Testimony
of Robert G. Joseph
Mr.
Chairman, distinguished Members, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today on national
missile defense and the ABM Treaty.
It is a particular pleasure to appear
before this Committee because of the leading
role that it has played in advancing the
understanding of the need for missile
defenses, as well as in promoting sound
policies and programs that are essential to
achieving this critical national security
requirement.
The
views I will express are personal and do not
necessarily reflect those of the National
Defense University, the Department of Defense
or any agency of the U.S. Government.
There
is substantial agreement on the emerging
threat to the United States from long-range
ballistic missiles.
This is reflected in the unanimity of
views in the Rumsfeld Commission and in the
subsequent reassessment by the intelligence
community last fall. The overwhelming majorities in both Houses of Congress that
passed the National Missile Defense Act
-- making it U.S. policy and law to
deploy a national missile defense "as soon
as is technologically possible" -- is
further evidence of the growing consensus on
the threat, both to U.S. forces and allies
abroad, as well as to the American homeland.
As
always, there are exceptions.
In one case it has been suggested that
three members of the Rumsfeld Commission were
almost tragically hoodwinked into supporting
the findings of the report.
However, few would find this
proposition to be anything other than
preposterous, especially the members in
question.
At
the international level, Moscow and Beijing
are fond of saying that the United States is
exaggerating the missile threat but their
position is very much tied to an active
campaign to perpetuate American vulnerability
to their own nuclear forces.
As for those allies who have suggested
that Washington is hyping the threat, I would
note that this criticism, when it does come,
comes primarily from Europe and not from
friends and allies in Asia.
Undoubtedly, the North Korean TaepoDong
missile that flew over Japan and the ongoing
deployment of missiles opposite Taiwan have
something to do with this difference in views.
I will return to Russian and allied
views but before I do, I want to make a few
comments on the threat and the need for
defenses.
The
assessment in the Rumsfeld report emphasized
two points of departure: first, foreign assistance is not a wild card but a fact.
And, second, missile programs today do
not follow the patterns set by the United
States and Soviet Union.
They do not require high standards of
accuracy, reliability or safety.
As, a result, they can move ahead more
rapidly and with less likelihood of detection.
After
conducting an extensive review across many
compartmentalized programs, the Commission
concluded "concerted efforts by a number of
overtly or potentially hostile nations to
acquire ballistic missiles with biological or
nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the
United States" and that this threat "is
"broader, more mature and evolving more
rapidly than has been reported in estimates
and reports by the Intelligence Community."
Perhaps
most disturbing, the Commission found that
countries like North Korea and Iran could
threaten the United States within five years
of a decision to acquire long range ballistic
missiles - and that we might not know when
such a decision was made.
In other words, we might have little or
no warning before deployment.
The
TaepoDong launch vividly validated the
Rumsfeld findings. This test was followed by the release of a report by the
National Intelligence Council that noted
progress made by states in Asia and the Middle
East in developing longer-range missiles,
including Iran's flight test of the 1300 km
Shahab-3 and the TaepoDong launch that
demonstrated North Korea's ability to
deliver small payloads to ICBM ranges.
So
what conclusions can be drawn from the threat?
First, I believe it is evident that the
United States requires a comprehensive
strategy to meet the challenges of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and missile
proliferation.
We must support and lead international
non-proliferation efforts, such as Missile
Technology Control Regime, to prevent and slow
further spread of weapons of mass destruction
and missiles.
Such efforts are essential but, as is
clear from the threat, they are not
sufficient.
As
a consequence, we must also pursue defenses to
protect ourselves against the threat.
This is a national security imperative.
Most observers agree with this
conclusion, at least with regard to theater
missiles and theater missile defense.
When it comes to longer-range missiles
and, especially national missile defense (NMD),
agreement breaks down.
The
most popular argument -- the argument du jour
against missile defense -- does not deny the
growing capabilities of states like North
Korea to attack the United States. Instead, it
focuses on their intentions.
Opponents of a national missile
defense, even a limited defense, are
increasingly fond of asserting that the United
States does not need to defend against missile
attacks because we can rely on deterrence
through the threat of massive retaliation, and
specifically the threat of nuclear
annihilation.
In
short, they would not dare strike our cities
because they know if they did their countries
would be obliterated.
We have heard this assertion from many
different sources, from former National
Security Advisors to, ironically, many
individuals who have long been associated with
the nuclear abolitionist cause.
A
number of recent press articles have clearly
intended to raise doubts about the threat.
Some have done so by first noting the
many analytical and policy shortcomings of the
term "rogue state."
While this is something I certainly
agree with, criticism of the term does not
advance an understanding of the threat.
These articles also argue that the word
rogue does not equate to irrational -
another point on which I certainly agree.
The
conclusion of these articles, however, is
something I reject. They add two and two and come up with a perfect three.
They assert that, because regimes like
North Korea are rational and want to survive,
they will be deterred by the threat of massive
retaliation.
This simply misses the point and is
based on a dangerous misunderstanding of
today's threat.
It neglects the primary motivation of
these states for investing billions of dollars
of scarce resources in missile and WMD
programs.
Our
work at the National Defense University --
which includes extensive red teaming and case
studies -- suggests that, although deterrence
of regional adversaries armed with weapons of
mass destruction will be difficult to achieve,
it remains our first line of defense.
Our work also leads to the conclusion
that deterrence of these contemporary threats
is fundamentally different from the East-West
deterrence of the past.
We
deterred the Soviet Union principally through
the prospect of massive retaliation and mutual
assured destruction.
We based our doctrine, force structure
and arms control policies on the concept that
-- as long as American and Russian cities were
vulnerable to nuclear annihilation in a
retaliatory strike -- neither side would be
tempted to use nuclear weapons against the
other in a disarming first strike.
Few
today would advocate this same concept as a
desirable basis for deterrence of regional
states armed with weapons of mass destruction.
The differences are apparent: we face a
much more diverse and less predictable set of
countries than we did in the Cold War.
These states are governed by
individuals that are much more prone to taking
risks than were Soviet leaders. That does not
make them irrational
-- only gamblers like Hitler and the
Japanese militarists in the 1930s.
Moreover,
the conditions that we valued for deterrence
in the U.S.-Soviet relationship -- such as
effective communications and agreed
understandings -- are not likely to pertain
with states like North Korea.
In addition, these states see weapons
of mass destruction as their best means of
overcoming our technological advantages that
they know will defeat them in a conventional
conflict.
WMD, and especially biological weapons,
are becoming their weapons of choice to deter
us from intervening in their regions to stop
their aggression, unlike in the Cold War when
we sought to deter the Soviets from expanding
outward.
In
this context, long-range missiles become
particularly valuable as instruments of
coercion to hold American and allied cities
hostage, and thereby deter us from
intervention.
The tremendous disparity in our favor
in both conventional capabilities and nuclear
weapon stockpiles simply does not matter to
this type of calculation. They need only hold a handful of our cities at risk.
This is not irrational. In
fact, it is very well thought out.
If you cannot compete conventionally
and you have territorial or political or
religious goals that require the use of force,
you must find a means of keeping the United
States out of the fight.
Failing
that, even if we do intervene, long-range
missiles can retain their deterrent value.
Under these circumstances, again in the
calculations of regional adversaries, their
missiles can reduce the risk of massive
retaliation by the United States if they use
chemical and biological weapons in their
regions, even if against U.S. forces.
This is what its all about.
It is not about North Korea conducting
a first strike against us - that is a
strawman being put up by NMD opponents as a
debating point.
Deterrence
of these new and different threats requires
new and different concepts and capabilities.
Cold War concepts do not apply.
The threat of retaliation, while
essential, is not sufficient.
Denial capabilities such as passive
defenses against chemical and biological
weapons and counterforce measures to attack
mobile and deep underground targets are
central to deterrence.
Perhaps most critical, the importance
of missile defenses stand out in our research.
A
second argument often heard against proceeding
with national missile defense is that such a
deployment, again even if very limited in
scope, would be undesirable because the costs
would outweigh the benefits.
Several versions of this argument are
made. Perhaps the most frequently heard is the assertion that NMD
would threaten strategic stability, a phrase
that clearly passes the focus group test but
that obscures the underlying old think on
which it is based.
What
is being said is that we must continue to base
our relationship with Russia on the same
footing that we did with the Soviet Union.
Those taking this view are usually willing to
extend Mutual Assured Destruction to China
and, although it is never stated explicitly,
they are willing to extend at least partial
vulnerability to states like North Korea.
The problem is that partial
vulnerability in a deterrence context is like
partial pregnancy.
I think that is why it is always left
unsaid.
A
third argument is that missile defenses are
not technically feasible. The Russians, of course, have an operational ABM system with
nuclear tipped interceptors that protect
Moscow and a large portion of their territory
against a Chinese-size threat.
The recently deployed Israeli Arrow is
conventionally armed.
Although not hit to kill, it does
demonstrate the feasibility of a national
program based on interceptors with
conventional front-ends.
In other words, there are different
approaches to missile defenses and I am
confident that our scientific community is up
to the task - as they have always been in
the past.
While
independent reviews of the current program,
such as that headed by General Welch, have
emphasized the risks inherent in meeting the
established deployment schedule, they have
generally confirmed the soundness of the
technologies being pursued.
This is despite the fact that the U.S.
approach has been the most technically
challenging.
In
fact, we have for ABM Treaty reasons ruled out
the most promising and cost effective avenues
to defense, including sea-based and
space-based ABM systems.
These are the capabilities that could
provide for boost or ascent phase intercepts
that offer the greatest potential for
countering the missile threat as it grows
quantitatively and qualitatively, including
the introduction of countermeasures.
The
fact that we have not pursued ABM sea- and
space-based approaches and the fact that we
are now embarked on a very accelerated
schedule to deploy even a modest land-based
system is the direct result of deliberate
policy choices.
In
1993, in what was declared to be an effort to
strengthen the ABM Treaty, ongoing national
missile defense programs were downgraded in
priority and funding was significantly
reduced.
Programs such as space-based sensors
were cutback; others such as space-based
interceptors were killed.
Even funding for ground-based
interceptors and radars was slashed and
essentially reduced to life-support levels.
In short, we lost seven critical years
- during which time our most likely
adversaries worked hard to acquire ballistic
missiles to strike our cities.
Today,
U.S. arms control policies -- based on Cold
War precepts -- continue to create roadblocks
that prevent us from moving forward to acquire
capabilities that can strengthen deterrence
against today's threats.
There can be no better example than the
positions we are taking in the ABM Treaty
negotiations.
Current policy is to preserve intact
the central provisions of the Treaty while
deploying a very limited -- but the
Administration tells us, effective -- national
missile defense against what it until very
recently called the "rogue" missile
threat.
The
problem is that these two objectives are
mutually exclusive.
As a result, in an attempt to retain
the ABM Treaty as the primary goal, the NMD
architecture has become so contrived that it
will have only a minimal capability against
near term threats. While the official position
is that we will go back to Russia to seek its
permission to expand our defenses as the
threat evolves, few see this as a serious
prospect.
In
an attempt to have it both ways, U.S. policy
has had another equally unsubtle influence.
For almost eight years, we have
proclaimed the ABM Treaty to be the
cornerstone of strategic stability with Russia
in a way that has served to perpetuate Cold
War suspicions and distrust.
This has had two effects.
First, along with other policies that
Moscow has seen as directed at Russia, it has
contributed to the reversal of political
relations with Russia.
Promoting MAD as official policy and at
the center of our relationship has a very
corrosive influence that necessarily imprisons
us in adversarial box.
Second,
if in fact the ABM Treaty and MAD do guide our
relations, nuclear weapons become the most
important currency, at least for a state like
Russia that can ill-afford alternatives.
We see this in Russia's declaratory
statements and defense planning priorities,
where nuclear weapons have become more
prominent than ever in its security policy.
This may help explain the total lack of
progress made in the last seven and a half
years in achieving further reductions in
nuclear weapons.
How
Russia will react to the deployment of a
national missile defense is an important
question.
A number of U.S. and Russian officials
have predicted dire consequences if we insist
on amending the ABM Treaty or withdraw from
the Treaty.
In particular, some have predicted that
deploying NMD will threaten the so-called
fabric of arms control and lead to an end to
further reductions in nuclear weapons.
Such
predictions are inconsistent with Moscow's
reaction to the Bush Administration proposals
in 1992 that sought fundamental changes to the
Treaty and the end of MAD as the foundation of
our political relationship.
The Russian reaction at that time was
to sign START II and to explore cooperative
means for deploying what President Yeltsin
called the Global Protection System in a
speech to the United Nations.
These
predictions also ignore Russia's own
approach to arms control, as seen most
recently in the CFE experience.
Here, the principle was clear.
Russia assesses the value of arms
control agreements in the context of its
defense requirements - a truly sound
concept.
When the security conditions change, it
acts with determination to change the
treaties.
For the United States, the parallel to
the ABM Treaty should be evident.
Although
it will not like it, Moscow will most likely
understand our position and will most likely
not act contrary to its own interests.
Arms control negotiations to reduce
nuclear stockpiles are important to Russia.
To end the negotiations would end
Moscow's best means to stay at perceived
parity. The Russians, according to almost all
assessments, will be compelled by economics to
go to much lower levels of offensive forces,
independent of arms control outcomes.
Yet,
even at the lowest levels speculated for
Russia in the future, a missile defense
deployed to protect against a limited attack
would not undermine Russia's nuclear
deterrent.
And this is the critical point: if
Moscow knows that U.S. defenses will not
undermine the Russian nuclear offensive
capability, it will have what it requires.
The
views of U.S. allies on national missile
defenses and the ABM Treaty are more complex.
A year ago, most would likely have
argued that the political costs and risks
would far outweigh the likely gains from
deployment.
Today, this calculation appears to be
changing, at least somewhat.
Still,
NATO allies continue to express concern about
the possible Russian reaction and, in some
cases, about what is described as the
"de-coupling" effects of a missile defense
that would protect the United States and not
Europe. Making this latter point the German
Foreign Minister has stated that confidence in
the U.S. security commitment could be
undermined if American cities were at less
risk of attack than European cities.
This
strained, counter-intuitive argument has it
exactly wrong: U.S. credibility as an ally
would be undermined if the United States were
vulnerable to blackmail from weapons of mass
destruction and long range missiles. On the other hand, if the United States could protect itself
from this threat, its credibility would be
strengthened.
Also
significant, the concerns and in some cases
objections of allies can be traced to their
doubts about the seriousness of the U.S.
commitment to missile defenses.
This is not to say that allies would
rush to support NMD if they thought we were
serious.
However, they question the depth of the
Administration's commitment to deploy
defenses and wonder whether or not this is
just the next American initiative that will go
unfulfilled but in the process will upset the
old framework to guide relations with Moscow
without replacing it with a new structure.
Moreover, the allies are not protected
under the current architecture and have little
to gain from supporting our missile defense
deployment.
What
is clearly required is American leadership.
Without leadership of the type we had
in 1983 in the INF context, we have been
unable and unwilling to make the intellectual
case in European capitals for missile defense.
This failure can be explained, in part,
by the internal contradictions in U.S. policy
between the stated goals of deploying defenses
and retaining the central provisions of the
ABM Treaty.
Any comprehensive approach to meeting
the missile proliferation threat must
reconcile these inconsistencies.
In doing so, we will better protect
against the growing threat and establish a
more stable basis for our relations with
Russia and others.
Thank
you for your attention.
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