UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Space

STATEMENT OF
LT. GEN RONALD T. KADISH, USAF 
DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT JOINT HEARING ON MISSILE DEFENSE

JUNE 27, 2002

Chairman Hunter, Chairman Weldon, Members of the Subcommittees.  Good afternoon, and thank you for the invitation to appear before you to talk about the Missile Defense Program.  Thank you also for your committee's strong support of this important program.  While we face many challenges in the road ahead, we are moving forward.  The consistent support your committee has given to missile defense will, in the end, have a profound impact on our nation's security. 

We are moving forward with the President's missile defense program.  My objective is to meet or exceed the Department-wide execution goals.  MDA's financial systems show that we are on track to do this.  Despite the continuing resolution during the first quarter of this fiscal year, MDA's financial systems indicate that overall in FY 2002, we are 60 percent obligated and 18 percent expended through April 2002.  This is comparable to our execution this time last year, by the end of which MDA had exceeded, overall, the Department-wide goals for obligations and expenditures. 

In addition, R&D is a two-year appropriation, and we would not expect to obligate 100 percent of our R&D funding in the first year.  For example, we have budgeted for contract awards fees that will not be obligated until the end of the period of performance in the second year.  In short, I am confident that MDA execution is on course, will meet or exceed Department-wide standards, and that MDA does not have a carry-over problem.

I would like to update you on our progress since I last testified before your subcommittees on 27 February.  As I look back, it has been a busy four months, punctuated by a series of important events just two weeks ago.  In the space of three days this month, we had a successful intercept of an MRBM by a Standard Missile-3 interceptor launched from an Aegis cruiser; the United States formally withdrew from the ABM Treaty; and we broke ground on the start of the expanded BMD System Test Bed at Ft. Greely, Alaska. 

We are truly at a crossroads in the development of missile defenses.  Our pace has picked up, and it is important that we sustain our momentum to be able to take full advantage of the opportunities that now lie before us.  Some of the momentum is most readily seen in our recent testing progress.  Additionally, our redesigned processes and management structures are now beginning to mature, although there are start up problems we need to solve, as you would expect with such a new management approach.

I mentioned the SM-3 successful intercept.  This was Flight Mission (FM) -3, part of our initial Aegis LEAP Intercept (ALI) test series for our Sea-based Midcourse Defense element.  The first test, FM-2, which took place last January, was also a hit, so we are now 2-for-2.  With these two tests, we have fulfilled our basic objectives at this stage of ALI testing, and the next step is to take advantage of this early completion of our objectives and capitalize on our success so far in the development of the SM-3 missile capability. 

Last March 15, we had our fourth successful intercept of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element.  Our record now stands at 4-for-6 in intercepts.  As in previous tests, we used a modified Minuteman as a target and the prototype booster for the interceptor.  The kill vehicle separated from its booster some 1400 miles from the target warhead.  By using on-board visual and infrared sensors, augmented by radar data provided through the in-flight communication system, the kill vehicle found and hit the target that was surrounded by three balloon decoys.  We have completed the initial reviews of our data, and the lessons learned are being applied to subsequent tests.  The next intercept test event, IFT-9, will be conducted later this summer.

Our initial operational testing of the PAC-3 has not achieved all the results we expected to see.  We have had four operational intercept tests this year, one each during February, March, April, and May.  In each case, soldiers from Ft. Bliss operated the firing units.  The four tests involved various mixes of PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles operating together against simultaneous air-breathing and ballistic missile targets.  In these tests, the PAC-2 destroyed only one of its two assigned air-breathing targets, and, against ballistic missile targets, the PAC-3 destroyed only two of four.  In one test, a PAC-3 hit its ballistic missile target but did not destroy the warhead, so the test was not judged a success.  In another, a PAC-3 missile failed to fire.  And in a third test, even though the missile target was intercepted and the warhead destroyed, a second PAC-3 failed to launch.  As a result, this test was not a complete success, because our operational concept calls for two PAC-3s to be fired at each target to maximize our chances of intercept.  We have some more work and testing to do to fix these problems, but the initial production of PAC-3 should continue as planned. 

Mr. Christie's Office of Operational Test and Evaluation is evaluating the results of this initial operational test series over the summer. 

While we naturally tend to focus on these very visible intercept flight tests, I believe that the thorough ground testing we must do before flight tests is even more important.  This has always been our approach.  Rigorous ground test checks can reveal critical flaws and are essential if we are to have successful intercept flight tests.  Unless we continue to take this deliberate and important step, we may waste the effort and resources we spend on the more complex and costly flight tests.  These ground tests sow the seeds of success in our future flight tests.

I mentioned we had broken ground at Ft. Greely for the expanded BMD System Test Bed.  This test bed will add two essential dimensions to our ability to test.  First, it will allow us to test our individual elements under more operationally realistic and stressing conditions than we could before.  And second, it will allow us to test the integration of those elements into a single BMD System in ways we that would not have been possible before.  Some of the tests we will now be able to conduct would not have been permitted under the ABM Treaty.

As we look ahead over the next 6 months, we have some 15 ground tests and 20 flight tests scheduled, including several data gathering flights. 

Looking farther out over the next year, individual element progress will be substantial.  For example, the Airborne Laser will be undergoing ground and component tests, especially in beam control, with low power laser tests scheduled for next summer.  For Ground-based Midcourse Defense, we are still looking at roughly one intercept flight test per quarter, with four, and perhaps even five, having been done by this time next year.  We have two important GMD command and control simulation exercises set up for this fall.  Our sea-based element has a sled test next month, with the next intercept flight test, FM-4, planned for the fall.  THAAD is still in a ground testing phase, with extensive missile defense integration qualification and radar tests. 

The exercise agenda is full.  We have four missile defense integration exercises and two system-wide wargames scheduled over the next twelve months.  Our international test agenda includes exercises this fall with Korea and with the US European Command and, next spring, with US Central Command. 

Let me turn to some of the process and management changes that are beginning to bear fruit. 

We changed our acquisition approach from threat-based to capability-based.  We have already taken a key step in that direction.  I have approved the initial Technical Objectives and Goals document, or TOG, that lays out the capabilities to which our BMD System should be designed.  This document will be the starting point for development. 

The TOG is distinguished from its closest predecessor document, the Operational Requirements Document, or ORD, in two major ways.  First, the TOG deals with capabilities that are more broadly defined than military requirements as traditionally derived.  This gives a somewhat wider range of latitude to the developer, in effect telling him what to do, rather than how to do it.  And second, it has been developed in conjunction with our user and developer communities.  This is an important departure from past practice where requirements were specified by the user in detail before being handed off to the developer.

The advantage the TOG has over its predecessor is that these objectives and goals can be modified during system development to incorporate advances in technology.  Furthermore, if necessary, the TOG can be adjusted to reflect changes in adversary capabilities.  It is this ability to make rapid trade-offs during development that will be so important to speeding up the decision and acquisition cycle that we need for missile defense. 

The Departmental system of oversight is maturing.  I met with the Senior Executive Council last winter, and we are scheduled to do so again this summer to present our program and budget proposals for next year. 

More of our routine MDA missile defense activity coordination occurs with the Missile Defense Support Group.  This group has representatives from each of the 13 separate Departmental entities that have a stake in our program.  It has met virtually every two weeks since it was stood up four months ago.  For example, the Missile Defense Agency developed an Implementation Plan to execute the Secretary's guidance in his January chartering memorandum.  We have reviewed the draft of this plan in detail with the Missile Defense Support Group, and we are now incorporating their comments.  I can tell you from experience that, had we used normal coordination procedures, we would not have been this far along in drafting such comprehensive guidelines for such a complex program-one that touches the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, and many other Defense Agencies. 

The National Team of government, support contractors, federally funded R&D centers, and industry that we have set up is also maturing.  It is helping us with the unprecedented tasks of integrating the diverse elements of the BMD System and developing a comprehensive BM/C2 approach.  The first engineering products, focused on Block 04 and to a lesser extent on Blocks 06 and 08, are due mid-July.  These products will form the basis for any Block architecture changes or risk reduction activities we need to take prior to submitting the FY04 President's Budget.  Together with our National Team members, we will be able to review and revise, as needed, our biennial Block architecture approach.  This development cycle gives us the ability to modify our BMD System approach as capabilities evolve and as the threat changes.   

The team's work over the past four months has been most productive, and I look forward to their report to me next month as to how we might best accomplish our tasks.  Their recommendations will form the foundation for my own recommendations to the Department for the program.  And you, in turn, will most likely see some of those during our hearings with you next year.

Chairman Hunter, Chairman Weldon, the Missile Defense Program is indeed at a crossroads.  With the continued support of the committee for the President's Budget, we can make the right choices to keep up the aggressive pace and momentum of our development effort.  In so doing, we can fulfill our responsibility to help protect the American people, our deployed forces, our allies, and our friends from the threat of ballistic missile attack.

Thank you.  I look forward to your questions.



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list