Statement by John C. Rood
Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.

A New Strategic Environment

Since the end of the Cold War, we have observed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles. The proliferation of these capabilities has continued despite the best efforts of the United States and our allies, including notable successes in Libya and in shutting down the A.Q. Khan network. Today, roughly two dozen countries possess ballistic missiles of varying ranges. The trend is toward missiles of increasing ranges, payloads, lethality, and sophistication.

Of particular concern are the missile programs underway in North Korea and Iran. As the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, LTG Michael Maples testified to the Senate on January 11, 2007, "North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program and has exported missiles and missile technology to other countries, including Iran ...." General Maples also testified on February 27, 2007, to the Senate that "North Korea continues to develop the Taepo Dong 2, which could reach parts of the United States and is capable of carrying a nuclear payload. On 4-5 July 2006, North Korea conducted seven widely-published launches... Despite the failure of the Taepo Dong 2, North Korea successfully tested six theater ballistic missiles, demonstrating the capability to target U.S. forces and our allies in South Korea and Japan." And of course, North Korea conducted a nuclear test in October. In Iran, we continue to see that government field additional ballistic missiles that are capable of reaching states in the region such as Israel, and the continued development of more advanced missiles with longer ranges. The Intelligence Community assesses that Iran would be able to develop an ICBM capable of reaching the United States and all regions of Europe before 2015 if it chose to do so. And, I would point out that Iran has acquired ballistic missiles from North Korea in the past and note the possibility that it could do so again in the future, potentially acquiring missiles with even longer ranges.

Iranian intentions are also of concern. For example, in October 2005 President Ahmedinejad called for Israel to be "wiped off the map" and in that same speech called for achieving "a world without America." These statements obviously take on greater significance given our concerns about Iran's ballistic missile efforts and its pursuit of nuclear weapons in defiance of the international community, UN Security Council resolutions, and its international obligations.

Mr. Chairman, it is important to note that our NATO Allies are also concerned about the proliferation of ballistic missiles. As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer observed after the April 19, 2007, North Atlantic Council meeting, "There is absolutely a shared threat perception...Allies all agree a threat from ballistic missiles exists."

Deterrence And Defense In The Twenty-First Century

Missile defenses are an important response to the threats that I have just described, but are just one element of the Administration's broader counter-proliferation effort. Under the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Administration has pursued a number of efforts in this area to secure materials and technology at their sources through cooperative threat reduction efforts and export control assistance. We have worked to curb the trade in these dangerous technologies through use of financial measures, support for the Missile Technology Control Regime, and efforts like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which today includes over 80 countries which have conducted dozens of successful interdictions of missile and WMD-related items. In addition, we have pursued active multilateral diplomacy at the UN Security Council and in groupings like the Six Party Talks with North Korea.

Missile defenses reduce incentives for missile proliferation by undermining the military utility and attractiveness of these weapons. Missile defenses are part of contemporary deterrence and promote stability, as we saw last summer, when we activated our system for the first time in response to North Korean missile launch preparations. In that case, our missile defense system allowed our national leadership to consider a wider, more flexible range of responses to a potential attack.

The Fielding Of Missile Defenses In Europe

To help address the threats that I outlined, the Administration has proposed fielding 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. Such missile defenses would build upon the initial capabilities we have fielded in Alaska, California, and elsewhere, and improve our ability to defend the United States from missile attack from the Middle East. Such additional assets deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic would also have the capability of providing missile defense coverage to most of Europe against intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles.

Russian Concerns

We continue to consult with the Russian Government regarding its concerns about the potential fielding of U.S. missile defense capabilities in Europe. Such deployments are not directed at Russia but rather are intended to address the emerging missile threat from the Middle East. The 10 interceptors we hope to field in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic would have little or no capability against Russia's large strategic offensive force, which could overwhelm the U.S. system's limited number of interceptors regardless of their location. In theoretical one-on-one engagements, U.S. interceptors located in Europe would have little or no capability to intercept Russian ICBMs launched at the United States as the U.S. interceptors are too slow to catch Russian ballistic missiles.

As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commented after the April 19 NATO-Russia Council meeting, "The Allies were convinced and are convinced that there are no implications of the United States system for the strategic balance... Ten interceptors will not, and cannot affect the strategic balance and ten interceptors cannot pose a threat to Russia."

On April 17, I led an interagency delegation to Moscow to consult with our Russian colleagues on this issue and to offer some new proposals for missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia across the full spectrum of missile defense activities - including experimentation with new concepts and technologies, research and development of missile defense systems and components, and work to improve the capability of our forces to successfully conduct cooperative missile defense operations during peacekeeping or other joint military operations. This proposal was a follow-up to President Bush's March 28 phone conversation with President Putin. In the week after my visit, Secretary of Defense Gates led another interagency delegation to Moscow to discuss opportunities for cooperation on missile defense. It is our hope that through the transparency and confidence-building measures that we have proposed, as well as potential missile defense cooperation, that we can address Russian concerns.

Way Ahead

Mr. Chairman, we will continue to discuss this issue with our European and Russian colleagues. In addition, I plan to lead an interagency team to Warsaw and Prague in late May to begin formal negotiations on the placement of missile defense facilities in those countries. If successful, these agreements would enable us to improve the security of the United States and our allies by giving us the capability to defend against the real and growing missile threat from the Middle East. As we embark on this endeavor, I would urge you and your colleagues to support the President's FY 2008 request of $310 million for the placement of missile defense capabilities in Europe.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for holding this hearing on this important topic.