Testimony to the
House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
On the Assessment of Apollo Hardware for CRV and CTV
By
Dale Myers
A team (Appendix 1) was
chartered by NASA to make a top-level assessment of the viability of using the
Apollo Command and Service Modules (CSM) as the basis for a Crew Return Vehicle
(CRV), and potentially for a Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV) for the International
Space Station (ISS). This assessment was
conducted on
Major Conclusions
The Team concluded
unanimously that an Apollo-derived Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) concept, with a
It was further concluded
that using the Apollo Command Module (CM) and Service Module (SM) as an ISS CRV
and CTV has sufficient merit to warrant a serious detailed study of the
performance, cost, and schedule for this approach, in comparison with other OSP
approaches, to the same Level 1 requirements.
Cost and Schedule
It was not possible for the
team to make an estimate of the cost of the design, development, manufacturing
and operational costs. On the one hand,
the Apollo system is well understood, and proved to be a highly successful,
rugged system with a very capable launch abort system. Documentation would be very helpful in
leading the designers. On the other
hand, nearly every system would have to be redesigned, even if it were to be
replicated. None of the existing
hardware (such as CMs in Museums) was thought to be usable, because of age,
obsolescence, lack of traceability, and water immersion. There would be no need for fuel cells or
cryogenics, and modern guidance and communications would be lighter and less
expensive.
There was not full agreement
on the cost benefit of using existing Apollo documentation in the design of,
what was agreed would be, a new vehicle with all new subsystems. However, it was judged that the development
and manufacturing costs of an Apollo derived CRV has the potential of lower
cost than a winged vehicle due to its lower complexity level.
The Operational costs would
be high for a Command Module Crew Return Vehicle (CM/CRV). Because of the very low orbital delta V and
the low aerodynamic cross-range, many landing sites would be required and the
infrastructure for 24 hour, seven day operations would be expensive,
particularly to meet the Level 1 requirement to bring the astronauts to medical
care in 24 hours. By adding a Service
Module, orbital delta V would make it possible to reduce dramatically the
landing sites required. This is why the
team surmised that a Command and Service Module Crew Return and Crew Transport
Vehicle (CSM/CRV/CTV) looked attractive.
The team judged that a
schedule for the CRV of 4-6 years (from contract go-ahead) and 5-7 years for
the CTV or a CRV/CTV (from contract go-ahead) would be reasonable.
Other Considerations
Although the flight hardware
would be less expensive, and its impact on the Expendable Launch Vehicles would
be minimal (it's just another axisymmetrical payload), the landing sites for
the CRV may drive the Life Cycle costs high.
By adding a Service Module (smaller than the one required to go to the
moon), orbital cross-range of 3000 to 5000 ft/sec, might be gained, and the
number of landing sites radically reduced.
If land landings can be added to the system safely, another major
reduction in life cycle costs would result, because the team believed that the
system could be made re-usable.
Some Personal Thoughts
Although the team was not
asked to compare the capsules to winged vehicles, and we did not, I have some
comments relative to wings vs. capsules.
The Apollo Program never had
a parachute failure in operation, although we had failures during the test
program. We had one parachute fail due
to N2O4 leaking onto the shrouds, but the vehicle landed safely on two
parachutes.
The Shuttle has had a wing
failure, but the failure was apparently caused
by the foam insulation from the tank. Shuttle runway landings have been 100%
successful.
It appears to me that the
robust launch escape system of Apollo, which worked over a wide range from the
launch pad to high altitude, will be hard to beat in a winged vehicle.
This Apollo based system,
without aerodynamic controls, wings, and landing gear is clearly simpler.
The ablative replaceable
heatshield is simpler to build and install than the corresponding winged
vehicle thermal protection system. We already know the thermal distribution on
the vehicle. With a land landing, a reusable
heatshield might apply to the Apollo system.
A land landing is a new
development for a Command Module and not an easy one. With a five-man crew, three parachutes (as
proven on Apollo) or a parasail might be used (although I'm not sold on
parasail reliability, and wonder how redundancy is supplied). Close to the ground, a retrorocket could be
used, with a blowout hatch in the heat shield to expose the rocket. Alternately, air bags could absorb the vertical
landing velocity. Any of the means of
softening the land landing could be aided with crushable struts on the couches.
I am not familiar with the reliability record of the Russian land landing
system, although I have heard that they have had trouble with it. Tumbling while landing in a
crosswind is a threat.
Landing with wings yields
good atmospheric cross-range, and thus more flexibility in when and where to
land. The winged system may be more
Life-Cycle Cost effective because of that feature, and it might give more
safety because of its ability to land at other airports.
Winged vehicles have less
"g-load" (gravity load) during re-entry, relieving stress on an injured or ill
crewmember.
If all things were equal,
I'd choose winged vehicles.
Unfortunately, they are not known to be equal, and that's why the team
recommended a thorough study of the Apollo CM/SM as a CRV/CTV.
Comments on the NASA Integrated Space Transportation
Program (ISTP)
The Chairman asked that I
comment on some issues other than the Apollo CRV and CTV. These will be personal remarks, and not those
of the Apollo CRV/CTV Team.
I support the ISTP. The OSP schedule looks reasonable, but only
if funding is made available in a timely fashion. I'd like to see a strong effort in autonomous
docking for either system, and in launch escape if a
winged vehicle is chosen. For the
Command Module CRV/CTV, development of a land landing system is the only major
new technology, other than long duration storage in space. I can't really
strongly recommend the land landing until a Life Cycle Cost Effectiveness study
is completed. If earlier dates are strongly desired, I believe some time could
be saved by accelerating Phase A and Phase B studies and initiating procurement
of long lead time items just after Preliminary Design. Some increase in risk
would result, but it appears that the contractors have already invested
significant funds, and configurations are reasonably stabilized as compared to
the Phase A and B of the Shuttle or Space Station. In the case of the Apollo
combined CRV/CTV, I would consider giving the Service Module to a different
contractor than the Command Module.
Doing so might make it possible to do the Crew Transport Vehicle
schedule in 4-6 years, and at the same time, stimulate new design at more than
one contractor.
Using an Expendable Launch
Vehicle for human transport is feasible, if the same attention is, or has been,
given to the reliability design requirements for the ELV as NASA gives for
human flight. The new Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicles (EELVs) have been designed for high reliability, and first
flights look good. A robust launch
escape system would reduce risk even further.
A careful review of the EELVs would be needed to determine whether the
NASA version would be common with the military and commercial EELV. If not, an additional expense is incurred,
and less reliability advantage gained from the repeated launch of common ELVs
for all launches.
The introduction of the
CRV/CTV to be launched on Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) will allow NASA to
use the Shuttle for cargo for the ISS, to share with the OSP crew transport to
the ISS, and for lower inclination orbits where heavy science payloads can be
placed in orbit, maintained and upgraded, repaired, and serviced. Even if a logistics module were developed to
be launched by an ELV, I firmly believe that the Shuttle will be needed until a
second-generation manned launch vehicle is operational. The ISTP gives NASA
more time to develop the technologies required to design a low cost to orbit
launch vehicle.
A key factor that must be considered
is this. Will the
The greatest risk is doing
nothing. NASA and industry management,
engineers and manufacturing people are getting old, like me. A new hardware program is sorely needed to
bring vibrant new people in to bear on NASA Programs. An OSP followed by a new low cost launch
vehicle, followed by a phased return to the moon and Mars would be an ideal
program that would bring stars to the eyes of every young American child and
help rebuild American interest in engineering.
Appendix 1
Assessment
Team Members
Vance Brand
Apollo Soyuz (ASTP) and
Commander for STS-5, STS-41B, STS-35
Aaron Cohen
Former Director of NASA JSC;
former Manager of the Command and Service Module in the Apollo Spacecraft
Program Office; former Shuttle Orbiter Project Manager, responsible for design,
development, production, and flight tests; former acting Deputy Administrator.
Dale Myers
Former V.P. and Program
Manager- Apollo Command and Service Module, NAA/Rockwell; Former NASA Associate
Administrator for Manned Space Flight; Former NASA Deputy Administrator
Kenneth Szalai
Former Director, NASA
Dryden; Chief Engineer NASA F-8 DFBW
with Apollo GNC systems.
Team leader.
John Young
Gemini 3, Gemini 10 (CDR),
Apollo 10, Apollo 16 (CDR), STS-1 (CDR), STS9 (CDR)
The Team convened 13-14
March 2003 to conduct the assessment.
DALE D. MYERS
President,
Dale Myers and Associates
Tel. (760)
753-4043 Fax (760) 753-8796
E-mail: DaleMyers@cox.net
Education B. S. Aeronautical Engineering,
Employment /
Experience
1989 - present President, Dale Myers and Associates, an Aerospace
Consultancy
1986 -
1989 Deputy Administrator, NASA
1984 -
1986 President, Dale Myers and
Associates
1979 -
1984 President, Jacobs Engineering
Group,
1977 -
1979 Under
1974 - 1977 Vice
President, Rockwell International and
President, North
American Aircraft Group
1970 -
1974 Associate Administrator, Manned
Space Flight, NASA
1964 -
1969 Vice President and Program
Manager Apollo Command and
Service Modules, North
American Rockwell
1957 -
1964 Vice President and Program
Manager, Hound Dog
Air Launched Missile,
North American Aviation
1943 -
1957 Aerodynamicist to Deputy
Director, Aerophysics
Department, North
American Aviation
Affiliations /
Activities
Member
Honorary
Fellow, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Fellow,
American Astronautical Society
Sigma Alpha
Epsilon (Chapter President, 1943)
National
Member,
Board of
Directors
1992 -
1997 Board member, General Science
Corporation
1989 -
1998 Board member, MacNeal Schwendler
Corporation
1989 -
1994 Trustee, Logistics Management
Institute
1984 -
1986 Board Member, SYS Technologies
1984 -
1986 Board Member, Aerovironment
1979 -
1984 Board Member, Jacobs Engineering
Group
1974 -
1977 Board Member, Ducommun
Corporation
Awards, Honors
and Recognition
Honorary
Doctorate Degree,
NASA
Distinguished Service Medal, 1971
NASA
Distinguished Service Medal, 1974
Meritorious
Service Award,
Achievement
Award,
Department of
Energy Distinguished Service Medal, 1979
Distinguished
Alumnus,
Aerospace Hall
of Fame,
Who's Who in
International
Directory of Distinguished Leadership
Service
NACA Stability
and Control Subcommittee, 1948-51
United Way,
Chairman 2nd District,
NASA Advisory
Committee, 1984 -1986
American
Delegate, AGARD, 1986-1989
Visiting
Committee, University of Washington, 1990-1998
Director, San
Diego Aerospace Museum, 1993-present
NRC AF Study
Board Committee on Pre-Milestone One, 1993
NASA
Aeronautics Advisory Committee, 1994-1997
Visiting
Committee, University of Washington Astronautics, 1998-present
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