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Under the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, "It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack ...." Adopted with broad bipartisan support and signed by the president, the statute answered the question whether to deploy a national missile shield, but could not mandate when a technically feasible system would be ready.

When will effective and affordable National Missile Defense (NMD) technology be ready? That is the question we pose this morning as we undertake oversight of a $10 billion technology development process that has yet to yield a deployable NMD system.

The Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) hastened the demise of the Soviet Union. Since then, we've moved away from the global vision dubbed "Star Wars" to merely trying to "hit a bullet with a bullet" and missing more often than not.

Without question, NMD program officials, today's stewards of the SDI legacy, confront complex technical challenges in a changing strategic, diplomatic and political environment. This is rocket science, and defending against emerging missile threats demands an unparalleled degree of technological precision in launch detection, target discrimination, command and control coordination, and target interception.

Our oversight of other complex weapons systems - the F-22 Raptor and the multi-role Joint Strike Fighter - underscored the importance of permitting technology readiness to drive design and deployment decisions. In those programs, we saw a genuine sense of urgency to overcome test failures, conquer new technology and meet emerging threats.

Is a similar sense of urgency propelling the NMD technology program? A 1998 review of the missile defense program found motion but not progress, a "rush to failure" caused in part by poor management and lack of aggressive oversight. The president's hastily announced decision last week to defer initial NMD deployment steps "until we have absolute confidence that the system will work" holds even proven technologies hostage to an artificial all-or-nothing standard.

Factors other than technical feasibility appear to be constraining NMD success. One of those factors, Russia's refusal to discuss necessary changes to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, could have been ameliorated had the president authorized construction contracts for that part of NMD technology we know will work, the X-Band radar facility in Alaska. Under the pressure of inevitable, if distant, NMD deployment, the Russians might be more willing to accede to limited ABM changes rather than face further loss of international stature in the event the treaty is deemed a legal nullity or a strategic anachronism.

The ballistic missile threat is real, and it is growing. China is developing weapons using stolen U.S. warhead designs, and appears willing to sell missile technology to rogue nations who may not be tamed by deterrence alone. North Korea could resume flight tests and acquire intercontinental missile capability at any time. Development of technology to defend against that threat should be pursued just as aggressively, unfettered by timidity over near-term diplomatic or political fallout.

The next president deserves to choose from a complete menu of mature NMD technologies in deciding how best to protect our national security.

Our witnesses this morning represent a wide range of views on how to implement the national policy on missile defenses. We welcome them all, and look forward to their testimony.