Testimony
of
Hearing on the NASA Orbital Space Plane Program
Subcommitee on Space and Aeronautics
Committee on Science
Room 2318
8 May 2003
Abstract
Requirements for NASA's proposed Orbital Space Plane
(OSP) and its place in the new Integrated Space Technology Plan (ISTP) are
discussed. Consideration and adoption of
appropriate top-level goals for the nation's space transportation architecture
is advocated. The role of OSP relative
to the Space Shuttle in support of International Space Station (ISS) is
treated. Key OSP design features,
especially the issue of a winged vs. semiballistic vehicle design, are
discussed. OSP programmatic assumptions
are examined, with attention to cost, schedule, and technology development
requirements.
Mr.
Chairman:
Thank you for inviting me to appear before this
committee to discuss this most important issue, that of the NASA Orbital Space
Plane (OSP) program, and its relationship to the new NASA Integrated Space
Transportation Plan (ISTP).
I will open by noting that, in my opinion, this is not
only a most important topic for
discussion, it is the single most
important subject to be addressed by the nation's leaders in connection
with our nation's future in astronautics.
In aeronautics, the air is merely a medium through
which one must transit in order to reach a desired destination. In astronautics, both air and space become
navigable media, but space also becomes much more: It is itself a destination, a region offering
access to an enhanced vantage point, hard vacuum, microgravity, advantageous
positioning, and new sources of energy and materials.
But to use these assets we must first reach the
destination. The physics of Earth's
gravity well are such that once we reach low Earth orbit (LEO) we are, in
Arthur C. Clarke's famous turn of phrase, "halfway to anywhere". This hearing, one of many such discussions on
the topic, is prima facie evidence
that despite the passage of sixty years since the invention of the first
vehicles capable of reaching space, the task of reaching LEO -- reliably,
routinely, and cost-effectively -- continues to elude us. We are still having trouble taking Clarke's
first half-step.
The task is difficult.
To reach LEO, we must package the energy required for an
intercontinental aircraft flight in a container with the volumetric efficiency
of an eggshell, yet which is tough enough to withstand high inertial, thermal,
and aerodynamic loads. The stored energy
must be expended within a few minutes, and prevented from being expended in a
few seconds. Each launch of an
expendable vehicle is its maiden flight, an event performed under only the most
carefully controlled and limited conditions in aeronautics, yet which in
astronautics must be a maximum-performance event. A reusable vehicle must survive a return
through an atmospheric flight regime so rigorous it cannot be simulated in even
the highest performance wind tunnels; such a vehicle can be fully tested only
by flying it "for real".
But while the task is difficult, we have allowed
ourselves to make it more difficult than it need be. We have sometimes concentrated so heavily on
particular details and "point designs" that we have failed to appreciate that
each such design must blend into, and be part of, a broader architecture. We have sometimes become enamored of specific
requirements, to the exclusion of broader goals. We have at times over-valued the role of
government while failing to pay due attention to the skill and expertise
residing in our industrial base. At
other times we have done the opposite, leaving too much to the discretion of
contractors who, after all, bear no final responsibility for the success or
failure of any government enterprise. In
some cases we have stayed too long with proven but inefficient technology. In other cases we have designated as
"operational" those things which were, at best, operating at the very edge of
the state of the art, and possibly beyond it.
We accept, without serious objection, a "cost of doing business" in
government space endeavors that should shame us all were it to be examined on
any sort of rational basis.
We have made most of the mistakes that can be made,
mistakes which would have put any commercial enterprise mercifully out of its
misery, in favor of a competitor with a better approach. But because the development of space launch
vehicles has been almost exclusively a government enterprise, and because the
few and only competitors have been other governments, normal market mechanisms are
absent, and we continue to muddle along.
This does not mean that all of our problems would be solved if we merely
turned space launch over to industry, and restricted the government's role to
supervising the purchase of tonnage per year to orbit. The contrary fact is true; the government's
role in sponsoring appropriate technology and systems development is crucial,
if effective launch vehicle technologies and an efficient free market in space
transportation are ever to exist. We simply
need to do it better than we have so far demonstrated.
In the wake of the
With these thoughts in mind, I offer the following in
response to the questions posed by this committee in its formal invitation to
appear.
·
What key factors
should be considered when evaluating human space transportation
architectures? Is the proposed ISTP an
overly optimistic or overly conservative approach to meeting NASA's needs? What areas of the proposed approach pose the
greatest risk? What recommendations do
you have to reduce these risks?
The key element of any system architecture is that it
be responsive to an overarching framework of goals. When a system architecture - or a specific
vehicle - is designed without reference to such top-level goals, the result is
a point design that is unlikely to blend smoothly into any larger picture. Rather than being designed to meet a higher
purpose, the purpose becomes merely that set of tasks the system can accomplish.
The proposed ISTP seems to lack the required global framework,
the desired broader view. Three elements
are specified - the Space Shuttle, a new Orbital Space Plane, and a reusable
launch vehicle. This latter element,
potentially the most important of the three, is hardly a factor in the present
discussion because it is being deferred for some unspecified period. What, then, are the questions being asked,
for which these three architectural elements are the answers? This discussion is nowhere to be found in the
proposed ISTP.
NASA should lead the debate to define and enunciate
the nation's goals in space, and following from them, our goals in the
development of space transportation - goals which will guide us for at least a
generation. These goals should be
embraced within the Administration, and shared and supported by the Congress,
for in this matter there is no conceivable partisan interest. Properly chosen goals will be shared by the
majority of informed stakeholders, and will be broad enough to accommodate the
flexibility of timing and funding that future Administrations and Congresses
will need and want, without sacrificing their essence.
While others may certainly have their own ideas as to
the appropriate goals for the nation in space transportation, I believe they
should include at least the
following:
- Robust and economical small, medium, large, and heavy lift
capability to LEO, to the 100 metric ton level or greater.
- Dependable, available crew transport to and from LEO.
- Crew escape capability from ISS and other space stations yet
to be built in other places.
- Reliable cargo transport to LEO, including the capability for
automated rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking with pre-existing
assets.
- The option, but not
the requirement, to combine crew and cargo transport as needed for a particular
mission.
- LEO-to-higher-orbit transfer capability.
- Efficient lunar and interplanetary transfer capability for
both unmanned and manned missions.
If I may be permitted an imperfect but possibly useful
analogy, NASA is the entity in the
Against this larger backdrop, the proposed ISTP can
only be seen as far too conservative. It
is not so much wrong, as it is incomplete.
If fully realized, it would leave us with little more capability than we
have today to go beyond Earth orbit. It
would do nothing soon to reduce the cost of space access. It would saddle us for the next two decades
with continued primary reliance on the Shuttle, which is by any reasoned
measure the riskiest element in the system.
Surely we can do better.
·
How might the OSP
alter NASA's reliance on, and the flight rate of, the Space Shuttle? Should crew and cargo delivery be addressed
by separate systems? If the OSP and a
separate cargo delivery capability for logistics re-supply were developed,
would it be necessary to continue to fly the Space Shuttle? If so, what missions could not be
accomplished without the Space Shuttle?
If the Shuttle is required for the duration of the Space Station, is an
OSP that performs both crew rescue and crew transportation required?
Given the existing Leve1 1 requirements and their
interpretation, the OSP is unlikely to alter substantially NASA's reliance on
the Space Shuttle.
The OSP program is specified solely in terms of its
requirements to "support" the International Space Station (ISS), where
"support" is defined as "supplementing" the existing capabilities of Shuttle
and Soyuz. It must support ISS crew
rotation on 4-6 month intervals, and system is to be designed to have minimum
life-cycle cost. These constraining
assumptions, offered without reference to a set of higher goals such as
articulated above, will have profound consequences in the generation to come. To see where these assumptions can lead, let
us consider the following train of thought.
If the purpose of OSP is to "support" ISS operations
by "supplementing" the capabilities of the Shuttle, and ignoring Soyuz for the moment,
then clearly the Shuttle must be kept flying, in accordance with the proposed
ISTP. Estimates vary, but it is accepted
that a viable Shuttle program requires a minimum of several - let us say three
or four - launches per year. Thus, in
the normal course of events, Shuttle alone can easily accommodate ISS
requirements. OSP would then fly only a
couple of times per year - if that - to maintain operational currency, or to
rotate the vehicle(s) docked at ISS for purposes of emergency crew return. Under these assumptions, OSP is thus needed
only when - as at present - the Shuttle is grounded. The OSP system thus needs to be designed to
accommodate a peak rate of possibly four flights per year for short periods,
and much less on average.
With such assumptions, it will be almost guaranteed
that the lowest-life-cycle-cost design is a simple (probably expendable)
vehicle with the least capability consistent with completing the tasks envisioned
today. A basic semiballistic capsule
designed for a few days of independent flight could easily suffice. By choosing this path - and it is inevitable
if we accept the Level 1 OSP requirements as written - we accept the
requirement to maintain the inherently high cost Shuttle program. Worse, we have as our only Earth-to-LEO
transportation systems two designs (Shuttle and OSP) which are wholly incapable
of being adapted to the needs of lunar return or Mars exploration, ventures
which should certainly be of interest over the intended design life of the
OSP. Considered in such a broader
context, radically different design choices might be made for OSP. But they are not possible given the
requirements as written.
It scarcely needs to be said that it will be extremely
hard to justify the development of such a vehicle, at a cost of several billion
dollars, for such a limited purpose as OSP will have, given the requirements
envisioned for it today. And, indeed, such
development makes little sense economically.
One could likely obtain several replacement Shuttle orbiters in a "block
buy" for the same cost as a new OSP.
Further thought in this direction would likely show that the most
economical crew return vehicle for ISS would be the Shuttle itself - modified
for a 60-to-90 day stay - with four to six crew rotation missions per
year. Following this logic, it becomes
difficult to see the path by which reliance on the Shuttle can be ended.
To me, the likeliest result of accepting the OSP Level
1 requirements as written is that a sober analysis will show the OSP to be
wholly unjustifiable in economic terms, and the program will subsequently be
cancelled in favor of continued use of the Shuttle. Since the Shuttle is not capable of
supporting the larger goals that I have enunciated above, or any similarly
broad set of goals, I would consider this outcome to be another setback for
NASA and the nation.
With regard to separation of crew and cargo, the issue
is not "should" they be separated, but "can" they be separated when it is
advantageous to do so, as is so often the case.
With the Shuttle, they cannot. While
the Shuttle's large cargo bay is its most impressive feature, it is also the
feature which, in my opinion, results in the greatest increment of risk to the
astronauts who fly it. With the cargo
bay attached to the crew cabin, the Shuttle orbiter is inherently so large that
only a sidemount configuration is possible, leaving the crew with no escape
path in the event of a launch malfunction, as with the Challenger failure, and
vulnerable to falling debris, possibly including ice, as with the Columbia
accident.
If the Shuttle system had been designed with a smaller
manned vehicle atop an expendable cargo pod, the overall system would have been
much safer. A simple escape rocket would
have sufficed to separate the crew vehicle from the launch system in the event
of a malfunction, which is of course ultimately inevitable, given a sufficient
number of flights. The crew vehicle
could have been launched, by itself, on a smaller vehicle or vehicles when no
cargo was required. The only lost
capability would have been the ability to handle "down cargo", the least-used
feature of the Shuttle system. My own
view on the value of "down cargo" is somewhat simplistic: It is so difficult and expensive to get
payloads to space that, having done
it, we ought by and large to leave
them there, and design them for that! But,
if necessary, I believe that the design of a reusable cargo pod capable of
executing an autonomous reentry and landing would pose little challenge.
·
Given that the
OSP program has not yet progressed beyond establishing the Level I
requirements, do you think NASA's plan for spending approximately $750 million
on technology demonstrations between FY03 and FY06 is justified? What technologies are the most critical to
demonstrate before proceeding to full-scale development?
Numerous advances in thermal protection materials
technology have been made since the Shuttle was designed and built, and some
relatively inexpensive demonstrations may be useful in this area. Automated rendezvous and docking, a procedure
so basically straightforward that the Russians first demonstrated it more than
three decades ago, remains to be demonstrated in the
·
What design
alternatives should NASA examine as it performs its concept studies for the
OSP? What changes to the OSP program
would you recommend to reduce the cost or accelerate the schedule? How does the decision to proceed with a
design that is totally reusable, partially reusable, or expendable drive design
complexity, development schedule, cost, and safety? Can the OSP schedule be accelerated
significantly without introducing unwarranted risks? If so, what recommendations do you have?
We should be careful to avoid overburdening OSP with
ISS crew return vehicle (CRV) requirements.
My view, harkening back to my involvement in the 1993 Space Station
redesign effort, and before, has always been that the CRV is properly viewed as
a "lifeboat", to be used in an emergency, and likely not otherwise. As an order of magnitude estimate, we might
expect to use it once per decade. If it
is used regularly or routinely, we are doing something seriously wrong with
regard to the operation of ISS, something which needs to be remedied. But stretching the notion of what constitutes
a CRV is not the answer. Therefore,
again in my view, crew transport requirements should determine the OSP design,
with CRV requirements at the margin.
As an aside, I have personally never been able to
understand why a refurbished Apollo spacecraft cannot be outfitted as a
perfectly acceptable CRV. The need for
developing a new vehicle to meet the crew escape requirement has never been
obvious to me.
Much in the news recently, and for good reason, is the
question as to whether the "Orbital Space Plane" should be a "plane" at all. In the wake of the
It is often stated that the landing accuracy of a
semiballistic vehicle will be inferior to that of a winged design. This is nonsensical. If a parachute or parasail is used, today's
steerable designs, with pinpoint GPS guidance, allow either design to achieve
highly accurate landing point control. Furthermore,
historical data indicates that even without benefit of steerable parachutes and
GPS, entirely acceptable landing accuracy can be obtained. The table below cites the mission-by-mission
Apollo landing accuracy (from "Apollo Program Summary Report", NASA TM-X-68725,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Apollo Landing Accuracy |
|
|
Distance from Target (mi.)1 |
Apollo 7 |
1.9 |
Apollo 8 |
1.4 |
Apollo 9 |
2.7 |
Apollo 10 |
1.3 |
Apollo 11 |
1.7 |
Apollo 12 |
2.0 |
Apollo 13 |
1.0 |
Apollo 14 |
0.6 |
Apollo 15 |
1.0 |
Apollo 16 |
3.0 |
Apollo 17 |
1.0 |
1Best
estimate based upon recovery ship positioning accuracy, command module computer
data, and trajectory reconstruction.
Note the phrase above, "if a parachute is used". It is not obvious that a parachute is
necessary (other than possibly as a backup system, wherein the goal becomes
crew, rather than vehicle, survival).
The terminal velocity of a semiballistic vehicle will be on the order of
300 miles per hour, probably less.
Braking rockets ignited at high altitude, initially at idle thrust, and
then smoothly throttled to touchdown can serve quite well, as the DC-X and
Of course, there is also the possibility of using
conventional parachute descent, with surface contact cushioned by
short-duration, high-thrust rockets as in the Soyuz design. Thus, there is no need to assume the
inconvenience of an Apollo-style water landing if a semiballistic design is
chosen, except possibly in a dire emergency when, in contrast to a winged
vehicle, the ability of a semiballistic to survive a ditching then becomes an
attractive option.
However, because we should carefully consider the
merits of a semiballistic crew vehicle design does not mean that we should ignore
the merits of a winged design. Various
lifting body research programs, as well 198 successful X-15 flights and 116
successful Shuttle landings (including approach and landing tests with the
When considering winged vehicle designs, however, I
think we have ignored one of the best options, the straight-winged design, for
somewhat specious reasons. All else
being equal, it is well understood that a straight-wing design will have less
mass, lower heat loads, a higher subsonic lift/drag ratio, a lower landing
speed, a shallower glide path on approach, and better subsonic handling
characteristics than a comparable delta-wing design. The delta-wing design offers as its principal
advantage a somewhat greater entry crossrange capability than for a comparable
straight-wing design. This allows
greater maneuverability from orbit to reach a given landing site, as opposed to
waiting on-orbit for perhaps half a day for another opportunity to reach the
site. The delta-wing design also allows
the so-called "abort once around", meaning that the Shuttle can land at its
launch site after only one orbit, in the event of a severe anomaly. This greater atmospheric maneuverability was
the reason for its selection for the Space Shuttle design, and was a source of
considerable controversy at the time.
But in over a hundred Shuttle flights, operational practice has shown that
this enhanced crossrange capability is at most a minor convenience, rather than
a significant enabling feature. Any
consideration of a new, winged, spaceplane should take these facts into account
in determining a design configuration.
When contemplating designs for a new winged space
plane, it may not be beyond the bounds of reason to examine the swing-wing
concept, so successful on the F-14 fighter aircraft. Providing robust, mass-efficient thermal
protection of the wing leading edges is among the most difficult, and
unforgiving, tasks in a spaceplane design.
With a swing-wing concept, it might be possible to avoid this task
altogether. For such a vehicle, the
atmospheric entry phase would be performed as a semiballistic design, while
terminal area energy management, approach, and landing would be performed as a
conventional winged vehicle. As always,
there are tradeoff analyses to be conducted, but the concept may be worth
pursuing.
The issue of OSP reusability is complex, which of
course is why it attracts so much debate.
The primary reason to prefer a reusable vehicle is that, in all reason,
it should be cheaper to operate.
Secondary reasons may include the fact that ground and flight crews gain
experience with the nuances of a particular machine, a valuable benefit when
compared to the obvious risks of undertaking a maiden voyage for every flight
of an expendable vehicle. However, for
the moment let us restrict the discussion to economic issues.
The economic benefits of reusability are strongly
conditioned by the cost of incorporating the necessary features into the design
and fabrication of the vehicle, and by its assumed flight rate and operational
lifetime. As a simple example, if it
will cost five times more to build a reusable vehicle than to build a
comparable expendable design, the reusable vehicle must fly five times to break
even with the expendable, assuming their processing costs are similar. Moreover, most of the cost for the reusable
vehicle is incurred "up front", while a greater proportion of the expendable
vehicle cost is incurred only when the next unit is actually procured. Time-value-of-money considerations can thus
strongly benefit the expendable vehicle when flight rates are low, and when decisions
are made on a lowest-life-cycle-cost basis.
The issue of designing to minimize life-cycle cost is
worth some discussion. It should be
noted that, over more than two decades of Shuttle operation, the program has
encountered much criticism because year-to-year operational costs have been
quite high when considered on a per-flight basis. This has been directly traced, in part, to
early-1970s budget constraints on initial design and development, when numerous
choices were made which had the effect of minimizing (or appearing to minimize)
development cost, while increasing operational costs. Again because of time-value-of-money
considerations, the strategy of designing the vehicle to minimize development
cost is closely akin to that of a design based on minimizing life-cycle cost,
especially when the vehicle will be in service for a long time. While neither principle is inherently wrong,
each should be applied in moderation.
Life cycle costs are heavily biased by early-year, or "up front",
costs. It is always easy to defer operational
funding problems to the "out years".
Yet, when the "out years" arrive, as they always do, we seem
consistently to regret the pattern of earlier choices, which were of course
intended to "save" money. Is it
possible, this time, that we could at least make a new mistake?
As outlined earlier, it will be tempting on economic
grounds to consider an expendable design for OSP, for the reasons just
mentioned. I believe this is a mistake;
if done, it will represent a failure of government to lead where industry, by
itself, cannot go. An argument to go
backward, toward deliberate use of expendable vehicles for manned spaceflight,
is an argument which inevitably favors the doing of less manned spaceflight,
precisely because out-year operational costs will always been seen as
unacceptably high when the out-years arrive.
This should not be our goal.
With respect to cost, I would like to offer a cursory
figure of merit, a target cost-per-pound of delivered hardware. It is well established within the aerospace
community that such figures of merit offer a valid first-order estimate of
likely program cost; indeed, such parameters form the basis of all accepted
cost models. Therefore, I would advocate
that the OSP design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E) costs should
be upper bounded at $100,000 per
pound for the dry mass of the vehicle.
The nation's experience base with reusable manned space vehicles is
limited, but both X-15 and the Space Shuttle orbiter would seem to fit this
definition. In recent-year dollars, both
were completed at a DDT&E cost of approximately $90,000 per pound of
delivered hardware. If the OSP is
allowed to cost more, we are conveying the message that nothing at all has been
learned in 40+ years of manned spaceflight.
Regarding the program schedule, it seems inconceivable
to me that a nation which required only eight years to reach the moon, from
virtually a standing start, can require a similar or greater length of time to
design and deploy a simple crew transport vehicle. If the OSP program requires more than five
years - at the outside - from authorization to proceed until first flight, it
is being done wrong. My primary
recommendation, the only one I think can affect the outcome in a significant
manner, is this: Define carefully the
goals the OSP is to meet. Pick a strong,
effective, proven, and trusted program manager, and accord to him or her the
total authority and responsibility for success. Set aside the necessary funds, with adequate
margin. And then see to it that everyone
else stays out of the way.
·
What challenges
may NASA face in using an Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) as the boost vehicle
for the OSP? Does the use of an ELV for
human spaceflight pose an unacceptable risk?
In the 1950s and 1960s, the term "man rating" was
coined to describe the process of converting the military Redstone, Atlas, and
Titan II vehicles to the requirements of manned spaceflight. This involved a number of factors such as
pogo suppression, structural stiffening, and other details not particularly
germane to today's expendable vehicles. The
concept of "man rating" in this sense is, I believe, no longer very
relevant.
If a winged design is chosen for OSP, there will be an
issue of coupling between the OSP vehicle aerodynamics and the launch vehicle
structural dynamics. Briefly, the OSP
must be oriented and flown very close to its zero-lift aerodynamic angle of
attack. Any significant amount of lift
on the OSP wings will create lateral loads at the OSP/launch vehicle interface
that are quite likely unacceptable, at least without additional structural
reinforcement at that interface.
However, it must be said that launch vehicle loads are likely not the
limiting factor; the wings of a spaceplane cannot themselves accept high
lateral loads without being ripped off. The
problem is a familiar one; the Shuttle must be flown with a nearly zero angle
of attack for similar reasons.
Therefore, irrespective of the launch system used for
a winged OSP, the vehicle must be flown at essentially a zero-lift angle of
attack, and any variations due to vehicle aeroelasticity must be carefully
controlled. While the problem is
certainly not trivial, it is not likely to be any more difficult for the new
evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV) than it will be for a winged OSP
attached to a future RLV.
The base reliability of unmanned expendable vehicles
seems to arouse concerns where that of the manned Shuttle system inexplicably
does not. Many, if not most, unmanned payloads are of very high value, both for
the importance of their mission, as well as in simple economic terms. The relevant question may be posed quite
simplistically: What, precisely, are the
precautions that we would take to safeguard a human crew that we would
deliberately omit when launching, say, a billion-dollar Mars Exploration Rover
(MER) mission? The answer is, of course,
"none". While we appropriately value
human life very highly, the investment we make in most unmanned missions is
quite sufficient to capture our full attention.
Logically, therefore, launch system reliability is
treated by all parties as a priority of the highest order, irrespective of the
nature of the payload, manned or unmanned.
While there is no EELV flight experience as yet, these modern versions
of the Atlas and Delta should be as inherently reliable as their predecessors. Their specified design reliability is 98%, a
value typical of that demonstrated by the best expendable vehicles. If this is achieved, and I believe that it
will be, and given a separate escape system with an assumed reliability of even
90%, the fatal accident rate would be 1 in 500 launches, substantially better
than for the Shuttle. Thus, I believe
that launching OSP on an expendable vehicle would pose no greater risk - and quite
likely somewhat less risk - for human spaceflight than is already accepted for
the Shuttle.
Witness
Biography
Mike was previously CEO of the Magellan Systems
Division of Orbital Sciences Corporation, and also served as General Manager of
Orbital's Space Systems Group and as the company's Executive Vice President/Chief
Technical Officer. Prior to joining
Orbital, he was Senior Vice President for Program Development at Space
Industries International, and General Manager of the Space Industries Division
in
Mike has served as both the Chief Engineer and the
Associate Administrator for Exploration at NASA, and as the Deputy for
Technology of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. Before joining SDIO, he played a leading role
in numerous space missions while employed at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics
Laboratory, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and Computer Sciences
Corporation.
Mike holds seven degrees in the fields of Physics,
Electrical Engineering, Aerospace Engineering, Civil Engineering, and Business
Administration, and has been an Adjunct Professor at the
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