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Chairman Everett, Ranking Member Reyes, Members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be with you today to provide the Subcommittee with a policy perspective on the progress we've made to date in the area of ballistic missile defense and where we are headed. Ballistic missile defense has been a top defense priority of the Administration from day one, and it remains a top priority.

I know that it has been some time since a representative of OSD/Policy has appeared before the Subcommittee, so I thought it might be useful to begin by reviewing how we got to where we are today.

At the beginning of the Administration, the United States faced a very different security environment from the one we faced during the four-and-a-half decades of the Cold War. Former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey has pointed out that with the demise of the Soviet Union, we found that while we had slain a great dragon, the dragon had been replaced by many dangerous snakes. In other words, the end of the Cold War did not mean that the United States no

longer faced a threat; rather, it meant that the United States would face different kinds of threats.

One such threat was the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them, including ballistic missiles. Yet, the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union prohibited us from fielding an effective defense against this growing threat. Regimes in countries such as North Korea and Iran and – at the time – Iraq understood that while they could not hope to match the United States in conventional forces, they could gain strategic leverage by investing in ballistic missiles. The strategic wisdom of leaving the American people vulnerable to missile attack as a matter of policy during the Cold War was – at best – debatable. The wisdom of maintaining such a policy in the post-Cold War environment is not. Without a defense against ballistic missiles, the American people are vulnerable to the growing threat of missile attack. Without defenses, a U.S. President faced with a threat to vital U.S. interests from a rogue state armed with long-range missiles could find that our options are constrained by the fact that these countries can now hold at risk the United States homeland.

To deal with this threat, President Bush in 2001 and 2002 took several bold steps. First, he announced that the United States would exercise its right, which was enshrined in the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, to withdraw from the Treaty.

Second, he directed the Department of Defense to end what had been for decades a “research and development only” approach to ballistic missile defense, and to begin fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities for the United States by the end of 2004.

I am pleased to say that we have by and large met the goal set by the President. In 2002, Fort Greely, Alaska, was an inactive installation, having been on the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure list. Two years later, it was a missile defense interceptor site. The United States today has all of the pieces in place needed to intercept an incoming long-range ballistic missile: ground based interceptors in Alaska and California; a network of ground, sea, and space-based sensors; a command and control network; and most importantly, trained servicemen and women ready to operate the system. Our ballistic missile defense system today is primarily oriented toward continued development and testing. But we are confident that it could intercept a long-range ballistic missile if called upon to do so.

Because of the importance of this mission, one of the first things I did upon assuming my current position in the Department of Defense was to take a trip to Ft. Greely. I want to tell you how impressed I was, not just with the site itself – the buildings, the silos, the computers – but with the dedication, the professionalism, and the sense of mission of the men and women who stand ready

to operate the system. I would encourage you all to visit Ft. Greely. It is a long way for most of you. But I know that the men and women stationed there would appreciate the visit, and that you will be as impressed as I was.

Our ballistic missile defenses are not as capable today as they will be in the future. But we knew that would be the case when we set out in 2002 to field these defenses. The end of 2004 was not a “pass/fail” exam, whereby we would evaluate what we had done to that point, declare it a success or failure, then move on to something else.

2004 was not an end point – it was a beginning. The President knew in 2002 that what we fielded in 2004 would be our *initial* capabilities. This is why he directed us to continue improving these capabilities over time through an on-going test and evaluation program, through research and development of promising new technologies, and by making continuous improvements to the systems we have already fielded. You will hear more of the programmatic details of how we are going about this from my fellow panel members in a few minutes.

But first I would like to take a few minutes to put this program in its strategic context, in terms of the evolving threat, and in terms of our overall defense strategy.

First and foremost, the threat posed by ballistic missiles is growing. And the missiles we are talking about are growing in range, complexity, and the threat they pose. In 1990, around the end of the Cold War, 16 countries possessed ballistic missiles of varying ranges. In 2006, 25 countries have them. The number of countries that possess medium, intermediate, or intercontinental range ballistic missiles – i.e., missiles that may reach our friends and allies, and in some cases the U.S. homeland itself -- has increased from five to nine.

Not only is the number of nations possessing ballistic missiles increasing, but this group includes some of the world's most threatening and least responsible regimes, such as North Korea and Iran.

As Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, recently testified in an unclassified session, North Korea continues to invest in ballistic missiles, not only for its own use but for foreign sales as well. According to Lt. Gen. Maples, “Pyongyang is likely developing intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.” And as then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2001, North Korea launched a multi-stage Taepo-Dong 1 missile in 1998, which “the intelligence community tells us . . . demonstrated a North Korean capability to deliver a small payload to the United States. For over 50 years, U.S. service-members have stood on the border between North and South Korea. We have

known that if North Korea decided to attack the South, these men and women would immediately be in harm's way. The prospect of long-range ballistic missiles in the hands of the North means that, for the first time, the American *people* too would be in harm's way.

Iran represents a dangerous nexus, combining a vigorous ballistic missile program, a desire to develop nuclear weapons, and a history of support for international terrorism. The most recent edition of the State Department's *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (April 29, 2004) describes Iran as the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism.

Terrorism has been part of Tehran's arsenal for decades. In fact, before the 9/11 attacks, more Americans had been killed by Iranian-backed terrorists like Hezbollah than by any other terrorist group. Iran has now made ballistic missiles an important part of its defense strategy – scenes of Iranian missiles on display in military parades are reminiscent of the Soviet Union. The Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, recently testified before Congress that Iran has engaged in a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly two decades, and that although it is the judgment of the intelligence community that Iran does not yet possess a nuclear weapon or have the necessary fissile material to do so, “the danger that it will acquire a nuclear weapon and the ability to integrate it with the ballistic missiles Iran already possesses is a reason for immediate concern.”

In this environment, recent statements by Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad threatening the United States and its friends in the region, most notably Israel, are of particular concern. In an October 2005 speech before a “World Without Zionism” conference, Ahmadi-Nejad declared that Israel was a “disgraceful blot” that should be “wiped off the map,” and that “anybody who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation’s fury.”

Iran’s ballistic missiles already cast a shadow over U.S. friends and allies, and our deployed forces, in the Middle East. The addition of nuclear warheads and an ICBM that could reach the U.S. would further extend Iran’s ability to coerce others and threaten the U.S.

The United States continues to support efforts by the Europeans, especially the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) and Russia to find a diplomatic solution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear activities. But, we need to take steps to safeguard our interests and the interests of friends and allies in the event diplomatic efforts do not succeed. And the Iranian case is just one example of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation problem that, thanks to ballistic missile technology, could directly threaten the American people. We must be prepared for this possibility, and for others to follow suit. The continued development and fielding of missile defenses is one vital step to defend against

such threats, as well as to reduce the attractiveness, to other countries of concern, of such WMD and missile technology.

As we face these threats, ballistic missile defenses remain an important part of our overall defense strategy. Last month, the Department of Defense released the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDR recognizes that since the previous QDR in 2001, the United States has found itself engaged in a “long war,” a global conflict against violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice, and who are actively seeking weapons of mass destruction. We believe that ballistic missile defenses play an important part in this long war. The QDR identifies a number of priorities to guide the Department as it makes choices about how best to help the nation win the long war. These priorities include: defending the homeland in depth; shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; and preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. Ballistic missile defenses can make a contribution to each of these important priorities. They can be used to defend the homeland and defeat the actual use of a ballistic missile against the population and territory of the U.S., its deployed forces, or its friends and allies. And, by making an adversary uncertain that a ballistic missile attack will succeed, missile defenses may dissuade others from investing in missiles, or deter their use by those who have already acquired them.

Some have questioned the amount of attention we have paid to ballistic missile defense in the years following the September 11 attacks, on the theory that the main threat to the U.S. is terrorism, and a ballistic missile attack against the United States is unlikely. I would turn that argument around. One of the lessons of September 11 is that nothing is unthinkable. The United States must *and can* prepare to defend itself against the widest range of threats possible. Leaving ourselves vulnerable to a type of attack will only increase the likelihood that an adversary will exploit that vulnerability to threaten or attack us.

Further, the U.S. government was criticized in the wake of 9/11 for not “connecting the dots” on the terrorist threat and failing to act to prevent the attacks. With respect to the ballistic missile threat, the dots are out there for all to see. I would not care to be before this committee in the wake of a ballistic missile attack explaining why, given all we know of ballistic missiles in the hands of dangerous regimes, we had not acted to defend the American people.

I spoke earlier about the ballistic missile defense goals laid out by President Bush in 2002. The President directed us then not only to field defenses for the United States, but also to cooperate with friends and allies to extend the benefits of missile defenses to them as well. Since then, we have embarked upon a number of important missile defense initiatives with international friends and partners. We

have worked with the United Kingdom to upgrade the early warning radar at Fylingdales so it can perform a ballistic missile defense mission; we reached agreement with Denmark to allow us to upgrade the early warning radar at Thule, Greenland; we continue to work with Israel on the Arrow ballistic missile defense program; our own Patriot anti-missile system is widely deployed and is available for export; Germany and Italy are our partners in the Medium Extended Range Air Defense, or MEADS, system; after we signed a Framework Memorandum of Understanding on missile defense cooperation in 2004 with Australia, Canberra has expressed interest in cooperating on a number of potential missile defense projects; and we are negotiating a Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement with Russia to facilitate both government-to-government as well as industry-to-industry missile defense cooperation, while we continue to seek practical areas of cooperation with Russia on a bilateral basis as well as in the NATO-Russia context.

One particularly good news story in international ballistic missile defense is our cooperation with Japan. Japan has committed to spending the equivalent of roughly \$1 billion U.S. dollars on ballistic missile defense, making it our largest international partner in missile defense. The United States and Japan have agreed to work together to develop a more capable sea-based interceptor that will improve the defense of both the U.S. and Japan. I am particularly pleased that the Government of Japan has agreed to evaluate the optimum deployment site for an

X-band radar on its territory that will help defend both the U.S. and Japan from ballistic missile attack. In addition, the U.S. and Japan are taking the steps necessary to share ballistic missile defense information with one another.

We also are considering fielding long-range missile defense interceptors and radars in Europe. There is roughly \$120 million in the President's Fiscal Year 2007 budget request to begin work on this project. Such a site would house interceptors very similar to those we have currently fielded at Ft. Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Fielding such a capability would improve the defense of the United States against long-range missiles, especially those launched from the Middle East. It also would begin to extend missile defense to our European allies, protecting their populations from attack and reducing the risk of coercion or blackmail.

The U.S. Government has held consultations with a number of Allies, beginning in 2002, about their willingness to host missile defense interceptors. We intend to continue these consultations in the coming weeks and months with allies who have expressed interest. I understand the Committee would like to know which countries we will be consulting on the matter. But we are currently in the process of notifying them, and I don't want to get ahead of that process today. That said, I would be happy to follow up with the Subcommittee in the near future with more details.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your questions and those of the Subcommittee members after my colleagues have presented their testimony.