Space

The Testimony of
Dr. John C. Karas
Vice President, Space Exploration, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss U.S. launch capabilities for meeting the national vision for space exploration. We are truly excited about the journey that the vision sets for this country, and I appreciate your leadership in moving us forward to realize our vision.

Introduction

I am reminded of what Robert Heinlein wrote, 'Once you get to earth orbit, you're halfway to anywhere in the solar system.' As we were reminded by Challenger, getting to orbit is still risky; and as we were reminded by Columbia, coming home is still risky. It's the first and last 100 miles that are the hardest. As we move forward on this bold national vision for space exploration, we need to carefully learn and not repeat the lessons of almost 50 years of spaceflight. I would like to provide a few recommendations based on our experience and lessons learned.

First, as specified in the vision, our priority is to return the Space Shuttle to flight so that we can complete the International Space Station and regain our momentum and yes, confidence for human space exploration. I was honored to lead the Lockheed Martin Independent Review Team looking into the Space Shuttle External Tank. Lockheed Martin is supporting return to flight with all the necessary Corporate resources. We all must continue to incorporate the lessons and recommendations in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, not only for the Space Shuttle return to flight, but in everything that we do. For example, we are currently applying every applicable idea and recommendation in the CAIB report to the Atlas EELV launch system to make it even more reliable and robust. In keeping with the CAIB report, Lockheed Martin is also investigating alternative concepts and methods to assemble and service the Space Station in an attempt to reduce loss of crew risk.

Next, before we can adequately address the space transportation capabilities that will be needed for near-term or future space exploration, I have to stop and ask, 'What are the requirements?' I've seen bold statements that we will need heavy lift approaching 50 to 100 tons to low-Earth orbit, yet the Space Exploration Level 1 requirements from NASA will not be available until September. Admiral Steidle and Code T are working diligently within NASA and with industry to establish these foundation requirements. I caution us not to get ahead of ourselves. How do we know whether existing launch vehicles will or will not satisfy our exploration needs for the next 20 years without understanding the exploration missions and requirements? We often like to jump to solutions, but it's not about heavy lift or developing new launch vehicles -- it's not about the Nina, Pinta or Santa Maria (vessels to get there), it's about the affordability of the exploration mission.

In the early 1960s, we did not have existing launch vehicles going to space. A portion of the Apollo funding went into converting ICBMs to be space launch vehicles or developing a new Saturn V launch vehicle. Today, we are fortunate to have new launch capabilities through the EELV program. We are working with NASA to look at all options, as shown in Exhibit #1, in a systematic trade study, and keeping our options open until we have definitive requirements that will drive selection criteria and downselect to an optimal solution. These options include utilizing the EELV, space shuttle-derived, hybrid options, or a new clean sheet approach. All options are viable until we can perform adequate analysis based on the exploration requirements. The majority of my testimony focuses on EELV-derived vehicles per your request.

Existing EELV Capabilities

Another lesson that we can take from the 60's is that incremental, evolutionary development is critical. We did not get to the moon the first time by jumping directly to the Saturn V. We built, demonstrated, and learned on Mercury/Atlas to Gemini/Titan to Apollo/Saturn; it took us 68 unmanned launches and 20 human spaceflight launches before Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin stepped onto the moon. We learned valuable lessons along the way at each incremental step, building capability and confidence for the next step. The Atlas V EELV today was built with that same model of evolutionary development from Atlas I, II, IIA, IIAS, III, to the family of Atlas V vehicles we have today, as depicted in Exhibit #2. Today, our Atlas V EELV covers a broad range of capabilities all of the way to approximately 65,000 lbs to low-Earth orbit, for government, commercial, and international customers at half the cost of just 10 years ago. At the same time, we have improved reliability through fault tolerance and parts count reductions and increased payload volume. In addition to vehicle improvements, we have drastically improved operations efficiency. We have created new infrastructure that doubles our flight rate, which is operated with reduced overhead cost, and increased responsiveness with demonstrated eight hours from vehicle on stand to launch.

Another lesson from the 60's that is critical for this program to be affordable and sustainable is NASA and DOD synergy. An Air Force ICBM called the Atlas was converted to the launch vehicle for the Mercury program to send John Glenn into orbit. The Air Force's larger ICBM called the Titan II was converted to the launch vehicle for the Gemini Program. While an Atlas ICBM is different from the human-rated space launch vehicle used for Mercury, they are fundamentally the same technology, and common processes, and provide economies of scale and utilization of the industrial base that benefited both NASA, the DOD, and the entire nation. When we move away from NASA-DOD synergy, as was demonstrated with the Saturn V and the Space Shuttle, one agency has difficulty maintaining an affordable and sustainable program. We have the opportunity again with a brand new fleet of advanced technology EELV launch vehicles to capitalize on investments by the DOD, Lockheed Martin, and Boeing, to once again have that synergy for mutual benefit. We have already studied improvements for human rating the Atlas V that will no doubt provide higher reliability and service for DOD and commercial customers. This is not unlike the improvements that we implemented in developing the Titan III for the Air Force, based on lessons from human rating the Titan II for NASA.

I also must mention a key lesson that we learned from Challenger: assured access to space. Access to space is no longer a luxury, but a necessity. This nation is dependent on our space assets. We need a robust system that has assured access in the event of a failure, so that we are not stranded without a launch capability for two years as we saw post-Challenger and now post-Columbia. Fortunately, the Atlas V and Delta IV EELV systems we have today are providing assured access to space with two very capable but independent systems.

Atlas Growth And Other Capabilities

When larger lift capability is required for extensive moon or Mars missions after 2015, the Atlas V will be able to meet the exploration requirements. As shown in Exhibit #3, with incremental steps from the current Atlas heavy, we can improve performance up to greater than Saturn V class lift. The first step is to expand our upper stage capabilities with larger tanks and existing propulsion. Both the Atlas V and Delta IV EELVs can get you to orbit; however, requirements will dictate that we go beyond Earth orbit. We would benefit from new in-space propulsion capabilities to efficiently break the bonds of Earth orbit. Unlike new booster engines that both Atlas and Delta have developed, more modern, larger upper stage thrust engines would enhance reliability and performance. We then can greatly improve our performance by just increasing the size of the booster fuel tanks and adding existing engines, not unlike when we developed the Redstone rocket, grew it to the Saturn I and, finally, the Saturn V rocket with common upper stage elements.

These vehicles up through 75 metric tons are compatible with today's existing EELV infrastructure. Further enhancements could be realized through partial reusability of the boosters, which are the easiest to recover. When I say partial reusability, I am referring to reusing only the most expensive elements, such as the engines and avionics with 3-5 uses. These methods date back to Saturn in the Ô60s and Atlas conducted experiments in the late 80's/early 90's to validate these concepts. If these concepts are implemented, recurring cost of less than $2,000 per pound could be achieved. This approach also minimizes development cost and performance impacts versus a fully reusable system.

As vehicle designs approach 100 metric tons or more, even larger stage elements become necessary, trending towards LO2/RP boosters with LO2/LH2 core or second stages. This trend might suggest mixed fleet or hybrid combinations of EELV and Shuttle-derived elements, taking the best from each. This is analogous of how we combined the best elements of the Titan and Atlas launch vehicles to create the Atlas V. Also, we need to consider other technologies being developed within DARPA, like the Falcon Program, and other NASA and Air Force propulsion programs to provide the best solution within the space transportation, heavy lift trade space.

HLV Trade Study Drivers

Even though I have focused on the expendable launch vehicle capabilities, the methods and approaches described can be applied to Shuttle-derived or clean sheet solutions. Regardless of the solution, the key is not just meeting performance requirements but affordability and sustainability requirements as well. In order to meet those cost requirements, we must minimize the non-recurring costs while reducing and distributing overhead and infrastructure costs. Therefore, the larger-lift vehicle elements that fly infrequently must be synergistic with smaller higher-rate elements, such as CEV, ISS servicing, robotic exploration, and DOD missions. This common element approach is what enables the current EELV fleet to have cost effective, heavy class vehicles, unlike in the past where Titan, Atlas and Delta had independent hardware and infrastructures. Currently we have an abundance of credible solutions with existing technologies for heavy lift. After the exploration and overall space transportation requirements are defined, we can then complete the economic trade-offs.

The national vision for Space Exploration calls for international cooperation. We support this vision and believe it is important to enhance the sustainability and affordability of the Space Exploration vision. We have already implemented this model of international cooperation, not only on the International Space Station, but in the development of the Atlas V with the use of a rocket engine technology from Russia, payload fairing from Switzerland, and structures from Spain. We also have other business partnerships with Russian, European and Japanese companies that look forward to bringing their technology for space exploration.

In closing, our new expendable launch vehicles, Shuttle-derived, and clean sheet approaches can have the same or better capabilities by providing significantly more reliability than even their recent versions through continual improvements. However, no system will be perfect or invulnerable to failure. It would be negligent of us all to develop a launch system for space exploration that does not provide our astronauts a way out on a 'bad day.' The Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo systems all had crew escape systems. It is imperative that we maximize crew safety through continual improvements of launch vehicle reliabilities, institute integrated vehicle health management to warn us if something is going wrong, and deploy crew escape systems that are robust enough to protect our brave explorers.

Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee may have. Thank you.

John C. Karas Vice President Space Exploration Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company

Joined Corporation in 1978 Appointed to Space Exploration position February 2004

John Karas is Vice President of Space Exploration for Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company. In this position, he is responsible for coordinating the corporation's capabilities and assets for human and robotic space exploration. Previously, he served as Vice President, Business Development, and was responsible for strategic planning, advanced technology concepts, and new business acquisition efforts for strategic and defensive missiles, and commercial, civil, and classified space lines of business. Karas reports directly to Tom Marsh, Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company.

Previously, Karas served as Vice President, Atlas and Advanced Space Transportation, for Lockheed Martin Space Systems. This responsibility included launch systems development and recurring operations for the Atlas program and advanced space transportation opportunities such as Orbital Space Plane and other manned, unmanned, reusable and expendable systems, including their respective business development, implementation and operations. Karas served as Vice President and Deputy of the EELV/Atlas V organization from March 1997 to December 2002 and was responsible for developing new launch vehicles such as the Atlas IIIA, IIIB and Atlas V family, and their launch facilities.

Karas began his career with General Dynamics Space Systems Division in 1978 and joined Lockheed Martin in May 1994 when Lockheed Martin acquired the Space Systems Division. From 1995 to 1997, Karas served as program director for advanced Atlas launch vehicles, specifically the Atlas IIIA launch system. He was instrumental in the creation of the company's launch vehicle strategy, which included the evolution of the Atlas II, III and V family of launch vehicles.

Karas was Director of the Advanced Space Systems and Technology department and Site Director of the company's operations in Huntsville, Alabama from 1991 to 1995. In this position, he was responsible for management of operations research, system predesign, technology development and new business funds for the entire division. Under his direction, the department focused on structures and propulsion technology. For example, new materials (aluminum-lithium and composites) and manufacturing technologies (near-net forming) were matured for cryogenic tanks. New cryogenic feedlines and Russian engines and subsystems such as the initiation and development of RD-180, advanced Russian propellants and flange tests also were completed during propulsion technology development, all of which were successfully transitioned into production on the Atlas III, Atlas V and EELV programs. Karas was also responsible for Single Stage To Orbit and National Aerospace Plane cryogenic systems and contracted R&D.

Karas served as Manager of Advanced Avionics Systems from 1986 to 1989. This group was responsible for new technology demonstration; conceptual predesign; avionics system design; and system integration lab testing for airborne guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) functions. These new technologies included developments such as adaptive GN&C, multiple fault-tolerant controls, a totally electric vehicle using electromechanical actuators and artificial intelligence applications. The Advanced Avionics Systems group also had the responsibility for the development of independent and contract research and development (IR&D and CR&D) and insertion of new cost savings and performance enhancement technologies into existing products. During his tenure in this position, Karas was designated "Employee of the Year" for the development leading to the upgrade of the Atlas avionics system.

Prior to leading the advanced avionics department, Karas spent seven years working all levels of integration on the Shuttle-Centaur program. Karas led the integration of Centaur and associated airborne and ground support equipment with Shuttle Airborne, Ground Systems and Flight Operations. In this capacity, Karas became very familiar with reusable, manned systems and with operations at NASA's Johnson, Kennedy and Lewis Space Centers.

His technical expertise includes system definition, propulsion & avionic technology development and insertion, and hardware/software integration. Karas also has developed redundancy management concepts for several flight-critical systems and their associated system demonstration and validation techniques. Karas has served on several national and international committees on these subjects.

In 1987 Karas was named employee of the year for advanced avionics. Karas was one of five senior managers that received Aviation Week's 2000 Laureate Award for Aeronautics/Propulsion for development and integration of the RD-180 Russian engine with Lockheed Martin's Atlas launch vehicle. He was also named Lockheed Martin Astronautics Manager of the Year for 2000. Karas and the Atlas team were awarded the 2002 Lockheed Martin Space Systems Leadership Award for the on-cost and on-schedule successful first launch of EELV/Atlas V. Most recently, Karas received the Houston Rotary Stellar award for Atlas V and launch site in March 2004.

Karas received his bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology in 1978. While working toward his degree, Karas was a co-op student for four years where he worked for NASA at the Kennedy Space Center. Karas has taken advanced course work toward a master's degree in engineering and an MBA.

March 2004