally, Poland agreed in October 2009, to host the Phase 3
SM-3 site. On July 3, 2010, the United States and Poland signed
a protocol amending the original 2008 Ballistic Missile Defense
Agreement, which will allow for the deployment of a land-based
SM-3 interceptor site in Poland. The next step is to bring this
agreement into force through ratification by the Polish
Parliament. Earlier, in February 2010, the Polish Government
ratified a supplemental SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement]
agreement with the United States.
Before I close, let me touch on the subject of missile
defense in Russia. Like the previous Administration, we believe
that missile defense cooperation with Russia, both bilaterally
and at NATO, is in the national security interest of the United
States. In Lisbon two weeks ago, NATO and Russia agreed on a
number of missile defense cooperative activities, including the
resumption of theater missile defense exercises.
As President Obama stated, by moving ahead with cooperation
on missile defense, we can turn a source of past tension into a
source of cooperation against a shared threat. That said, even
as we seek greater cooperation with Russia on missile defense,
the United States will continue to reject any constraints or
limitations on our missile defense programs. Restrictions or
limitations on U.S. missile defense capabilities are not under
discussion. Let me reiterate what Secretary Miller said. There
are no secret deals with Russia to limit our missile defenses.
Finally, let me also say that Russia will not have a veto
over U.S. missile defenses in Europe or anywhere.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Turner, let me stop there. I
will be happy to answer any questions. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rose can be found in
the Appendix on page 76.]
Mr. Langevin. I thank Mr. Rose for his testimony, and I
should also say welcome back, Mr. Rose, to the Congress and to
the committee where you served prior to your current position.
It is great to have you back, and you are one of two witnesses
today that are alumni of the Armed Services Committee staff,
the other being Dr. Miller. Welcome back to both of you, I
should say.
With respect also to Ms. Tauscher's testimony, I ask
unanimous consent that Secretary Tauscher's testimony be
inserted into the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Tauscher can be found
in the Appendix on page 81.]
Mr. Langevin. I would ask on a personal note on behalf of
myself and the subcommittee to give our best to Secretary
Tauscher and we look forward to seeing her in the very near
future.
With that, let me turn the first question to General
O'Reilly. It is my intention also, I should mention, to do two
rounds of questions. I am going to take latitude as chair for
an extended period of time, and I will extend that courtesy to
the ranking member. And then we will go to the five minute rule
for the other members of the subcommittee. As I said, we will
go to a second round of questions as well.
Beginning with General O'Reilly, last October the
subcommittee asked GAO to evaluate the Department's plans for
implementing the Phased, Adaptive Approach for missile defense
in Europe. Last month, the GAO delivered a draft report. One of
the key conclusions is, ``The administration's EPAA policy
committed DOD to a schedule that will be challenging to meet
based on the technical progress of missile defense element
development and testing programs, and before the scope of the
development efforts were fully understood.''
So, General O'Reilly, could you tell us what measures are
being considered to mitigate the consequences of any potential
test failures or delays that might lead to production gaps or
otherwise result in schedule delays for delivering planned
capabilities to combatant commanders?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the plans that we have laid out for
each of the elements of the Phased, Adaptive Approach were
designed based on traditional development of missile systems
and their fire control systems. We have looked at the
development timelines, and the ones we have used in the Phased,
Adaptive Approach are actually longer than what you can compare
them to with our other missile defense programs. So our
assessment is this is a conservative set of schedules.
We have also laid in decision points, which I have briefed
the GAO on, of different technological maturity levels that
will be reached before we move to each of the development
phases of our program. So we deem this to be a very manageable
risk and laid out in a very prudent approach to developing
these systems.
I will note that some of their analysis was comparing our
missile developments of just the missile to system
developments, which are more comprehensive. And one of the
advantages of using the Aegis system as the mainstay for our
capability for the EPAA is we evolve it from one fire control
capability to the next, and in between we bring a new missile
on board. And that does, in fact, reduce the amount of new
technology that has to be applied and also has a more
deliberate delivery approach.
Mr. Langevin. Well, as a follow-on, since each successive
phase delivers additional capability, how will you mitigate
delays for equipment deployment in one phase from affecting
preparations for the next phase?
General O'Reilly. The capabilities are developed in phases
that are aimed at specific threat classes that we are trying to
negate. And, as we said, Phase 1 is aimed at medium ballistic
missiles and short-range and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles. If we had a problem with the subsequent phase, in
each phase it would usually equate to producing or deploying
additional numbers of missile defense systems. Since our
systems are flexible and since they are mobile, we have the
ability to add capability in if we found in fact we needed--we
only had shorter-range interceptors versus using longer-range
ones of a subsequent phase.
So we believe the adaptability itself of the system allows
you to adjust to the capability that is available at any given
time.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
Dr. Miller, the GAO also concluded that ``DOD has not fully
implemented a management process that synchronizes the European
Phased, Adaptive Approach acquisition activities and ensures
transparency and accountability. The DOD has made progress in
acquisition planning for technology development, system
engineering and testing, partial progress in defining
requirements and identifying stakeholders, but has not yet
developed an EPAA acquisition decision schedule or an overall
EPAA investment cost.''
Dr. Miller, how do you respond to GAO's concern expressed
in the draft report to the committee? Does OSD have the
appropriate acquisition plans with milestones and budget, to
track progress in each phase of the PAA?
Secretary Miller. Mr. Chairman, I would like to answer but
then give an opportunity for General O'Reilly also to answer as
the acquisition executive for the systems and for the missile
systems involved here.
At the outset of this effort and, indeed, throughout the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review, we looked at the likely costs
associated with the Phased, Adaptive Approach and had an
overall estimate for those costs associated with missiles,
sensors, and so forth. As each of those programs matures, we
have seen the refinement of those cost estimates and currently
believe that we have a pretty good grasp on what the overall
cost of this program will be. One of the uncertainties or one
of the choices one makes is how to ascribe the cost of the
Aegis BMD-capable ships associated with that. Because they are
a global asset, we generally don't include them in our cost
estimates for the cost of Phased, Adaptive Approach for Europe.
Now with respect to oversight of the program, in addition
to the Missile Defense Executive Board, which meets regularly
and reviews this and other elements of missile defense, the
Missile Defense Agency's programs, including all of the Phased,
Adaptive Approach-related programs, come in for, as you know,
an annual review in the Department and get a pretty intensive
scrub. And that has been the case this year, as it was
throughout the course of the conduct of the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review.
My sense is that we have a very good understanding of what
the key technical risks are associated with each of the
elements of the Phased, Adaptive Approach and that we have a--
and that General O'Reilly and the Missile Defense Agency have a
clear, lined-up program of activities that stretch from today
through the coming decade for when the key milestones will be,
when they need to get key systems on contract, and what other
key decisions are.
General O'Reilly. Thank you. Sir, for each one of our
programs in the EPAA, as the acquisition executive I have
established six baselines--cost, schedule, technical,
operational, contracts, and test baselines. This is far more
descriptive that is in a typical acquisition program baseline.
Ours is more detailed. If there is a lead service involved,
like the Navy or Army or Air Force, I have asked and received
cooperation from their acquisition executives. So when I sign
these baselines, the service that is going to be the lead
service for these capabilities also signs the baseline after
they have conducted their own reviews. So it is unprecedented
that a joint program actually has two service acquisition
executives, or the service acquisition executive and myself as
missile defense. We perform twice the amount of reviews you
would normally see.
Also, as Dr. Miller said, the Missile Defense Executive
Board does perform a lot of the duties that a Defense
Acquisition Board would perform. So instead of typically having
a Defense Acquisition Board review once every two to three
years, I have a review once every two to three months. So it is
a very integrated, technical management approach. It is very
visible. And I have provided those baselines and we will
continue to update those baselines over the course of the
development of the EPAA.
Mr. Langevin. General, do you have an overall cost estimate
on each phase of the PAA and sufficient mechanisms there to
track that cost growth there?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, we do, and that is part of our
baselines, not only for each individual element but also the
aggregate, as we understand the definition of the architecture
of the EPAA. And the reason I say that is we use an analytical
architecture, but it is the combatant commander, the European
Command, that determines what the war plans and the actual
architecture will be. And that is submitted to the Joint Staff
for approval. And that is currently going through that process.
I will let Admiral Macy address that. But once that is produced
we then can take our unit costs, and very quickly be able to
determine precisely what the costs are. But we do have
estimates today.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
Admiral Macy, in April we received testimony from the
Department that, ``The Joint Staff is leading a review which
includes an examination of how the Global Force Management
process will incorporate the updated missile defense policy and
planning guidance contained in the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review. The review will be completed in the summer of 2010.
Additionally, the Joint Capability Mix-3 study will determine
inventory levels of BMD assets by spring 2011.''
Admiral Macy, two related questions. First, can you provide
us with an update on the status of the Global Force Management
process? And, second, if the JCM-3 study is completed in the
spring, how soon do you expect that inventory requirements and
associated cost specifics to Phase 2, 3 and 4 can be formulated
and made available to Congress?
Admiral Macy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Global Force
Management development project was a several-months-long effort
to understand was there anything that was different about how
you do ballistic missile defense and how you would handle the
management of forces? We have for many years, of course, had
Global Force Management. It is how you determine which
divisions go where, which Air Force fighter squadrons go where,
which ships go where in any given year. This is an effort that
is run between the Joint Staff, Strategic Command, and Joint
Forces Command.
So the study was to look at, okay, is there something
different about ballistics missiles that affects that? There
were some things learned out of that. Those have been folded
into--and it did wrap up in the late spring, early summer.
Those have since been wrapped into the effort that I alluded to
earlier, which is the ongoing planning effort being led by
Strategic Command on how to do management of ballistic missile
defense in the different regions at different times and across
the globe--the problem, of course, being that you have a finite
number of ships, a number of THAAD batteries, a number of TPY-2
radars, and everybody wants them. So the question is, who gets
them, and how often, and when do you need them?
We don't envision either the need or the ability to station
everything 24-7, 365 wherever we might want it. And that comes
into the Global Force Management on what will be, if you will,
permanently emplaced; what will be on a regular deployment
schedule; and what will be on a surge deployment schedule. That
process is going on now. It goes through a series of reviews,
culminating with reviews led by the Vice Chairman, and it will
wrap up this coming spring. So I would expect that this spring,
we will be able to come back and talk to you, on a global scale
and on a management scale, how we would do that. Obviously, we
are not going to get into the details of individual concept(?)
plans, but we will be able to describe to you what we think
will be the way we will manage that.
At the same time--and these are interrelated because part
of the discussion that you have with the COCOM [combatant
command] about what do you think you need in a time of low
tension versus what do you need in a time of high tension
figures into, how does the COCOM think he is going to fight? As
I discussed in my testimony, that drives how you do the JCM-3
study to figure out what do you think you are going to need--
how many interceptors, how many launching platforms, and how
many sensor systems.
And so as those two studies wind in and out between each
other to figure out what is the answers, they will result in a
set of options that the senior decisionmakers can look at and
say okay, these are the ways in which I will deploy forces in
times of low, medium and high tension and where to, and having
decided that, these are how many I need to handle the steady
state, and this is how many I need to handle the surge
condition. We will be looking at things like utility curves;
when do you not have to buy any more interceptors because it
doesn't buy you that many more days within a particular
conflict? The details will obviously be classified. And when we
come back in the spring we will have that discussion. We will
be ready to go into a great deal of depth.
So the date answer to your question, if you will, Mr.
Chairman, is I hope to personally in the April timeframe be
sitting down with your staffs as an initial review of the
details preparatory to taking them up to the members of the
committee.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Admiral. We look
forward to that when it occurs.
My final couple of areas for each of the witnesses, talking
about base agreements and NATO integration. I wanted to, first
of all, again congratulate you on the recent achievement at the
NATO summit in Lisbon in gaining support for territorial
missile defense and the PAA. The questions are for Mr. Rose and
Dr. Miller.
Looking forward, what are the remaining challenges in
ratifying the necessary basing agreements in the host countries
and in finalizing a location for the radar site in Phase 1? And
then, for General O'Reilly or Dr. Miller, how does the recently
announced NATO decision to facilitate integration of NATO
members' missile defense systems into a unified NATO framework
affect the current EPAA plans?
Secretary Rose. Sir, let me start with Phase 1. We are
discussing with a number of nations the potential deployment of
the Phase 1 radar. We are confident that we can meet, from a
legal perspective in getting the agreements in place, the
timeline of the end of 2011.
With regards to Phase 2, the land-based SM-3 site in
Romania, we are making good progress on the Ballistic Missile
Defense Agreement. We already have an existing supplemental
SOFA as well as a Defense Cooperation Agreement. So we hope to
come to conclusion on that soon. I can't give you a date
because these negotiations--that is how negotiations go--but we
are very confident that we will have the agreements in place
for Phase 2. Now that will need to be ratified, the Ballistic
Missile Defense Agreement, by the Romanian Parliament. But we
have been told by the Romanian Government they don't foresee
any challenges.
With regards to Phase 3 and Phase 4, in Poland we signed a
protocol this July to the 2008 basing agreement and we are
awaiting ratification of that agreement by the Polish
Parliament.
With regards to NATO, now that the political decision has
been made, the individual committees--the operational side of
the house, the technical side of the house--will begin to do
the work to implement that decision.
Secretary Miller. I will just add very briefly with respect
to the TPY-2 radar which we intend to deploy by the end of
2011, we currently have a couple deployed overseas there. They
can be moved relatively rapidly. As you know, Mr. Chairman, as
you know, we have one in Japan and we have put one in Israel.
And we are still confident that the timelines for moving that
equipment and getting that established are very achievable.
General O'Reilly. Sir, and I would like to add as far as
from point of interoperability, our systems were built from the
beginning using NATO protocols and NATO standards so that our
systems are interoperable with other systems that have been
built to NATO standards. As I said in my testimony, the most
effective missile defense is to have layers so you can have
several opportunities to intercept an incoming missile. The
U.S. contribution to NATO and EPAA is primarily an upper-tier,
what we call, would be your first shot opportunity, either in
outer space or in the upper atmosphere. Our fire control
systems will be interlinked with the Active Layered Theatre
Ballistic Missile Defence System that NATO is developing, which
would coordinate the utilization of their lower-tier systems,
such as Patriot and some of the early Aegis missiles, and some
of the other missile defense systems that they have already
procured. So we will maximize the combined capability of both.
We began two years ago with a direct link between the
testbed. The laboratory that NATO uses to develop their command
and control in Den Haag is directly connected with our
laboratory in Colorado Springs, so that as we develop software
we assure ourselves that they are interoperable, and we have
taken that into account and it is a very useful tool having
both of those for further development of command and control
approaches.
Sir, from an operational point of view, I would defer to
Admiral Macy.
Admiral Macy. Mr. Chairman, I have, in one of my other hats
I have the privilege of being the U.S. representative to the
NATO Air Defense Committee and, as such, have been involved in
these discussions for quite some time. NATO has been discussing
this over the past year at some length. There have been a
number of position papers done. The NATO Air Defense Committee
has done a number of papers coming out of previous tasking at
the Strasbourg-Kehl summit of several years ago. There has
already been initial CONOPS [Concept of Operations] development
going on. It is both convenient and useful, of course, that the
Commander of European Command is also SACEUR [Supreme Allied
Commander Europe] and the Commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe
is the NATO Commander AIRNORTH [Allied Air Forces Northern
Europe]. So those staffs have been involved and already looking
at what are the CONOPS, what are the processes and procedures.
After Lisbon, the Secretary General has given direction
that a number of committees look at this and be prepared to
answer in some detail next spring such issues as CONOPS and
command and control. So between that approach, of course, NATO
and the United States have shared command and control for air
defense for a great number of years. So we know how to do that,
and we take that, and using the systems, as General O'Reilly
mentioned, that have been built in conformance with NATO
specifications, we believe we are very well positioned to
integrate the U.S. PAA contribution to NATO into the NATO BMD
capability.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. I want to thank the witnesses for
their answers to my questions. With that, I will now turn it
over to the ranking member for his questions.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In addition to
recognizing your service before we go on, with this being the
last hearing of the subcommittee, I want to recognize Bob
DeGrasse and Kari Bingen for their leadership roles in the
staff in this committee. I think in the subcommittee we have
had a very bipartisan relationship. And I know that I can
attest and I know, Mr. Chairman, that you would also, that both
Bob and Kari have worked diligently to ensure that both the
subject matter and the members approach issues from a
bipartisan basis. So I appreciate both Kari and Bob's service
and look forward to your dedication as we go into the 112th
Congress.
Gentlemen, almost all of you when you were giving your
statements gave us some sense of the obvious criticism that I
know you feel of the suspicion that there is a ``secret deal''
with Russia; that Russia might have veto power over our missile
defense systems and that this Administration might agree to
limitations on our missile defense. In fact, Dr. Miller, you
state in your testimony on page 7, ``. . . the Administration
has made clear to Russia and Allies that the United States will
not agree to any limitations or constraints on U.S. ballistic
missile defenses, and that the United States intends to
continue improving and deploying BMD systems.''
The problem, gentlemen, I think is that the Phased,
Adaptive Approach, though, is borne out of a limitation and a
constraint that has been placed on our missile defense system.
By having scrapped the third site where the ground-based
missiles were intended for Poland, including the radar that was
included to Czech Republic, this Administration unilaterally
put a constraint and limitation and proposed, then, the Phased,
Adaptive Approach, which was not mutually exclusive to the
third site. It includes systems that were concurrently being
developed. And that is an issue, I think, that puts a light
over the issue of the Administration's need to continue to say
that they would not agree to limitations because they stepped
forward initially with one.
The second issue, I think, that causes each of you in your
testimony to have to raise this issue is the fact of the
statements that the Russians themselves are making. I have the
Moscow Times report today about President Medvedev's state of
the nation address where he is reported to have said he warned
the West that if NATO doesn't reach a deal with Russia of the
joint development of an anti-missile shield over Europe, a new
arms race would start in the next decade and Russia would be
forced to build up its offensive strategic forces.
The Washington Post reports Putin having said that ``if the
missile defense system excludes Russia and includes
installations along Russia's borders, Moscow will see that as a
threat and be forced to respond with an expansion and updating
of its own weapons systems''--this at a time when the Senate is
being called to take up the issue of the New START Treaty where
you have the Russian leadership specifically singling out
missile defense as a threat to their willingness to comply with
the treaty that our Senate is now being asked to concur in.
Which brings me to the issue, I think, that I would like
you to deal with today, and that is the issue of since the
third site was scrapped and the two-stage was preserved,
according to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, as a hedging
strategy for homeland defense in case, one, the long-range
threat comes earlier or, two, technical issues arise with the
later models of the SM-3 interceptor, it brings me to a
question of, well, how do we evaluate this hedge? At what point
would the Department make a decision to employ the hedge? What
criteria would be used? And what threat indications and warning
would you need to see ahead to make such a decision to deploy
that two-stage? How long would it take to deploy if the
decision is made so? And the third one is, in light of the
statements that we saw today from the leadership of Russia,
does your hedge strategy, if it is needed to be deployed,
already violate what the Russian leaders are saying would be
their continued commitment to the New START treaty?
Dr. Miller, your thoughts.
Secretary Miller. Mr. Turner, if I can, let me start by
taking exception, if I can, to your characterization of the
Phased, Adaptive Approach as a ``limitation.'' Frankly, the
conclusion of the missile defense review work that we did and
the conclusion of people at multiple levels in the Department
of Defense is that it was a better idea, a better approach that
would provide more capability sooner for the threats we have
today and a more important delta to the capability for the
longer-range threats we may see in the future. And I will come
back to that point when I talk about hedging.
With respect to Russian statements, we can expect the
Russian Federation to do what is in its national interest. We
are, of course, committed to do what is in the United States'
national interest. And the idea behind the ballistic missile
defense cooperation is that in this area, because we both face
threats from Iran and, potentially, other states, that there is
room for cooperation and there is room for both of us to
advance our interests and improve our security, and similarly
for NATO and Russia through the NATO-Russia Council, that there
is room for both to improve security.
I will state, as well, that there is a long history of many
in Russia wanting to slow down the U.S. missile defense
program. I don't think that we could be any more clear about
the fact that we will not accept that and we will go forward
and continue to improve our capabilities, both qualitatively
and quantitatively.
With respect to the question of the hedge, I think it is
useful to think in terms of timeframes. If a missile--if an
ICBM threat from Iran were to arise prior to 2017, the two-
stage GBI is not going to be an effective hedge for that time
window, from today to then, because that is about as quickly as
we would expect that we could get it in place. And that is
about when it would have been in place under the previous
approach.
So it is, I think, useful to remind ourselves that the
first hedge--let me back up. The first objective of course is
to prevent this from occurring in the first place. And that is
what the sanctions with respect to the nuclear program are
about, and what the pressure track is about, as well as our
offers for diplomacy, should they go that way. But it is useful
to remind ourselves that we currently have deployed 30 ground-
based interceptors and that these interceptors are intended--in
fact, capable--of providing defense of the United States.
The next hedge that is applicable before 2017 is that the
Secretary of Defense last year made a decision to finish off
Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely. And that means if we see an
additional threat in terms of the quantity or the quality that
could cause us to want to allocate more interceptors to a given
re-entry vehicle if we thought it was a more sophisticated
threat, those eight interceptors will be available, and those
silos will be prepared.
So within that timeframe, within the next seven years, that
is what the hedge looks like. So the two-stage GBI really comes
into play in the 2017 timeframe and later. And what we would
look for is a combination of progress, if you can call it that,
in the Iranian nuclear program and ICBM capabilities. And I
think it is probably preferable not to go into details for
indicators and warnings but I think it is fair to say that you
look at not just the independent activities of those two but
the efforts to make them and to provide a weaponized
capability.
You noted that some assessments have suggested that Iran
could have a capability potentially as soon as 2015. I don't
take exception to that. There is a tremendous amount of
uncertainty about the timeline. But, as I said, the first thing
that it is essential to remember is that we have capabilities
in place and we are prepared to augment them in that timeframe
with our ground-based interceptors. And the rest of the hedge
will come in later.
With respect to the technical hedge for the--if there are
challenges with later versions of the SM-3, we will see those
in the coming years and then have a decision to make--if that
is indeed the case--the decision of whether to attempt to
correct the program, to simplify the program, to accelerate the
program, et cetera, versus to bring in another capability, will
be at that point on the table.
Mr. Turner. Before we go on, Dr. Miller, let me go back
because there was a lot in that answer so let me try to break
it down. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review states that the
hedge for the two-stage is, in case one, the long-range threat
comes earlier or, two, technical issues arise with later
models. Now you don't disagree with that, right?
Secretary Miller. That is right.
Mr. Turner. So for this to be the policy and for this to be
the policy that you agree with, it must mean that the hedge
would be available prior to the Phased, Adaptive Approach being
available because otherwise it wouldn't say earlier. Is that
correct?
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. As you know, the Phase 4----
Mr. Turner. Pause for a second. I just had to ask you this
because you said the Phased, Adaptive Approach was going to be
here sooner. And I just wanted to be clear because my
understanding of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review was that
the hedge was in case it was needed earlier than the Phased,
Adaptive Approach would be available. And I just want to make
certain you didn't disagree with the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, because that is what we have been operating on.
Secretary Miller. I agree with the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review and my comments about the Phased, Adaptive
Approach providing capability earlier are with respect to the
earlier phases of that Phased, Adaptive Approach.
Mr. Turner. But not the portion that relates to protection
for the United States homeland and the protection that the two-
stage would be providing.
Secretary Miller. Specifically, the two-stage GBI is a
hedge. One of its functions can be as a hedge against
challenges with Phase 4, which is the Standard Missile-3 IIB,
homeland, which is intended to provide another layer for the
United States. It will also provide an additional capability
for ascent-phase intercept for medium-range and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles as well.
Mr. Turner. Good. Now in light of the comments--and I know
you are well versed in all the issues of START and missile
defense--in light of the comments that we are hearing from
Russia, if you were in a position to deploy the hedge do you
believe that their statements indicate that deployment of the
hedge would be a violation of their perspective on START?
Secretary Miller. Mr. Turner, I don't believe so. I have
not seen a definitive statement in that regard. But I can say
with some confidence that the answer to that would not affect
the decision made, certainly, by this Administration, whether
or not to go forward with the hedge. The statement that there
will be no constraints or limitations on missile defense
certainly applies to the hedge as well as to all other elements
of our program.
Mr. Turner. Walk me through, then, for just a moment as to
the timeline of the hedge. If next week we were to a position
where the hedge was to be pursued because the threat had either
come earlier or that we are now aware of technical issues with
the later models of the SM-3 interceptor that moved your
timeframe back, what is the timeframe for the deployment of the
hedge?
Secretary Miller. For the two-stage ground-based
interceptor, the soonest that we currently expect that we would
be able to deploy in Europe would be in the ballpark of 2017.
That is what the estimate--the estimate previously, at one
point it looked possible to deploy earlier as we had delays in
movement forward with the previous Administration's plans. That
slipped from an initial goal of 2013 to a later goal of 2015.
And ultimately, because of the requirement to conduct
additional testing and then the delays, also, in ratification
for the Poland and the Czech Republic, that slipped into, I
would say, the 2016 to 2018 timeframe.
Mr. Turner. Is that a rolling six to seven years then? You
say 2017 now but, I mean, let's say it is three years from now
and we are to have deployment. Are we still dealing with that
type of delay?
Secretary Miller. There are steps that we can take to
shorten that timeline, and I think General O'Reilly can talk to
that for a moment.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, there is. Under the previous
plan it was a six-year development of the missile field. The
six-year development was triggered on successful testing of the
two-stage GBI. We did a successful test, the first of three, in
February of this year--I am sorry, June of this year. And then
we will next year have our first intercept. And then we have
another two-stage GBI test currently scheduled for 2016.
However, a two-stage GBI is configured like a three-stage, and
we confirmed its performance last summer, except the third
stage is literally missing. I mean it literally is the same
length and everything is a three-stage. So the two-stage GBI,
we believe, you can accelerate the qualification and the
certification and the other requirements that were previously
put by Congress on the performance of the two-stage before you
begin construction. We completed 35 percent of the design of
the missile field. So we archived all of that information. And
so if we had to execute, we could in fact reduce that six-year
down to perhaps one or two years shorter than that. Again, our
trigger is----
Mr. Turner. From five to four years.
Secretary Miller. Yes, sir. That wasn't our current plan
that we had previously, but that is what you would do if you
had to shorten the construction cycle. And we were relieved of
the requirement of continuing several tests of the SM-3 or--I
mean the two-stage GBI.
Mr. Turner. And the reason--and I know you gentlemen are
aware of the reason why I am asking the question, is to
evaluate the viability of the hedge. I wanted your thoughts on
will it be viewed as violating the Russian's view of START? Can
it be delivered on time? If the threat is there that would
cause you to turn to the hedge, can you really deliver the
hedge in a timeframe where it would be effective?
And it sounds like your time periods--six, five, four--that
you can shorten it somewhat, but you still have a relatively
long lead time for the hedge to provide that protection to the
U.S. homeland.
General O'Reilly. Sir, the next expansion of capability
that we have is--and there will be several independent reviews
that Congress has asked for and will receive. And they all
indicate that the greatest capability that is needed, if there
was a need for a hedge, is not specifically more interceptors.
It is more capability to do discrimination and sensor
management and so forth. And that aspect of the previous
program we are actually accelerating over the EPAA--as I
mentioned, the upgrades of the new radars. And we do have
greater capability being developed on an accelerated level to
help us with discrimination, which independent assessment
indicates is where your greatest need would be. If you wanted
additional firepower beyond adding eight missiles, which the
timeframe for that is on the order of eight weeks to complete
the population of the missile field, the next step would be to
expand the number of refurbished missile field number one,
which is about a two-year--it would take two years to do that.
So we do have some intermediate steps which you could employ
if, in fact, a hedge was necessary that could shorten going to
a deployment in Europe of several years to build a new missile
field.
Mr. Turner. That just goes to the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, I mean is the document of course that states that this
will be a hedge and the two criteria for the deployment of the
hedge. And I am just trying to evaluate, do you see a scenario
in which that hedge would be deployed; would it be there
timely, would it be viewed as a violation from the Russians? So
maybe I need to ask that in a different way, Dr. Miller. I
mean, do you see a scenario in which the hedge would be
deployed?
Secretary Miller. Sir, I think that that scenario is quite
unlikely and I think it is----
Mr. Turner. So do you not see a scenario in which----
Secretary Miller. No, sir, I think it is unlikely. And I
think it is unlikely for the following reason. And that is that
we have a good program in place for Phased, Adaptive Approach.
We have the capabilities coming into place that will allow
testing in the next several years and will allow us to get a
good sense of the SM-3 IIB and the technical risk there. If we
discover at that point that the test history and the modeling
that has led to the parameters of the system are incorrect and
can't be rapidly adjusted, then we have a decision--and General
O'Reilly may want to talk about the timeline--in that timeframe
to go for the hedge. I think we have done, and MDA and our
teams have done, the analysis deeply enough that that technical
hedge is unlikely to be necessary.
With respect to the hedge for--but we are talking about
obviously the protection of the United States, so that is why
we, despite a low probability--there is a low probability, we
hope, of an attack in the first place--but this is why it is
still valuable to do this hedge.
With respect to the hedging against an earlier arrival of
the threat, as I said, I think you have to think about that in
a different sort of layer, and that is that if it comes very
quickly there is not going to be time to deploy a two-stage,
even when compressed, and then the addition of GBIs at Fort
Greely, is going to be a sensible thing to do.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Miller, I really was not asking you a
probability question. I mean I understand that I am certainly
with you on the issue of let's certainly hope and have an
expectation that the probability of any of these circumstances
would be very low. However, the Administration in the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review did establish this as a hedge. And so I
want to make certain that this language is not meaningless.
And, therefore, my question to you of do you see any scenario
where the hedge is deployed----
Secretary Miller. I will give you a shorter answer, sir.
Yes, the scenario would be either when there is a technical
problem with the SM-3 IIB that we don't see solving quickly.
And that would be something that we will have insight in the
next few years. And then if we see an Iranian capability for
ICBM nuclear capability and its integration arising, then we
will need to look hard at that hedge and whether, depending on
what occurs, whether to try to accelerate the SM-3 IIB and/or
to look to deploy a two-stage ground-based interceptor.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. The whole concept of a hedge, by the
way, is this issue that we are all struggling with, which is a
gap where the threat emerges or arrives prior to the capability
being deployed. The concern with the Phased, Adaptive Approach
and the number that you had indicated of the ICBM threat of
perhaps being 2015 when we know the Phase Adaptive Approach
doesn't provide a response to that threat until 2020 provides
us a five-year gap of which we have a concern, but as our whole
discussion with respect to the hedge and other issues of
technical capability goes to, the emergence of that threat and
the acceleration of our facing that threat posing, then, a
wider gap between technical capability and present threat.
Which takes me to the next portion of my questioning.
When the White House announced the PAA last September, it
said the new approach was based upon an assumption that the
long-range missile threat was ``slower to develop.'' Recent
reports indicate that Iran perhaps has 19 BM-25 advanced
ballistic missiles that it acquired from North Korea in its
arsenal that are capable of reaching Berlin and Moscow. Now, in
all the hearings that we have had and all the discussions that
we have had about the capability of Iran, the discussion of--
the issue of the possibility of their acquiring this capability
instead of just merely developing it has always been raised as
an accelerator.
When is the Phased, Adaptive Approach expected to provide
coverage to Berlin? If the threat to Berlin, other Western and
Central European population centers exists today, according to
these reports, and the Phased, Adaptive Approach won't cover
these areas until 2018 at the earliest, then there would appear
to be a present gap in the defensive coverage of Europe. What
options are available to accelerate coverage of Europe; what
appear to be very near-term threats; and any other thoughts
that you would like to provide us on the issue of these
reports?
Secretary Miller. Mr. Turner, I don't want to speak to
intelligence assessments in open session either to confirm or
deny the accuracy of the information that you have put out.
Mr. Turner. Well, it is information that is being reported.
This is out in the public. This is not something that is in a
classified discussion that we are having. What I have asked you
is this is what is being reported; your thoughts, and how does
that relate to the issue of a possible gap that we might have?
Secretary Miller. One of the advantages of the Phased,
Adaptive Approach is that it is adaptive, and that if we see
something coming earlier, we have the possibility to accelerate
first by moving Aegis-capable ships with SM-3 interceptors and
as the later interceptors come online, to be able to put them
in additional locations as well.
General O'Reilly. Sir, and if I may, without referring to,
again, commenting on sensitive intel information, if you just
looked at the distance of what you have said in your question
between Berlin and Iran and other locations in the Middle East,
if you take that distance, next spring we are actually
intercepting a target of that range with our Phase 1
capability. Again, we have said we took a very conservative
approach to developing the EPAA. But just to use the type of
distances you are referring to, which is in the range of an
intermediate-range ballistic missile, we said we would deploy
in Phase 1, in my testimony, intermediate-range ballistic
missile range, which is the range you are talking about to
Berlin. And that will be Phase 1 capability. And we are testing
live fire tests next spring against that range.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Rose, you indicated that there were no
secret talks ongoing, which we are all very glad to hear, of
course. But press reports do continue to surface that Under
Secretary of State Tauscher and her Russian counterpart are
negotiating a missile defense agreement. Also, we are told that
Secretary Tauscher signed out a Circular 175 memo last May for
a missile defense agreement with Russia. According to the State
Department's Web site, a Circular 175 refers to regulations
developed by the State Department to ensure the proper exercise
of the treaty-making power and seeks to confirm that the making
of treaties and other international agreements by the United
States is carried out within constitutional and other legal
limitations.
What is the exact nature and scope of the missile defense
negotiations that are going on with Russia, and would you
please tell us the contents of the Circular 175?
Secretary Rose. Certainly. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner.
Let me start by saying that our discussions are focused
strictly on cooperation. We are not discussing limiting our
missile defenses in any way. Now, in order to facilitate
cooperation, sir, you need to have an agreement in place to
exchange information. Back in 2004 the Bush administration
began negotiating with Russia a Defense Technical Cooperation
Agreement. What this agreement was, was a broad framework that
allowed the two ministries of defense to exchange information
not just on missile defense, but a variety of issues.
The last DTCA, as we call it, negotiations with Russia were
held in 2008. Now, earlier this year this Administration
decided to propose a more limited form of the DTCA which would
only address missile defense issues, the Ballistic Missile
Defense Cooperation Agreement. Basically, what the BMDCA was,
was very simply a framework agreement which established a
cooperation working group and it basically was a framework in
which you could stick individual projects under that.
For the record, we specifically included language in the
agreement that said, ``This agreement shall not constrain or
limit parties' respective BMD plans or capabilities
numerically, qualitatively, operationally, geographically, or
in any other way.'' Now, we made this proposal to the Russian
Government last spring and they said that they were not
interested in negotiating a Ballistic Missile Defense
Cooperation Agreement at that time. What we understand, and I
will defer to Dr. Miller, is recently the Russian MOD [Ministry
of Defense] has indicated an interest in restarting the
negotiations on the broader DTCA.
Sir, with your question about what Circular 175 authority
is, it basically is a relatively routine matter in the State
Department to ensure that when there is any international
agreement, whether it be a supplemental SOFA, R&D [research and
development] agreement, that there is adequate coordination
across the interagency and that U.S. foreign policy objectives
are fully--it is aligned with overall U.S. foreign policy
objectives. So let me defer to Dr. Miller if he wants to add
anything on the DTCA and the future of that.
Secretary Miller. Mr. Rose is correct that it appears there
is now at least a possible interest to have discussions to move
toward a DTCA, Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement. What
the scope of that will be is to be determined. The idea is to
be able to have an umbrella agreement that then allows us to
discuss possible technical cooperation in a number of different
areas.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman. We are now operating
under the five-minute rule, and the chair now recognizes Mr.
Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I got here just
in time to be here under the five-minute rule.
Gentlemen, I appreciate very much your being here. As
happens quite often, Mr. Turner has stolen all of my questions.
I will do a little variation here.
General O'Reilly, you know, I know that you have had to
deal with a lot of questions about the Phased, Adaptive
Approach, and I want you to know that there is certainly no
adversarial perspective in my mind at all, because I think you
are doing a magnificent job and I think we are blessed to have
you where you are in this country, and I am personally very
grateful for that.
That said, there is a lot of discussion about the PAA being
suggested or touted as capable of providing a greater coverage
sooner to all of our European allies compared to other missile
defense plans, and I will just try to make that a general
comment. But the previous approach of utilizing interceptors in
Poland and radar in the Czech Republic was forecast at the time
to provide about 75 percent coverage of our European allies
against longer-range missiles by 2013, with the remaining 25
percent of southeastern Europe covered with U.S. and NATO
shorter-range missile defense systems.
Given the timeframe of PAA, do you think that it will live
up to the expectation of having greater coverage sooner,
especially given the reality, it seems, that the Phased,
Adaptive Approach has developed a little slower than we
thought, and we and our allies are already, in my mind,
perilously vulnerable to a ballistic missile threat given
especially with Iran having new missile capability brought in
from North Korea.
Was there enough of a question there for you to pull out an
answer?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, except for the comment that the
Phased, Adaptive Approach, sir, was slower than----
Mr. Franks. Do you believe that the Phased, Adaptive
Approach is developing as quickly as you anticipated?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. We are in track for Phase 1,
which will be next December. By then, we will have all of the
capabilities that we have described delivered. And each one of
those milestones are, in fact, the final date for the last
delivery of a capability. But we are going to be delivering
capability as it comes on board.
For example, the fire control system for the next Aegis
ship that is a Phase 2 capability, the Navy will be certifying
that operationally next summer. So we will be three years ahead
in that regard. So, again, we were very prudent and
conservative when we laid out this, but we are delivering
capability as soon as we can and we are testing it in an
integrated fashion. For example, as I said, we are testing
against an IRBM next spring with the Phase 1 capability.
So, sir, I do believe we are on line to have a significant
amount of schedule margin so that if we do have problems in
development--and they do occur--but we have taken that into
account historically, and we will--we have a very high
confidence level to meet these milestones for all four of them.
Mr. Franks. And it remains your perspective that we will
have greater coverage sooner with PAA than we did with the
European site.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. With the European site, the
coverage was limited by the time of flight of a GBI. The
missiles we are talking about now fly significantly shorter in
time and, therefore, they can engage earlier. That is why we
have a site in Romania that has been chosen, and a third site,
it was in Poland, which is significantly further back. So from
that vantage point, we do have a significant amount of
coverage.
Sir, and I respect your question on coverage, but I will
say a major factor in our assessments was raid size. And having
10 missiles and deciding you needed more, it would take several
years to expand a missile field, where in this capability you
can expand it in weeks to additional sets of missiles.
Mr. Franks. The last question--well, kind of a two-part
question. The BM-25s from North Korea in Iran, do you think
that those present any new issues that Phased, Adaptive
Approach should take into consideration? And, secondly, if
there is any area of coverage and reach, given the shorter arm
of SM-3s, are there any areas that you feel like should be of
special consideration to the committee or to the MDA?
General O'Reilly. Sir, again, I cannot comment on
intelligence-type information in this forum, but as I said in
my testimony, we will have intermediate range and demonstrated
intermediate-range ballistic missile capability next spring,
before we deploy. And we have already shown we have very
robust, 10 intercepts with the Aegis system of short-range
missiles, and we have had seven out of seven intercepts with
the THAAD system.
Mr. Franks. Well, seven out of seven is close enough.
Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman.
We will now go to round two, and I have only one question,
and General O'Reilly is the lucky winner of the question.
Getting to costs, again, and contracting, General, first of
all again, I do want to thank you for your testimony here today
as well as your ongoing engagement with this committee's
efforts in pursuing information on missile defense efforts, and
your overall effort has been stellar, an outstanding and a
great service to the country.
While the PAA is designed to move current technology into
defense of Europe as soon as possible, there are clearly large
technical developments required to achieve a lot of phases of
the strategy. As we have seen with previous efforts for our
domestic architecture, these large systems are initially bid
through open competition, but it seems that once the initial
contract is done, there are many years of sole-source follow-on
contracts to provide support to these systems. This can
obviously drive up long-term costs of large defense systems
because it limits competition in later phases of the contract.
So, General, my question to you is how does MDA plan to
reach these aggressive development goals while keeping costs
low? Is there any thought about working more with industry to
better leverage the research and development efforts already in
development at small- and medium-size businesses in terms of
upgrades and support?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, there is. First of all, in our
advance research area, we have over 340 contracts that are with
small businesses and universities today, and they are focused
on the technologies we need for the later stages of the Phased,
Adaptive Approach, and I am constantly engaged with small
business.
Second, in our larger contracts. I have required that they
submit a plan of how they are going to utilize small business,
and we have made it award fee criteria that we evaluate the
large businesses on how they comply with the plans they
proposed at the time of award.
We are also going through a very large series of
competitions, and some of these competitions are programs that
have not had competition in over a decade. For example, the
ground-based mid-course defense contract is up for competition.
We make our decisions on to compete or not, not on the
aggressiveness of the schedule, but on evaluating and surveys
and input from industry, to see if there is more than one
source out there that is a viable source. And we have had great
cooperation from industry, and in some cases some of our
proposals have had over 10 industry teams indicate they are
willing to propose. That is what we use for our criteria.
In the case of the Aegis Ashore, we have extended the
current Lockheed contract because they are the ones that
developed the Aegis system to begin with. But we have also
notified that after the initial deployments of taking the Aegis
system on a ship and building it as close as possible to the
one on land so that sailors don't have to go through retraining
or anything when they are using--or the logistics system--after
we do the initial deployments, we will compete that also.
So, sir, there is no contract in MDA which we have
designated will not be competed in the future.
Mr. Langevin. Good. I appreciate your answer. I have to say
that that is encouraging to hear. It has been kind of a pet
peeve of mine that we have these big legacy systems, and I have
heard this from numerous small- and medium-size businesses,
that they find it frustrating to be able to offer a product
that might be much more effective at a lower cost, because
there is just so much up-front investment that the big
companies have made and so much investment that it makes sense
for them to want to stick to the current technology and not do
the upgrades. Again, small businesses have been frustrated and
shut out in a lot of ways.
But I am encouraged by your answer, and I hope that
continues to be the case. Getting a better product, especially
as technology improves so rapidly, and being able to get it at
a lower cost, would benefit not only capabilities, but also the
taxpayer.
With that, my questions are completed. I will turn to the
ranking member for round two.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just got two
things I would like to ask.
General O'Reilly, I would like to go back to your response
on the issue of the emerging threat from Iran, the evolving
threat from Iran. Our discussion, and, again, our concern here
is to try to find where the gaps are and how we are going to be
able to respond to those gaps.
The Phased, Adaptive Approach, viewed in the light of the
scrapping of the third site is an approach that is in a race
against emerging threats. The information that we had had about
the Phased, Adaptive Approach, just conferring with staff, was
that if the scenario is Iran and Berlin, that it is coverage
that is not available until 2018. You indicated in Phase 1 you
will have some intermediate-range ballistic missile
effectiveness.
If you could confer with our staff and provide us the
information on that, because it is different than what our
understanding is of your phases. We hope, of course, that every
time that there is a gap that is identified, that your system
is, as you all have described it, evolving and responsive so
that we can respond to those gaps. So if you would please
provide that information, I would appreciate it.
The second thing goes again to the comparative of the
Phased, Adaptive Approach into the system that was scrapped.
The third site, and including the radar that was intended for
Poland and the Czech Republic, would have provided coverage for
the homeland of the United States and also provided coverage,
as Mr. Franks was saying, for 75 percent of Europe. But there
was coverage that was provided to homeland United States.
In looking at the Phased, Adaptive Approach, as you all
have acknowledged, Phase 4 is where coverage to the United
States comes in, and that is the 2020 timeframe. The prior
phases, 1, 2 and 3, are fairly focused on protecting Europe,
and yet the United States is fully funding the Phased, Adaptive
Approach, as near as I understand it and as I think our
committee understands it.
With that shift of shared benefit arises the question of
shared contribution. I know we certainly are all very excited
of NATO's interest in NATO-izing a missile defense shield, but
what is the current Administration's approach to contributions
from NATO Allies for the Phased, Adaptive Approach?
Secretary Miller. Mr. Turner, as you know, we view the
European Phased, Adaptive Approach as a U.S. contribution to
missile defense for NATO. We have a vested and a very strong
vested interest in that because, as you also know, we have more
than 100,000 troops there and we have, of course, additional
Americans there as well. So there is something very directly,
from an American perspective, involved in being able to defend
in Europe. We also, as you know, conduct operations and move
our forces through Europe and the European Command's area of
responsibility as well.
Now, with respect to shared resources, each of the
countries in NATO that wish to contribute at the lower tier, or
if they contribute to an upper tier, will obviously fund that
themselves. And we have the shared NATO resources into it,
which each nation contributes for the Active Layered Theatre
Ballistic Missile Defence Programme, which is the command and
control elements, that both will make the Phased, Adaptive
Approach plug in to the lower-tier systems and allow the lower-
tier systems and any other upper-tier systems that are provided
in the future to be able to work more effectively together.
So you have got national contributions, including from the
United States; you have got the NATO contributions for ALTBMD
[Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme]
and the work involved in integrating those systems; and then
you have got the countries that have Patriot and other systems
in Europe that will then tie into that and then fund those
capabilities.
Secretary Rose. Mr. Turner, I also think it is important
that we note the important contributions of land and territory
that Romania and Poland are providing to the PAA, to the
defense of the United States as well as to the defense of the
Alliance as a whole.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the ranking member.
Mr. Franks is now recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess to couch the question in a way, General O'Reilly,
that will not create a need for you to touch on anything
sensitive, I think Mr. Turner's phrase was it is a race, and
certainly that seems to be the case. So I have two questions.
Given potential vulnerabilities that we have, what areas of
the Phased, Adaptive Approach, the knowledge points, or what
areas, the milestones, would you like to see accelerated, given
the potential threats that are emerging?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I do agree it is a race. The race,
though--my perspective is, is not with the ICBM. The ICBM
threat--again, we have 30 missiles. Even if you shot four
against any one missile, 30 interceptors, even if you shot four
interceptors, you would need more than seven simultaneously
launched ICBMs in order to overcome our current system. So we
believe that is a great capability, and as I alluded to, we are
in fact upgrading the sensors and other parts of the system to
make those 30 interceptors much more capable. So that is for
homeland defense.
However, if you do not count the United States, Russia,
China, or any of the European countries, there are still over
6,000 missiles out there, and that is where our capability is
needed greatest. We have over--we are approaching about 1,000
Patriots, and we are increasing rapidly the number of Aegis
against short-range ballistic missiles but that, by far, is
where we are outpaced and outnumbered, and that is where our
focus is on accelerating that early capability--this and Phase
2, from a global point of view.
I would defer to Admiral Macy to elaborate on that.
Admiral Macy. Really, the only thing to add is to refer
back a little bit, sir--I don't think you had a chance to join
us----
Mr. Franks. And I apologize for that.
Admiral Macy. No, sir, please, I wasn't going there. Along
with the JCM-3 study that we are doing to look at the number of
interceptors and sensors and launch capabilities we need, we
have a parallel planning going on within the Joint Staff and
the COCOMs on how to fight in these areas. And we are looking
at, okay, we are currently outgunned in the interceptors versus
threat missiles. We expect that will, frankly, continue. So the
question is how do you most effectively fight, how do you fight
in such a way that you bring other elements of national power
into the fight to end the fight as soon as you can do it? But
certainly in the near term, I don't think it is going to be a
great flash of brilliance to anyone on this committee that
additional sensors and additional interceptors are going to be
requisite.
What we can't answer to you right now is sort of, what is
the upper end, what is the total cost? And we hope, once we get
through these studies that I promised the chairman, I would
look forward to coming back in the April timeframe to discuss
with you, it will start to give us that answer. But in the near
term, certainly, interceptors and sensors is the key, and every
one of the combatant commanders is screaming for more.
Mr. Frank. General O'Reilly, let me take off of a comment
that you made related to ICBMs. Obviously we are hoping that
Iran is not going to be in a position to have ICBMs any time in
the next few days. But given that concern, with the SM-3
capability and given that SM-3 at least at this point is sea-
based, when do you anticipate an ability to intercept ICBMs
coming to America from Iran?
I realize that is pretty fundamental. But when do you
anticipate that? I know there is no way to anticipate when they
will have them. But when would you anticipate being able to, if
it is just one--I know the raid issue is always a second
question--but if it is just one ICBM coming from Tehran to New
York, when we would be able to, with high likelihood, be able
to intercept that? I know that is still a redundant coverage,
but when we would be able to gain that redundant coverage?
General O'Reilly. Sir, due to the number of interceptors
which we have, the probability will be well over in the high
nineties today of the GMD system being able to intercept that
today. Again, our calculations along the same line say the
number would have to be greater than seven, simultaneously
launched, to start lowering that. And that is today.
Mr. Franks. I am aware of that. But that is our GMD here.
General O'Reilly. For the SM-3, I believe your question was
for the SM-3 IIB.
Mr. Franks. I am talking about redundant coverage in
Europe.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. For the SM-3 IIB, our plans
that--we, again, are in a competition to have companies come in
and propose--but using historical plans, our first flight
testing will be in 2016, and that is a significant indicator of
the integration of the missile and its performance and how it
performs with the Aegis system.
Unlike other missile systems, the Aegis system is already
our backbone. So we can focus on just the missile development
and, way before that, our ground systems and ground testing.
But the first flight testing would be 2016.
Mr. Franks. So potentially as early as 2017, 2018, we would
have redundant protection over and above our GMD on shore--or I
should say at Vandenberg and Fort Greely--we would have
redundant protection from a potential ICBM coming from Iran as
early as 2018?
General O'Reilly. Sir, during that period of time, during
2017, 2018, 2019, that is when we have our prototype missiles
that we are testing. The actual production missiles, the plan
is for 2020. That gives us four years of flight testing besides
all of the ground testing.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, sir, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Miller. Mr. Franks, Mr. Chairman, might I say
something very briefly?
Mr. Franks, when you talk about redundant capability, I
think it is important to understand that the two-stage GBI is
still a GBI. So if you have a problem such that the three-stage
ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely and Vandenberg don't
work--and that is one of the reasons you are thinking about an
independent capability--there is a high probability that that
same problem would apply to the two-stage GBI. That is one of
the big reasons why we see so much value in a different
approach with the SM-3 IIB, because it has different
phenomenology, a different set of capabilities.
You can compensate for not having a two-stage GBI by
launching more three-stage GBIs from the United States, and in
any event, you are down to very small probability differences
associated with intercept; because as General O'Reilly said,
you start with a high level with the ground-based interceptors
that we already have deployed.
Mr. Franks. Well, Mr. Chairman, I won't respond, but I hear
what you are saying. It is not exactly the direction I was
going, because I am grateful that we don't have that problem
right in front of us. But one of my concerns here for a number
of years, actually, has been the calculus that Iran makes in
moving forward with nuclear capabilities, missile capabilities,
on a number of different fronts.
To the degree that we can convince them that any effort on
their part strategically, and certainly tactically, would be
less than optimal for them, I think that is important because
it may, added to some of the other pressures that they are
dealing with, threats from Israel, threats from--probably not
us, unfortunately, but threats from Israel--you just wonder
what it will take to dissuade them. It is almost as much
psychology as it is military strategy and science. But I know
you guys are doing your best and I am grateful you are on the
job. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman. With that, this
hearing is drawing to a close. I want to thank our witnesses
for your testimony today. Most especially I want to thank you
all for your service to our Nation, particularly on this
extraordinarily difficult and complicated issue.
Obviously, the potential threats to the Nation are great.
You bear heavy weights of responsibility in making sure that we
have the most robust missile defense system in place. I can see
that we are making steady progress, although it is very
challenging, and we thank you for the work that you are doing.
This committee stands to continue to work in partnership with
you, and, again, I thank you for your great work.
With that, I want to say what a privilege it has been to
chair the subcommittee over the last two years. I had very big
shoes to fill, and I still am trying to live up to the high
standard that Secretary Tauscher has set for the subcommittee,
and we thank her for her work.
Let me say what a privilege it has been to work with Bob
DeGrasse and Kari Bingen as well, and the rest of the Armed
Services Committee staff. They are real stars on the Armed
Services Committee staff, and have put in countless hours to
make our job easier and to make sure that this committee is
providing effective oversight. We are grateful to both of you
for your service to the subcommittee.
Let me also say what a privilege again it has been to serve
with the ranking member, Mr. Turner. He and I have had a strong
partnership on this issue, these issues as well, and I
appreciated his invaluable input.
Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, could I just add, sometimes you
are thanking everyone else, but in an adversarial political
environment, sometimes it is important to say things that are
true and real. And I will tell you it has been hard to tell you
were a Democrat on this committee, because you have simply done
what you believed to be right for the country.
Mr. Langevin. You were doing so well up to that point.
Mr. Franks. But I just want you to know, I don't know how
we could have had a more reasonable, more affable, more
dedicated chairman to try to do what was right for the country,
and you certainly have my respect. I didn't vote for you, but I
wish you everything good in the world, and you certainly have
been wonderful to work with.
Mr. Langevin. Well, I thank the gentleman for his comments,
and I take the comments in the spirit with which they were
intended.
With that, again, thank you to our witnesses, and keep up
the great work. Members may have additional questions that they
will submit to you, and you are asked to respond expeditiously
in writing.
With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
December 1, 2010
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
December 1, 2010
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
December 1, 2010
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. The Congress has been deeply concerned with the
proliferation of cruise missile technology and its impact on U.S.
deployed forces. On June 16, 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates testified
before Congress that he was concerned with the ``. . . extraordinary
Chinese deployment of all manner of cruise and ballistic missiles.''
How does the Administration plan to address the threats of cruise
missiles and unmanned air systems to the land-based components of the
PAA that are focused on intercepting SRBM, MRBM and SRBM?
Dr. Miller. The Department considers cruise missiles (CMs) and
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) as part of the larger air-breathing
threat set (as opposed to the ballistic missile threat), which also
includes manned fighters and bombers. The defensive systems we have
developed (e.g., F-22, Patriot, Aegis ships, E-3), and are developing
or improving (e.g., F-35, advanced fighter radars, SM-6) will be
capable of addressing the CM and UAS threats. Additionally, some of the
systems that perform ballistic missile defense (BMD) also have an
inherent capability to defend against CMs, UAS, and other air-breathing
threats. Combatant Commander defensive plans account for the full
spectrum of air and missile threats, and allocate air defense assets
and capabilities to provide comprehensive coverage of all critical
assets including BMD elements.
Mr. Langevin. The Congress has been deeply concerned with the
proliferation of cruise missile technology and its impact on U.S.
deployed forces. On June 16, 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates testified
before Congress that he was concerned with the ``. . . extraordinary
Chinese deployment of all manner of cruise and ballistic missiles.''
How does the Administration plan to address the threats of cruise
missiles and unmanned air systems to the land-based components of the
PAA that are focused on intercepting SRBM, MRBM and SRBM?
General O'Reilly. MDA's mission does not include air-breathing
threats. However, MDA works closely with the Services and the Joint
Staff to ensure their systems are integrated with the Ballistic Missile
Defense System to the greatest extent possible.
Service capabilities that are or will be capable of addressing air-
breathing threats include systems that are currently fielded (e.g. F-
22, Patriot, Aegis ships, and E-3) and systems in development (e.g. F-
35, advanced fighter radars, and SM-6). Combatant Commander defensive
plans account for the full spectrum of air and missile threats, and
allocate air defense assets and capabilities to provide comprehensive
coverage of all critical assets including BMD elements. The Department
is confident that the air defense systems being fielded are capable of
preventing these threats from having a significant impact on our
ballistic missile defense capability.
Mr. Langevin. The Congress has been deeply concerned with the
proliferation of cruise missile technology and its impact on U.S.
deployed forces. On June 16, 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates testified
before Congress that he was concerned with the ``. . . extraordinary
Chinese deployment of all manner of cruise and ballistic missiles.''
How does the Administration plan to address the threats of cruise
missiles and unmanned air systems to the land-based components of the
PAA that are focused on intercepting SRBM, MRBM and SRBM?
Admiral Macy. The Department considers cruise missiles (CMs) and
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) as part of the larger breathing threat
set (as opposed to the ballistic missile threat), which also includes
manned fighters and bombers. The defensive systems we have developed
(e.g., F-22, Patriot, Aegis ships, E-3), and are developing or
improving (e.g., F-35, advanced fighter radars, SM-6) will be capable
of addressing the CM and UAS threats. Additionally, some of the systems
that perform ballistic missile defense (BMD) also have an inherent
capability to defend against CMs, UAS, and other breathing threats.
Combatant Commander defensive plans account for the full spectrum of
air and missile threats, and allocate air defense assets and
capabilities to provide comprehensive coverage of all critical assets
including BMD elements. The Department is confident that the air
defense systems that are being fielded will be capable of preventing
these threats from having a significant impact on our ballistic missile
defense capability.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. We understand that the Missile Defense Agency conducted
a summer study (in 2010) on the hedging strategy. Can you provide the
committee with the study results and any other detailed contingency or
hedge plans?
Dr. Miller. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) along with the support
of Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders and Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers, conducted and provided the summer study results to
the Missile Defense Executive Board. The Department can provide, at the
classified level, a summary of the results, as well as further hedge
planning to the Committee.
Mr. Turner. You've stated that the U.S. homeland is currently
protected against a threat of limited ICBM attack by 30 ground-based
interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg,
California. Discuss why it was then necessary to provide further
coverage of the United States homeland in Phase 4 of the European
Phased, Adaptive Approach? What needs/requirements are Phase 4
capabilities expected to satisfy?
Dr. Miller. Phase 4 of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach
(EPAA) provides defense in depth. The ability to put up more than one
layer of defensive capability increases the likelihood of success. The
SM-3 IIB interceptor, to be deployed in Phase 4 of the EPAA, will be
the first layer of our homeland defense system, with Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) providing the second layer. Having another
layer enhances the overall probability of intercepting intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The SM-3 IIB provides a backup if for some
reason there is a development or performance issue with the Ground-
Based Interceptors (GBIs), or a temporary outage or failure with the
Ground-based Mid-course Defense system. The SM-3 IIB design and key
components are different from that of the GBIs, which provides
additional assurance that the overall U.S. defensive system will be
able to defend the United States.
Mr. Turner. We appear to be seeing troubling new developments in
both North Korea and Iran's longer-range missile programs. Are you more
concerned today than last year about the threat of Iran and North Korea
developing and deploying an IRBM or ICBM? Do these threat developments
change your approach in any way?
Dr. Miller. The European Phased, Adaptive Approach (EPAA) includes
visible actions beginning in Phase 1, including the deployment of a
BMD-capable Aegis ship to the Mediterranean and a forward-deployed AN-
TPY2 radar in Southeastern Europe in 2011. The basing of land-based
interceptor sites in Romania (by 2015 and Poland (by 2018) provides a
more permanent and substantial posture; the signing and ratification of
the agreements to support those bases demonstrates a commitment to
missile defense that is visible to both our allies and potential
adversaries.
Mr. Turner. A former OSD Policy official testified before this
committee in March 2007 that, ``The advantage of mobility is
flexibility . . . But there is also an important advantage to ground-
based silos. That advantage is permanence . . . Both our allies and
potential adversaries will know with certainty that a missile defense
capability is in place. These missile defense assets then will be able
to both assure allies and deter and dissuade adversaries at all times
once they are fielded.'' Do you believe a permanent force presence
matters in the assurance of our allies? How does the U.S. provide that
same assurance to allies and deterrence to potential adversaries with
the European Phased, Adaptive Approach, especially since it relies on
all mobile systems in the near- and mid-term that may not be available
to deploy to Europe if allocated to other theaters?
Dr. Miller. The European Phased, Adaptive Approach (EPAA) includes
visible actions beginning in Phase 1, including the deployment of a
BMD-capable Aegis ship to the Mediterranean and a forward-deployed AN-
TPY2 radar in Southeastern Europe. In addition to these actions, NATO
decided to develop a missile defense capability to protect all NATO
European populations, territory and forces at the recent Lisbon Summit.
As the United States makes the EPAA its contribution to this NATO
effort, our Allies will know what the United States has committed to
the collective defense of the Alliance and will have a say in
operational planning. Finally, the basing commitments for the land-
based interceptors sites from Poland and Romania, along with the
signing and ratification of the agreements to support those bases,
demonstrates a commitment to missile defense that is visible to both
our allies and potential adversaries.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Miller, you credited the Bush Administration with
pursuing missile defense cooperation with Russia. Yet the Obama
Administration has criticized its predecessors for lack of such
cooperation. What is this Administration offering to Russia that you
believe could lead to Moscow's participation despite criticism from its
government officials of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach and
threats of an ``arms race'' if the U.S. improves its missile defenses?
Dr. Miller. The Obama Administration believes that missile defense
cooperation with Russia is in the national security interests of the
United States, as did the Bush Administration. We believe that our
ongoing efforts to work collaboratively with Russia in areas where both
our countries share a mutual interest has created a significantly
improved bilateral environment, and therefore an opportunity for,
bilateral and multilateral BMD cooperation.
An example of this opportunity in a multilateral context was the
agreement by NATO and Russia at the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting
in Lisbon on November 20, 2010, to resume theater missile defense
cooperation and to develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future
framework for NATO-Russia BMD cooperation.
In the context of our bilateral relationship, BMD cooperation can
be a vehicle to bring both the U.S.-Russia and the NATO-Russia
partnerships to a new level and could enable our two countries to work
together in a coordinated manner against the common challenges,
dangers, and threats of ballistic missiles of increasingly greater
ranges, potentially equipped with weapons of mass destruction.
As senior Administration officials have explained to Congress, as
well as to their Russian counterparts, the United States will not agree
to constrain or limit U.S. missile defenses qualitatively,
quantitatively, operationally, geographically, or in any other way. The
Administration is committed to the development and deployment of
effective missile defenses to protect the United States, our deployed
forces, and our allies and partners against existing and emerging
threats.
Mr. Turner. We understand that the Missile Defense Agency conducted
a summer study (in 2010) on the hedging strategy. Can you provide the
committee with the study results and any other detailed contingency or
hedge plans?
General O'Reilly. As directed in the Defense Planning and Program
Guidance (DPPG), the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) along with the
support of Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders and Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers, conducted and provided the summer
study results to the Missile Defense Executive Board. The Department
can provide, at the classified level, a summary of the results to the
Committee.
Mr. Turner. You've stated that the U.S. homeland is currently
protected against a threat of limited ICBM attack by 30 ground-based
interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg,
California. Discuss why it was then necessary to provide further
coverage of the United States homeland in Phase 4 of the European
Phased, Adaptive Approach? What needs/requirements are Phase 4
capabilities expected to satisfy?
General O'Reilly. The 2020 Phase 4 architecture adds an additional
layer of defensive capability that increases the likelihood of
engagement success against evolving and projected ICBM threats from the
Middle East. The interceptor's reliability, availability, and
probability the kill vehicle can acquire and engage a target are all
factors in the probability of engagement success. Also, as independent
BMD systems are layered, the probability of engagement success
increases. The SM-3 IIB interceptor comprises the first layer of our
homeland defense system, proving early intercept, and the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense provides the second layer which enhances the overall
probability of intercepting ICBMs with two different missile defense
systems. In addition, by having two independent BMD components, the
system is made more flexible and adaptable to changes in threat missile
designs and capabilities.
The development of the SM-3 IIB interceptor with a higher burnout
velocity and a greater divert capability than other SM-3 variants
provides an early intercept capability against MRBMs and IRBMs and a
hedge to augment homeland defense against future potential ICBMs
launched by today's regional adversaries. Early intercept capabilities
enhance battlespace with an extended engagement layer that avoids
wasteful salvos by shooting an interceptor, evaluating the consequence,
and shooting again only if the first intercept attempt was
unsuccessful. Intercepting missiles early (pre-apogee) also degrades
performance of midcourse countermeasures and counters post-apogee
maneuvering reentry vehicles.
Mr. Turner. We appear to be seeing troubling new developments in
both North Korea and Iran's longer-range missile programs. Are you more
concerned today than last year about the threat of Iran and North Korea
developing and deploying an IRBM or ICBM? Do these threat developments
change your approach in any way?
General O'Reilly. We currently have a Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system that can provide significant capability against limited
ICBM attacks against all near-term estimated threats. We continue to
upgrade the system to ensure we maintain the capability hedge.
Mr. Turner. You noted in your testimony that the Missile Defense
Agency supported multiple interoperability demonstrations with NATO's
Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD). Can you
elaborate on what these demonstrations have shown in terms of
capability, interoperability, lessons learned, etc.? Also, provide a
schedule and milestones for ALTBMD plans, including the integration of
U.S. missile defense capabilities.
General O'Reilly. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been working
with the ALTBMD Program Office (PO) for the last four years to document
U.S.-NATO interoperability requirements in Interface Control Documents
(ICDs) and to test and demonstrate interoperability between U.S. and
NATO missile defense systems.
The MDA has participated in the following missile defense
demonstrations, tests, and exercises with NATO and Alliance partners:
January 2008: Initial interoperability demonstration between the
U.S. Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC)
System and a prototype of the NATO Air Command and Control System
(ACCS).
November 2008: Interoperability test between the U.S. Patriot
system and a prototype of the NATO ACCS.
January 2009: Interoperability test between the U.S. Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) system and a prototype of the
NATO ACCS.
August 2009: Interoperability test between the U.S. C2BMC system
and a simulation of the Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance-2
(AN/TPY-2) system with a prototype of the NATO ACCS.
July 2010: Joint Project Optic Windmill (JPOW), a warfighter
exercise involving the mixture of simulated, hardware-in-the-loop
(HWIL), and live systems from the U.S., NATO, Germany, Spain, and The
Netherlands. This event focused on the development of joint Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).
December 2010: NATO Ensemble Test 1, the first multinational
interoperability test conducted by NATO with participation from the
U.S., Germany, Italy, France, and The Netherlands. The U.S. systems
involved in this test were live and HWIL representations of C2BMC,
Aegis BMD, Patriot, and a simulation of AN/TPY-2. The NATO systems
participating in the test were live versions of the ACCS prototype and
Integrated Command and Control (ICC) that will be deployed as part of
the NATO Interim Capability-2 (InCa2) at the end of December 2010.
The tests and exercises with NATO have proven the U.S. C2BMC & AN/
TPY-2, Patriot, and Aegis BMD systems can interoperate with the NATO
command and control systems and other Alliance systems using
standardized Tactical Data Links communications (Link-16). The tests
successfully demonstrated the two-way exchange of situational
awareness, command and control, health and status, and engagement
information between the U.S. and NATO systems.
The emerging results from Ensemble Test 1 indicate the U.S. systems
will also be interoperable using Link-16 with the German Patriot and
Surface-to-Air Missiles Operations Center (SAMOC), the French Sol-Air
Moyenne Portee Terrestre (SAMP/T), the Italian SAMP/T and Horizon/
Principal Anti-Air Missile System (Horizon/PAAMS), and the Dutch
Patriot and Air Defense and Command Frigate (ADCF).
MDA, the ALTBMD PO, and military operators from the U.S. European
Command (EUCOM) and NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE) successfully demonstrated during the JPOW exercise that the
U.S. and NATO interoperability can support a variety of command and
control Concept of Operations (CONOPs), preplanned engagement
strategies, and upper-tier/lower-tier coordination schemes that are
still being developed and agreed upon between the U.S. and NATO.
The MDA and ALTBMD PO have also conducted a series of planning
experiments to Demonstrate that military operators from NATO and the
U.S. can exchange missile defense plans using a NATO approach for
missile defense operations. As a result of these experiments, the MDA
is currently working with NATO to revise the Interface Control
Documents and implementation for the exchange of missile defense
planning data. The revised approach is more collaborative and will
reflect the planning method used by U.S. forces today.
ALTBMD Program Office made Interim Capability-2 (InCa-2) available
for operations in December 2010, Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) Increment-1 in 2013 and IOC Increment-2 in late 2014. The first
NATO
upper-tier capability is projected in approximately 2016. The figure
below
illustrates the draft milestones for the interoperability of U.S.
Phased, Adaptive
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Mr. Turner. Given the recent in-sourcing initiatives, and DoD
proposals of trimming a percentage of contracting positions, what is
the current MDA in-sourcing plan? How will the plan address personnel
shortfalls and address the risks associated with the potential shortage
of technical expertise?
General O'Reilly. During the course of FY 2010 MDA established and
filled 237 civilian authorizations as a result of insourcing actions.
The continuation of insourcing beyond FY 2010 will be subject to the
Department's final guidance for the 2012 President's Budget.
MDA policy also requires each employee to conduct, at a minimum, 80
hours of mandatory annual training. Functional Managers and supervisors
develop and issue functional organizational training objectives and
career guides to ensure a fully trained MDA workforce. Each level of
supervision requires a commitment to develop employee skills and
competencies needed to maintain effective job performance, taking into
account present and future technical skills by employment category.
Supervisors work with employees to develop Individual Development Plans
that encompass a short-term, mid-term and long-term career development
guide that is subject to supervisor approval, and included as part of
the employee process evaluation. MDA employees are required to obtain
annual certification for various skill sets and occupational fields.
For example, as an acquisition centric agency, MDA requires employees
to obtain Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Certification. DAU
certification is a tiered program with levels one through three based
on a combination of experience and responsibility.
MDA has also established the Missile Defense Career Development
Program (MDCDP) to ensure we have a workforce with technical expertise
to meet emergent program requirements. The MDCDP is a two-year
developmental program consisting of rotational assignments aimed at
strengthening the overall experience of the participant and preparing
them for conversion to a permanent government career upon completion.
MDA presently has 279 participants in the MDCDP.
MDA has significant technical expert resources (FFRDCs, UARs, CCS,
universities, industry, national labs). We continue to align the
application of this significant technical expertise to meet challenges
while continuing to seek greater efficiency.
Mr. Turner. We understand that the Missile Defense Agency conducted
a summer study (in 2010) on the hedging strategy. Can you provide the
committee with the study results and any other detailed contingency or
hedge plans?
Admiral Macy. We must defer this question to the Missile Defense
Agency, as the study results are classified and MDA has responsibility
for access.
Mr. Turner. Admiral Macy, please provide the committee with any
analysis and contingency plans for defense of the U.S. homeland under
the following scenarios: 1) where the missile fields in Alaska are not
able to shoot, 2) where the missile fields in California are not able
to shoot, or 3) one of the upgraded early-warning radars (e.g., at
Fylingdales or Thule) are not operational.
Admiral Macy. Specific contingency plans are more appropriately the
purview of the combatant commander, and the Joint Staff would defer to
U.S. Northern Command on this topic. However, as a general
developmental principle, the Ballistic Missile Defense System is
designed to provide backup capability for scenarios such as those
described.
Mr. Turner. You've stated that the U.S. homeland is currently
protected against a threat of limited ICBM attack by 30 ground based
interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg,
California. Discuss why it was then necessary to provide further
coverage of the United States homeland in Phase 4 of the European
Phased, Adaptive Approach? What needs/requirements are Phase 4
capabilities expected to satisfy?
Admiral Macy. Phase 4 of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach
(EPAA) addresses several requirements. The first is redundancy. The
ability to put up more than one layer of defensive capability increases
the likelihood of success. The SM-3 IIB interceptor, to be deployed in
Phase 4 of the EPAA, will be the first layer of our homeland defense
system, with Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) providing the second
layer to enhance the overall probability of intercepting
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Second, having an
additional capability against an ICBM threat to the homeland provides a
backup if for some reason there is a development or performance issue
with the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), or a temporary outage or
failure of one of the systems. Third, the SM-3 IIB design is different
from that of the GBIs, which provides additional assurance that the
system will be able to respond effectively to changes in threat missile
designs or capabilities. Finally, the additional interceptors in Europe
will allow us to engage raids of larger size should the growth of the
threat inventory exceed current projections.
Mr. Turner. We appear to be seeing troubling new developments in
both North Korea and Iran's longer-range missile programs. Are you more
concerned today than last year about the threat of Iran and North Korea
developing and deploying an IRBM or ICBM? Do these threat developments
change your approach in any way?
Admiral Macy. We continue to watch North Korea and Iran closely,
but there have been no developments that have necessitated significant
changes to the planned development of the U.S. Ballistic Missile
Defense Systems (BMDS). Because of continuing improvements in the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and the number of ground-
based interceptors now deployed compared to potential North Korean and
Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States
possesses a capability to counter the projected threat from North Korea
and Iran for the foreseeable future. With regard to deployment of BMD
assets, the essence of a phased, adaptive approach to regional missile
defense is the flexibility to phase our fielding to improvements in BMD
capability, and to be adaptive to changes in the threat.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Miller credited the Bush Administration with
pursuing missile defense cooperation with Russia. Yet the Obama
Administration has criticized its predecessors for lack of such
cooperation. What is this Administration offering to Russia that you
believe could lead to Moscow's participation despite criticism from its
government officials of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach and
threats of an ``arms race'' if the U.S. improves its missile defenses?
Mr. Rose. The Obama Administration believes that missile defense
cooperation with Russia is in the national security interests of the
United States, as did the Bush Administration.
The Administration is optimistic about the prospects for ballistic
missile defense (BMD) cooperation with Russia. We believe that our
ongoing efforts to work collaboratively with Russia in areas where both
our countries share a mutual interest has created a significantly
improved bilateral environment, and therefore an opportunity for,
bilateral and multilateral BMD cooperation.
An example of this opportunity in a multilateral context was the
agreement by NATO and Russia at the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting
in Lisbon on November 20, 2010, to resume theater missile defense
cooperation and to develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future
framework for NATO-Russia BMD cooperation.
In the context of our bilateral relationship, the Administration's
view is that BMD cooperation may well be a vehicle to bring both the
U.S.-Russia and the NATO-Russia partnerships to a new level and could
enable our two countries to work together in a coordinated manner
against the common challenges, dangers, and threats of ballistic
missiles of increasingly greater ranges, potentially equipped with
weapons of mass destruction.
As senior Administration officials have explained to Congress, as
well as to their Russian counterparts, the United States will not agree
to constrain or limit U.S. missile defenses qualitatively,
quantitatively, operationally, geographically, or in any other way. The
Administration is committed to the development and deployment of
effective missile defenses to protect the United States, our deployed
forces, and our allies and partners against existing and emerging
threats.
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