[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-49]
SPACE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION AND THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 30, 2009
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STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey California
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
Bob DeGrasse, Professional Staff Member
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Zach Steacy, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, April 30, 2009, Space Systems Acquisition and the
Industrial Base................................................ 1
Appendix:
Thursday, April 30, 2009......................................... 25
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2009
SPACE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION AND THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California,
Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee........................ 1
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee.................................. 2
WITNESSES
Blakey, Marion C., President and CEO, Aerospace Industries
Association.................................................... 12
Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office.............. 8
Hartman, Joshua T., Director, Space and Intelligence Capabilities
Office, Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Blakey, Marion C............................................. 64
Chaplain, Cristina T......................................... 42
Hartman, Joshua T............................................ 29
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
SPACE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION AND THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 30, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:01 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen O.
Tauscher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Ms. Tauscher. Good afternoon. The hearing of the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee will come to order.
I want to thank you all for attending. This is an important
hearing that will delve into issues surrounding the acquisition
of national security space systems.
During the past decade, most national security space
programs have experienced significant cost increases and
schedule delays. Our goal today is to explore why this happens
and to figure out how to deliver satellite systems in a timely
and cost-effective manner.
Specifically, the witnesses have been asked to address the
following questions: Why can't we control costs, and deliver
space systems in a timely fashion? Are plans for national
security space acquisitions properly balanced with the
industry's capacity to deliver? Finally, what can Congress and
the executive branch do to address these issues?
We have three excellent witnesses today. First, we have Mr.
Josh Hartman, who is Director of the Space and Intelligence
Capabilities Office, and a Senior Advisor to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
(USD (AT&L)). Mr. Hartman is well-known to members of the
committee. He is a former staffer here on the House Armed
Services Committee (HASC) and on the House Appropriations
Committee (HAC). Mr. Hartman began his career as an Air Force
Officer, where his assignments included working on space
programs in both the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO).
Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain, the Director of Acquisition and
Sourcing Management at the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO), will also testify. Ms. Chaplain is responsible
for GAO assessments of military and civilian space acquisition.
She has led a variety of Department of Defense (DOD)-wide
contracting-related and best practices evaluations during her
18-year career at GAO.
Finally, my friend, Marion C. Blakey, President and Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of the Aerospace Industries Association
(AIA), will testify. Prior to joining AIA, Ms. Blakey served a
five-year term as Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). Before that, she served as the Chairman
of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
I want to thank each of our distinguished witnesses.
I also want to recognize Mr. Steve Miller, the Director of
the Operations Analysis Procurement Planning Division for the
Cost Analysis Improvement Group, which we call the CAIG, in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). He is with us today
to answer any questions about the cost analysis report that
Congress ordered the Secretary to complete.
Last May, this subcommittee drafted language in the Defense
Authorization Act directing the Secretary of Defense to task
his Cost Analysis Improvement Group to analyze the industrial
base that supports the development and production of space
systems and provide a report by October 1, 2008. This report,
which has been provided to each subcommittee member's office,
will form the basis for our discussions this afternoon.
The report drew three conclusions. First, today's workforce
does not match the Nation's needs. The demographic make-up is
not sustainable, and hiring rates are insufficient to replace
retirements over the next 10 years.
Second, the CAIG found that every DOD satellite program had
at least a 25 percent cost growth or 25 percent schedule slip,
and almost half of all the programs had more than 100 percent
growth in both cost and schedule.
Finally, the CAIG concluded that, ``Today's DOD space
acquisition strategy is not delivering well-performing
programs,'' and ``a different approach is required.''
Specifically, the CAIG report suggested that once a company
develops competency in a mission area, the government should
view them as a partner. The government should ask for
incremental improvements to space systems, rather than trying
to drive down cost through competition, which has not saved any
money.
As you can see, the CAIG report should give us plenty to
talk about this afternoon.
With that, let me turn to my good friend, our ranking
member, the distinguished gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, for
any comments he may have.
Mr. Turner.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO,
RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for your
leadership and for hosting this subcommittee.
I also would like to welcome our witnesses, and also
recognize Josh Hartman for his prior service to this committee.
Today's hearing comes in the middle of our full committee's
legislative efforts to address defense acquisition reform. Our
intent here is to examine, in greater detail, one segment of
this broader issue--challenges in space acquisition and the
industrial base.
Forming the basis of our hearing today is some excellent
work produced by the Department of Defense's Cost Analysis
Improvement Group, CAIG, and the Government Accountability
Office, GAO. The data contained in the CAIG study presents a
stark picture of national security space. Nearly every single
defense space acquisition program is over cost and behind
schedule. Our space budget is the highest to date, yet we
launch fewer satellites per year than ever before. We have no
inventory of satellites to provide insurance for an already
fragile space constellation.
We appear to be in a precarious cycle. With fewer
satellites being launched, the requirements for each grow,
because that satellite must now be many things to many users.
Satellite complexity grows, schedules expand, and costs
balloon. High costs and long schedules mean we launch fewer
satellites, and we are back to where we started. All the while,
the pool of experienced personnel continues to shrink.
The principal question becomes: How do we break this cycle?
How do we maintain a healthy industrial base, and keep smart
scientists and engineers engaged when there are diminishing
opportunities to design and build new satellites? Do we need to
make fundamental changes to our space architecture and
investment strategy to sustain robust on-orbit constellations
and greater stability in the industrial base?
Based on the statements submitted by our witnesses, there
seems to be a consensus on what should be fixed in space
acquisition. These recommendations sound like common sense--
realistic cost and schedule estimates, requirements matched to
resources, mature technology, stable budgets, and an
experienced workforce.
My question for our witnesses is then, how do we put these
sound recommendations into practice? What are the barriers that
have prevented them from taking root in the Department?
Furthermore, with an acquisition strategy based on evolution,
how do we preserve cutting-edge science and technology (S&T)
and create the right on-ramps to incorporate these technologies
into acquisition programs?
As our subcommittee deliberates the fiscal year 2010 budget
request for space programs in such areas as missile warning,
protected communications, and imagery intelligence, we will be
looking to apply these acquisition recommendations and lessons
learned from the past.
Lastly, the statement of one of our witnesses notes the
negative impact that U.S. export control policies have had on
the health of the space industrial base. Representing several
of these second- and third-tier suppliers, I hear firsthand
their concerns. I hope, in a bipartisan way, our committee can
work together on a pragmatic approach that strikes a balance
between protecting our unique, advanced space technology and
capabilities and promoting a viable defense industry that
competes in the global marketplace.
Our witnesses bring a diverse cross-section of government
and industry views on these challenging acquisition and
industrial base issues. I look forward to hearing their
testimony.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
We will begin with Mr. Hartman. We have received your
prepared statement in advance, and it will be introduced in the
record. We welcome your remarks, Josh.
STATEMENT OF JOSHUA T. HARTMAN, DIRECTOR, SPACE AND
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OFFICE, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Hartman. Thank you, ma'am.
Chairwoman Tauscher, Ranking Member Turner, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is both a
pleasure and an honor to come back to the committee and, in
fact, subcommittee where I started my career on the Hill. So
thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today to
talk about the state of space acquisition and the space
industrial base.
We live in an increasingly complex world. The future
demands of the world from a national security perspective will
vary widely, and we will need systems from our acquisition
process that will enable speed and agility, that are responsive
and relevant to that changing environment.
Past performances, as you have noted, in the development of
our space intelligence systems has not given us great
confidence we will actually be able to produce these systems in
the future in a timely or an affordable manner. Today, we
largely survive on systems that have long lived past their
design lives; and, for tomorrow, we hope that systems that were
built with a Cold War mentality will be delivered successfully
and able to meet threats of the future.
As noted by the President and increasingly accepted across
the Department, as recently as the Secretary of Defense's
public statements on the budget which will soon come over to
you and the Congress, we in the Department are recognizing and
do recognize--for many of us, for quite a while--that, in the
past, we have not been buying the right things and in the right
manner. However, we have several initiatives under way that
will address this.
They are: increasing the program manager empowerment and
accountability; implementing configuration steering boards to
manage requirements; the use of defense support teams, joint
analysis teams, and independent program assessments;
encouraging prototyping and competitions as well as
demonstrations; and executing principle-based acquisition set
upon a group of fundamentals that should be dependent, or part
of any acquisition program, and not dependent upon an
individual system.
So in your invitation, you asked me to specifically address
the state of acquisition. My assessment of that is that current
execution of our major systems has improved, but we are not
there yet. There is still more work to be done.
As a whole, in the space and intelligence mission area, we
can point to increasing levels of success and stability. But,
as Exhibit 1 would show you, the performance of our space
programs through the electro-optical (EO), the infrared (IR),
the weather, the precision navigation and timing, as well as
space situational awareness (SSA) throughout the Air Force, the
Navy, and the National Reconnaissance Office, as well as tri-
agency efforts have been anything but successful.
The results of these programs have been a delay in critical
capabilities to our intelligence customers and to our
warfighters. We have put fixes in place, but, as I suggested,
we haven't gone far enough.
The way that we currently buy and deploy these systems
have, and will continue to produce critical capability gaps and
delays in fielding those systems, especially as we move into an
environment where responsiveness and dynamic tempo will be much
more of a driver in our operational conflicts.
So to establish a theme that will cover throughout both my
statement and, I presume, the questions, I want to quote from
the executive summary of the OSD CAIG's Space Base Industrial
Assessment of 2008, and that is: ``The recent focus on
transformational systems has hampered the execution pace
required to maintain legacy capabilities. Stability in the
workforce and the Department's desires must be achieved. The
Department must re-examine its acquisition strategies to secure
continued operational performance from these space domains.
Successful programs are those that have realistic cost and
schedule expectation, are well understood, have stable budgets,
experienced and stable staffs, and have a spiral development
acquisition strategy.''
In the past, our corporate level Office of the Secretary of
Defense oversight was inadequately or improperly focused. Our
space and intelligence organizations operated autonomously,
largely. There was not a good, strong organization to provide
this oversight within the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
(AT&L) area within OSD.
But, to address this, OSD has created an organized and
certified set of acquisition professionals who are space savvy
within the office of AT&L, called the Space and Intelligence
Capabilities Office, who will perform this function now.
So we are putting back in charge of the acquisition of
these--I am sorry--the oversight of these acquisition programs
a good pool of skilled acquisition professionals who will know
right where to go in order to help manage these programs in the
future.
Over the last two decades, the skills of our workforce and
of our government folks have atrophied both in program
management and in engineering. This can be attributed primarily
to a training deficiency, leadership shortfalls, and an
unstable investment in the space industrial base.
Today, we face a challenge with an aging workforce and low
recruitment that results in junior and middle management gaps
for the current state of acquisition, as well as the future. We
see this in Exhibit Number 2, where you will see the older,
more experienced engineers will soon be retiring, and we have
had trouble bringing on younger engineers, putting them in the
right programs to be able to replace that skill set.
Our programs will need technically smart people and
accountable, disciplined leaders who can execute them properly.
Stable funding in the industrial base, grassroots technical
education efforts, and changes in the space community business
model will make this area a more enticing place to work and
make our recruitment goals easier to achieve.
Our most daunting problem, though, is that across the space
and intelligence community we have asked the industrial base to
do things that are unwise, inefficient, and often, frankly,
impossible. We have attempted to buy large monolithic systems
that produce a capability of ``one-size-fits-all,'' meaning a
single system that satisfies all of its users.
The philosophy of ``one-size-fits-all'' has driven much of
our acquisition strategy since 1970; and, using the CAIG data,
you can see the remarkable change in Exhibit 3, that as we move
from year to year comparing the annual number of launches to
the overall investment within the space community, we move from
a high number of launches at lower cost to a low number of
launches at higher cost.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on pages 35, 37, and 38.]
So, as we progressed, we began to rely more on individual
systems. We piled more and more sensors on those individual
systems. We raised the complexity of those individual systems.
And, in the end, we wonder why we don't find the performance
that we once had.
This model, I would suggest, is a Cold War relic. It is
when space systems were needed to satisfy only strategic policy
decisionmakers, and events unfolded in a fairly static
timeline. Today's reality is that one size does not actually
fit all. We need to evaluate alternatives to the large, complex
systems, use less complex systems, less risky systems when we
can do so without compromising the missions of our satellites
that are needed to perform those critical missions. Our needs
neither can be, nor should they be satisfied from one orbit
with a single mega-sensor acquisition model.
There are three remaining reasons for this. First,
instability in government demand caused by the mega-sensor
model has evaporated much of the skills in the workforce to
meet the demands in the future. Additionally, our business
practices have provided insufficient volume for the sub-tier
component and technology providers to remain viable or to
stimulate benefits from innovation or competition.
Second, different types of users require different amounts
of data, and at different times, in different geographic
regions, from different sensors. For example, users in Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM) might require foliage-penetrating radar or
electro-optical imagery, while the capability would largely go
unused in Central Command (CENTCOM) because there aren't many
trees in the desert. Pacific Command (PACOM) may need open
ocean surveillance of ship tracking, while European Command
(EUCOM) may want to understand the pattern of low-level IR
events. The operational tempos in each of these areas of
responsibility (AOR) will diverge. We know there is high demand
in CENTCOM, low demand in SOUTHCOM. Developing a system that
can satisfy all of these users, all the time is unsustainable,
if not impossible.
Third, we must begin to consider the implications of a
contested environment in space. I think there is no debate that
protection, dissuasion, and deterrence must be a part of our
national security space strategy. Deploying architectures with
constellations of just a few satellites leave the Nation
incredibly vulnerable and invites our adversaries to target our
systems. The bang for the buck is just too great for them to
pass up. Taking out a satellite of a 5-ball constellation
versus a satellite of a 20-ball constellation completely
changes the calculus and the risk for attacking our assets in
space. Survivability must be a consideration in our acquisition
processes; and our current acquisition model, unfortunately,
only reinforces this vulnerability.
The solution is to change our business model that will
enable the employment of an architecture of distributive
multiple nodes, layered capabilities to provide the right layer
of that capability at the right geographic regions, at the
right time. Architectures should leverage commercial systems.
Multiple sensors from different sizes of spacecraft and non-
space platforms should be an integrated architecture that
weighs the benefits of those multiple sensors and those
multiple media in which we need the capability for our
warfighters.
This model will provide for a balanced architecture where a
foundational capability will provide for medium or large
systems. At the same time, small and agile, less complex
systems would be layered to augment in optimized orbits with
additional capability in high-demand areas, or niched
capability for special operations, irregular needs, or crisis
situations.
As recommended by the GAO and by the CAIG, evolution of
capability would be a hallmark and a key tenet of this model.
Systems would purposely be designed to live shorter lives to
reduce the system complexity and the amount of redundancy
required. It would synchronize on-orbit life with development
time. It would increase industrial volume and take advantage of
rapidly advancing technology.
This new business model would have multiple benefits in the
industrial base, the government workforce, and the capability
of our warfighters. It would shorten cycle times, allowing for
the quicker fielding of assets. It would allow for larger
volume purchases and, as I suggested, a greater technology
refresh rate at a time when technology changes quicker than we
can launch systems.
It would produce a more stable workforce due to the
synchronization of development time and mean mission duration.
This is really very important, and I want to try to highlight
why that is important.
If I build a system that takes me 8 years to build and it
lasts for 15 years, I immediately have a disconnect between the
workforce that is rolling off of a program and then should be
rolling on to the next program. I have got to find something
for that workforce to do for the next eight years until the
replenishment of that satellite is needed.
This new model will reduce overall program risk. It would
raise confidence in delivery at a time when, frankly, the users
have little confidence in our ability to deliver. It would
generate efficiencies that our current system does not produce;
and, due to the shorter development schedules, it would create
a continuity of expertise, a sense of ownership of individual
systems by the workforce, government, and industry, which would
increase morale and the attractiveness of the space field,
having a positive effect on recruitment.
The model would restructure competition and reinvigorate
innovation through a focus on new payload and subsystem
developments. The competition model that we use today is to
compete in the entire system but a bus--a satellite bus is a
satellite bus. I am oversimplifying a little bit. But the true
innovation comes at the sensor and payload level, and that is
how we ought to structure competition.
Last, this business model would architect survivability of
space assets by design, making it more difficult and costly for
an adversary to negate our space capability. Adversaries rarely
play to each other's strengths, so we shouldn't be surprised
that future adversaries and future environments don't conform
to the results of a ``one-size-fits-all'' acquisition in
architecture.
We shouldn't presume that our warfighters will be taken
care of under this model. We shouldn't presume that industry
can produce under this model. As a result, we should adopt a
new business model and implement these new architectures for
our space and intelligence systems.
I believe all these changes can be appropriately introduced
to produce the desired results. However, many of the problems I
have talked about are enmeshed in our culture, and this culture
has to change. Congress has a role in helping the
Administration reinforce that cultural change.
I look forward to working with you and answering your
questions today.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Hartman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hartman can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
Ms. Tauscher. Ms. Chaplain, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Chaplain. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me today to discuss
this topic. It comes at a critical juncture for the space
acquisition community.
First, it is clear that there are acquisition problems that
continue to restrain the ability to invest in the future.
Second, there has been recent cancellations of programs that
actually represent that future DOD was hoping to get to. Third,
DOD currently faces culture capability gaps in very critical
areas: protected communications; weather surveillance; space
surveillance; navigation, timing, and positioning. And, fourth,
there are concerns about the capacity and leadership and that
we are losing our edge in space technology.
My testimony today is going to focus on the condition of
space acquisitions, the causes, and the solutions; and I
believe you will see a lot of commonality between what Josh
said and I said. I think that is a good thing.
On the condition of space acquisition, we continue to find
large cost overruns in space programs, adding up to billions of
dollars and schedule delays adding up to years. In fact, some
programs we thought were going to be on a better track last
year saw some setbacks this year.
Just a couple of examples. The Advanced Extremely High
Frequency (AEHF) program ran through some more delays this year
because it had encountered design and workmanship problems in
the process of integrating the satellites. Last September, the
program reported a unit cost about 130 percent above the
baseline due to both technical problems and a decision to buy
another satellite.
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS) program, which is focused on weather
and environmental study, continued to experience problems in
development even after being restructured shortly--just a year
or so ago. The launch date has slipped from November 2009 to
January 2013. It is a three-year delay. The original life-cycle
cost was $6.5 billion. It is now $13.5 billion and likely to go
higher.
Why is this happening? I think what we see in our reviews
is consistent with what the CAIG saw, the Defense Science Board
has reported, and other committees and study groups have said.
First, there is a tendency to start programs too early,
before technologies are fully understood, before requirements
are settled, and before we even have agreements between the
community on what the system represents and how we are going to
use it together.
Two, space programs are increasingly ambitious. In terms of
requirements, as Josh mentioned, we are trying to build
satellites that are more monolithic and serving too many
communities, but also ambitious in terms of schedule that seems
to be immovable and creates a lot of pressures on the program.
Third, there is a lot of optimism in the planning phase in
terms of cost and schedule. We performed a review for this
committee a couple of years ago, and in virtually every major
space program, we found very consistent optimism across a
number of categories, including things like industrial base
capability, technologies, requirements, stability to fund the
programs.
Fourth, there is a diversity of stakeholders in space that
you don't see in other weapons programs. So this is an added
difficulty to space acquisitions that we don't see on the other
side of weapons. Some programs involve all military services,
various Pentagon components, various components in the Air
Force, Strategic Command (STRATCOM), potentially the NRO,
potentially the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA),
and even outside agencies in cases like the Global Positioning
System (GPS). There is no one really at the top to negotiate
all these competing priorities and try and focus on getting
acquisition and being able to make those top-level decisions.
We have identified a number of other factors in our review
that I think have been identified by others as well, one being
funding shifts within the programs. Ultimately, some programs
become bill payers for other programs, and that caused the
delay in the start of the GPS IIIA program, which is now facing
a lot of schedule pressures.
Also, there are gaps in the workforce. As you heard from
Josh and you will hear from others today, when we go to program
offices ourselves, we see big gaps in the program offices. A
lot of key technical and business positions aren't being
filled, and often the people we see who know the most about a
program are the contractor employees or the Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) employees versus the
government employees. When we did our cost-estimating review
for this committee, we also found gaps in cost-estimating
expertise.
Another issue is short program manager tenure and lack of
accountability. Another one is the lack of funding for testing
articles in space. In fact, a lot of people have said over the
years it seems like there is more an aversion to test and fail
before an acquisition than to try new things and to see
failures and wring out the risks before you can begin an
acquisition. These days, there is not enough funding to be able
to even test in general.
There are some factors we have identified that are tied to
the industrial base. Consolidations in the space industry have
resulted in less competition. Conversely, there has been a
desire to compete and go with a lower price, which has resulted
in going with contractors who don't necessarily have the
expertise needed to complete that program. In fact, on a few
programs you hear complaints that we have ``lost the recipe.''
There has also been the consolidations during the 1990s
with the emphasis on acquisition reform. When it was
implemented in the space world, it was really more of a
relaxing of oversight and quality assurance activities that
really had an impact on the things like quality of parts and
systems engineering that has had a big impact on space
programs. That happened within government and within industry.
Also, there is a gap of technical workforce in the
commercial sector that we have seen reported by a number of
study groups. So it is not just happening in government, it is
happening in the commercial sector.
I would like to note, though, that we have visited a number
of commercial satellite suppliers in a recent review, and they
each told us they feel like they do have the workforce they
need to do their work.
When it comes to a solution set, I really believe there is
broad agreement between what we are saying, what the CAIG is
saying in its report, what the Allard Commission said in its
recent study for these committees, and what has been said by
many others over time, and also the solutions, I believe, is
what is being advocated for the entire weapons portfolio. And
they are very simple tenets that were suggested by the ranking
minority member.
First, more achievable requirements; second, more up-front
understanding of technology; third, strengthened leadership;
fourth, stability in funding--and that means setting priorities
to which systems receive the highest and so forth. Next, is
strength in workforce. And also that comes with giving good
incentives to program managers and ensuring they stay long
enough so they can be held accountable for the decisions that
they make.
Next are the types of solutions that Josh has been talking
about, kind of looking at solutions that focus on smaller kinds
of satellites, more achievable systems, and programs that stay
in production for long periods of time, that constantly are
renewing themselves so you are constantly renewing and
strengthening the industrial base.
The CAIG also noted in its study a need for stability in
contractors with specialized expertise. We agree that programs
that have switched contractors who don't necessarily have the
expertise to do a program has caused problems. But when you
talk about an approach that is going to stick with one
contractor for a certain kind of capability over multiple
programs, there are some cautions that need to be kept in mind.
One is you still do need competition at some level. Josh
suggested that would be at the payload or sensor level, and we
would agree with that at GAO.
Second, you still want a process where you are going to
encourage new entrants into the acquisition process. They are
the ones that give you the opportunity to innovate and get
better value. And there are some programs in defense--and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) focused on
getting new entrants. We just need to maintain that focus and
make sure it is well resourced.
Third, under any conditions, you need strong oversight on
the government's part. It is more important than ever if you
are sticking with one contractor, program after program, that
it is difficult to do when you have deletions in program
management capability and oversight on the government side.
Last is just to keep in mind that stability in contractors
is not the only fix that we need for space. There are other
issues here that really need to be addressed, one being making
sure technologies are well understood before a program begins;
making sure requirements are understood and remain stable;
making sure funding remains stable; making sure tenure in
program managers is at a length that ensures accountability;
and making sure you have the leadership over all space
programs.
What is being done today, there are a lot of good actions
being undertaken. At the DOD-wide level, there are actions
designed to strengthen program managers and to make them more
accountable. There are actions designed to improve the
investment process so that you can focus better on priorities.
At the Air Force level, there are a lot of actions going on
in the area of cost estimating. There is emphasis on a back-to-
basics policy that focuses on evolutionary development, not
biting off more than you can chew.
On individual programs like the GPS IIIA program, there are
a lot of good decisions being made upfront to better position
those programs for success.
At Congress, there has been legislative proposals--one of
which was discussed this morning by the larger committee--that
have a very broad span of actions designed to increase
knowledge upfront and better execute programs throughout.
While there is widespread agreement on what needs to be
done, you still need to make sure that there are larger changes
in the planning, budgeting, and acquisition processes that sync
up to these reforms that really establish priorities. You also
need to ensure that there is accountability in this process,
something that has been hard to do, to date. You do need, as
Josh said, changes in the culture and mindset to accept these
kinds of changes, even a different kind of architectural
approach that focuses on small, more achievable, versus large,
exotic, monolithic.
I don't want to diminish the good things. Even with all
these reform efforts, I really believe a focus needs to be
really strong on just maintaining the capability we have and
ensuring that we don't face capability gaps in some of those
areas I mentioned.
That concludes my statement. I am happy to take any
questions you have.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Ms. Chaplain.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain can be found in the
Appendix on page 42.]
Ms. Tauscher. Ms. Blakey.
STATEMENT OF MARION C. BLAKEY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AEROSPACE
INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION
Ms. Blakey. Thank you.
Good afternoon, Madam Chairman. I appreciate very much the
chance to be here with you all this afternoon and to be able to
speak before this distinguished panel. Ranking Member Turner,
thank you very much for the opportunity.
Before I go on, I would like to congratulate you, Madam
Chairman, on your new nomination, too. Needless to say, we are
very enthusiastic about the prospect of having you as our Under
Secretary for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. So we look
forward to having you in that role, as well.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you.
Ms. Blakey. It would be hard to overstate the importance of
our national space infrastructure. Security space
infrastructure is absolutely vital to our country's overall
high technology capability, and it supports virtually every
aspect of our modern military and civilian way of life. The
space industrial base also accounts for thousands of high-
quality, high-paying jobs; and this, of course, is critically
important in today's economy.
There are several challenges that we see as posing specific
threats to the national security space industrial base. The
first challenge is the shrinking aerospace workforce. America's
scientists, engineers, and other technical workers are the core
of our Nation's space industrial base. But we have real
concerns that, as the current generation ages and retires, we
are not renewing the workforce to keep America at the forefront
of technology development.
According to a survey that we did with Aviation Week--the
aerospace industry has tackled this very issue, and we found
that more than 60 percent of our aerospace workforce was age 45
or older, and many are near or in fact at retirement age at
this point.
Indications show that there are not sufficient numbers of
high school and college-age students studying science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) to replace the
generation of workers that are about to retire. And the
shortfall of experienced workers ages 35 to 40 calls into
question the ability of our industry to meet the Defense
Department needs.
The second challenge is the defense acquisition process
itself. Both government and industry have the goal of providing
the best equipment possible, at the best value to taxpayers
just like you and me. There is room for significant improvement
in DOD's process, which is hampered at this point by size and
complexity and instability in important areas like requirements
and budgeting.
The last challenge is our outdated export control system,
which directly hampers the aerospace industry's ability to meet
Defense Department needs, as you noted, Congressman Turner. The
U.S. export control system has negatively affected the Nation's
space industry, particularly the network of supplier companies
that provide the components for our space programs.
The United States used to dominate the global satellites
export market until the rules changed about 11 years ago that
put commercial satellites on the U.S. munitions list. As a
result, our share of the export market dipped below 70
percent--dipped from about 70 percent in 1995, to about 25
percent in the year 2005. Those who know the details of the
change, know that the intention behind this was good, but
clearly the results have been disastrous and directly impact
the industry's ability to provide the equipment our warfighters
rely on.
We have several recommendations to preserve the health of
the national security space industrial base. First, the
Administration should establish a national space management and
coordination body that reports directly to the President. We
believe they should have the authority to coordinate, across
departments and agencies, all of our space efforts.
Second, officials must support and invest in the science
and education national priorities that we have detailed. This,
of course, first and foremost, are the STEM initiatives to
address this workforce challenge.
Third, the DOD should implement management practices that
promote requirement stability and accurate cost estimates, just
as the other witnesses here today have noted, because this will
ensure that programs can come out on time and on budget.
As articulated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Cost Analysis Improvement Group, the CAIG, I also will quote
from their report: ``Stability starts with government's funding
and plans, leads to an efficient and productive industry
workforce, and results in well-performing programs that deliver
mission area success.'' First and foremost, again, stability.
Lastly, I would note that lawmakers and the Administration
do have to take concrete steps to reevaluate the International
Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) controls on commercial
satellite technologies. This is very important, and we believe
it needs to be addressed at this point.
So, in closing, it is absolutely vital that we continue to
maintain and upgrade the national security space systems,
adequately protect them, and ensure the healthy industry base
that is going to be needed for their development.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to be here today.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Blakey can be found in the
Appendix on page 64.]
Ms. Tauscher. I am going to begin with questions.
Mr. Hartman, in your testimony, you describe actions to
empower program managers, create steering boards, provide
technical support, increase competition, and practice
principle-based acquisition. Yet, I am still not clear how the
Department intends to establish stability in industry, and
which programs offer procurement of a very small number of
highly complex items.
Specifically, with the cancellation of the Transformational
Satellite (TSAT) program, what actions will the Department take
to retain industry engineers and scientists involved in
protected communications?
The second, sub question: How would you recommend managing
the missile warning business post-Space-Based Infrared System
(SBIRS) to avoid another major disconnect in this business
line?
Mr. Hartman. Thank you for the questions.
Protected Comm is a national asset. We will continue to
have demands in this new environment that I mentioned that will
force us to move most of our Comms, we believe, to protected
assets.
In the future, in light of the cancellation of TSAT, we
will look at how to implement additional capabilities on
Advanced EHF and the WGS--Wideband Global Positioning System--
and begin to look at, as I suggested, a layered approach to
finding that additional capability from a protected and anti-
jam perspective.
We are just in the midst of cleaning up all the pieces
after the cancellation. There is lots of potential technology
harvesting that should and will take place as a result of the
nearly $3 billion we spent on TSAT that will become the
foundation for the future plans for that augmentation to
advanced EHF or additional free-flyer systems to produce that
layered architecture I talked about.
Ms. Tauscher. How do you make sure that the technology that
is harvested actually has a human capital component to it that
we don't lose?
Mr. Hartman. We have been working with the two prime
contractors and their subs to take a look at the next level
down, primarily focused at their sub-vendors. In the space
industry, the primes don't really have the core of the
expertise to produce these systems. That strength comes from
their subs. So we realize that the strength in that workforce-
protected Comm will result in investment in the sub-tier. So we
will look at the right arrangement with industry to maintain
that workforce level.
Ms. Tauscher. I think the things that you described
earlier, and that Ms. Chaplain talked about, too, when you have
long lead on a lot of these systems, and it takes five, seven,
longer to actually develop and put these things in orbit, you
have got to understand that there has got to be something for
people to do in the meantime. Whether we have a blended
solution that includes a suite of acquisition--I think part of
what we have to do is understanding that very few of these
things are, in and of themselves, the totality of what we are
looking for.
So I think very much like they do in the computer
business--they went from selling boxes to selling suites--
because you have to stretch out the capability of your
workforce to continue to work while you are in development of
new things.
Perhaps what we have to do is to look at a suite of systems
and make sure that when we are doing acquisitions, we are not
buying onesies and twosies. We are buying enough to keep the
capabilities fresh, to keep the workforce energized, and to
have a very aggressive outreach to universities and colleges,
and where we are really dipping down into high schools,
frankly, and making it very clear that these are robust jobs,
good-paying jobs that have a long life, and that you are not
going to be out on the street every time somebody decides to
either cut the funding or switch to something else.
So I think that there is a combination. I know Mr. Turner
and I talk about this offline quite often. I think that you
could get a lot of bipartisan support in--both the industry and
the Administration could get a lot of bipartisan support in
taking that approach so that we weren't finding ourselves
always trying to figure out how to patch things together when
one situation doesn't meet our expectations.
I am going to pause here. I have a number of other
questions both for Ms. Chaplain and Ms. Blakey, but I am going
to yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I have got one question about the CAIG's recommendation,
and then I want to get to the trade issue.
The CAIG is recommending a 20- to 30-year long-term program
and resource plan for the national security space enterprise.
What are your thoughts on such a plan?
Mr. Hartman. I think in the current business model that
something like that has to be done, because it takes us 10
years to produce a system. So in order to develop that
continuity that Congressman Turner talked about, you have to
look that far in advance.
But I would argue that that would be a difficult process.
It will be a process that changes a great deal. And the reason
why is in the space domain, the users are very unsophisticated
at this point. They have a hard time articulating what it is
they need 2 years from now, let alone 20 or 30 years from now.
When you match that with the quickly evolving pace of
technology, it is very difficult for me to put together an
architecture and a capability plan 20 to 30 years from now. So
that is why I think it is important for us to restructure the
business model and allow us to be able to field systems in a 2-
to 3-year period or 4 to 5, rather than this 10-year period we
are currently on now.
Mr. Turner. My biggest concern, in addition to the export
controls in the industry, is the concept of innovation. It
would seem to me that although you can tell if you have a 20-
or 30-year plan what your current capability gaps would be,
what you can currently do that you are going to lose, it would
seem very difficult to project what needs you might have or
what ingenuity that might arise, causing you to be interested
in a new technology that you are not currently pursuing.
That also goes into my concept of is this workforce, the
fluctuations in demands--you are not going to be getting--the
opportunity for ingenuity frequently happens on the shop floor
when someone is tinkering with something, not when someone gets
a contract with a spec requirement that someone did at their
desk. That tinkering, that ability to work with what you are
doing, gets suppressed when you have these spurts and then
valleys.
Mr. Hartman. Sir, I think a great way to describe what you
just talked about is, in a model that forces us to look that
far in advance, we are forced to use invention rather than
innovation. Innovation, as you suggested, is taking today's
capabilities, tinkering with them, to produce results in the
near term, as opposed to producing a big-bang sort of invention
that will satisfy our needs in a 20- to 30-year timeframe.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Blakey, your thoughts.
Ms. Blakey. I think we do need to pay attention to the
opportunity, though, for both invention and innovation. And
research and development (R&D) is at the heart of this, having
enough funding and enough support for R&D and, frankly, a
tolerance for failure. Because it does, at times, come down to
that. Are we willing to take some risk to make leapfrog
technologies happen?
So all that, I think, is what the industry is very eager to
offer, if we have the support to do it.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Chairman, could I ask you a question? I
think what Ms. Blakey just talked about, I think, is part of
the nut of the problem. Part of the problem we have got is that
so much of what we are doing is not R&D but actually trying to
put things out. And if we could bifurcate, like the real world
tries to; if we had a constancy of R&D, instead of trying to do
R&D on a job, because you don't have funding for R&D. Instead,
you have to wait to get the job, and then you do R&D and try to
call that the job, but, in truth, you are still trying to
spiral-up to get the capability.
You and I have talked before about a constancy of R&D and a
way to have that happen. Clearly, we have got a private sector
that would like to spend more in R&D, but they don't get paid
for that. I think we should try to talk together as to what
ideas you all have.
For me, what Ms. Blakey just said reminded me of the fact
that, for a long time, we were forcing the private sector to
effectively do their R&D on the job. Wait until they get the
contract and then try to push ahead. A lot of this is on the
move, and what we need to do is have much more of an invested,
consistent, predictable R&D base. Then I think you actually
pretty much know what you are going to get when you buy
something. Because they have developed it, not just dreamed it
up, and then you can control--considering the fact you can't
control much--but you can control for some level what the cost
and what the deliverable will be, instead of having a lot of
this on a wish list called a contract.
Mr. Turner. That would be great. Those are excellent
points. You are close to advancing a product. You are advancing
knowledge. That, then, can lead to products. That is excellent.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. The export control issue is one that I am very
interested in because, as you were describing, Ms. Blakey, you
said that we had 70 percent and then went down to 25 percent in
the market. Although we recognize, as you did in your comments,
that there are some things we don't want to put out in general
commerce or in the hands of just anyone, it would seem that
since someone else is satisfying that market that someone else
has the knowledge and capability and is selling knowledge and
capability, so the end result is people have some technical
capability and that we ought to be able to have an opportunity
to commercially participate in that.
We certainly have the review process when someone asks to
export something. I wonder what you know of, when we do that
assessment, what is lost. We are down to 25 percent. Is that
gap one that we are prohibited in participating? In other
words, I might have the best widget, and the export control
says, ``You can't give them that.''
Is the competition providing the equivalent, or are they
providing something less? And who would be doing that? How do
we know what is out there in the commercial area that we are
losing as we try to address this issue of export controls?
Ms. Blakey. Well, I continue to believe that U.S. industry
can provide the finest technology out there. In terms of
quality, unparalleled. So I genuinely believe that we still can
be highly competitive in this arena, despite the downturn that
the ITAR restrictions have caused for us.
When you have companies out there worldwide, advertising
that they have ITAR-free satellites that can be immediately
contracted for, and those who are needing the service say, ``We
would like to have the U.S. quality, but in fact the delays,
the problematic nature, perhaps it won't happen,'' all those
kinds of things really do put a tremendous drag behind our
capability.
And I would also go to your point earlier, Congressman
Turner, and that is we are talking about the second and third
tier of smaller, specialized providers, that those suppliers
are really not in a position to go through all the hoops that
ITAR often requires, and so they have to content themselves
with supplying only to the U.S. Government. And that is a very
thin support at times for those companies.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Hartman, any comments on export controls?
Mr. Hartman. I think--I won't go into great detail, but I
think the current regime has been burdensome. I think it was
developed at a time when it was to address specific needs at
that time 11 years ago, as Ms. Blakey said. We exist in a new
global environment, and I think the new regime needs to adjust
to that new global environment to make our industry more
competitive overseas and to allow the partnerships that I think
we are going to need for the future to be able to bring the
capability to the users of space systems.
Mr. Turner. I think there was a time when the U.S. economy
was viewed with such vastness we thought there were areas we
could take hits in by being overly restrictive. Now, as we are
in these economic times, it shows there are areas that we need
to be competing in in order to thrive.
But I do also think it goes back to the issue of ingenuity,
that the more that we are doing, even in the commercial side,
the more we are going to have. As our chairman was saying, that
the concept of R&D can have an alternative source of funding,
also, to support operations.
Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner.
We are now going to go to five-minute questioning. I want
to thank all the members for coming. We have a large cadre of
members here, and I appreciate that very much. We are going to
go to Mr. Larsen for five minutes, the gentleman from
Washington.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Blakey, I don't want to sound critical of the term
``tolerance of risk,'' but this chart that Mr. Hartman had is
why the tolerance may be at an all-time low for risk here in
Congress and, as well, why we're looking at an acquisition
reform bill in the full committee that Ms. Chaplain outlined.
It is because of the cost increases, the budgets and schedules
being far above what anyone planned. I think until we get past
that--until we can get through acquisition reform, that the
tolerance for risk might continue to be fairly low, which
probably doesn't spell out a very good future in terms of the
budgets that we have seen in the past, especially in the
satellite programs we have overseen here on this committee over
the last several years. It has been a point of frustration for
a lot of us.
I do want to, though, ask you a little bit more about the
export-control issue. I think you are absolutely right-on with
regards to the problems with ITAR and the ITAR-free
advertising. But, as well, the point Mr. Hartman made about,
perhaps 11 years ago, it might have been time for the
particular export-control regime we have--let history judge
that--but can you speak to this point: I have been over to
China, the China Academy of Science and Technology, which is
where their satellite showroom is located, basically. They will
put you in a car for $5,000. The whole design of this place is
to go around and show other countries who want to be involved
in space activities, commercial or otherwise, to show folks
what the Chinese can offer.
In other words, the export-control regime certainly hasn't
seemed to stop any other country from moving forward on
satellite development, satellite launch, commercial or
otherwise.
And so, looking at this export-control regime, it seems to
be something we want to do because it certainly hasn't achieved
its objective. If we still come to the same conclusion that we
want to have it the way it is, then let's do that
intelligently, rather than blindly, which it what it seems we
are doing now.
Can you comment on that?
Ms. Blakey. No, I think that is exactly right. I think that
we all agree that for truly sensitive technologies--
technologies where we are maintaining our national security
based upon very fine technologies that should not be allowed
outside of our country or only in a very trusted community of
allies--that is set aside, and that we should focus more on, in
fact, being very careful on those.
But in the commercial world where, just as you say, this is
widely available and it really is a question of being
competitive on the basis of quality, reliability,
deliverability. We could and should compete there in a way that
we are just not able to with the current, very outdated system
and list. So that is what we are asking for Congress to take a
good look at, because we do believe at this point, it is time.
I should also probably be clear in my remarks earlier in
talking about risk, because what I was going to was not on
specific programs where there is a deliverable and you have got
both cost and budget deadlines that must be met. We are
actually proposing a number of reforms on the acquisition front
because we believe it must be much more reliable and effective.
But R&D, our country right now is underfunding, we are
underinvesting, and, honestly, this Congress could address
this. Because making the R&D tax credit permanent so that we in
industry know what to count on, it may not seem that large, but
without that stability, living year-to-year, hand-to-mouth on
this, it is not the way you are going to get the kind of robust
investments, whether it is industry or government funding, that
is at issue there. And the industry would like to step up more.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Hartman, would you say that the CAIG
recommendations would be consistent, or nearly consistent, or
not at all consistent with what Secretary Gates has said about
trying to get to a 75 percent solution rather than a 99 percent
solution?
Mr. Hartman. I wouldn't want to speak for the CAIG. We have
Steve here to talk about that, if necessary.
But I think, in talking to Steve, my assessment of what the
CAIG's recommendation is is completely in line with where the
SECDEF is. The SECDEF has talked about the need for ``good
enough.'' He didn't specifically mention space systems. But it
is very applicable to space systems, and it goes in line with
the business model that I was suggesting.
And, in the context of requirements management and
expectation management, we ought to spend more time working
with the users to explain to them really what a space system
can do for them and the timeline associated with being able to
produce this capability; letting them know that in three years
we can give them this good enough capability and continue to
shoot in the next evolution toward what their end desires are.
Mr. Larsen. I just want to conclude by saying sometimes ho-
hum works better than whiz-bang, which sometimes never works.
Mr. Hartman. Absolutely.
Ms. Tauscher. Let me give members and our witnesses the
state of play. We are about to be called in about 15 to 30
minutes for an hour of votes. Today is Thursday. This is ``get
out of town day,'' as we call it. So I want to give members a
chance to at least ask a question, and then if we still have
time before the votes are called, we will go through it again.
We have got four members with five minutes each. If members
have more lengthy questions that are more substantive, if you
want to submit a question for the record, please feel free to
do that. Those members who have already asked questions are
free to do that, too.
I want to turn to Mr. Franks of Arizona for five minutes.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will try to not abuse
the time here at all.
I appreciate all of you for being here. I think we all do.
It is a critically important subject, and it is reflected in
some of your testimony. Of course, the United States can't
afford to do without the national security space system. It is
not only critical to gathering information related to
terrorists and unfriendly nations' weapons programs, our
military leaders would be completely blind without what all of
you do. I certainly thank you. I know the whole committee does.
Mr. Hartman, I know that a lot of this has been covered,
but acquisition in the Department of Defense is obviously a
notoriously kind of slow and inefficient and costly process.
Sort of a bureaucratic challenge. It is not to demean the
Department. It is just a complicated job. And that reputation
is especially true related to space acquisitions.
Sometimes Congress tends to think that the solutions come
in the form of greater oversight, creating more offices and
programs. Is there anything that you think that we can do away
with or add, notwithstanding Ms. Blakey's suggestion, to make
the circumstances better? What do you think is currently being
done that would resolve the bureaucratic condition of the space
acquisition program?
Mr. Hartman. Sir, I think I would recommend three things
that Congress could focus on. First is helping the executive
branch toward consolidating and establishing strong leadership
in the space and intelligence community. That would clarify a
lot of the problems. It would focus us in on the requirements
and investment issues that we continue to have in the debates.
The second thing I would do is look at finding ways to
encourage the Department to fully fund programs through the
entire--through five years of our planning cycle. Our resource
team tends to focus on the year of execution, which is the most
important year. It is the year that we bring the budget over to
you. The problem is that, in a planning perspective, many of
these programs are often broken in the outyears, and we find
ourselves in what I call the ``Wimpy Syndrome,'' for those of
you who are familiar with Popeye: I will gladly pay you Tuesday
for a hamburger today.
The suggestion is they will fix the funding disconnects
during the next budget cycle. And it is not a sound way for a
program manager to be able to expect his funding to come
through. That stability needs to be able to exist through that
planning process.
The third thing I would do is--and I think, Mr. Turner, you
touched on this a little bit and, Ms. Blakey, you talked about
the importance of R&D. Investment in invention ought to happen
in the science and technology world. We ought to reinvigorate
the lab system and build that linkage between the S&T community
where invention ought to happen so that we can then innovate
inside the program offices.
Ma'am, you mentioned the same thing. We should no longer be
trying to work technical miracles within the program office. We
should be doing those things before the program ever comes. And
one of the key ways to do that is something that the committee
did back in their authorization act in 2006, which was to
direct the executive branch to develop the science and
technology plan. It happened, and then it stopped happening.
And that needs to be a continual thing.
It is focused on space. There is a larger science and
technology plan, but one for space needs to also happen. And it
needs to have the buy-in of not just the science and technology
community, but the acquisition community. It ought to be
connected to each other.
So those are the things that I would suggest that Congress
would be the most help on.
Mr. Franks. The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
initiative has, as you know, enjoyed some pretty significant
bipartisan support. What do you think--how can it help mitigate
the risks of capability gaps, whether it is positioning or
navigation or timing or missile warning or communications even
of weather? How can we use that to help mitigate these
capability gaps?
Mr. Hartman. Sir, I think the way that you pose the
question is a great way to look at it. ORS is not a blanket
solution for all of our capabilities. There are certain ways
that ORS can play in individual mission spaces; weather, for
example. There are some commercial opportunities out there that
will allow us to buy data to satisfy--or to keep requirements
away from the end-post program or future weather satellite
systems. We ought to find a way to integrate that into--that is
the Tier-1 ORS solution.
They are looking at that same model for radar right now.
And we are, in the U.S., behind our international competitors
when it comes to a Tier-2 radar, meaning not the exquisite
stuff. We are, because of the industrial base--lack of
industrial base investment in the R&D side and on the
operational side by the U.S. Government, forced to look for
international partners for satisfaction of mission capability
within that realm, bring in another Tier-1 capability.
But, as I talked about earlier in that business model, the
architectures we ought to employ ought to be layered. They
ought to be focused on geographic areas. They ought to use
optimized orbits, niche capabilities. ORS would play a great
role in providing that top layer. It is not going to satisfy
all of the mission requirements. It is going to satisfy those
specific mission requirements for that specific joint forces
commander. And I think you can do that in all of the mission
areas. Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) is one that
you mentioned. But imagery, whether it be radar or electro-
optical can be one, or IR. I think that the opportunities are
boundless when it comes to looking at the ORS applications from
that perspective.
Mr. Franks. Thank you all again; and thank you, Madam
Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Franks.
Mr. Langevin of Rhode Island for five minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to thank the panel for what has been a very fruitful
discussion.
A lot of the issues that I have had concerns about have
already been asked or the panel addressed them. I appreciate,
Ms. Blakey, you addressing the issue of lack of support,
investment in the STEM programs, encouraging our young people
to go into those programs. I share that concern as well, and
have pursued a number of opportunities where we can provide
more support in those areas, especially the younger ages.
We have got to encourage more of our students to go in
there. It really is a national security issue at this point. We
are losing our edge in the area of math and science,
engineering and such. So we obviously have to do more in that
area.
I share the concern, also, about the issue of export
controls. We have our foreign partners or competitors putting
out satellite capabilities that are pretty robust, and our
industry is prohibited from exporting our technology. I
understand clearly we have got to be concerned about our
national security and not letting our best R&D technologies out
that could be used against us. It would be a disadvantage. But
the commercial sectors in other countries have developed these
capabilities and are available to foreign competitors. I think
we need to really look at our export controls in wondering is
it--it is clear we need time to revise those export controls.
And, obviously that has important implications for our
industrial base as well.
I also agree with the issue of--you know, one of the
problems in rising costs and acquisition, we need acquisition
reform on the issue of R&D on the fly. Sometimes this issue of
doing too much, too soon just doesn't work.
And another thing, in addition to doing R&D on the fly as
we go, is these changes in mission requirements as we go,
trying to--you know, you start out with one set of requirements
and then you do the add-ons, which are an increasing problem.
The other thing that maybe you can comment on is the issue
of focusing more in developing a common bus so that as
technology upgrades are achieved that it can be achieved more
cost effectively. It is easier to do it and upgrade.
Do you want to----
Mr. Hartman. Yes, sir. I think that is an important
initiative for the future. The reality is that there are--there
has been common buses. Our current primes have common buses.
But there are several different kinds of common buses.
What we are looking at doing--and this is primarily done
through the Air Force research lab in the ORS office--is
developing common standards across the industrial base that
will allow us to plug and play and, as we talked about earlier,
focus the investment and innovation and competition on that
sensor and payload level, as opposed to the bus level.
Mr. Langevin. Let me ask you this: Secretary Gates has
recently announced the decision to cut the Transformational
Satellite program instead approaches two more bands Extremely
High Frequency satellites as alternatives. What will this mean
for our communications satellite industrial base, and how will
this affect other major satellite acquisition programs? And
will the fiscal year 2010 budget reflect a commitment to
prioritizing space acquisition programs?
Mr. Hartman. Sir, I think the cancellation of TSAT and the
investment of the Advanced EHF satellites, as you noted, will--
what it will mean is the first step in what we have talked
about here today, is evolving systems and not putting too much
risk on an individual system. We will have to resist the
pressures from ourselves to try to pile too much investment
into advanced capabilities within both the WGS and the Advanced
EHF systems. So I think that if we do this properly, it will be
as I suggested, that first step moving in this direction.
With respect to the priority of space systems, I don't know
what the total amount is for investment, but I think it will
largely remain static. It will be a decrease from last year's
investment in overall dollars associated with the space
industrial base sector.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. I yield back.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you.
When a plan comes together--we are called for five votes,
and we have Mr. Thornberry of Texas for five minutes.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I appreciate you all's testimony. Particularly, Ms.
Chaplain, Mr. Hartman, you all seem to agree on everything. And
I have been in lots of hearings over the past several years
where there is lots of agreement on the problem. You all are in
agreement on where we ought to go, but it seems to me the
problem is getting from here to there.
You both mentioned things like culture and so forth. It is
hard for us to pass a law to fix culture, I have found out. And
I have tried to listen carefully to all of your suggestions:
fully funding R&D, putting all the money in the fight-up for a
program, and so forth.
But it seems to me that in a number of cases, we find
ourselves just trying to fill a hole or plug a gap or meet an
immediate need; and, therefore, that R&D money is the easiest
money to squeeze. It is nice to think about going to a real
common bus or so forth, but we just have to--it takes all we
can do just to do what absolutely has to be done, what the
warfighter has grown dependent on, for example. So do you have
any other--I don't mean other suggestions, but do you have any
more guidance for us on how to get from here to there?
Mr. Hartman, you work in a big building. Not everybody
would agree with all of the things that you have laid out,
although it sounds perfectly reasonable to me. But either of
you, how do we get from here to there and over that hurdle that
seems to stop us?
Mr. Hartman. You are right. It is a very big building. And
that is exactly the trouble that we will experience in
implementing something like this. The role for Congress is to
keep this issue front and center and to speak about how
important this is. It will force that attention that will be
required to make these changes.
But the problem that we are going to have, frankly, is
that, under what I would expect to be static defense budgets
over the future, there will be little room for new capital
investment inside the space community. So the progress that we
will be able to make will be similar to my response to
Congressman Langevin's question. We will have to, because of
survival, evolve our system. What we will have to do is save
ourselves from each other, and that is to resist piling
additional capability on these systems.
This change is going to have to take place over several
years. It is going to be much like we are talking about,
evolving our systems. It is going to be an evolutionary
process, and that first step is to force us to take what we
have, stretch it out and slowly push it into the future.
Ms. Chaplain. I would comment that the condition today has
not always been the case, and there was a time when we did get
a lot accomplished. There was cost growth, but not to the
extent that you saw today. And there was a lot of reasons why
that occurred.
I think we kind of need to go back to that time to the
extent possible. That means things like reducing complexity in
the requirements process, making it simple, maybe reducing
players involved in the acquisition process or, at least,
making them accountable for the role that they do play.
There has also been talk about a national security space
strategy in recent years, and that is very big because that
does not exist right now in the way it should be. And there you
can really lay out where are we going to go for space, not just
for DOD but for the Intelligence Community for now. So, where
are we going to go and why? What is the priority? How are we
going to get there? And then you can even lay out the thrust
areas that you want for S&T and pocket places for the
inventions.
This is things that we need to make room for, the next GPS
that we don't think we are going to have today. But I really
believe we can get there. It is not hopeless, because we were
there at one time. And maybe it is just time to go back and
look at what made things work back then and try to get back
there. There is a lot of people I know in that community who
were there back then who would love to get back there today.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry.
I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony, for
their hard work and the people behind them that have worked
hard with them. Thank you for your patriotism. Thank you for
being here with us.
We obviously have a number of challenges coming forward.
Certainly I have heard from my colleagues, ITAR and this whole
question of R&D and how we get a better commitment to have
deliverables that come on time and on budget and that are part
of a suite of systems that maintain our industrial base.
So I think this was a very, very good hearing. I am sorry
the votes have come in the middle of it, but I think we have
done a good job of making sure that these issues are out in
front of us.
So, once again, I thank you for your support and your
testimony; and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 30, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 30, 2009
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