[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-71]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY SPACE AND MISSILE
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 21, 2009
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey California
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
Bob DeGrasse, Professional Staff Member
Frank Rose, Professional Staff Member
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Zach Steacy, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, May 21, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Request for National Security Space
and Missile Defense Programs................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, May 21, 2009........................................... 41
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 21, 2009
FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California,
Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee........................ 1
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee.................................. 3
WITNESSES
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command,
U.S. Department of Defense..................................... 6
O'Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense
Agency, U.S. Department of Defense............................. 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert....................................... 45
O'Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J................................. 63
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Franks................................................... 119
Mr. Turner................................................... 119
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 126
Mr. Turner................................................... 125
FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, May 21, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:03 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Ms. Tauscher. Good afternoon.
This hearing of the Strategic Forces subcommittee will come
to order.
Today the subcommittee will receive testimony on the
President's fiscal year (FY) 2010 budget request for national
security space and missile defense programs.
Traditionally, this subcommittee would have held separate
hearings on both of these topics. After all, unclassified
national security space programs account for over $11 billion
of the President's request, and the total request for ballistic
missile defense (BMD) programs tops $9.3 billion.
Unfortunately, the timing of the budget submission and the
committee's legislative schedule have made it impossible to
hold two separate hearings before our markup. That said, the
good news is that the subcommittee has held four hearings and
two briefings on specific aspects of these programs already
this year.
Appearing before the committee this afternoon are two well-
known witnesses. Both of them are well equipped to address
these two major elements of the President's defense budget.
First, General Robert Kehler, the Commander of Air Force
Space Command (AFSPC), will address the national security space
aspects of the budget.
Second, Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, Director of
the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), will discuss the missile
defense budget request.
I want to thank both of our distinguished witnesses for
appearing before the subcommittee today. And I especially want
to thank, on behalf of the committee, all of the men and women
that serve with you both in the military and the civilian
ranks, and especially the people sitting right behind you, who
I know have worked very hard on this testimony that you have
submitted well before the deadline, and we very much appreciate
how comprehensive it is.
But you certainly represent the Services that have the most
people involved in these programs. They are very excellent
people, and they are very patriotic Americans. And we want you
to please extend to them, on behalf of this committee, our very
heartfelt thanks for their service.
Before turning to our witnesses, I would like to briefly
identify some of the key issues we hope the witnesses will
address in the course of their testimony today.
National security space systems provide a wide variety of
capabilities to our warfighters by offering global access,
unhindered by geographic or political boundaries and
unrestricted by surface or air defenses. While the funding
requests for most major space programs remains consistent with
past plans, the fiscal year 2010 request contains several
significant programmatic shifts.
First, it recommends terminating the Transformational
Communications Satellite System, or TSAT, program. Second, it
expands funding for other military satellite communications
systems. And, finally, the request provides a significant
increase for Space Situational Awareness (SSA) programs.
During the past decade, most national security space
programs have experienced significant cost increases and
schedule delays.
General Kehler, I would ask you to discuss how the budget
before us today will help deliver satellite systems in a more
timely and cost-effective manner. More specifically, what are
the Administration's plans for ensuring that the warfighter
will have sufficient, protected communication bandwidth in the
next decade after the termination of the TSAT program, and what
will happen with the engineering and technical talent who have
focused on this problem?
The subcommittee has also focused significant attention on
the vulnerability of space-based systems in recent years. In
that regard, General Kehler, how will the budget before us
address the increasing vulnerability of our satellite system?
Turning to the issue of missile defense, Secretary Gates
has incorporated key decisions into the budget that, in my
view, refocus the program to its original purpose and to the
most pressing threats to the security of the United States and
our deployed troops and allies.
In 1999, Congress passed, and the President signed, House
Resolution (H.R.) 4. That law established the policy of the
United States to, ``Deploy, as soon as technologically
possible, an effective national missile defense system capable
of defending the territory of the United States against limited
ballistic missile attack, whether accidental, unauthorized, or
deliberate.''
Secretary Gates announced three decisions to refocus the
program on their original goals and to address the most
pressing threats.
First, he has proposed capping the deployment of long-range
missile defense interceptors deployed in Alaska and California
at 30, arguing that these 30 interceptors would be more than
sufficient to counter rogue threats or unauthorized launches
for the foreseeable future.
Second, he proposed cancelling three programs: the Multiple
Kill Vehicle (MKV), the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), and
the second Airborne Laser (ABL) prototype aircraft. These are
programs that have been pursued to counter long-range missile
threats that could develop in the future. Each has experienced
technical challenges and some are unlikely to be cost effective
if deployed.
Finally, the secretary has recommended a $900 million
increase in funding for theater missile defense programs, such
as the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and the Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System. This decision will
better protect our deployed forces, allies, and friends against
the existing short- and medium-range ballistic missile threat,
and it is consistent with the demands of our combatant
commanders for more interceptors for theater defense.
General O'Reilly, in the course of your testimony today,
could you describe how the Secretary reached these decisions?
Were you consulted in the decision-making process? Did the
Missile Defense Agency recommend these actions? And do you have
any reservations about the Secretary's decision?
As we dig into the details of the budget, I would also like
to hear about your new plans for exploring ascent phase
intercept technologies to hedge against more complicated
threats in the future.
With that, let me turn to my good friend, the distinguished
ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Turner, of Ohio, for
any comments he may make.
Mr. Turner.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO,
RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate your
holding this hearing and, of course, your continued leadership
in this.
And I have been assured by staff that even though we all
know that you are awaiting confirmation by the State Department
that that process will continue and you will continue to chair
our subcommittee.
I want to ensure that we get ample time to be able to
congratulate you in another hearing just prior to your
departure. So, please ensure that we get that opportunity, and
we know we do not have to do it today.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. But thank you for your leadership.
Well, we have two very thoughtful and accomplished military
leaders with us today, General Kehler, General O'Reilly.
Welcome back. Thank you for appearing before the subcommittee.
Thank you for your leadership. You are both experts in your
field, and we thank you for your contributions to our national
security.
We have an unusual task before us today. In a single
hearing, we must cover two broad areas, space and missile
defense, that under normal circumstances could equally merit
their own hearing.
We also have an unusual budget request to consider this
year. During last week's full committee hearing with the
Secretary of Defense, we heard of profound changes in the
budget that not only occurred outside the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) process, but were arrived at without what appears
to be a commensurate level of rigorous analysis.
As our full committee Ranking Member, Mr. McHugh, said,
``the only unifying theme in this year's budget is that the
aggregate fits within the top line.'' This appears to be an apt
description of the missile defense budget this year.
During our recent subcommittee hearing on the nuclear
security budget request, we learned that major program
decisions at the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) would not be made until the completion of the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR). Yet, over in the Department of Defense
(DOD), sweeping missile defense decisions have been made ahead
of the QDR and prior to the Administration's completion of its
missile defense policy and strategy review. By making such
decisions now, is the Department prejudicing the outcome of
these reviews?
We just observed yesterday a determined Iran test of its
200-kilometer, solid-fuel Sejil-2 ballistic missile that Iran's
president suggested was linked to its ongoing nuclear program.
There is a clear desire by some actors to emphasize the
development of longer-range missiles. How good is our
intelligence?
We know short-range systems well. In many cases, they are
based on decades-old technology. What concerns me, however, is
our level of knowledge about rogue nations' longer-range
systems. This detailed intelligence information is critical to
having effective missile defenses. When such uncertainties
exist, one usually compensates with increased margins and more
diversification, not less.
Given this growing threat, I am puzzled by the Department's
decision to: stop deployment of ground-based interceptors (GBI)
at 30 rather than 44, reduce the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) program by 35 percent, and curb its development. I have
not seen any analysis or formal force structure requirements to
justify this decision, nor have I seen any changes in the
Intelligence Communities' (IC) threat assessment that would
indicate a decreasing threat.
Furthermore, what are we to make of the disconnect between
Secretary Gates' testimony that the Department will, ``Continue
to robustly fund research and development'' of GMD to improve
its capability, and MDA's budget overview, which states, ``We
intend to . . . curtail additional GMD development''?
MDA's budget overview also calls for rigorous testing,
which I agree with. But I do not see more GMD flight testing in
fiscal year 2010. I hope today we can address these basic
questions.
We have also been induced to a new concept this year:
Ascent Phase Intercept. It sounds promising, but it also sounds
a lot like parts of boost and parts of midcourse. I would like
a better understanding of what this entails. It would seem
risky to move away from ABL, KEI, and MKV for this, as yet,
unproven concept. General O'Reilly, I would ask you to address
what gives you confidence that Ascent Phase Intercept is more
technically feasible, effective, and affordable?
During our last missile defense hearing, we reviewed an
independent study on MDA's roles and missions requested by this
committee. It recommended that MDA's mission should be
refocused on research, development, test and evaluation
(RDT&E), and that science and technology (S&T) should receive
renewed emphasis and increased funding. However, I am hard-
pressed to find such emphasis in this year's budget. How does
MDA advance our missile defense technologies and foster
innovation and ingenuity when net reductions are made in future
capabilities like ABL, KEI, MKV, and the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System (STSS)? I am unconvinced that a $126
million decrease in Special Programs adequately captures what
we lose with the nearly $1 billion cut to future capabilities.
There is one area in the budget where Congress did see
rigorous analysis. In previous hearings, we noted a Joint Staff
study which had recommended increasing the inventory of Aegis
and THAAD interceptors. The budget request is responsive to
these requirements, and I am pleased with that. However, the
Joint Staff study only looked at these two systems. How do we
know the force-structure requirements for other missile defense
elements? Also, why does an increase in Aegis and THAAD have to
come at the expense of GMD and European missile defense systems
designed to protect the U.S. homeland and our allies?
Looking across the $1.2 billion cut to MDA, I believe that
we have been presented with a number of false, either-or
choices. We can do better.
In contrast, the budget request for space appears
relatively balanced. Important acquisition programs, such as
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), Wideband Global
Satellite (WGS), Global Positioning System (GPS), Space-Based
Infrared System (SBIRS), and National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) are
provided with stable funding. The only substantial change is
the TSAT termination.
The Air Force decided instead to fund two more additional
AEHF satellites and one WGS satellite, and acknowledged the
importance of sustaining the industrial base. However, these
three satellites are not a long-term solution to addressing the
military's increasing communications requirements. Without
insight into out-year plans and funding, I find it difficult to
have confidence that the Air Force has adequately committed to,
and budgeted for, these capabilities.
The budget requests for Space Situational Awareness, SSA,
has doubled. It appears a large portion of this increase is
allocated to the Joint Space Operation Center (JSpOC).
General Kehler, I would like to better understand the
Department's effort to improve SSA, space protection, and our
space intelligence capabilities. Additionally, can you discuss
why Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) is on the Air Force
Unfunded Priorities List (UPL)?
Lastly, Air Force Space Command is in a state of
transition. Can you discuss the status and challenges of
divesting your nuclear mission and inheriting the cyber
mission?
On a final note, I would like to acknowledge the men and
women serving in the organizations you lead. These are two
worthy fields to have a career in, and we are proud of their
service and accomplishments.
Thank you, Madam Chair, for presiding over this important
hearing. We look forward to the testimony of the witnesses.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
We will begin with General Kehler.
We have received your prepared statement in advance and it
will be entered into the record. We welcome your remarks.
General, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General Kehler. Well, Madam Chairwoman and Representative
Turner, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a real
honor for me to appear before you today both as an Airman and
as the Commander of Air Force Space Command.
Thanks very much for your continued support, not only for
the United States Air Force, but for the capabilities that we
contribute to the Joint Force.
I will certainly take the words that you have given us
today about your appreciation for the service of the men and
women of the military across the board, specifically Air Force
Space Command. I will take that back.
And Madam Chairwoman and the rest of the members of the
subcommittee, I know you know this, but that resonates with
them and they deeply appreciate that when they hear from the
representatives of the American people, the appreciation of the
American people. So thank you for those words, and I will
definitely take those back.
It is also a great pleasure for me to appear with the
Director of the Missile Defense Agency. I am very proud to lead
39,000 active duty Guard and Reserve Airmen, government
civilians, and contractors who contribute to our Nation's
strategic deterrence, and who deliver persistent, space-based
capabilities to America and its warfighting commands around the
globe.
Our mission is to provide an integrated constellation of
space and cyberspace capabilities at the speed of need. All
over the world, as we sit here today, in space operations
units, in space launch and range facilities, in missile alert
facilities, in acquisition centers, and of course, in our
forward-deployed locations around the world, the men and women
of Air Force Space Command are proud and pleased to be
answering their Nation's call.
Our Airmen are focused on three main areas.
First and foremost, we operate, secure, and maintain our
Nation's land-based strategic deterrent, with perfection as the
standard. Second, we assure access to space, protect our
freedom of action in space, and provide joint warfighting
capabilities from space. And, finally, we are improving
cyberspace capabilities by establishing an operational
Cyberspace Command, which will be designated 24th Air Force, to
meet the demands of the 21st-century national security
environment.
Today's Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast
Guardsmen navigate with accuracy, communicate with certainty,
strike with precision, and see the battlefield more clearly
because of space-based capabilities.
It is our job to put those capabilities directly into their
hands, and we are constantly mindful of those joint team
members who are in harm's way.
We are very proud of our accomplishments. We have a long
string of successful launches. We are exceeding performance
standards in critical operations areas like GPS, satellite
communications, weather support, and missile warning.
But we are very much aware of where we need to improve: We
need to get better at acquisition; we need to restore the
nuclear enterprise; and, we need to deliver new capabilities to
the joint team on time. We also understand clearly our
important role across the spectrum of Joint Operations, from
routine activities, to irregular warfare, to deterring major
conflict with regional power.
The demand for space capabilities is going up. At the same
time, the threats and challenges in this operational domain are
increasing. The fiscal year 2010 budget continues our progress
in a number of key investment areas. You have pointed out some
of those already.
It continues our assured access to space. It helps improve
our situational awareness, and our space protection. And it
continues modernization of GPS, our satellite communications
systems, missile warning, operational responsiveness, and other
areas.
If there is a thought that I could leave you with, it is
this one: Make no mistake about it, the men and women of Air
Force Space Command, and the men and women of the United States
Air Force are in today's fight every minute of every day.
We thank you for your past support. We look forward to
continuing the discussions that we have been having over the
last several months. And I stand ready to answer your
questions; happy to take them on whenever you are ready, and I
was diligent, I think, in taking notes, so I am ready to go
whenever you are.
Thanks for having us today.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in
the Appendix on page 45.]
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much, General Kehler.
General O'Reilly, we have received your prepared statement
in advance and it has been entered into the record. We welcome
your remarks.
General O'Reilly, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. PATRICK J. O'REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR,
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General O'Reilly. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman,
Congressman Turner, other distinguished members of the
committee. It is an honor to testify before you today on the
proposed fiscal year 2010 budget for the Department of
Defense's missile defense program.
During fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 to date, the
Missile Defense Agency has achieved many accomplishments in the
development of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS),
including the execution of successful Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)
Block IA, and Standard Missile-3 Block IV interceptor salvo
flight test; the delivery of 28 additional SM-3 Block IA
interceptors, including deliveries to Japan; a Ground-based
Midcourse Defense intercept utilizing the entire sensor and
command and control (C2) suite deployed in the Pacific in
placement of two other ground-based interceptors and
refurbishment of two other ground-based interceptors at Fort
Greely, Alaska.
Deployment of the----
Ms. Tauscher. General O'Reilly, can you pull the mic a
little closer to you please?
Thank you.
General O'Reilly. Deployment of an Army Navy/Transportable
Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2) radar to Israel, the execution of
an experiment involving the closest data collect to date of a
boosting missile from a satellite, the safe destruction of a
malfunctioning U.S. satellite, repeated demonstrations of the
Atmospheric Laser Beam Compensation during the Airborne Laser
flights, delivery of the first Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense, or THAAD, unit for testing, three THAAD intercepts,
including the launching of a salvo of two THAAD interceptors
using the operational firing doctrine.
Earlier this month, we also successfully placed in orbit
the Space Tracking and Surveillance System Advanced Technology
Risk Reduction (STSS ATRR) satellite to serve as a pathfinder
for the next generation space-sensor technology.
However, in addition to our successes, we also faced
challenges developing the BMDS. During fiscal year 2008 and
fiscal year 2009 to date, we experienced nine significant
flight test delays, four target failures out of 18 target
launches, and one interceptor failure in flight. These and
other contributing factors have resulted in a $264 million cost
growth and, further, we have incurred over $252 million in
unplanned costs and 25 weeks of schedule revisions due to
unplanned operational deployments of our systems under
development.
In response to those challenges, we have worked with our
leadership and stakeholders to engage our management oversight,
strengthen our relationship with the warfighting community, and
improve BMDS acquisition and test planning.
We have adopted a series of initiatives to improve
acquisition and oversight of the contracts we will award over
the next 18 months. I am also signing Memorandums of Agreement
(MOA) with the Services to institutionalize the Missile Defense
Agency and Service's roles and responsibilities for development
and sustainment and fielding of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System.
In fiscal year 2010, we are proposing approximately $7.8
billion for missile defense in response to Secretary Gates'
guidance. As Secretary Gates announced on April 6th, this
budget was the result of a holistic assessment of capabilities,
requirements, and risk and needs.
For the purpose of meeting the Secretary's vision to
institutionalize and enhance our capabilities, to enhance the
wars we are in today, and the scenarios we are most likely to
face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a
hedge against other risks and contingencies.
The Secretary further said we will restructure the program
to focus on rogue-state and theater-missile threats.
Today, there are 5,900 ballistic missiles and hundreds of
launchers in countries other than the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), China, Russia, or the U.S.; 93 percent, or
5,500 of those missiles, are short-range ballistic missiles,
with ranges less than 1,000 kilometers.
Six percent, or 350, are medium-range ballistic missiles
with ranges between 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers. And less than
one percent are Intermediate, or Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles, or ICBMs.
Both Iran and North Korea are showing significant progress
in developing ICBM technology, but their number of launch
complexes which exist limits the number of missiles they can
simultaneously launch.
I assess the technical risk is low that 30 fully
operational ground-based interceptors, or GBIs, and silos is a
sufficient number to counter the simultaneously launched rogue-
nation ICBMs over the next decade. Additionally, indications
are early and prominent if the number of rogue-nation ICBM
launch complexes increases.
Although we are proposing to limit the number of GBIs and
silos to 30, we are storing additional silos, and we are
continuing the production of the remaining 14 GBIs on contract
to maintain the ability to produce additional GBIs for testing,
refurbishment, future upgrades, and to allow programmatic
flexibility to respond to the Quadrennial Defense Review, the
congressionally mandated Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and
other policy direction.
In contrast to our rogue-nation ICBM defense, I assess the
technical risk is considerably higher that the previously
planned inventory of theater missile defense interceptors and
units can be overwhelmed by the large number of short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles today.
Thus, to better protect our forces, allies, and friends
from short and medium ballistic missile attack, we propose to
add $700 million to field more Theater High Altitude Area
Defense and Standard Missile-3 interceptors. We also propose to
add $200 million over three years to fund the conversion of six
additional Aegis ships to ballistic missile defense
capabilities.
Furthermore, as a hedge against further advanced threats,
we propose $368 million to leverage our emerging missile
defense force structure and accelerate the development of
capability to destroy missiles at all ranges in the highly
advantageous early phases of flight.
To more effectively hedge against future threats, we
propose to cancel the second Airborne Laser, or ABL, prototype
aircraft, terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle, or MKV, and
Kinetic Interceptor, or KEI, programs in lieu of more
operationally efficient, alternative technology architectures.
We will continue the research and development effort with
the existing ABL aircraft, including the first attempted shoot-
down of a ballistic missile this fall, to address affordability
and technology issues while addressing the program's proposed
operational role.
The MKV technology program was established to address
complex countermeasures by identifying to destroying all lethal
objects in a cluster using a single interceptor. The MKV was in
the early stages of a long development process extending until
2018, and required significant research and development and
very immature technology.
We plan to transfer the knowledge gained from MKV to our
kill vehicle technology base. As stated previously, destroying
missiles earlier in flight before countermeasures can be
deployed is the better hedge against advance future threats
than trying to kill all the countermeasures after they have
been deployed.
The original KEI mission grew from a boost-phase-only
mission to a boost and midcourse mission. The development
schedule grew from 5.5 years to 12-14 years, depending on the
spirals. Program costs grew from $4.6 billion to $8.9 billion,
and the missile average unit production cost grew from $25
million to over $50 million per interceptor.
Technology issues delayed the first booster flight test
date by over a year, and we assess the probability of this
flight test occurring this year as very unlikely.
Additionally, KEI size limits its ability to be
operationally deployed without dramatic changes to our military
infrastructure and significant reduction of our firepower.
Affordability and government requirements growth, not
contractor performance, was the main contributor to KEI's
execution problems.
Given the above facts, and only 15 percent of the $8.9
billion worth of contract until 2018 had been accomplished, the
Secretary of Defense terminated the KEI program. Recently, KEI
contractors indicated they can complete their flight tests by
the end of September 2009, in a manner that accommodates our
legal liabilities for program termination. I will assess their
proposal.
Like MKV, we will review the KEI products and expertise
developed to date to determine follow-on applications to
Ascent-Phase Intercept mission. The Missile Defense Agency,
Joint Staff, combatant commanders, armed services have
intensified their collaboration on the development of the
missile defense capabilities and budgets.
As announced by Secretary Gates in response to the
warfighters' priorities, we are making ballistic missile
defense more affordable and effective by: one, reshaping our
program to enhance protection of our deployed forces, allies,
and friends against existing threats; two, continue to develop
and maintain the Ground-based Midcourse Defense capability to
defeat a limited, long-range, rogue-state attack or accidental
launch against the United States; and three, prepare to
leverage emerging Ascent-Phase Intercept technologies to hedge
against the threat growth and realize the greatest potential
for reducing cost and increasing operational effectiveness of
missile defense.
The rationale is based, in part, on a Defense Science Board
(DSB) study in 2002 which emphasized the benefit of Ascent-
Phase Intercepts. The study noted that the technological and
operational challenges of intercepting threat missiles in the
ascent phase, the phase after powered flight and prior to
apogee, is significantly less challenging than boost phase.
Ascent-Phase Intercept would allow us to intercept early in
the battle space and optimize our ability to execute a shoot-
look-shoot tactic and defeat the threat before countermeasures
are deployed, minimal potential impact of debris, and reducing
the number of interceptors required to defeat a raid of threat
missiles.
With this budget, we will also continue to execute to the
fullest extent of the law, the upper-tier European capability
program to counter long-range attacks from Iran. We will
execute a rigorous test program to build the confidence of the
U.S. and allied stakeholders in the BMDS, bolster deterrence
against their use, and send a powerful message to potential
adversaries looking to acquire ballistic missiles; thus,
testing figures prominently in our proposed budget of fiscal
year 2010.
Furthermore, we are collaborating with the service
Operational Test Agencies (OTAs) and the support of the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) to
restructure our test program, to improve confidence in the
missile defense capabilities under development, and ensure the
capabilities transferred to the warfighter are operationally
effective, suitable, and survivable.
In conclusion, the proposed fiscal year 2010 budget
rebalances the development of our missile defenses to improve
our ability to meet the threats we face today and provide a
cost- and operationally-effective hedge against future
ballistic missile threats facing our deployed forces, allies,
friends, and our homeland.
I greatly appreciate your support for the opportunity to
testify today. I request that I submit the remainder of the
statement in writing for the record, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
And, ma'am, and, sir, I greatly appreciate, also, your
compliments to our workforce that works tirelessly to deliver
this capability.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General O'Reilly can be found in
the Appendix on page 63.]
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much, General O'Reilly.
General Kehler, I am going to begin the questioning with my
first question.
As you know, the National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System, or NPOESS, program has
experienced serious schedule and cost problems. The estimated
launch date for the first satellite has slipped by over three
years to 2014 and the total program cost has grown from $6.5 to
$13.5 billion. And according to what our staff is hearing, the
tri-agency acquisition arrangement between DOD, NASA, and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is
largely dysfunctional.
What are your thoughts about how the Nation should proceed
in the acquisition of new weather satellites?
General Kehler. Thanks, Madam Chairwoman.
First of all, the requirement to provide weather data, both
of the Earth and the Earth's atmosphere, and of the space
environment every day, from a combatant commander perspective,
remains very high. Very important for our troops to understand
the weather for all the obvious reasons. Very important for our
Airmen to understand the weather, our Sailors, and the list
goes on.
We, right now, have three military weather satellites left
on the ground. One will launch later this year, and that leaves
us with two. And we are managing the timeframe of launching
those two remaining satellites that we have already constructed
so that we can hedge our bet, basically, here about what might
happen with NPOESS.
In terms of the NPOESS program itself, we are not happy
either. I think that all of us understand there have been some
significant issues here. There have been issues with the
construction of the sensors. In some cases, we are stretching
in terms of the technology. In other cases, we are stretching--
or the program was stretching, anyway, in terms of the number
of sensors we were trying to integrate on the same platform, et
cetera.
A number of studies have been done about what to do. There
is one going on now that is about to out-brief within the next
week or so. I understand they have made some recommendations. I
have not seen those. We are looking forward to getting that and
see what their recommendations are, both in terms of program
content and, as importantly, in terms of program management.
So I cannot give you a better answer today, Madam
Chairwoman, than we are waiting to see what this latest review
tells us. I know some have seen pieces of it. I have not. We
are looking forward to that. And when we do, I think it is
important for us to come back and explain to you what we think
the right way forward is.
Ms. Tauscher. Do you think that you will see that review
before the mark-up of the bill on June 11th?
General Kehler. I have heard one answer that says that they
are ready to report their results as early as next week. So, I
would hope that we would have information before you mark.
Ms. Tauscher. Well, I will direct the staff. We are going
to be back in our districts next week for the Memorial Day
recess, but we come back on June 2nd. So as soon as you come
back, if you have been briefed and you can brief us, we will
gather the subcommittee and try to accomplish that as soon as
we can.
General Kehler. Yes, ma'am.
And it is a actually, it is a larger group that you
probably need to invite than just me because there are others
with equities in this decision as well.
Ms. Tauscher. We will do that.
General Kehler. But we would be happy to come.
Ms. Tauscher. I have a second question.
Recently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found
that the Air Force is struggling to build the GPS IIF
satellites within cost and scheduled goals. I actually was
watching one of the cable shows this morning, and they had this
whole big thing about, you know, GPS and, you know, are you
going to be able to turn on your GPS and get from where you are
supposed to go. So I think this has hit the major media.
The program has overrun its original cost estimate by about
$870 million and its launch of its first satellite has been
delayed to later this year, probably November of 2009, almost
three years late. GAO has also raised questions about the Air
Force estimate for the GPS IIIA schedule and the possibility
that delays could result in a gap in the GPS constellation in
the future.
Would you describe the current health of the GPS
constellation, the status of both GPS IIF and IIIA, acquisition
programs, and the prospect that we might experience a gap in
the GPS signal sometime in the future?
General Kehler. Well, let me answer the final question
first.
I am highly confident that we will be able to sustain at
least, and I believe more than, the minimum 24 satellite
constellation as far as we can see. I am highly confident that
we can sustain more than 24 satellites.
Let me start with that. Now, let me backtrack.
GPS is critically important, not just to the U.S. military,
not just to the citizens of America--by the way, the taxpayers
who pay for it and offer it free of charge to the rest of the
world--but it is important to the entire world. We are
responsible for it, and we take that responsibility very, very
seriously.
Right now, on orbit, we have the largest and most capable
constellation we have ever had. We have 30 active satellites.
We have another one that we have launched that is still in
checkout. Some new signals are being checked out. And we have
three additional that are not right now an active part of the
constellation but are available.
We understand the issues that the GAO has raised. In some
cases, you know, we are not taking exception to them. I would
take some exception to the fact that I think some of what is
being reported is old news. We have been working on these
problems for quite some time.
We understand what the issues are. We are about to launch
the first of the GPS IIF satellites. That will occur late this
year. We have other launches that have to go in sequence, and
so I cannot give you a specific such-and-such a date. We have
got issues there that we are trying to work through. But that
is not bad news. That is actually good news.
The GPS III program, at this point, is proceeding very
well. It is still in development of course. But because of the
problems that we had with IIF, we have taken more time, in some
cases, deliberately, to get IIF right before it goes to orbit.
And then we said we would buy a finite number of those and get
on with GPS III, which has been a program we have started with
all of the acquisition reform features built in from the start.
So I have a lot of confidence in GPS III. I am also confident
in the ground system that we have put together.
Why the reporting is going on today, it is because it is
based on a very, very conservative analysis that is done for
planning purposes. That conservative analysis suggests that we
might have a problem here. But what that does not take into
account is the real steps that we take to manage the
constellation through times like this.
Those steps, when we take those steps, and when we get to
the next launches, give me the confidence that would say we are
going to be able to sustain more than 24 satellites on orbit.
And all the indicators that we have with the on-orbit
constellation supports what I am telling you here. When you
take those measures into account, those real steps that we take
to prolong the life of the satellites that are on orbit, when
you factor those into the same analysis, it does not show the
same kind of problem.
So, I have high confidence--let me say this again--I have
high confidence that we are going to be able to sustain greater
than 24 satellites as we continue to upgrade GPS. We are
committed to retaining that as the gold standard for the world,
and we have a commitment to do that, and we understand what our
commitment is.
Ms. Tauscher. General, the reason you say 24 is because?
General Kehler. That is the minimum requirement to give
high-accuracy signals. And, again, as I say, today there are 30
active in the constellation, and we expect to be able to
sustain 24--greater than 24 is what my projection would be. I
just cannot tell you how many.
Ms. Tauscher. I hope your statement today goes a long way
to giving confidence to people that rely on GPS for many
different reasons.
I have questions, more questions for you, General Kehler.
And I certainly have some questions for General O'Reilly, but I
want to give my distinguished colleague, the ranking member
from Ohio, Mr. Turner, a chance to ask some questions.
So, I am happy to yield to you, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
General O'Reilly, you have a tough message. And many
people, in looking at your budget recommendations, are very
concerned because they do not see that the world has changed
much in the past couple months, or that the analysis at DOD has
been completed in the past couple months that would justify a
significant change in policy that you are bringing in front of
us.
And I wanted to ask you a couple questions about that. Many
times when we are faced with issues of guiding a program, you
complete a strategy and then you undertake a budget.
As our Ranking Member McHugh said, it looks as if this is a
budget that its only common theme is it fits under the top
line, and that you have a budget and under which we are
constructing strategy. And that is of a great deal of concern
when the issue of missile defense is so important and goes
right to the issue of our national security.
Every day in the news, the public is more and more aware of
what the actors of rogue nations and other nations are doing to
be able to get greater reach and greater precision, greater
ability to impact the United States and our allies.
And as you look at the capabilities that we have
accomplished, that your agency has worked so diligently, and
others, to accomplish, it seems as if we are retreating. You
and I have had conversations about my concern about the issues
of innovation in that, you know, when we are advancing in
technical areas and then we step away from funding, either
research or development, we are losing the concept of what is
the next generation of innovation that could be in front of us.
So many people have questions about how these budget
decisions are being made and why and whether or not this is
prudent. The Department appears to be making profound missile
defense program and budget decisions prior to the
Administration's completion of its missile defense policy and
strategy review.
We do not, as a committee, seem to have any information in
front of us that would justify the switches that are occurring
in each of the programs. One such switch is the issue of a
switch from long-range missiles focus, and we do not have
intelligence or information here that would indicate that
people are not trying to get greater reach to impact our
country.
I have several questions that I want to ask you about
specific programs that I know that members on this side of the
aisle have specific questions about them, but could you talk
for us a moment about the issue of how this budget is put
together. Because although you have answers as to, you know,
comparatives; why one program over another. It appears that an
overall strategy is missing as to why we are undertaking the
cuts of programs that before, just a few months ago, appeared
to be pretty important.
General O'Reilly. Thank you, sir.
First of all, this budget proposal reflects a process that
has been developed over the last several years that I believe
the most profound impact on the budget was the participatory
problem--or participatory involvement of senior decision
makers, and especially the combatant commanders, the Joint
Chiefs, and the Services, in order to have the strategy that
you refer to today and those analyses, versus the strategy
before was based primarily on technical judgments by the
Missile Defense Agency without the greater involvement.
So, number one, I do not believe it is so much of a
strategy change, as a process change. This process has now come
to fruition. There was more involvement by Combatant Command
(COCOM) commanders and the warfighters than I have seen before.
There also was more intense involvement by senior Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) leadership and the analysts that
work to support them than has been in the past.
So, this is a process that was started several years ago,
and I believe this is the first budget which was produced from
that process as the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB),
chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, chaired that board with the full
participation of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and
the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Service
Chiefs, the Joint Chiefs, were very involved in this. This was
not an isolated decision. In fact, it was the most
comprehensive that I have ever seen in the missile defense
area.
Again, the two aspects: number one is the programs we are
referring to are aimed at 1 percent of the threat, whereas we
are very concerned also about the other 99 percent of the
threat that we--you are exactly right, sir--we are concerned
about the research and development that is going in to counter
that more deployed, more advanced threat, as far as a threat to
our deployed forces today.
This is not done at the expense of the long-range threat.
The reduction of the missile silos actually employs a process,
then, that allows them to be more operationally ready than they
are today. So, we believe this actually enhances that
capability by focusing on those 30 and building of
refurbishment process, and so forth, for the missiles that did
not exist before.
But, primarily, sir, I must say that, yes, the Secretary of
Defense did give us clear guidance to focus on the rogue threat
and the theater threats, but at the same time, there was
involvement that I had not seen before by senior warfighting
commanders, and they set the priorities in which I was
responding to.
And then it was approved up through the Secretary.
Mr. Turner. And I have a series of questions regarding the
change from 44 GBIs to 30 GBIs.
General O'Reilly, do you believe that Mr. Altwegg, your
executive director, as he does, that, I believe this is his
statement, ``the risk may go up,'' by stopping GBI deployment
at 30 interceptors.
So, although you say an analysis has been done, I think,
you know, the committee members were a little concerned as to
how exactly the process was undertaken to go from 45 to 30. I
do not think we have from you the analysis that would justify
or explain that. And, as I think you are aware, Mr. Altwegg, in
a May 7th press conference on the budget, commented that the
``risk may go up somewhat, but our intelligence data and the
threat at the present time permits us to restrict the number of
emplaced missiles to 30.''
I am not familiar with that information. Could you comment
on his statement?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
As the new Director of the Missile Defense Agency, I asked
for exactly what you are asking for: the analysis to show 44.
Why was there 44 missiles? I have yet to see that yet.
We have looked at projections from 2002 of what the threat
would be today. Those were off by a factor of 10 to 20 in that
regard. So, that also underscored, with the warfighter input,
senior combatant commanders, also the lack of an analysis, as
you are saying for the 44, put us into a position where there
was an operational risk assessment done.
And the operational risk assessment was deemed to be low
for the fact that how many simultaneous missiles this system
would have to engage at any one time now or over the next
decade, and what would be the intelligence indicators to say
that there was a surprise growth due to the fact that it takes
so long to build one of these launch complexes due to the fact
that there was not a strategy that I had presented, and my
agency knows of about, again we believe it was a judgment in
the past done on a threat.
But the analysis we have done until now and the assumptions
in which that original judgment was made on, was off by a
factor of about 10 to 20.
Mr. Turner. And saying that the 44 was arbitrary, I am not
quite confident that the 30 is--that the reduction that you
have chosen is not arbitrary also. I look forward to you
providing to the committee what other information that you have
that would justify the 44 to 30.
I understand your position that the 44 was arbitrary. But,
again, we are seeing increasing threats in this area, not
decreasing, and yet we are seeing decreasing investment.
On May 13th, the Secretary of Defense testified that, ``We
will continue to robustly fund research and development to
improve GMD.'' And on page 10 of the DOD budget overview for
MDA, it clearly states, ``We intend to curtail additional GMD
development.''
How should we interpret these two statements that appear to
be a disconnect? Please--I mean, describe for us any robust R&D
efforts for GMD that are going to be continued in this budget
request.
General O'Reilly. Sir, the reference in the overview was in
the area of the ground system, of curtailing the development or
the deployment of the ground system.
However, at the same time, we are expanding the research
and development, as I said, for the entire architecture which
the GMD system benefits. One of the benefits of Ascent-Phase
Intercept is if you are going to strengthen that, GMD
automatically benefits from having early sensors, robust
command and control, robust communications and secure, which is
necessary.
Besides that, we also have funded a refurbishment program
to take the oldest interceptors out, replace them with new
ones, also to upgrade those interceptors with technical risks
that we found in the original deployment.
That will be done over the entire fleet over a period of
time. We also are expanding the test program, which is part of
the development, and we are continuing to expand the command
and control and the algorithms necessary to meet the
warfighters' requirements for better command and control of the
system during an attack, and also to plan for it.
We have others that I can provide for the record of efforts
that we are continuing on in GMD. But I did not mean to convey
that, in fact, the 30 missiles that we believe is sufficient
for silos is going to halt the development of the ground-based
interceptors.
In fact, we will continue on with the two-stage interceptor
development, which again brings a new fresh of avionics to the
GBIs and also their industrial base.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 119.]
Mr. Turner. One that continues to be a concern on support
for the European missile defense. The budget request includes
only $51 million for a European capability. Does this low
funding level indicate a change of the Administration's
position, or lack of support, for a European missile defense?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the Quadrennial Defense Review I
know is going to address that. But in the meantime, the logic
behind the fiscal year 2010 budget was that I have significant
restrictions based on the law, the Appropriation, and the
Authorization Act of last year, on how much I can spend for the
construction and the development of the missile systems
proposed in Europe and the European Midcourse Radar (EMR).
Due to those restrictions, primarily the need for
ratification of the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement in the
Czech Republic and Poland, the $51 million was the most we
could see that we could expend this year with those
restrictions still on us.
And then there was a second one associated with the
production of further GBIs for the European midcourse--or the
European capability that is limited by the number of flight
tests we have to occur first for a two-stage GBI, which we are
proceeding with.
But in sum, sir, the limitations from last year's laws is
the reason why we are limited to $51 million.
Mr. Turner. So, then, should I interpret your answer to
mean that there is still sufficient, significant support from
the Administration for the European missile defense system
(EMDS)?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
The instructions to me was to continue with that
deployment, that planning, to the greatest extent possible
allowable by law, which equated to the $51 million for the
development of the sites and the planning, and also we are
continuing the development of the two-stage GBI.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
I am going to recognize members for five minutes by their
appearance before the gavel.
And first we have Mr. Andrews of New Jersey for five
minutes.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you, General, Lieutenant General, for your service
and for excellent testimony today.
I do not think either of you have made a major change in
your assessment of the threat that the country faces. I do
think you have made a major change in the way we assess the
evidence in these programs, frankly, switching from a faith-
based approach to these programs to an evidence-based approach,
which we agree with.
In looking at the budget sent over, it is interesting, if
you look at some zeroed-out and significantly-cut programs, BMD
intercept, Multiple Kill Vehicle, the three European programs,
they are reduced by a little over $1.1 billion. And then if you
look at what has increased, procurement of THAAD, Aegis RDT&E,
Aegis procurement, and Command, Control, Battle Management and
Communications (C2BMC), they are increased by almost $1.1
billion. So, there was a balance between those two approaches.
And I do think that the evidence supports the balance that
you have struck. And, Lieutenant General O'Reilly, obviously it
was more directed at you, although I think the same is true in
the space-based programs, I wanted to ask you a little bit
about the evidence of the Multiple Kill Vehicle.
My understanding is that the emphasis on the mission has
changed rather substantially when our strategy is what the
multiple kill would have done. On page 25, you say we are--
instead of the initial purpose of the MKV to integrate into
midcourse interceptors, we are now assessing the feasibility of
destroying threat missiles early in flight before
countermeasures can be deployed, as a hedge against advanced,
future threats.
Is it fair to say that, you know, that the old rationale
for the Multiple Kill Vehicle does not fit the new strategy?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the mission of the Multiple Kill
Vehicle, if we are successful with what we are trying to do
with this proposed budget, we would not need that mission.
Mr. Andrews. And it is also true on schedule, is it not,
that the initial schedule for the MKV was 5.5 years. It has now
grown to somewhere between 12 and 14 years? Is that right?
General O'Reilly. Sir, that is the Kinetic Interceptor
Program.
Mr. Andrews. Okay.
General O'Reilly. But the MKV program, sir, was on a 2018
timeframe.
Mr. Andrews. Where is it now?
General O'Reilly. Well, that is----
[Laughter.]
It is in the very beginning of the program, so that is
why----
Mr. Andrews. Right.
And am I correct that the cost has, according to what I
have read, gone from $4.6 billion to $8.9 billion?
General O'Reilly. Again, sir, that is the Kinetic
Interceptor Program, yes, sir.
Mr. Andrews. Right.
And the first booster flight test was due in what year?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we re-baselined the program in 2007
for the first booster test last year. It had technical----
Mr. Andrews. Did it happen last year?
General O'Reilly. No, sir. They have had technical
problems----
Mr. Andrews. Did you think it is going to happen this year?
General O'Reilly. No, sir. I do not believe it is going to
happen this fiscal year. Our schedule assessment was----
Mr. Andrews. I understand there is some issue about
September of 2009 possibly happening.
I want to compare that to the judgment you have made about
THAAD and Aegis. I note that THAAD procurement is up by $316
million. Aegis RTD&E is up by $578 million. Procurement for
Aegis is up by $112 million.
It was my understanding that the THAAD tests basically
batted six-for-six. Is that right?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Andrews. And it is also my understanding that the
system has proved so effective there is already a foreign sales
component with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Could you tell
us a little bit about that?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
They have made a request for several billion in investment
of, and procurement of THAAD.
Mr. Andrews. My understanding is, from your testimony, is
that $6.9 billion is, at least the potential for that?
General O'Reilly. Million, sir, or billion?
Mr. Andrews. Yes.
General O'Reilly. I know it is well over $5 billion, sir.
Mr. Andrews. Right.
And Aegis also has a similar record on successful testing.
Could you tell us a little bit about that?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Well, THAAD has had six-for-six, as you said, sir, but what
is also important is five of those intercepts were against
actual threat targets.
Mr. Andrews. Right.
General O'Reilly. In the case of Aegis, they have had a
successful string of--out of nine intercept attempts, they have
had seven intercepts, but one of them, the missile did not
launch because there was a command and control issue of the
configuration by the soldiers.
But for the ones they attempt--they launched, it was eight-
for-seven.
Mr. Andrews. Within the constraints of the fact that we are
in a public setting, within those constraints, is it a fair
conclusion that each of those two systems I just mentioned,
properly positioned, would have a high degree of probability of
success against the rogue missile threats that you assess exist
today?
General O'Reilly. Sir, against the vast majority, the 99
percent I was referring to, yes. Against the longest-range
ones, ICBMs, the way we are configured today, no, but that is
what we are proceeding with on the Ascent-Phase Intercept, to
give them that capability so they could handle missiles of all
ranges.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you.
My time has expired. Thank you very much.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Andrews.
I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Lamborn, five minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Madam Chairman, before we start the questions,
I have to make an unfortunate announcement.
Yesterday, the first female Air Force Academy graduate to
die in combat was killed by an improvised explosive device
(IED) near Kabul, Afghanistan. So, I would ask, if you could,
ask for a moment of silence.
Ms. Tauscher. I think that is appropriate.
The committee will have a moment of silence in honor of the
lost Airman.
Mr. Lamborn. Lieutenant Roslyn Schulte.
[Moment of silence.]
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
General O'Reilly, here is a question about KEI. I am
concerned with the decision announced on May 7th to cancel KEI,
kinetic energy interceptor, in fiscal year 2010, followed by
the Missile Defense Agency issuing a stop-work order on the
program.
Likewise, it is troubling that these decisions to
immediately halt the program and disallow the rest of the 2009
funding, which had been approved and directed by Congress, was
made without a chance for congressional review.
But would you still consider proceeding with the planned
KEI missile test this fall in as much as the engine set has
been built and already delivered to the test site. Over $1
billion in taxpayer funds have already been invested in the
program, and the completion of such a test would likely yield
important scientific data that could prove useful in future
missile defense R&D efforts.
General O'Reilly. Sir, first of all, the motivation for the
stop-work was we have a legal liability for termination of over
$39 million. Since no money was proposed for fiscal year 2010,
I have got a responsibility to ensure that I can have enough
funding in fiscal year 2009 to cover the termination agreements
I have with Northrop Grumman and the other companies involved.
So, that was first of all. I have to protect that. And that
was not sufficient, under the existing plan proposed by the
company, in order to also pay for the flight test.
Second of all, there was three tests that were required, as
the contractor proposed prior to the flight test, again, they
have had technical difficulties with components and so forth.
The program--the original schedule proposed a year--two years
ago, they are a year behind in that. And when we looked at the
remaining activities they have, including the additional ground
testing, we did not see that it was feasible. Our estimate was
it would be done, at earliest, if everything was successful,
would be December.
But, I have modified the stop-work order and asked the
company to propose to me so we can evaluate, is there a
proposed way in which they believe they could execute the test
in the timeframe, within the funding, and still cover the legal
liabilities that I have.
Also, I have asked in the stop-work order to have a
thorough review of the program. A lot of the technologies
developed in KEI are directly applicable to what we are
referring to in the ascent phase.
So, we want to ensure we leverage that technology and
expertise and the follow-on work that then would benefit not
just KEI, but all the missile systems we are deploying.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
What are the Department of Defense's plans for Ground-based
Missile Defense, and why should Congress have any confidence
that MDA can support ``robust R&D,'' as the Secretary of
Defense has talked about, to improved Ground-based Missile
Defense, including plans for testing years into the future,
when budget priorities may shift money away from Ground-based
Missile Defense in the future?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the limitation we are proposing on
GBI is the 30 silos, because it was related to the rate at
which we need to launch interceptors and the number of
interceptors we need to put in the air to counter any rogue-
nation threats that are in the air at the same time.
However, it is dependent on an extensive architecture, the
GBI program. In all of those other areas, we are upgrading
those programs and they will be feeding better discrimination
data, command and control data, and so forth, for the
interceptors.
We designed the missile so the basic missile itself had a
large capacity for new software. We can upload that software in
the missiles in the silos. It was done as forethought ahead of
time.
So, we will continue the lab work of our testing, the
command and control work, the development of the additional
nodes that tie into the GMD system, and, for example, our
forward-based radars and our Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar.
All of those upgrades also directly feed to the GBI's
capability of killing a target.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
And, lastly, in light of the $1.2 billion decrease in MDA
funding, can you identify any underfunded programs that would
strengthen missile defense if you had additional dollars and
would put them next in the list of priorities?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the part of the missile defense
architecture that we can benefit the most from is our ability
to see threats as early as possible and get an accurate track.
So, we are launching two satellites in August on a Delta IV out
of Cape Canaveral, and we are planning on utilizing them in
future intercept tests over the next couple of years.
What we need is a constellation--or would be a significant
benefit to the missile defense architecture, if we had a
constellation that provided persistent surveillance and cold-
body tracking of cold bodies after they have boosted.
That is one area. Another area is the development of
airborne sensors; and we are working very closely with the
Predator office and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) looking at
how can we exploit that capability in order to, again, get
early surveillance.
The interceptor would give us some improvement, but early
surveillance and persistent surveillance would give us the
greatest leverage.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from New
Mexico, Mr. Heinrich.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General Kehler, General O'Reilly, I want to thank you for
joining us today. I want to address my first question to
General Kehler.
General, as you know, Operationally Responsive Space's
headquarters is in my district in Albuquerque, as well as the
Space Development and Test Wing. And I was very pleased to hear
of the successful launch of the Tactical Satellite-3 (TacSat-3)
on Tuesday night, and I certainly congratulate you, Director
Wegner, and all those involved with that launch, on that
successful launch.
Earlier this week, the Air Force released its Unfunded
Priority List, which listed ORS as number 3 out of 20. And I
wanted to ask you if you could explain, specifically, what you
think could be accomplished by funding this priority?
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
We are delighted, as well, with the successful launch of
TacSat-3. It was another step in what we believe is a very
promising way forward for smaller satellites with highly
capable payloads that will be useful for the warfighters.
What we are doing, now that we have launched TacSat-3, we
are already on to the construction of the next ORS-like vehicle
called ORS Satellite Number 1, ORS Sat-1. And the difference
is, the TacSat series has been developmental, if you will.
ORS-1 is actually now taking a need from one of the
combatant commanders and trying to apply operationally
responsive principles to assembling and launching that. We have
given ourselves a fixed time to do that in. We have given
ourselves a fixed budget to do that in. But we have also given
ourselves some off-ramps where we can make decisions.
Part of that Unfunded Requirement would be the next
increment, if we get to the right decision point, and then
decide to go forward with this ORS Satellite Number 1, that we
can actually make it within the kinds of parameters, very
aggressive parameters, that we have set up.
And then assuming that is right, the next piece is for the
second of those satellites, which would complete the combatant
commanders needs in a certain orbit. You cannot cover
everything they need covered with one satellite. I know you
know that. But, we would need to put a second one on orbit.
That is what this does. It completes the first one, goes to the
second one.
Mr. Heinrich. I actually think you probably answered my
second question, which related to consulting our combatant
commanders in terms of what might be included on that ORS Sat-
1.
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
In fact, this is answering, specifically, a need from
Central Command (CENTCOM). They have identified, among a number
of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
shortfalls that they have that we are addressing; for example,
even bigger picture in the Air Force with increased Global
Hawk, Predator orbit, et cetera.
They have also asked us to do some things that are best
done from space, and those are infrared (IR) coverage, and that
is what we will do.
Mr. Heinrich. Great. Well, thank you General Kehler.
I want to ask--sort of move to a different topic for
General O'Reilly.
You know, I am a believer in maintaining a multilayered
missile defense structure, and one of the programs that we have
invested a lot over the years and, because of my background in
directed energy that had a real interest in, is the Airborne
Laser, which I think presents a lot of value in areas of
directed-energy research, as well as potential in both the
boost and ascent phase.
I wanted to ask you if you could discuss sort of what the
Department's plan is for applying ABL's work to other directed-
energy efforts, and what plans are in store for the program
after the forthcoming tests and shootdown this fall?
General O'Reilly. Thank you, sir.
First of all, the achievement of the Airborne Laser last
year was truly revolutionary. We were able to fire a laser to a
target that was 80 kilometers or farther away in the Earth's
atmosphere, and the system normally shoots upward, so this is
more difficult.
We were able to measure the diffusion of the laser beam
over this range and receive a return off the target and then
compensate for that defocusing by the atmosphere, like your
glasses, and we actually fired the laser, then, using adaptive
optics with a defocused laser, and we used the Earth's
atmosphere to focus it.
So, what happened was we had a very precise laser, we have
done it 12 times. So we have convinced ourselves that that
breakthrough technology is directly applicable for any time a
high-powered laser is fired in the atmosphere. And we did it
repeatedly.
That gave us the confidence to move on to take the high-
powered laser, the 1.3 megawatt-class chemical oxygen iodine
laser (COIL), we have installed it in the aircraft. The
aircraft has flown for several weeks now. It is going through
flight checkout, and we are updating the optics on it. But we
are convinced that we have solved the largest fundamental
problem.
We have also fired that large laser on the ground at
Edwards Air Force Base over 70 times and at full power. So, it
is a matter of integrating them onboard the aircraft, and that
gives us the confidence for this year.
However, this is revolutionary technology. We still must
prove it. So we have a shoot-down planned in the fall against a
couple of targets, and then if we are unsuccessful, this budget
supports another attempt later on in the wintertime. If that is
unsuccessful, a third attempt in the springtime. If that is
unsuccessful, I will go back to the Secretary of Defense and
propose either termination or some other decision.
If it is successful, we will continue to use it as a
research and development platform. It has given great
indications that it can be put on military aircraft of a
smaller size and be much more deployable.
So those are the type of things we would like to pursue
before we begin a Tail 2-type development.
Mr. Heinrich. You meant when it is successful this fall,
right?
General O'Reilly. Sir?
Mr. Heinrich. Sorry.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. [Laughter.]
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
General O'Reilly. We do want to prove it.
Mr. Heinrich. Yes. Absolutely.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Heinrich.
I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Chair, I
guess the first thing I would like to do is just to identify
with the ranking member's comments in his opening statement,
and also with Mr. Heinrich's comments and inquiries related to
the Airborne Laser. I think that is very insightful.
Let me thank both of you for being here. I never want to
forget that while those of us on this panel talk a lot about
freedom, it is people such as yourselves that give all of your
life to it and sometimes, literally, give your life for it. And
you are the most noble people we have in our society.
And often times, I think it is probably the most manifest
in that you take whatever we do, imprudent or not, and you do
the very best you can to protect this country. And I am very
grateful to you.
I have two new little babies, so I am more grateful than I
have ever been to what you do, because what you do today
certainly affects generations to come.
One, perhaps, example that I might mention, General
O'Reilly, in your testimony you talked about some of the legal
impediments in the law in the last Congress that, perhaps, has
impeded progress on the European site.
And I continue to believe that the missile defense, and
especially related to the European site, could potentially have
the ability to devalue a nuclear program in Iran and help some
of our other ancillary efforts to keep that country from going
nuclear, which I feel is an imperative of the highest priority
and may keep us from facing a, you know, a Jihadist terrorism
in our own country.
So, with that, General O'Reilly, let me direct my first
question to you, sir. Pretty basic question: Do you believe
that the threat from long-range missiles has increased or
decreased in the last six months, as it relates to the homeland
here?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I believe it has increased
significantly, and I base that assumption on the intelligence
information. I am a customer. I do not develop intelligence,
but I use it. And the demonstration of the capability of the
Iranian ability to put a satellite in orbit, albeit small,
shows that they are progressing in that technology.
Additionally, the Iranians yesterday demonstrated a solid-
rocket motor test, which is much more feasible to deploy and
sustain in the field, and that is disconcerting.
Third, the North Koreans demonstrated, even though their
attempt to put a satellite in orbit failed, they had a first
and second stage that performed fairly well, which, again,
shows that they are improving in their capacity, and we are
very concerned about that.
Mr. Franks. Sure.
Well, I know that the reports that you mentioned show a
difference in the strategic emphasis from 2002 to 2010, and I
am hoping, just for the ability to educate the committee, that
any reports or data that you are able to release to the
committee that would help us understand, for instance--related
to the ground-based midcourse. I think that some of your
testimony is very compelling, and I would hope that any
information or studies that you reference in your testimony,
would that be possible to give that to the committee?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Franks. All right. Thank you.
Let me shift gears here on you. I think probably related to
GBI, there has been a lot of questions that I will not repeat.
But the manufacturing line and industrial base continues to be
a great concern in any situation that we face. When does the
line go cold for the second- and third-tier suppliers, and how
will this affect your ability to keep options open for the
future production of ground-based interceptors?
General O'Reilly. Sir, for the lower-tier suppliers, the
last procurement of the current 44 GBIs was made in 2008 and
there was some long-lead procurements before that. So, their
deliveries are occurring this year.
One area that we are looking at is to upgrade the avionics
of the missile fleet. And those are the types of initiatives
the Secretary if referring to as continuing that work so that
we have flexibility to respond to the decisions of the QDR and
others, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review.
So, we have attempted to be as flexible as possible from a
programmatic point of view on those ultimate decisions, so that
we are not prematurely limiting our ability to have an
industrial base to produce GBIs.
Also, the refurbishment program does replace a large part
of the missile avionics system and other components, and so, by
having a refurbishment program, also keeps the supplier base
active to supply those components.
Mr. Franks. Well, again, I thank you both very much for
your service to the country.
And thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Franks.
I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from
South Carolina, Mr. Spratt.
Mr. Spratt. Thanks very much.
General, [audio break] talk about the significance and size
of this program . . . [INAUDIBLE] . . . to bring that money to
a current value in today's dollars, we have probably spent $150
billion trying to master the threats of missile defense and the
threat of other missile attacks. And clearly the threat is out
there, but there are additional threats on top of that.
Thank you, sir. Shows you my technical expertise.
Let us cut straight to the BMD, or the GMD. In a way, you
diminish that program with faint praise by cutting it from 44
back to 30. Is this because you have reassessed the threat
posed by rogue enemies, or is it because the system itself has
limitations and there may be better options?
And if the STSS turns out to be successful and proves that
we can master the track and also that we can discriminate, is
there a future for this system that is beyond the size that you
have in mind right now?
General O'Reilly. Sir, for the GMD system, sir, we believe
that the threat continues to grow, but what we are watching is
the rate at which these missiles can be launched, the raid
size, how many can be launched at one time. That is critical to
us to determine what size missile field do we need to respond.
That is one.
Second of all, the STSS program is a pathfinder for what we
are exploring as a satellite system that is focused on basic
functionality so that we do not run into the pitfalls we have
seen in other satellite programs of cost and schedule overrun,
and so forth, and I know General Kehler can respond to that
better.
But we are trying to narrow the requirement so that it
delivers exactly what we need in a manner that uses proven
technology for that program, so----
Mr. Spratt. We have been following these systems, the
SBIRS-High and the SBIRS-Low and now the STSS for a long time,
and their potential was always just over the horizon.
Are you confident that we are about to know whether or not
it can perform the mission? If not, we may have to look
elsewhere for something of its----
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
We are going to launch those satellites, those
demonstrators, those two, in August, and we have a robust test
program for the next year-and-a-half to demonstrate all of its
capability. And that may be its shelf life, but traditionally
they last on orbit much longer than that, and we are going to
take advantage of every possibility we can to test this system
and use it in different ways to prove out the benefit of a
satellite constellation system for ballistic missile defense
surveillance.
Mr. Spratt. General O'Reilly, you testified before that
there has been an increase of 5,900, I believe, of various
missiles, but the vast majority of those, 93 percent, I
believe, are short-range and medium-range missiles.
Are we putting our money in the right place? Are we
developing systems like the--adequate systems--like the THAAD
and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) to counter the
threat, or is there something else? Should not this be where we
are putting substantial resources since this is where the
threat primarily resides right now?
General O'Reilly. Sir, our intent is, this is a fiscal year
2010 budget. But, our intent is to increase the production
capacity for both those systems so that we can, in our out-
years, we are exploring to triple the number that we previously
were going to procure for the very reason you said, sir.
So, we have a near-term greater capability against those
shorter-range threats to cover our deployed forces and our
allies.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much for your testimony.
General Kehler. And, Madam Chairwoman, if I could just add
a point, Mr. Spratt, sir, just as a point of reference.
The first two SBIRS payloads are, in fact, flying. Payload
number one----
Mr. Spratt. SBIRS-high?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. Well, it is the elliptical orbit,
but yes sir, it is a part of the SBIRS-high program. The first
two are flying. The first one is performing exceptionally
well--has been handed over to the Commander of Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) for use.
The second one is also flying and about two-thirds of the
way through checkout and looks very promising, just as a point
of reference.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Spratt.
I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from
Washington, Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And, General--start with General Kehler this time.
With the termination of the TSAT, it leaves open the
question of the future of protected communications-on-the-move.
And the increase from four to six satellites for AEHF, as well
as the addition of the seventh for advanced procurement for
WGS, brings home the question whether, you know, whether or not
we are going to continue to have what we projected to be a TSAT
capability. Is it going to migrate to AEHF or WGS, and I am
just curious, in terms of thinking ahead on this, what the
answer to that might be?
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
The decision on TSAT was really made in the context of all
of the budget decisions. The requirement to provide for
protected communications-on-the-move remains--protected
communications across the board, really, but the requirement
remains.
But when you have to get to the source of capabilities the
TSAT was going to bring is really the question. And in the
context of the other budget decisions, some of the big demand
for protected communications-on-the-move has slipped to the
right with the other budget decisions.
That has given us an opportunity to continue on a pathway
that we have just really started. First of all is WGS, which is
wideband unprotected, but very wideband, highly-capable pipes
that we are putting up in the sky.
The first one of those is flying--has been turned over to
the combatant commander for use. The second one is on orbit and
in checkout, and it looks like that is going to be a highly
successful program.
We then will continue to fly for a little while longer the
Milstar system until we can put the first of the Advanced EHF
satellites on orbit. It looks to us like we can--the decisions
that Congress made last year to go to a fourth AEHF now gives
us an opportunity to harvest some of the technology out of
TSAT, bring that into Advanced EHF, and potentially WGS.
At the same time, we will be still relying, at some level,
on commercial satellite communications. The question for us to
come back and answer to you is what that mixture looks like and
how quickly we can pull into the protected piece of this, some
of those technologies we have already invested in in TSAT.
Mr. Larsen. So, I guess a base, or bottom line on that, or
a headline from that is that it may be early to make a decision
on whether--on where that potential capability should migrate
to, the TSAT capability?
General Kehler. I think we are--well, what we know is that
we will infuse some of that technology into Advanced EHF. The
question is--and perhaps WGS as well--the question is how, and
in what kind of blocks.
What we do not want to do, sir, is make the mistake that we
have made in the past about having requirements that we cannot
quite get our arms around at this point. We need to go
deliberately. We need to use our ``block-build'' approach, and
we need to pull in those things that make the most sense.
Mr. Larsen. And I suggest to you that we do not want to
help you make those mistakes, as well.
General O'Reilly, the MDEB was constituted in this past
year and I think that, was it January 21st of 2009 is when it
first really came into--it does not matter--it came into place.
General O'Reilly. Actually, it was July of the previous
year, sir.
Mr. Larsen. July of 2008.
Was MDEB involved, then, in this year's--in the development
of the fiscal year 2010 missile defense budget?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
They have reviewed the budget and provided the input to it
twice, and I presented to the Missile Defense Executive Board,
that was well-attended, the proposals, and then their input
went forward to the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Larsen. And was this the first time in the history of
the agency, the Missile Defense Agency, that the budget was
then developed with that additional oversight, as opposed to
MDA going directly to SecDef and then to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and then to the President, and
then to us?
General O'Reilly. Sir, this was the first time we had the
benefit of the, not only the process, but also the products
that, for example, the combatant commanders, STRATCOM is
required in this process to provide a Prioritized Capabilities
List, which I responded to.
And then they even evaluated my response and provided a
Capability Assessment Report, which had a strong influence on
this budget of--they rated us red, yellow, green on responding
to their priorities, and that input was also provided to the
MDEB.
The products and the subcommittees were all working
throughout this process.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
My time is up. The point I wanted to make is just that
there is--I know we are having this debate about missile
defense and I appreciate it as well. But it is really not just
a matter of your debate, sorry, your budget showing up to us
from the Secretary of Defense. It sounds like a more robust
review, even before it got to that level, than we have seen
before. That is what it sounds like to me--the internal review
within the Department.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from
Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General Kehler, General O'Reilly, thank you for your
testimony here today.
I have a couple of questions. First one, more in a broad
sense and how you make your decisions. How robust is your
effort in conducting an analysis of alternatives, as other
technologies mature, and being able to incorporate them into
existing programs?
You know, we spent a lot of money in Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) developing cutting-edge
technologies. I am always skeptical of expensive weapons
systems and their ability to adapt to new technologies that
emerge, you know, for example, the ABL using a chemical laser,
and if there were to be advances in solid-state lasers, could
you and would you be able to adapt to incorporating that type
of technology on ABL, for example, even though you have
invested so much time, effort, and money into developing a
chemical laser.
So can you talk to me about your robust effort in doing
analysis of alternatives? How does that process work?
General O'Reilly. Sir, that is a maturing process that is
associated with the establishment of the Missile Defense
Executive Board run by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
The expectation in that board, though, is that the analysis
that was done to support these decisions is on par with the
analysis that was done in other milestone decisions. Again,
this is a maturing process for the Missile Defense Agency.
A good example would be we are looking at extending the
range of the THAAD missile. Before we do that though, we are in
a very collaborative analysis of alternatives and assessment by
the Army, the Joint Staff, the Missile Defense Agency, all
reporting out to the Missile Defense Executive Board.
So that adds a level of scrutiny at that level that had not
existed before in a formalized process. Also, I am the
acquisition executive for the early stages of development, and
although we are exempt from 5,000, the DOD processes for
acquisition, I am reviewing the use of a milestone process for
my sake, in order to conduct extensive analysis and evaluation
of alternatives before we initiate contracts in the way that
you are referring to, sir.
And that is for the initial milestones. A full-scale
development, I am soliciting the participation of the service
acquisition executives that I am going to--that is ultimately
going to receive this capability, so that together we are
reviewing these programs before we execute large contracts.
We do work with DARPA and we have had exchanges with them
and we are investing in solid-state laser on the side as a
technology program.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you for your answer, General.
General O'Reilly, I know that some of these things you have
talked about in your opening statement and some members have
touched on them, but just again for my comfort level, the
budget request increases funding for the Aegis BMD and THAAD
programs by $900 million, while terminating the Multiple Kill
Vehicle, Kinetic Energy Interceptor, and adding the approaches
of the second Airborne Laser prototype.
Can you talk a little more about the Department's rationale
for the significant increase in funding in these two programs
and cutting back on the other three? And also why were these
decisions made prior to the completion of the Administration's
missile defense policy and strategy review? And finally, does
this reflect a shift in focus from long-range threats to more
short- and medium-range threats?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the Missile Defense Executive Board
process allowed the warfighter a strong voice on what
priorities of capabilities they need and what risk assessments
are out there. The Joint Staff, or the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), over a year ago, approved a study
that showed that we were deficient in the number of Aegis and
THAAD missile systems.
And so that was an endorsed study from the previous two
years ago, and so therefore with the scrutiny that that study
has had, and the endorsement it has had, we move forward with
those procurements because the threat to those forces exists
today, and we wanted to, as quickly as possible, respond to
both those requirements that were endorsed by the Vice Chiefs
of the Services and meet the threat that we saw out there.
The other shift, though, is primarily, we--part of the
Missile Defense Executive Board is it does review the threat.
And it does review the intelligence and so forth. And we are
aiming the research and development, along with the deployment
of the most mature systems we have, to respond to the large
preponderance of the threat which is in the short and medium
ranges.
Mr. Langevin. And the issue of waiting for the completion
of the Administration's missile defense policy and strategy
review?
General O'Reilly. Sir, there is a lot of decisions that we
did not make, such as to keep the GBI line--to terminate that
line. We did not. And there is an example of we are maintaining
programmatic flexibility awaiting for those decisions, those
policy decisions, to be made later this year and announced
through the QDR and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review.
So we wanted to be as responsive as we could, as quick as
we could, to the combatant commanders' request for missile
defense capability--at the same time, allow programmatic
flexibility for those policy decisions that will be made later
on this year.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
I yield back.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
I think we will go into a second round of questions.
General O'Reilly, the United States and Israel are jointly
developing an upper-tier missile defense system to engage
potential ballistic missile threats to Israel at longer ranges.
Israel's preferred alternative is to develop a new missile, the
Arrow-3. However, I understand that successful development of
the Arrow-3 system is considered a high risk.
What are the key risk areas? Are we exploring alternative
ways of assisting Israel to meet its upper-tier requirement?
And how likely is it that Arrow-3 will be able to meet the
schedule of deploying in initial capability by 2014?
General O'Reilly. Ma'am, the design for the Arrow-3 missile
system shows it will be an extremely capable missile. It is
very advanced. It is a more advanced design than we have ever
attempted in the United States with our programs. That is due
to the way that the seeker has great flexibility, and it has
other propulsion systems. It will be an extremely capable
system.
However, associated with that advanced development is the
schedule that goes along with that and the timelines in which
we saw, we are not in a position to say they cannot achieve
those technical accomplishments. And we hope they do, and we
are very supportive of that process.
But we saw particularly the schedules in which they were
proposing, I had deemed, and I had had independent studies
deem, as very high-risk for a missile development program.
So, our assessment is that it is unlikely that they can
meet the schedule, which they had laid out to accomplish all of
these technical achievements, at this time.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
It was our understanding that Mr. Rogers from Alabama was
going to have an opportunity to speak after the first round,
but since we are going to wait for the second----
Ms. Tauscher. No one consulted with me on that. If they had
consulted me, I would have said that having two----
Mr. Turner. That is fine.
Ms. Tauscher [continuing]. Two different hearings at once
would have made it difficult to do that.
Mr. Turner. That is absolutely fine. It was really a staff
communication to us. So we understand, Madam Chairman, that
that was not your call. But in order to facilitate his
schedule, I am going to yield to him a portion of my time.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the ranking member.
Generals, thank you both for being here, and thank you for
your service.
General O'Reilly, I want to pick up on our conversation
from last week about these GBIs. Well, first of all, when you
were talking to Mr. Langevin, I thought you said you were
delaying the decision on the GBIs until later--the termination
of that.
General O'Reilly. Sir, that is the production line. We have
not proposed that we would stop the production line or any
potential for future buys of GBI.
Mr. Rogers. That is----
General O'Reilly. What we had stopped was the going beyond
30 missile silos.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. So then as far as tests are concerned, I
know that of the 44 you are going to use 10 for testing. So you
are not--at least on this date--you are not planning to
discontinue production so that you will have some future
interceptors for tests?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
We are, in fact, in parallel to this effort, going through
a test review with the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation and the service Operational Test Agencies. And we
are identifying quite a number of tests that we are going to
need in the future that will require GBI participations,
including salvos of GBIs.
So that--we are completing that work now and that will be
another indicator of the number of ultimate GBIs we would need
for the purpose of testing.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
You talked earlier when the ranking member was asking you
about the logic for 30 as opposed to 44 being deployed, and you
basically said you looked for somebody to tell you why we had
44, and you never had been able to get an answer.
General O'Reilly. Well, sir, it was the best I can tell. I
have not seen an analysis, but the best I can tell, it was a
judgment based on where the threat would be today driven by how
many rogue-nation intercontinental ballistic-type missiles
could be launched at one time in this timeframe. And, of
course, it was very hard to judge risk or the threat, and that
was a judgment done many years ago. But that was the best
understanding I have today of how the number got to be 40, at
that time.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I understand your interest in the Ascent-
Phase Interceptor, and I like that idea. I just do not
understand why we would diminish a level or a layer of our
current capability while we are waiting on that, I think
exciting, technology to mature.
General O'Reilly. Sir, in the GBI assessment or analysis,
we did go back and look at what we know today and what the
Intelligence Community can identify as the ability for the
threat to launch multiple.
We need a GBI capability. We realize that. And we need to
have one that is sustained for decades.
Mr. Rogers. Right.
General O'Reilly. We realize that, and we have not shut the
door to that at all.
In the area of the execution of those other programs, which
we terminated, their execution was delivering very late, it was
very high-risk. We want that capability, but although boost-
phase capability would be ideal, our assessment of the risk of
achieving that is very high.
Yet, very close to boost-phase is ascent-phase, and we
thought it was much more achievable, and we want to have enough
interceptors so that we can respond in volume with a large
number of interceptors responding back to those threats.
And so we are trying to explore, and we are pursuing ways,
to take our given force structure today and make it more
powerful and more of a deterrence to these type of launches.
Mr. Rogers. How much money is in the budget for that
ascent-phase technology development?
General O'Reilly. Sir, if look at what we are strictly
going to be investing in, it is focused at about $368 million
this year. But it leverages the interceptor work and over $1.5
billion that is going on in the development of the rest of the
system that the ascent-phase adds that first layer of defense.
So, it is going to be working with--it is going to be
developed in consonance with that other $1.5 billion. So I did
not advertise $1.8 billion in that area because I believe that
is not a fair assessment.
But there is $368 million that is directly going to give us
this type of capability to use the rest of the system this way.
Mr. Rogers. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate that.
And I yield back.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Larsen, do you have any second-round
questions for five minutes?
Mr. Larsen. Not at this time, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Lamborn for five minutes?
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
General Kehler, how does the $136.4 million increase in
Space Situational Awareness funding in the fiscal year 2010
budget reduce the vulnerability of our space assets, and will
the increase enable the DOD to share SSA data to prevent
accidents like the Iridium collision in February?
General Kehler. Sir, with the increased importance of space
comes some interesting issues, one of which is an increased
need for us to have better situational awareness of what is
there.
Space becomes more crowded all the time. We look at over
19,000 objects that we actively track on orbit. There are
hundreds, certainly, thousands, perhaps even more that are
there that we do not see--nuts, bolts, washers, screws, things
that have been part of the cost of doing business on orbit. And
so it is important for us to increase our situational
awareness.
In the 2010 budget, the increases that we have asked for
for situational awareness are not because of program overruns.
They are not because of difficulties that we are having. We are
looking to target that fiscal year 2010 investment at being
able to use our existing sensors better. And that means being
able to understand the data, collect more data from the
existing sensors, put it together better, and put it to better
use.
In the meantime, as we are working our way down this road,
we are increasing our computing capability today, as well as
the number of human beings who are analysts who can look at the
data and decide when a collision might occur.
That money is actually being spent right now, today. It is
not, by budget standards, it is not a huge amount of money. We
expect to have much better capability to predict potential
collisions by the end of this year.
We are better today than we were when the collision
occurred back in February. We will be better tomorrow than we
are today. But that is at using the data that we already have
and being able to use it better.
As we go into 2010, we will begin to pull more sensors into
that mixture, and I think we will be able to do better sooner
not by worrying about new sensors, although there is some of
that in that budget. We will put a new sensor on orbit here
later this year that will allow us to observe objects on orbit
better.
But by and large, this near-term investment is to make our
operations center better. They can process the data better,
display it better, and give human beings some better
understanding of what they need to do, and how they need to go
about it.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
General O'Reilly, the budget request includes only $51
million for a European capability. Does this low funding level
indicate a change of Administration position or lack of support
for European missile defense?
General O'Reilly. Sir, it does not. It reflects the legal
restraints I have from last year's Authorization and
Appropriation Act. Fifty-one million is about the extent I can
execute this year without the ratification of the Ballistic
Missile Defense Agreements of the Czech Republic and Poland.
We are continuing the two-stage GBI development, which also
is part of the European capability and the development and
deployment of forward-based radars, which are also part of that
architecture.
But I am limited to that amount; that was my estimate as
how much I could do without these other constraints being met.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
On Tuesday, a Washington Post article referenced a study by
the EastWest Institute, an independent think tank based in
Moscow, New York, and Belgium, that concluded the proposed
European missile defense system is ``ineffective against the
kind of missiles Iran is likely to deploy.''
General O'Reilly, you do not agree with that assessment, do
you?
General O'Reilly. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Lamborn. And why not? [Laughter.]
General O'Reilly. Sir, a lot of the assumptions they use in
these type of assessments are not accurate and they do not
reflect our true capability--our specifications, what we have
demonstrated, also what we know of the threat, for what I have
access to in intelligence, it does not correlate to the basic
assumptions that they use in that study and others I have seen
like that.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Madam Chairman, I yield back.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Langevin, from Rhode island, for five minutes?
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General O'Reilly, it has come to my attention that MDA has
set aside money for THAAD batteries but not radars. I was
concerned that the goal of the Administration appealed more to
THAAD systems and may be hampered by a limit in the X-band
radars and production to accompany the batteries.
What is MDA's plan for dealing with the gap in deployable
radars to the new THAAD systems, and when does MDA begin the
procurement of the radar to meet the Administration's goals?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we do not have a gap in the radar
between the radars and the batteries. This radar is a
multifunction radar. It can operate with the THAAD unit for
tactical defense, and it can also operate standalone as a
forward-based radar for strategic-type threats, long-range,
IRBM, ICBM, on its own.
So, what we have procured is enough for the THAAD units
today, and additional radars to also produce in that same
function, we are developing the software so that these radars
can operate in one function or the other, and they are
interchangeable.
So, this concern may be the concern that they do not see a
radar matched to a particular battery. We did that on purpose
so that we have a pool of radars and any of them can support
that battery. But we have the seventh radar being delivered
this year and we have four THAAD units previously. With this
budget, we are proposing additional THAAD units, two more, and
with those THAAD units come radars.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
That was all I had, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Franks for five minutes.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General O'Reilly, earlier you had just mentioned briefly
the complexity of the Arrow-3, and this was not really one
going to be one of my questions, but I was somewhat fascinated
that, potentially, it has the potential to have some paradigm
shifts in missile defense capability.
And I understand that there is at least an effort to make
sure that that process stays alive to see if they make their
knowledge points and it is because the Israelis, as you know,
certainly have shown the ability to shock the world, many
times.
And I am hoping that we can make sure that if that is to
happen again, it can be good for the United States and for
Israel. So I am glad to see that there is still an effort there
to see how they do with the Arrow-3.
The committee--in fact, you cited the Joint Staff's joint
capability, the Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) study conclusion
that twice the number of Aegis and THAAD interceptors are
required, and to the budgets, in my judgment, they did that,
and I think that is a credit to those who did.
What studies have been done to identify the force-structure
requirements for the rest of the missile defense architecture,
like for example, you know, GMD or Patriot or radars and other
sensors. Have there been other studies that, you know, to
identify the force requirements?
General O'Reilly. Sir, over the past year, we have also had
great success in establishing Memorandums of Agreements with
the Services. And in the case of the Army, I signed one with
the Secretary of the Army in January.
Part of that created a board of directors in which would
review those exact studies so that we have Army input, we
participate with the Army, and we make joint decisions. The
programs you mentioned are all Army programs, and that is how
we have worked through the Army force development process of
their Army staff to determine what are the force structure
requirements for the Army.
Mr. Franks. And, again, without pressing you too hard here,
are there copies that would be available to the committee that
would give us some clarification as to what the rationale was
in many of those case?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I will have to go back and look at
that, but I will go back to the Army and make that request.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 119.]
Mr. Franks. I would appreciate it, General. Sure would.
Let me then shift gears again. You know, there have been at
least one study that has examined alternatives to the proposed
missile defense system in Europe, and the independent
assessment conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses
(IDA), which was required by the fiscal 2008 budget.
Have you seen any alternatives to the current proposal that
are more cost-effective in providing defense of Europe and the
U.S. than the existing plan?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we are going through that cost-
estimating process right now. There are several alternatives
that it, again, it is driven by the assumptions, 30-year life,
those type of assumptions.
But the current proposal for an upper-tier defense, which
is what was proposed--upper-tier against long-range threats. We
have not seen a proposal that is less costly than that.
But we are also evaluating, and the Department is
evaluating, the protection of all of NATO, and that is more
costly when you bring in other units because you need shorter-
range units to protect the southern tier from Iran, which is
the focus of this.
But for the upper tier, for the lowest cost of protecting
for the upper tier would be the program of record, at this
time.
Mr. Franks. Well, one of the alternatives that I have seen,
you know, would provide protection for Europe, but it would not
provide protection for the homeland. And I just want to make
sure, you know, that the protection of the United States is
still a necessary criteria for the Administration's plans for
the European site.
Is that still your understanding?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. And there are analyses going on
and assessments by the Department as part of the Quadrennial
Defense Review that have not been complete yet. But, from that
point of view, the requirement I have had, the guidance I have
had, is for the protection of the United States and Europe.
Mr. Franks. General, I hope you are successful. Thank you,
sir.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Obviously, a lot of the questions that you are receiving
today concern the reduction of the 44 GBIs to 30--is a concern
of not only the level of protection that we have but also
looking forward and our capabilities to support our industrial
base.
There is concern in second- and third-tier suppliers where
reports indicate could be without work at the end of this year,
which results in the issues of loss of capability and cost for
restarting versus cost for maintaining.
You had indicated before the 44, perhaps, was arbitrary.
You believe that you have some basis for looking at 30. But one
of the issues that has been raised in the numbers that you are
going to be reducing the ground-based interceptors to is the
issue of sustaining flight testing.
According to the budget request, 10 of the remaining 14
GBIs not deployed will be used for test assets. Assuming two
flights per year, and perhaps the salvo test, the expectation
is that you would run out of test GBIs before the end of the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Once these 10 GBIs are
used up, do you see the need for further GMD flight testing?
And then the context in which this information has been
highlighted is the issue that, currently, for our ICBMs and our
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), you say they are
two to three times--there are flight tests.
My understanding is that, General Kehler has indicated that
before the Senate Armed Service Committee--that you would like
to go from three flight tests to four flight tests. The concern
is, obviously, is that with the reduction, you are going to run
out of the ability to conduct tests of something that, perhaps,
if you look at other programs, we will need a continuous
sustainment, not just for determining whether or not it
operates but whether or not there are upgrades and other types
of testing to ensure that it is operational.
If you are going to run out of these, it does seem that
there, perhaps, should be an effort to sustain our industrial
base, both the second- and third-tier suppliers, so we do not
incur a huge cost as we go forward with testing. Have you taken
that issue into consideration, and what are your thoughts?
General O'Reilly. Sir, if I can, first is I do not believe
I have said the 44 was arbitrary, it was just I have not seen
the substantiating data that was used for that. It appears to
me to have been a judgment on risk and on an intel assessment
of how many threat missiles would be available today, or we
would be threatened by, for simultaneous launch.
But, so it was a judgment made on data. It is just that
that data is still under assessment, and I know what they said
and it is not the case here----
Mr. Turner. Okay, I guess that is where I accept your
correction, however, I guess the concern that everyone has is,
well, what is the change? Is the data on which it was based
lost to you? I mean, you say you have not seen it. Because what
we would like to see is what has changed.
Everyone's understanding of the changes of the environment
we are in is an increasing threat, not a decreasing threat. And
so that is why everyone is so concerned about your now
proposing a decrease. So, in the issue of picking that number,
people have concern about what data was used. So, if you do
have an ability to look back at that and give us some
comparative, we would appreciate it. But your thoughts on the
issue of testing, I would appreciate.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
This budget was developed without the benefit of the
current test review, which is ongoing, that we have testified
to before; Dr. McQueary, myself, and General Nadeau. We are
completing that review now. It has an increase in testing over
what was previously assumed for the purpose of this budget.
Those results will go to the Missile Defense Executive Board,
and we will brief that out for judgments made by them in order
to inform our proposed budget, 2011, for the next year.
In the meantime, my concern has been, as you have stated,
to focus and ensure that we are addressing the obsolescence
process--or problems that do occur with any electronic system
over time, and we are in a position in which to activate the
production lines if they do go cold or extend those production
lines for those suppliers through a refurbishment process.
What this budget proposed which did not exist before was a
formal process where you have additional missiles, spares,
intentional. And you recycle them through fleet as a way of
measuring their performance and understanding their aging.
These are also fairly extensively tested missiles in their
silos themselves. They were designed that way up front using
the latest technology at the time, which was just a few years
ago, which is much beyond the type of fleets at which we are
compared to often, the older missile systems that do not have
the level of built-in tests and they are not monitored in the
same way in their environment.
But even with that, we have an annual maintenance program.
We have a quarterly program that goes out and looks and
measures the performance of each missile. In the past, we have
pulled missiles and refurbished them because of the
instrumentation which we have in these silos.
So, when we put that together, that is also going to be
considered into the ultimate number of GBIs that we need to
procure.
Mr. Turner. Okay. So I do not mischaracterize what you have
said, and see if I can get this right, you do believe that
there could be increased flight testing requirements in looking
at sustainment of the program. You are evaluating that. You are
going to be making recommendations as to what that would be,
and it might result in a shift in the number of ground-based
interceptors that you are going to recommend, which could, in
turn, then assist sustaining the industrial base.
General O'Reilly. That is correct, sir, as we finish this
review of what is necessary in order to fully characterize the
GMD system.
Mr. Turner. And, excuse me if you said, because I did not
catch it, what is your timeframe for that?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we had testified before we would be
complete by now. It is a very complex review involving
STRATCOM--was added to the process, so we have a warfighter
input. We thought that was important.
But our timeframe is June, sir. Next month.
Mr. Turner. So, you think that the number of ground-based
interceptors that--you may have a different number as we move
forward with this bill, then, for us.
General O'Reilly. Sir, we will propose it to the Missile
Defense Executive Board as the total results that come out of
this testing program.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
I am about to close the hearing, but I just wanted to make
one clarification, General O'Reilly, because I think that there
is clearly some confusion. Do we not already have a defense
against some of the Iranian long-term threat in the Alaska
system?
General O'Reilly. Yes, ma'am, we do----
Ms. Tauscher. So the idea that we would have no threat, no
deterrent, no defense, unless the European site was built is
really leading people astray?
General O'Reilly. Ma'am, the European site is focused on
protection of what we do not have in Europe today and redundant
coverage of the United States, but it is redundant coverage of
what we already have.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you.
Well, General Kehler and General O'Reilly, thank you very
much for being here, once again. We extend our best wishes to
people in your command, both the civilian and the Guard and the
Reserve and the folks that are working on active duty, and we
appreciate your being here.
You have informed us very well on the number of issues that
we have a lot of jurisdiction over, so we thank you very much.
And the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 21, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 21, 2009
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[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
May 21, 2009
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
General O'Reilly. In FY 2010, we will maintain the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) long-range defense capability with missile
fields at Fort Greely, AK (FGA), and Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB),
CA, where we will emplace 26 and 4 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs),
respectively. While the number of missile silos will remain at 26 at
FGA, we will transition to newer silos to improve operational
readiness. Thirty highly ready, operational GBIs will provide the
United States with a sufficient number of operational interceptors,
considering the limited number of ICBM launch complexes in North Korea
and Iran and the long development time required for construction of
additional ones. Additional GBIs, beyond the 30 emplaced in silos, will
be necessary for maintaining and refreshing an operational fleet of
GBIs through testing, upgrades and refurbishment. In FY 2010, we also
propose to fund enhancements to GMD models and simulations, upgrades to
increase the robustness and reliability of GMD communications; upgrades
to command and launch systems; and security, infrastructure, and
sustainment operations at FGA and VAFB.
In addition to the budget request for GMD, there are other
significant midcourse defense development activities in our proposed FY
2010 budget intended to enhance GMD's contribution to the BMDS.
Approximately $650M beyond the BMD Midcourse Defense program element
will benefit and enhance the operation of our long-range defenses,
namely, test planning and execution and target development ($160.6
million); development and operation of the Sea-Based X-Band radar
($174.6 million); software development, system engineering, and
External Sensors Lab work for the AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar ($201 million);
operation of the Upgraded Early Warning Radars ($28 million); modeling
and simulations ($51.3 million); and work on the Single Simulation
Framework ($36 million).
Continued research and development will improve the capability we
already have to defend against long-range rogue missile threats. We
will also continue rigorous ground testing as well as the development
and testing of two-stage GBIs to expand the defensive battle space,
better protect the United States, and potentially develop a European
Capability.
While the emerging results of the MDA test restructure study will
influence the final number of GBIs procured, the FY 2010 budget conveys
a commitment to complete the procurement of 44 GBIs already on
contract, some of which will go to the replacement and refurbishment of
the 14 oldest interceptors in order to improve operational readiness of
the fleet and extend GBI production capability. Completion of this
procurement allows us to retain an active production capability which
could be used to meet potential requirements for the European
Capability, respond to test results, and implement future policy and
fleet lifecycle management decisions. Moreover, similar to Air Force
and Navy practices for Minuteman and Trident missiles, we intend to
propose procurement of additional GBIs beyond the 44 already delivered
or on contract for long-term follow-on operational test and evaluation.
Although we will limit the number of operational silos to those
required to support the 26 interceptors at Fort Greely, we are
reviewing the construction of Missile Field #2 to determine the most
cost-effective approach to maintaining the highest level of missile
silo reliability for future decades of GBI operations.
Additionally, we are upgrading the security infrastructure and
completing the construction of a new power plant and power distribution
system at Fort Greely. Once operational GBIs are emplaced in all 30
silos, we will begin replacing the oldest emplaced GBIs with the newest
interceptors from the total produced to maintain a high state of
operational readiness in their latest configuration. [See page 17.]
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
General O'Reilly. The Services develop force structure requirements
in partnership with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). MDA provides the
technical and analytical information on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
systems to the Services so that they may determine the BMD force
structure required to meet their operational demands. Once developed,
the Services pass requirements to USSTRATCOM for prioritization and
then to MDA/Service Boards of Directors (BoD) and the Missile Defense
Executive Board, in turn, for adjudication.
MDA has assisted the Army, as Lead Service, in the development of
force structure requirements for the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) system, the AN/TPY-2 Radar (Forward-Based Mode),
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors and fire control, and
most recently, European BMD capability.
European Capability
Army and MDA have conducted numerous site visits in Poland. MDA and
the Army have developed plans for the construction of European
Interceptor Site facilities and the Army has developed force structure
estimates required to operate and maintain those facilities. The
European Operational Concept, published by MDA in April 2009, describes
the operation of the European component within the Ballistic Missile
Defense System. The Army will leverage this document when developing
the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership Personnel and
Facilities required for BMD capability. European Capability force
structure planning is on-going. However, force structure resourcing
will only occur pending ratification of agreements with Poland and when
directed to execute the program.
AN/TPY-2
The initial deployment of AN/TPY-2 (Forward-Based Mode) radar at
Shariki, Japan in Jul 2006 under national emergency underscored the
need to resource AN/TPY-2 units. MDA has provided Space and Missile
Defense Command with AN/TPY-2 concepts, operational description,
functions, and tasks to support detailed analysis for the design and
development of force structure required for AN/TPY-2 units. The Army
has conducted a force design update and resourced Table of Organization
and Equipment for four AN/TPY-2 Radars. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council reviews ballistic missile radar capabilities and
placement options to provide improved surveillance and impact point
prediction support in support of Combatant Command (COCOM)
requirements. Decisions for radar deployment follow COCOM procedures
and the Joint Staff's Global Force Management Process.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 21-inch Business Case
Analysis
MDA, in collaboration with the Army, is developing a Business Case
Analysis (BCA) analysis for the development of a 21-inch interceptor.
The Army is working on a companion study which examines the impact of
an enhanced, improved capability of a 21-inch interceptor on currently
planned Army force structure. Both studies are expected to be presented
at the next MDA/Army BoD for PB12 consideration.
Joint Capability Mix Study
The Joint Capability Mix (JCM) II study was conducted by the Joint
Staff J8 JIAMDO in collaboration with MDA and the Services. The JCM II
has recommended the acquisition of additional inventory for THAAD,
Aegis, AN/TPY-2 Radar and European Mid-course Radar. The Joint
Requirements Oversight Council has endorsed the recommendation. The
Missile Defense Executive Board and the Deputy's Advisory Working Group
have approved resources for the acquisition of these components.
Ballistic Missile Defense Review
The Ballistic Missile Defense Review, currently being conducted by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, is
analyzing key aspects of missile defense policy, force structure,
sufficiency, and funding. The review is scheduled for completion in
January 2010.
Upgraded Early Warning Radars
Air Force is the Lead Service for the Upgraded Early Warning
Radars. Force structure (manpower and funding) requirements for those
components are found in the Transition and Transfer Annexes, co-
authored by Air Force and MDA and approved by the MDA/Air Force BoD.
Aegis BMD
In addition to the Joint Capability Mix II requirements that call
out SM-3 quantities, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) has
documented formal requirements from several Combatant Commanders that
call for Aegis BMD ship presence in various regions. The requirement
exceeds what can be supported by the number of planned Aegis BMD ships.
These requirements are being addressed in PR11.
Additional Studies
The Missile Defense Executive Board Operational Forces Standing
Committee has directed review of other technology initiatives with
force structure implications. These studies are listed below. If
technology is proven, these capabilities would become the basis for
future Service force structure reviews.
Land-Based SM-3 Architecture
Early Intercept
Air-Launched Hit-to-Kill Initiative [See page 36.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 21, 2009
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. The FY 2010 budget request includes a total of $9.3
billion in missile defense funding, approximately $1.5 billion below
the FY 2009 funded level. A significant number of programs were
eliminated such as MKV and KEI; some were significantly reduced such as
GMD. Can you provide the committee with the analysis data the
Department used to recommend these total programmatic changes?
General O'Reilly. In direct response to the warfighter's expressed
needs, we are reshaping our program of work to bolster transportable
regional defense capabilities to provide more robust protection of our
deployed forces, allies and friends against existing threats.
In accordance with Unified Command Plan 08, United States Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) is responsible for synchronizing planning for
missile defense. In coordination with the other combatant commands and
the Services, USSTRATCOM uses its Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP)
to develop and produce a biannual list of desired ballistic missile
defense capabilities, the Prioritized Capability List (PCL). MDA
responds to the PCL with an assessment, called the Achievable
Capabilities List (ACL), of the technical and schedule risks and
programmatic feasibility of delivering the requested capabilities in
the timeframe specified. As a member of MDA's program control board
which manages the configuration of MDA's programmatic and operational
baselines, USSTRATCOM assesses the degree to which the ACL satisfies
the PCL. This assessment is called the Capability Assessment Report
(CAR). The CAR provides the foundation, justification, and rationale
for MDA's annual budget submission. Although the PCL is produced every
two years, the Operational Forces Standing Committee (OFSC) and the
Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) review BMDS development
priorities and progress on a bimonthly basis. These programmatic
changes are in concert with expressed warfighter ballistic missile
defense capability needs.
More specifically, the Department chose to terminate the Multiple
Kill Vehicle (MKV) program because it was not considered affordable at
this time given its technical challenges, our need to re-look at
requirements, and our need to re-allocate resources to accommodate an
increased focus on theater capabilities. The MKV technology program was
established for integration on to midcourse interceptors to address
complex countermeasures by identifying and destroying all lethal
objects in a cluster using a single interceptor. Because this
technology is still in the early stages of development and considerable
questions remain about its feasibility, we decided to focus resources
instead on technologies that are designed to defeat advanced
countermeasures of launched missiles in their ascent phase--after the
boost phase and before the threat missile reaches its apogee.
The Department terminated the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)
program because it is incompatible with the Department's direction to
counter rogue nation and theater threats and it is not the most cost or
operationally effective hedge to countering future ballistic missile
threats. KEI's boost phase intercept mission was ideal for countering
long-range, advanced, strategic threats, but current and emerging
medium- and intermediate-range threats over the next decade will be
more effectively countered early in their flight (during a threat
missile's ascent phase) by utilizing near-term interceptors and
leveraging the Missile Defense Agency's emerging BMDS sensor and
command and control network. The deployment of other interceptor
systems will be much sooner than KEI's planned deployment. The
deployment of other interceptor systems also avoids the significant
operational and platform integration issues associated with deploying a
new, large KEI class interceptor on mobile platforms. KEI was not
deemed affordable due to the cost growth of program and a program delay
from the original five years to today's fourteen-year development
schedule. In addition, delays due to technical problems indicated a
lack of technology maturity of the KEI interceptor.
Regarding the Ground-Based Missile Defense (GMD) Program, the GMD
planned program for FY10 has a balanced program for sustainment of the
current operational capability while continuing development for future
capability. The GMD program plans include funding for key element goals
in advancing the GMD system to stay well ahead of the threat
capabilities of rogue nations. Specifically, verifying capability and
improving confidence in the fielded system, continued ground/flight
testing and fielding of thirty operational GBIs. Thirty highly ready,
operational GBIs will provide the United States with a sufficient
number of operational interceptors, considering the limited number of
ICBM launch complexes in North Korea and Iran and the long development
time required for construction of additional ones.
While the emerging results of the MDA test restructure study will
influence the final number of GBIs procured, the FY 2010 budget conveys
a commitment to complete the procurement of 44 GBIs already on
contract, some of which will go to the replacement and refurbishment of
the 14 oldest interceptors in order to improve operational readiness of
the fleet and extend GBI production capability. Completion of this
procurement allows us to retain an active production capability which
could be used to meet potential requirements for the European
Capability, respond to test results, and implement future policy and
fleet lifecycle management decisions. Moreover, similar to Air Force
and Navy practices for Minuteman and Trident missiles, we intend to
propose procurement of additional GBIs beyond the 44 already delivered
or on contract for long-term follow-on operational test and evaluation.
Mr. Turner. Your Department made significant programmatic decisions
regarding U.S.- and European-based missile defense programs prior to
the completion of the Administration's QDR. Can you please explain why?
Did the applicable combatant commanders including NORTHCOM, STRATCOM,
and EUCOM play a role in this decision-making process?
General O'Reilly. The original schedule for Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) in Europe projected a 2013 capability; however, delays in
obtaining Host Nation Ratification and restrictions imposed by Section
233 of the FY09 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) have resulted
in revisions to the program schedule and funding obligation plans. The
European Component program reflects compliance with FY09 NDAA
requirements and continues to focus on two-stage interceptor
development and test, pending the outcome of the QDR, in order to
maintain the European Component of the BMDS as a viable missile defense
option.
USSTRATCOM and the Joint Staff represent the warfighter community
within the Operational Forces Standing Committee and the Missile
Defense Executive Board in reviewing BMDS development priorities and
progress on a bimonthly basis. These stated programmatic changes are in
concert with expressed warfighter ballistic missile defense capability
needs.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. In a memo to the Commander of Strategic Command in
February you wrote, ``Space-based intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems today provide many advantages to U.S.
forces in combat. However, these systems were not designed specifically
to support battlefield operations as their primary mission, yet their
services have become essential to warfighting capabilities.'' Further,
you noted that we need the capability to deliver an effects-based,
tactically focused, ISR capability that is responsive to the
warfighter. You specifically cite the need to determine how we can
provide combatant commanders the ability to directly task space-based
assets and downlink data in theater. These capabilities would provide
commanders the ability to plan and direct space-based sensors with
confidence and flexibility. In addition, receiving, processing, and
disseminating quality data in operationally relevant timeframes would
greatly enhance combat decision-making.
Are you aware that commercial satellite data providers can
immediately bolster the combatant commanders' access to high-quality
imagery and products through direct tasking and downlink and other
rapid tactical access methods?
General Kehler. Yes, we are definitely aware of the many forward-
leaning advances and capabilities offered by the commercial space
sector. One of the key drivers for today's active use of commercial
satellites was the operational demand for digital imagery during DESERT
STORM. As a result, current Eagle Vision (EV) commercial systems have
responded to the U.S. military's need for rapid, tactical access to
broad area and multispectral overhead imagery. From a military
perspective, our partnership with commercial space is a key element in
the way-ahead vision for maintaining information superiority across the
broad spectrum of military operations.
Mr. Lamborn. In a memo to the Commander of Strategic Command in
February you wrote, ``Space-based intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems today provide many advantages to U.S.
forces in combat. However, these systems were not designed specifically
to support battlefield operations as their primary mission, yet their
services have become essential to warfighting capabilities.'' Further,
you noted that we need the capability to deliver an effects-based,
tactically focused, ISR capability that is responsive to the
warfighter. You specifically cite the need to determine how we can
provide combatant commanders the ability to directly task space-based
assets and downlink data in theater. These capabilities would provide
commanders the ability to plan and direct space-based sensors with
confidence and flexibility. In addition, receiving, processing, and
disseminating quality data in operationally relevant timeframes would
greatly enhance combat decision-making.
Do you plan to leverage this critical capability that is currently
available and if so, please provide details?
General Kehler. We continue to explore a variety of commercial
satellite options and are presently leveraging this important
supporting capability. For example, the Eagle Vision system is a
commercial architecture designed to provide theater commanders and
combat units with rapid imagery products for mission planning. It is
currently deployed and is both tasking and receiving commercial space
imagery from a variety of platforms. Also of note, in the recent
Schriever V Wargame in March 2009, we explored more effective ways for
the United States to operate with commercial providers and coalition
partners to assure space and information superiority. As a part of this
evaluation, we organized an Industry Cell to operate in conjunction
with the other government groups to more effectively integrate
commercial products. While certain legal and foreign affiliation issues
must still be considered, we continue to evaluate the feasibility of
these private sector capabilities and, through currently fielded
systems and future exercises, better understand the important
contribution that commercial imagery plays in today's fight.
Mr. Lamborn. General Kehler, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is
responsible for the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) tasked with
monitoring approximately 15,000 objects in the orbital threat
environment. These objects are compounded by additional breakups, and
the entire debris field must be tracked to prevent catastrophic
collisions in space. In addition, the Haystack antenna at Millstone
Hill is being deactivated for hardware upgrade, which degrades our SSN
capability. Would AFSPC realize enhanced Space Situational Awareness by
leveraging the existing network of MDA sensors through multi-mission
sensor utilization?
General Kehler. AFSPC recognizes the potential contributions of the
MDA sensors network and continues to assess the value they could bring
to Space Situational Awareness (SSA). Within the Command, we have a
strategic approach toward achieving our Nation's SSA objectives which
includes, as our number one priority, to ``integrate and leverage
information from a variety of existing assets and sources--use current
information in new ways.'' In fact a number of our sensors already
perform important roles for missile warning, missile defense or space
surveillance depending on the scenario. Back in July 2008, when we
completed our National Interim SSA Architecture, we identified SSA
capabilities that MDA sensors could contribute toward and included them
in the architecture. Since that time, we have been involved in
activities to find the best approach for data exchange between the two
communities through a net-centric, service-oriented architecture.
Finally, we are working with our mission partners to analyze the
individual sensors' and networks' capabilities and their specific value
to the mission along with any necessary agreements that would have to
be put into place, funding sources, and concepts of operations changes.
Mr. Lamborn. General O'Reilly, I understand that the sensors
deployed in the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) collect
information on orbital space objects. This information must be assessed
for possible threat, and upon resolution, discarded as non-threatening.
Assuming that the necessary modifications are implemented with no
degradation of the primary Ballistic Missile Defense mission, would the
MDA support enhanced information sharing with the space community
through multi-mission sensor utilization?
General O'Reilly. While these activities demonstrate the inherent
capabilities of the X-Band radars to support the Space Situational
Awareness (SSA) mission, full integration of these radars into the SSA
mission will require development and testing of real-time software and
connectivity into the Space Surveillance Network (SSN). Additionally,
such use would need to be coordinated with the respective Combatant
Commanders and appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures
developed.
SSA is a difficult problem requiring a network of sensors
worldwide. The Cobra Dane Upgrade (CDU) and the Upgraded Early Warning
Radars (UEWRs) are currently connected to the SSN, provide multi-
mission capability, and have been contributing to the SSA mission for
over 20 years. Additional MDA ground and sea-based radars can
potentially support the SSA mission from their operational and test
locations, supporting launch characterization, reducing track coverage
gaps, and increasing capacity. Several of the X-Band radars have
demonstrated their ability to support the mission in the past:
The AN/TPY-2 radar has participated in the USSTRATCOM-
sponsored Extended Space Sensors Architecture (ESSA) Advanced
Capability Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
As part of this demonstration, the AN/TPY-2 radar at the
Pacific Missile Range Facility supported characterization of
the TACSAT-3 launch on May 19, 2009
The Ground-Based Radar Prototype (GBR-P) has demonstrated
an offline capability to perform long-range satellite tracking and
imaging and orbital debris tracking
During Operation Burnt Frost, multiple AN/TPY-2 radars
and the SBX all provided tracks of the USA 193 satellite as well as
high-resolution data of its destruction. Also, the CDU and the UEWRs
provided pre-event characterization and post-intercept debris tracking.
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