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Text: General Kadish's Senate Testimony on National Missile Defense

(Calls system development "challenging" but achievable) (7040)
Development of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system now being
tested by the U.S. military is admittedly "difficult and challenging,"
but it is by no means "impossible or infeasible," Air Force Lieutenant
General Ronald T. Kadish told the Senate Armed Services Committee June
29.
Kadish, director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization,
testified at a hearing on the limited NMD program which is due to
undergo its next major test on July 7. President Clinton is expected
to announce his decision regarding deployment of the NMD system later
this year.
"I do not share the assessment that what we are attempting to
accomplish with our system is in any way impossible," Kadish said,
adding that "those who charge that the system cannot be
technologically feasible simply do not have all the information they
need to make such a conclusion."
"I believe the tests planned over the course of the next five years
will continue to build our confidence in our ability to discriminate,
to identify target warheads in spite of anticipated countermeasures,
and to destroy any incoming warheads using advanced hit-to-kill
technology," he said.
Kadish rejected criticism of the testing system devised. "Is it a
perfect system? No, but it beats little or no testing at all, which is
the problem generally faced by those states that are being given
credit by some of our critics for developing unsophisticated
countermeasures that are believed by them to be capable of overcoming
our planned system," he said.
And he strongly denied accusations that system tests have been rigged
to produce favorable results. "I testify here before you today that I
would not tolerate, nor would those above me or below me in the
Defense Department tolerate, such activity," he declared.
Following is the text of Kadish's remarks as prepared for delivery.
(begin text)
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. I am delighted to have the
opportunity to testify on the U.S. National Missile Defense program.
Today, I would like to outline for you what we are doing in the
program, why we are doing it, and how we are progressing. I also will
address the independent assessment that General Welch has just
completed. Then I want to amplify my comments on the acquisition
approach we are taking and the testing program, and close with some
thoughts on the "attacks" the program recently has received.
The impetus behind our program comes from the threat assessment by the
Intelligence Community and the bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission. The
Director of Central Intelligence testified before Congress earlier
this year that, "Over the next 15 years, our cities will face
ballistic missile threats from a variety of actors ...." He
specifically pointed to North Korea's ability to test its Taepo Dong
II missile this year, a missile that "may be capable of delivering a
nuclear payload to the United States." Given this capability, the
threat of an attack on the United States territory will become
increasingly likely during the next few years, a potential for which
we must be prepared.
We expect these initial capabilities to include only relatively simple
countermeasures. These emerging capabilities and timelines have been
significant factors in how we have gone about developing the NMD
system and why we picked the approach that we did.
System Description
Let me begin by explaining why we picked the midcourse phase of a
ballistic missile's trajectory to execute the intercept. There has
been a lot of discussion, including by a number of very distinguished
persons, about the potential benefits of a boost-phase system or even
a terminal-phase one; but most of the focus has been on the boost
phase.
Chart I helps illustrate some of the points associated with intercept
options.
In the boost-phase, there are many ways we can approach the problem.
We can do it from land, as the Russians have suggested -- in other
words, a Russian-based (joint U.S./Russian) boost-phase intercept
system -- or we can do it using either a surface or subsurface
sea-based system. In both cases, the ship-based interceptors would
have to be launched from a point very close to the booster launch
point, i.e., in waters where ships are highly vulnerable; the response
would have to be very rapid (the timing for this approach is obviously
critical). The first signal we would get would be from a satellite
indicating a launch; as soon as it recognizes that there had in fact
been a launch.
Of course, an immediate intercept response to this signal assumes that
we are very clear it is a hostile ICBM (intercontinental ballistic
missile) launch. We do not necessarily want to be shooting down a
satellite launcher or a test shot. Clearly, there are some very
important command-and-control issues associated with this system and
its development. If the launch is validated as hostile, then we could
try to intercept with a high-performance interceptor which we do not
now have -- to get out quickly and shoot down the missile in its boost
phase.
Another alternative is a space-based system. Here there is a choice of
either a space-based laser system or a space-based interceptor. Of
course, were we to use a kinetic energy interceptor from space, it
would have to be an extremely high-performance interceptor to reach
the missile in its boost phase, or we would have to accept the reality
that the intercept would take place during the missile's mid-course
phase. As to a space-based laser, as you know, we have the Space-Based
Laser (SBL) technology under development. The launch of the first
integrated flight experiment for this system is scheduled for the 2012
time period. Development and deployment would stretch considerably
beyond that.
So besides the obvious point that each of these systems probably would
violate the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, we also have rather
lengthy development times associated with them. None of these
approaches could produce a system in the 2005 time period.
A terminal-phase system would provide defense at the other end of a
ballistic missile's trajectory. This approach has some very distinct
advantages in terms of being able to sort out decoys. The effect of
the earth's atmosphere on the warhead and penetration aids can
significantly assist our discrimination capability.
The disadvantage associated with this approach is that we would have
to have a very large number of interceptors at many locations because
this is a "point defense" system. Defending all 50 states and major
metropolitan areas in them with a terminal system would require an
extensive number of deployments -- a very expensive and probably very
contentious concept (since many, less populated areas would remain
unprotected). Also, because intercepts would take place virtually
overhead, there are some obvious disadvantages regarding nuclear,
biological, and chemical warhead fallout.
Each phase has its advantages and disadvantages, including the
mid-course phase that we selected.
The big advantage of the mid-course, from a defensive point of view,
is that we have relatively more time to react than during the other
two phases. We have more time to make decisions, to sort the decoy
from the warhead, and to ensure human-in-the-loop control. This extra
time also allows us the ability to shoot, and then verify the success
of that shot, and then shoot again if necessary, a so-called
"shoot-look-shoot" capability. Additionally, multiple shots
(simultaneously and/or sequentially) at the target give a higher
probability of being able to hit it. And if we were unable to
discriminate between, for example, a very sophisticated decoy and a
warhead, we would shoot them both down. Multiple shots and a
shoot-look-shoot capability can provide for a more robust defense. The
longer time period of the mid-course phase allows that.
The downside of the mid-course phase, of course, as so many critics
remind us, is that it is quite easy to generate decoys in this phase
(since it takes place outside the atmosphere). This poses a major
discrimination challenge, one with which we are quite familiar. I will
come back to this issue.
Importantly, given the progress we already have made in the
development of technologies for the planned NMD system, if we are to
develop a system in the shortest possible time period against a
relatively simple offensive system, a midcourse defensive system is
the way to go. This is the approach we have chosen. It is an approach
that does not rule out later adding either boost or terminal phase
complements to the system, should the threat evolution require it and
future technology allow it. If the President decides to deploy, we can
have an initial capability by 2005. The remainder of my discussion
describes the system we could deploy, pending that decision.
Chart 2 shows the basic system elements of the selected NMD system. It
begins with the space-based warning system, the system that picks up
the fact that a booster has been launched and provides some initial
trajectory information. The Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite
system is already in place. The DSP has been there for many years to
detect launches, and we are planning to replace this constellation
with more capable SBIRS-(Space-Based Infrared System)High satellites.
Six planned Space-Based Infrared System satellites will be inserted
into geosynchronous and highly elliptical orbits and will have greater
sensitivity and an improved ability to project trajectories.
Once we have the detection, track, and initial impact projection data
from the space-based sensors, the information is passed on, through
the command and control system, to the Early Warning Radars (EWRs).
These are also in place today at a variety of places around the globe.
These UHF radars will be upgraded to enhance their current ability to
track the targets, providing better information to help us determine
where the targets are headed and provide better information for the
intercept.
This information is then passed to the X-band Radars -- high
frequency, short wavelength radars -- that can do an excellent job of
discrimination. Using these radars, we can begin to sort out the
decoys and other objects from the real warhead or warheads. This is
the kind of radar planned for deployment on Shemya, an island at the
end of the Aleutian Islands (more about this later).
Assuming we knew the missile track and that it was heading toward the
United States, we would launch the ground-based interceptors. This
interceptor will have two main elements -- the booster and the
exoatmospheric kill vehicle. We are now using in our tests a booster
that is a surrogate for the final operational booster. The operational
booster will be built from a combination of three modified
off-the-shelf commercial boosters. We have run into some unexpected
technical problems in the modifications, which have had an impact on
the schedule, and we are working to resolve these. In the meantime, we
will continue to conduct our tests with the surrogate.
Finally, we have the interceptor kill vehicle itself The EKV is the
front end of the National Missile Defense (NMD) Ground Based
Interceptor (GBI) missile. It is launched with a three-stage booster.
In all integrated flight tests to date, we have used a surrogate
booster. Later flight tests will use the operational booster. The
booster propels the EKV toward an approximate intercept location so
that the EKV can perform terminal maneuvers to impact the target. Once
the EKV separates from the booster, it acquires, tracks, and
discriminates its target, ultimately maneuvering for a hit-to-kill
collision. The EKV weighs about 130 pounds and measures about 51
inches long. It uses a multiple-waveband seeker to acquire, track, and
discriminate its target. This seeker consists of infrared and visible
light focal plane arrays and a cryogenic cooling system attached to a
telescope, supported by processing hardware and software. Onboard
guidance and navigation equipment calculates homing maneuvers, and
divert propulsion and attitude control system motors make the needed
lateral and pointing movements to zero in on a target and destroy it.
Before launch, the EKV receives key information from the Battle
Management, Command, Control, and Communications (BMC3) element as to
the incoming threat and the predicted position and time of the
intercept. The GBI's Command Launch Equipment uses that information to
construct a firing solution and launch the interceptor. After launch,
the EKV uses an onboard communications system to receive further
targeting information from the BMC3 element's In-Flight Interceptor
Communications System, or IFICS. This information may include a more
precise estimate of the threat's position and speed, as well as
additional discrimination data based on radar measurements. The NMD
EKV was designed by Raytheon. It has been used in integrated flight
tests 2 (sensor fly by only), 3 (intercept), and 4 (near hit).
The key to ensuring that this entire system works together is the
battle management system that integrates all the elements, including
the multiple sensors, which enhances the system's overall
discrimination capability.
Lastly, I should point out that we will later be adding a new
Space-Based Infrared System in low earth orbit, the so-called
SBIRS-Low, to provide even more effective launch detection and
discrimination against later, more sophisticated threats.
Chart 3 provides an illustration of how the NMD system works, the
concept of operation showing how the pieces of this complex system fit
together. It starts with the detection of the launch of the threat
missile by the satellite system. This information is transferred to
the large early warning radar that helps predict the envelope within
which the target is expected to travel. We can then commit the
interceptor, based upon the projected trajectory, since this is
basically a ballistic trajectory. The X-band Radar refines that track
and does a significant amount of discrimination of decoys from the
target reentry vehicle, and passes that information to the
interceptor. This radar can also provide data through the battle
management system to the interceptor in mid-course for course
correction and seeker pointing after the interceptor has been
launched. This inflight communications ability will be included for
the first time in our next flight test on July 7.
Then the kill vehicle itself, on its own, does the final sorting among
the decoys and the target, diverts toward the right target, and does a
hit-to-kill, direct intercept. The kinetic energy from this high-speed
collision (with closing velocities of approximately 15,000 miles per
hour) will literally pulverize the target. In relative terms, these
reaction timelines for NMD program operators are very short. In some
cases, however, the time allotted to us in the mid-course phase of
flight could allow us to get off a second shot against the same
target, thereby increasing the probability of an intercept.
Program Schedule
Chart 4 addresses the NMD schedule. One of the key aspects of this
program is our intent to upgrade and evolve this system over time.
This is an important point. It was our original intent, and it
continues to be our intent.
We start off with a single-site system with 20 missiles, a single
X-band Radar, multiple EWRs that already are available but will be
upgraded, and then the SBIRS-High, which are planned to replace the
DSP satellites. This configuration of the system we refer to as the
initial "C-1", or Capability 1, system.
As the threat grows in number, the X-Band Radar software can be
upgraded and 80 missiles added. We refer to this later system, which
we would deploy by 2007, as the "Expanded C-1" system. The SBIRS-Low
satellite sensor system would be added later for additional detection
and discrimination capability as the threat evolves.
Obviously, with the small size of the system we have here, it is not
even remotely a threat to the large quantities of the Russian missile
systems. It is clearly intended for the small quantities of missiles
that we might expect from the countries of concern.
The important point here is that subsequent enhancements include
significant hardware and software upgrades and the addition of a
substantial additional discrimination capability. Basic improvements
are funded.
Flight Tests
Chart 5 shows the initial system flight tests. There have been four
such flights to date. The first two flights were not intended as
intercept flights. They were intended to gather data on the EKV's
ability to discriminate. There were two such "fly-by" tests, using two
different candidate kill vehicles, each built by a different
contractor team. This was during a competitive phase, and there were
two systems at that time -- a Boeing/TRW system and a Raytheon system.
Both candidate vehicles were flown. The first test was called 1-A
since, on the originally planned flight (#1), although the target
missile was launched and flew, the interceptor was incorrectly
programmed and did not fly. So we wasted that target, but later reused
the interceptor for flight test 1-A.
Both these flights were successful in that they allowed us to make a
fair comparison of their relative capabilities. What is particularly
important, though, is that they also gathered an enormous amount of
data on targets that are even more sophisticated than the ones the
so-called "Expanded-C1" system, the 100-interceptor system we could
deploy by 2007, is designed to defeat.
When we went to the intercept phase of our flight test program,
starting with the third flight, we simplified the target cluster,
because our objectives were very different. We wanted to see if the
interceptor could operate through to intercept, and to see if the
whole system could work together. Some people have said, "You dumbed
it down," and I will address this point later. Let me just say now
that that was not what we were doing at all. What we were doing on the
first two flights was trying to make flight comparisons and to gather
a lot of data for later use. When we started the intercepts on flight
#3, we wanted to be able to verify our capability against the expected
threat.
On this third flight test, IFT-3, the target complex consisted of the
warhead bus, a balloon decoy, and a re-entry vehicle. What was
interesting about this particular flight, which resulted in a
successful intercept, is that the kill vehicle looked first at the
decoy, then assessed it as not being the right object, searched for
the real target, found it, diverted toward it, and slammed into it,
destroying it. In other words, the test demonstrated a basic
discrimination ability and an intercept ability. The test was
successful.
IFT-4, the fourth flight-test, integrated more of the NMD system
elements. This integration showed the transfer of data from radars to
command-and-control, and from command-and-control to the booster
launch. Everything went well until we got to the last five and a half
seconds of the flight. At that point, the infrared seekers on the
missile failed to cool down, the target was not picked up properly,
and no intercept occurred. A post-flight analysis indicated the cause
of the failure was an obstruction in the cooling system. We have taken
corrective actions to address the material handling and flight
preparation processes and made adjustments to the hardware to ensure
that this problem does not reoccur. This failure did not require a
major redesign of the EKV.
While we demonstrated integration of the system, we did not
demonstrate final intercept. This we will try again with our July 7th
test flight, IFT-5. In this test, we will add the one system link not
utilized on IFT-4, namely the in-flight communications system to send
guidance and final seeker pointing information on the target to the
interceptor while in-flight.
Overall NMD Decision and Deployment Schedule
Chart 6 lays out the schedule. To put the planned tests and the
decision process into perspective, let me first go through that
internal DoD acquisition decision process and relate it to the flight
tests.
There are basically four major acquisition decisions to be made.
The first of these, the so-called "Deployment Readiness Review,"
(which Dr. Gansler chairs, and which has all of the senior military
and civilian relevant leadership as participants) is scheduled this
year. It will assess the technological state of the program and
provide a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary
will then make a recommendation to the President.
To meet a 2005 Initial Operational Capability, we would have some
other critical, early decisions to make: site selection, authorization
for site preparation for the Shemya X-band radar, commencement of
design work for that site, and begin construction of the radar site
infrastructure. There are a few early long-lead parts that we might
want to order at this point. None of this work will be contracted for
until a Presidential decision is made to proceed.
The second key point in the acquisition decision process is next year,
when, again to make the 2005 schedule, we would have to start the
actual building of the radars and associated communications systems at
his point we would also want to authorize some selected long-lead
parts for the interceptors. These become the second-tier of long-lead
time system elements.
The third major acquisition decision is the point at which we would
actually commit to buying the interceptors. In terms of the typical
program, this is when we say, "We are going to build our weapons."
This is a decision that would get made in 2003.
The final decision, the determination that the system is ready, is the
easiest one to make. That is the one in which we say, "We have 20
interceptors. This system has been shown to be effective. We're ready
to go." It is the prior three that are the major acquisition decision
points in the development process.
So, first, we decide whether to commit to construction of the radar
construction site at Shemya (the X-band Radar). Second, we decide
whether to commit to the other radar upgrades and the communication
systems and the building of the X-band radar. Third, we decide whether
to commit to the actual interceptor builds. Finally, we get to the
IOC.
There are a series of flight tests that are planned all the way
through this development program. First, we had the two initial
fly-bys to characterize seeker performance against multiple objects.
Then we tested the ability of the kill vehicle, which resulted in a
successful hit. The fourth flight test demonstrated the integration of
the system, but did not result in a successful final intercept. Now we
have our fifth test coming up July 7th. Together, these tests will
give us a measure of the system's technological feasibility for this
summer's DRR.
We have planned a series of additional flights. Flight test #6 is
scheduled for later this year. Flight test #8 is critical because it
is the first test of the next-generation interceptor booster, the
booster planned for production. This decision would be made by the
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) on what recommendation to provide to
the Secretary of Defense at that time.
The third milestone point is when we would make the decision to commit
to the interceptors. At this point we want to be using the production
interceptor. Functionally, the final production interceptor is the
same as for the ones we have used in this early round of flight-
testing. But when we move from engineering to production, there are
many necessary quality and process changes. So, it is important that
the production kill vehicle be the final proven design. And this third
milestone is scheduled to determine that. Again, this decision would
be made in the DAB as to what to recommend to the Secretary.
Throughout the testing process, not only are we testing equipment that
becomes progressively more mature, we are presenting new challenges to
the system so that each test increases in complexity and
sophistication. They also include increasing the sophistication of
decoys and penetration aids to ensure the system can handle the threat
we project for that time.
There is also a series of test flights (not shown on this schedule)
that are not intercept-flights, but which, nonetheless, are crucial.
These involve putting up additional target decoys to check out the
radars and much of the rest of the system. These are "risk-reduction"
flights. There is a whole series of these flights, and they have been
going on and will continue. In one test we had 22 different objects in
space to test the radar's discrimination capabilities. These tests
improve our ability to discriminate and test out various elements of
the system.
Independent Reviews of the Program
Next, let me highlight the independent reviews of this program that
have taken place. Secretary Cohen recently asked retired General Larry
Welch and his team of noted scientists and experts from a wide
spectrum of viewpoints to conduct a third review of the program -- and
he will discuss this with the Committee later this morning. I might
note that some of these earlier reports were quite critical of the way
we were going about the NMD program.
In his earlier reports, General Welch's team highlighted three basic
criticisms. One of them, the so-called "rush to failure" criticism,
was the judgment that we were being too schedule-driven as opposed to
event-driven in the development of the system. In response, we
modified the overall program. You may remember that we had a
"three-plus-three" program aimed at fielding a system as early as
2003. As a result of that report, we modified our schedule by
extending the IOC two years, to provide for possible deployment by
2005 rather than the original 2003. It gave us more time.
Additionally, we made a major philosophical change, namely to be
event-driven rather than schedule-driven. Our major milestone
decisions are now scheduled to occur after the major events identified
on Chart 6. The events are driving the decisions to commit to further
action, not the schedule.
The second point made by General Welch's team in their earlier reports
was that we were trying too hard to do too much too soon. He
recommended that we adopt a more evolutionary approach. We should
start out with simpler decoys and evolve the system over time. That is
exactly what we are now doing.
And third, in his earlier reports, General Welch believed that we did
not have as many tests scheduled as we should have had. We have since
added a significant amount of testing and testing resources to lower
the risk in the program.
Chart 7 shows the four very important and unanimous findings and
recommendations from the independent review team. The first one is
that the technical capability is available to develop and field the
limited system to meet the defined C-1 threat. This is a relatively
limited threat, but the technical capability to meet it is available.
Second, the team finds that the NMD program is still on a high-risk
schedule. We agree, and this is something we have been saying for a
number of years now. Importantly, the report concludes that there is
"no technical reason to change the schedule at present." So we are
continuing with the schedule that we have now, based on both his
assessment and our own, that we have the ability to meet the 2005
date, if things go according to plan.
Third, General Welch's team said that there are inherent restrictions
in our flight testing that will be very limiting for the program.
That's true. For example, we don't want objects falling onto fisherman
in the South Pacific, so we have range safety limitations. We also
have limitations on debris in space, and we have limitations on impact
area. Our intent is to try to come up with some ways in which we can
overcome these limitations.
The team's last point dealt with discrimination. It concluded that
while "design discrimination capabilities are adequate to meet the
defined C-1 threat ... more advanced decoy suites are likely to
escalate the discrimination challenge." Clearly our capability has to
evolve with the system and the threat. What was really encouraging
about his findings is the fact that he and his team believed we have
the inherent capability in our design, should we choose to add the
additional sophistication, to be able to handle those sophisticated
decoys.
In their most recent report, the Welch team attempts to provide a
quantitative illustration of the program's schedule risk. In it, Welch
team members highlight the risks associated with the three major
decision points mentioned earlier. These are, first, risks associated
with the flight that we have coming up, and the decision scheduled in
the fall. Then there is the risk regarding the flight with the new
booster. Finally, there are the risks associated with the
demonstration of the production kill vehicle and the decision on its
production release. These are the gating items in the schedule, and
these are the events we will use to drive the decision points. General
Welch labeled these three major decisions, first, a "feasibility
assessment," second, a "decision to purchase," and third, a "decision
to deploy."
Shemya Construction Site Is The Long-Lead Item
Chart 8 provides a perspective of Shemya Island. It is not a place
that one would normally choose for a vacation. It is a very small
island, way down at the end of the Aleutian chain. By looking at the
size of the airport runway, you can get some idea of the scale.
Shemya is a terrible place in terms of weather. It happens to be a
perfect place in terms of geography, because from this vantage point,
we can see everything coming up towards the United States from the
direction of North Korea. We will need to put a power plant and a
radar on the island, and preparing the site for these represents a
significant challenge in meeting the schedule for NMD system
deployment by 2005. In fact, it is the longest lead item.
Chart 9 gives an idea of average of days per month with wind
conditions under 30 miles per hour in Shemya. Shemya's normal weather
conditions are not those under which we would like to land a barge
loaded with heavy or sensitive equipment. The wind can reach above 100
miles an hour on some days. There are only a limited number of days
throughout the year, and not even many during the more favorable
summer months, in which the winds average less than 30 miles an hour.
There are even far fewer days with winds less than the 10 miles an
hour, needed for some delicate crane operations. So Shemya is not an
attractive place in terms of high seas, of bringing in equipment on
barges, and of construction. Any building has to be done in the
summer, and even then the weather may not be very accommodating.
Chart 10 looks at why, if we are to make the 2005 date, we must start
site construction in the summer of 2001. For construction preparations
to begin, we need to let a contract, probably in this calendar year.
That means we need to get a request for a proposal (RFP) out very
shortly, in order to have the contract award and be in a position to
begin construction. Contract award for the radar construction, of
course, will depend on the President's decision regarding deployment.
(In making this decision, the President will consider four criteria:
status of the threat, the maturity of the technology, affordability,
and overall national security, including arms control.) Let me
reiterate: the construction -- digging the ground, pouring the
concrete, putting up the base for the radar -- is the long-lead item
in deploying this system for the year 2005. Between then and now, of
course, we have another 17 integrated Right tests, so there are a lot
of parallel actions we must undertake to move this system forward.
Our System Acquisition Approach-And Some Misconception
Now let me turn to some other issues, specifically our general
acquisition approach, which will shed further light on our
programmatic decisions.
Two major stresses on this program have emerged. The first stems from
the pace at which the threat has grown, and which in turn has placed a
premium on developing such a complex system in a much shorter time
frame than might otherwise be the case. The second concerns the
technical challenges of mid-course discrimination and hit-to-kill,
which we are resolving through modeling, simulation, and both ground
and missile testing.
The nearness of the 2005 deadline will not allow business as usual.
Certainly the way we must acquire some of our systems in order to meet
more rapidly evolving threats is markedly different from the way we
did it during most of the Cold War.
The development of the Atlas ICBM in the late 1950s under the
leadership of Air Force General Bernie Schriever was accomplished
under a similar urgency. He pioneered some of the concurrency in
development we use today, an approach that entails risks, yet can
yield great payoffs in the long run. The difference between then and
now is that some of those acquisition techniques and procedures are
now being used for simultaneously acquiring many interrelated
systems-essentially, a "system of systems," not just one crash
program.
In many respects the Ballistic Missile Defense program, because of its
importance, complexity, and unique joint requirements, is paving new
ground in the weapons' acquisition world. The standard -- or
traditional -- approach to weapon-system acquisition is risk-averse,
and does not allow us to develop new concepts and systems rapidly. As
you know, we in Defense have not been able to keep pace with rapid
developments in the commercial sector. This inadequacy in our approach
to acquisition is magnified when the threat drives the urgency for
development. Nonetheless, the program, in spite of the schedule
urgency, must be event-driven, (not held to calendar dates even if
performance has not yet been satisfactorily demonstrated). This is our
approach.
The second major stress on the NMD program involves coping with
technological complexity. The hit-to-kill approach we are following
allows little room for error -- not more than a few inches at very
high speeds. There is a premium on accuracy, but that accuracy is
meaningless unless the right object is identified correctly
(discriminated) and struck. It also puts a premium on our testing
program and on our modeling and simulation capability because we
cannot do live testing for every eventuality or reality that we might
expect to encounter. A single fully integrated intercept flight test,
for example, with far-flung equipment ranging across and above the
globe, can cost upwards of $100 million and require several months of
preparation.
I mentioned earlier that we have been accused of dumbing down our
tests and even falsifying results. The charges betray a
misunderstanding of the NMD testing program, its objectives and its
approach. Any well conceived test program -- and the NMD testing
regime has survived a number of exhaustive reviews over the past
several years, not just by General Welch -- involves a series of
events, each building on the success or failure of prior events. Yet
each test, whether it is a ground test or a flight test, is designed
to be sufficiently unique in and of itself so as to isolate variables.
Too much attempted in a single test event will not allow program
managers to identify problems, causes, and solutions. Yet, if there is
too little attempted, the testers waste valuable resources and
unrecoverable time.
When we progressed from the first two (non-intercept) flight tests,
involving 11 objects each, to the next two intercept flights,
involving three objects each, we were not making the targets simpler
in order to gain a shallow success. We were examining very different
and discrete capabilities of the elements being tested. The target
information gathered, especially on the first two (non-intercept)
tests, is being used to enhance the development of both the hardware
and the software of this very complex system. Future intercept tests
will build on this data, so that by the time these intercept tests are
completed-along with other non-intercept "risk reduction" target
flights -- we will have a comprehensive picture of the capabilities of
the NMD system to cope with the threat projected for that time. Some
seem to expect that the first tests will demonstrate the full
capability of the mature system, and they criticize us for not
immediately testing to the ultimate capability we project.
Real world constraints -- not only range safety limitations I
described earlier, but resources as well -- preclude us from doing all
the ground- and flight-testing we would like, and this means we must
do as much modeling and simulation as we can, both for system elements
and the whole integrated system. We also know that what works on the
test range may not work in a real-world crisis, and we try to second
guess those differences using as broad a range of data and experience
as we can.
Is it a perfect system? No, but it beats little or no testing at all,
which is the problem generally faced by those states that are being
given credit by some of our critics for developing unsophisticated
countermeasures that are believed by them to be capable of overcoming
our planned system.
The ability of the planned system to "work," i.e., handle the
countermeasures threats has been questioned rather extensively in the
open press. I do not share the assessment that what we are attempting
to accomplish with our system is in any way impossible. Neither did
General Welch and his team of experts with access to far more data
than the critics. Difficult and challenging, yes. Impossible or
infeasible, no. Those who charge that the system cannot be
technologically feasible simply do not have all the information they
need to make such a conclusion. They are not taking into account the
inherent capability of the NMD design to adapt to the evolving threat.
I believe the tests planned over the course of the next five years
will continue to build our confidence in our ability to discriminate,
to identify target warheads in spite of anticipated countermeasures,
and to destroy any incoming warheads using advanced hit-to-kill
technology.
I would like to close by addressing charges that the NMD tests are
"rigged," and that we are "falsifying data" and "lying" about the
success of the technology that we need to make the system work. I
testify here before you today that I would not tolerate, nor would
those above me or below me in the Defense Department tolerate, such
activity. Ethical or competency problems in any part of my
organization would be detrimental to the Department as a whole, and,
more fundamentally, betray the trust the American people have placed
in us. Many people have worked diligently on this program and remain
dedicated to developing this country's first operational national
missile defense system.
The very scrutiny that the NMD program has received, still receives,
and will continue to receive, may be its surest and most effective
defense against allegations of incompetence and for falsifying data.
Daily attention from the American people, the Executive and
Legislative branches of government, U.S. industry, and independent
analysts, together with the sheer numbers of people inside the program
representing various and independent public and private entities, help
ensure the integrity of the information we use to affirm our system
engineering approach.
Chart 11 shows a flow chart to depict the NMD analysis process. Data
integrity from NMD Integrated Flight Tests is assured through the use
of configuration-controlled data from a variety of independent sources
and organizations, which is then assimilated into an Integrated Data
Package by an independent contractor outside the influence of the NMD
Lead System Integrator. Once developed, all analysts, including the
Lead System Integrator, or LSI, use the Integrated Data Package as the
benchmark of truth.
The IFT-5 Data Management Plan identifies in excess of 200 data
products that are obtained from national test ranges, including
Kwajalein Missile Range, Vandenberg Air Force Base, Kauia Test
Facility, and the Joint National Test Facility using multiple sensors
(optical, infrared, photonic hit indicator, telemetric, and radar).
Data is collected by more than 25 providers representing multiple
agencies, many providing data independently of the NMD contract and
test objectives. These raw data products, under configuration control,
are delivered to members of a government team who serve as couriers to
transport the data to the data manager for subsequent distribution.
Data products then are distributed to over 50 organizations for
analysis, a procedure that provides a broad range of independent
perspectives. At all levels of data collection and processing, data is
controlled and archived.
Data analysis is performed by the LSI and by multiple diverse
government organizations, for the Operational Test Agencies and the
NMD Joint Program Office. Within the LSI, element-level subcontractors
and subject matter experts perform critical analysis using different
perspectives, tools and resources. Analysis results are presented by
various organizations at a series of comprehensive Post-Test Analysis
Briefings.
We also must not ignore the fact that many of the discrimination
technologies and techniques the system relies on cannot be discussed
in an open forum. There are legitimate national security concerns
about divulging information on our discrimination capabilities. Some
material has been made public, but there is a great deal more that has
not been divulged, and properly so. We withhold this information not
to "cover up" what we have been doing, but to prevent access to
information by potential adversaries concerning the design
specifications of our counter-countermeasures systems. Consistent with
the national security of this country, we will continue to be
forthright and open with respect to this important defense program.
Public opinion in these matters is of utmost importance, which is one
of the reasons we must make every effort to correct the record and
defend the integrity of the NMD program. Over the coming months and
years, I believe program results can speak for themselves in
responding to the criticism that the NMD system cannot operate as
designed against the projected countermeasure threat that a state of
concern might pose. We believe the established testing program will
continue to affirm our assessments thus far. In the meantime, it is
vitally important to continue the public discussion and try to resolve
any legitimate disagreements.
Mr. Chairman, I again thank you and the Committee for this opportunity
to discuss our National Missile Defense system.
(end text)
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