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Dr. Stephen A. Cambone
Director of Research
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University

           Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before this Committee.  I have been asked to discuss with the Committee the elements of a decision to deploy a national missile defense (NMD). 

           My testimony, Mr. Chairman, assumes that either President Clinton, or his successor, will make a decision to deploy a national missile defense. 

I.  Threat

           The ballistic missile threat to the United States that prompted Secretary Cohen to call for an NMD deployment by 2005 has not diminished. 

           According to open sources, North Korea continues to develop its ICBM-range ballistic missile (Taepo Dong 2) even as it engages in the politics of summitry with the South, restores relations with European and other Asian nations and conducts talks with the US.  Iran continues to import ballistic missile components from North Korea and to acquire help from Russian and Chinese entities to develop long range ballistic missiles even as its reform-minded government sends signals of willingness to adjustment its relationship with the West.  However, it appears that the government has decided to focus on social and economic policy reform not changes to national security policy.  As a result, there is every reason to believe that Iran could pose a ballistic missile threat to the United States within five years of a decision to do so.  The nuclear weapons programs of both countries continue to worry the US.

 Apart from North Korea and Iran, according to open sources other emerging ballistic missile powers are working hard on their programs.  Pakistan has made substantial progress in developing both liquid- and solid-fueled ballistic missiles.  The former systems are based on the North Korea technology used in its Taepo Dong program.  The latter systems are based on Chinese-supplied technology and production facilities. India's little noted program is moving with Russia assistance toward development of SS-20 class ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

These emerging ballistic missile powers continue to trade among themselves.  There is also reason to believe they are willing to assist others in acquiring missiles of longer ranges.  Hence, there is worry about the programs of Iraq, Libya, Syria and Egypt, to name but three recently in the news.

Deployment of an NMD system is driven in the first instance by the threat posed by emerging powers.  It is appropriate to note the extant threat as well.  Russia's ballistic missile forces are declining in size due to financial and production limitations.  Nevertheless, the SS-27 ICBM Russia is deploying is a state-of-the-art system the Russians claim is explicitly designed to penetrate US missile defenses.  Of the recognized nuclear weapon states, only China has a program aimed at modernizing and expanding its ballistic missile capabilities.   Progress by Russia and China is of interest as well due to their willingness to transfer technology to emerging powers.

 According to the Director of Central Intelligence in March of this year, "expertise and materiel from Russia has continued to assist the progress of several states."  China, he has testified, "remains a key supplier of WMD-related technologies to developing nations."  Of particular concern is the September 1999 assessment of the Intelligence Community that Russia and China "are probably willing to sell the requisite technologies" for developing countermeasures to the emerging powers.  

It is against this background that the US will deploy a national missile defense system.  As we do so, we will need to be clear with ourselves, our allies, and even with potential adversaries about three points:

· the objectives served by deploying an NMD system;

· the relationship the system to those objectives

         · the consequences we think an NMD deployment will have on international relations and how the US will address those consequences to promote stability and sustain deterrence on both regional and global scales.

 II. Objectives

             An NMD system has three broad objectives, in my view: to defend the US and extend defense to allies; deter further enlargement of the threat and discourage development of countermeasures. 

 The first objective of an NMD is to defend the territory of the US against a limited threat or use of ballistic missiles, armed with a nuclear, chemical biological (NBC) or conventional warhead, against its territory by an emerging ballistic missile power.  It should have capability to extend defense to our allies.  It should also have a capability to defend against an accidental or unauthorized launch by Russia or China.  Of the two, concern for such a launch by Russia is presently low, but if its financial condition leads to reduced confidence in the command and control system or further deterioration in its missile attack warning system, concern could rise.  China may prove of increased concern over time as it begins to deploy mobile ICBMs and SLBMs directed by a new command and control system and supported by a rudimentary ballistic missile attack warning capability.

Defending against the emerging powers is dismissed as unnecessary by some that would have the US rely exclusively and perpetually on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter such threats or attacks on the US.  This policy preference is based on an unfounded faith on our capacity to understand and to know how to manipulate the perceptions and decisions of the leadership in these states.  To be sure, we will continue our efforts to improve our understanding and to posture ourselves for deterrence.  But to admit we are certain how to deter all threats under all conditions is not an admission that deterrence is not applicable to the emerging powers.  Instead, it is to admit that deterrence can fail.  It is to insist that should deterrence fail that the president has the means to protect the American people and that he be afforded the opportunity to choose with deliberate care the response of the United States.  This combination seems a prudent adjunct to classic offensive nuclear deterrence. 

Second, an NMD deployment should be designed to deter the further acquisition of ballistic missile capabilities by emerging powers that currently possess them or acquisition of such capabilities by additional powers for threatening or use against the US and its allies.  There are those who would wish to continue to rely on bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation agreements to achieve this objective.  But this preference does not address our current situation.  Ballistic missile and NBC capabilities have already proliferated, the emerging powers do not share the norms of international behavior on which they are based, Russia and China indifferently observe them and Western powers, the US included, are reluctant to respond promptly and vigorously to proliferation.  An NMD coupled to theater missile defense and to highly capable counter-proliferation capabilities deployed by the US and its allies is needed to assure an adversary that the cost of acquiring ballistic missile capability far outweighs any prospective gain.

             Concern is heard that missile defense deployments will encourage continued and perhaps accelerated acquisition of additional and more sophisticated ballistic missiles.  The source of the concern is that if China, for example, were to respond to an NMD deployment by expanding its long-range ballistic missile forces beyond what is currently projected, countries like India and Russia would do so as well, responding more to China than to NMD.  As noted below, the strategic balance between projected Chinese ballistic missile forces and a limited NMD will not change relative to today.  India's territory is now held at risk by Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missiles.  India is, today, improving the quality and range of its ballistic missile forces.  It likely will have the technical capability soon to deploy missiles with range sufficient to hold Beijing at risk.   This is occurring without reference to US NMD.  Russian proposals for reductions to START III are undoubtedly drawn up based on their own assessment of China's future capability. 

 An NMD system-that is, its technical features and supporting research, development and test program-should have as its third objective discouraging the development of countermeasures.  The deployed elements of the system need to be robust enough to impose high technical risk on those who would develop countermeasures.  The elements in research, development and test are critical to supporting the objective.  The RD&T must demonstrate that adversary countermeasures programs face high technical risk and cost and have very low probability of success.  It has become fashionable to say the system proposed by the Clinton Administration cannot accomplish this objective.  This assertion is used to advance the proposition that we should, therefore, forego a defense deployment. 

A more appropriate conclusion is that a technically more robust NMD system is required-- both with respect to deployed elements and the RD&T program.

III. An NMD System

             In my judgment the land-based NMD system the administration has proposed is inadequate to the nation's needs.  Confining the initial deployment to a single site is strategically unsound.  It leaves the US dependent on a system deployed in a vulnerable site, equipped with interceptors of only one type, confined to destroying individual warheads during that portion of their flight where the defense is highly susceptible to countermeasures, oriented against only one of the pressing threats we currently face.  Moreover, a sufficiently robust RD&T program does not support the system.  It does not provide for the defense of our allies.  And finally, measures to remedy these defects are themselves subject to further negotiation with Russia.  Some have argued that for one or all of these reasons the Administration's proposed deployment is flawed fatally and that it should be abandoned.

 I would argue that these flaws are very real but that they derive directly or indirectly from the effort of the Administration to develop and deploy an effective defense without unduly stressing the constraints of the ABMT.  Those constraints have resulted in a proposal for a stand-alone capability that cannot meet the three objectives of an NMD deployment.  Only a limited defense developed and deployed outside ABMT constraints can address the flaws of the proposed system and meet the objectives of an NMD deployment.

A pressing challenge to a limited defense is countermeasures.  We should not be surprised that an adversary would seek to develop countermeasures.  To be effective and resilient to countermeasures, a defense needs at least two independent opportunities to intercept the threat.  Ideally, one opportunity should come early in the flight of the missile, in its boost phase, when the missile, the warhead and any countermeasures are all joined together.  Early in flight the missile presents a target that is, in former DCI Jim Woolsey's words, "large, slow and hot" and therefore especially vulnerable to the heat-seeking interceptors we plan to deploy.  The second opportunity necessarily comes later, during the mid-course phase of flight, after a missile has dispensed its warhead and any countermeasures.  These present targets that are, again in Woolsey's words, "small, fast and cold" and relatively more difficult to destroy than the missile. 

Our NMD system requires both.  The combination of boost and mid-course intercepts is essential for two reasons.  First, it provides the US with the highest probability of destroying the threat.  It creates more opportunities for basing the system in ways that decrease its vulnerability to attack by an adversary.  And, the multiplicity of components, particularly the availability of different types of interceptors, reduces the probability of a catastrophic failure of the system. Secondly, the combination imposes substantial technical, operational and cost burdens on an adversary intent on developing effective countermeasures.  Countermeasures destroyed in boost phase cannot degrade midcourse capability.  Measures to avoid boost phase intercept can make midcourse countermeasures more expensive and less effective.   

 A decision to deploy an NMD system must include the capability to intercept the threat both early and late in its flight. The early intercept capability most frequently discussed is based aboard ships or on land deployed in close proximity to the launch site.  An alternative is a laser carried in a large, modified commercial aircraft.  The Air Force is developing just such an airborne laser for theater missile defense (TMD).  The best location for a boost phase system is in space. 

 Mid-course intercept capability can be accomplished from the land, as the Administration proposes, or from Aegis cruisers based at sea, as some propose.   It is important to note that a mid-course intercept, whether from land or sea faces nearly identical problems with countermeasures.  Both are heavily dependent on sensors based in space and on the surface.  These sensors perform a discrimination function, separating actual warheads from countermeasures, and help guide the interceptor to the point where it identifies and collides with a warhead.

            The timing and sequence for deploying an NMD system is relatively inelastic in my view.  The threat exists now.  Because the land-based system is closest to being ready for deployment, and its mid-course intercept capability is needed in a fully deployed system, there are strong reasons for continuing with its deployment.  The ship-based mid-course interceptor is not as far along in its development.  As part of a combined system of boost and mid-course interceptors, however, it may be that a less vulnerable location and more hospitable environment than that of Alaska for the land-based interceptors would serve as well or better.  But in any case, at least one and probably two additional deployment sites are needed to address all potential threats.  Whether an increase is necessary in the total number of mid-course interceptors the Administration plans to deploy depends in the first instance on the expected effectiveness of the boost phase interceptors.

 It may be possible to deploy an emergency sea-based boost phase intercept capability before 2005, though I know of no such system now in development.  I would favor deploying a fully developed boost phase intercept capability based at sea, on an aircraft or some combination of the two.  Land-based boost phase intercept capabilities are relatively vulnerable and depend on cooperation for basing on foreign countries.  Most projections for sea-based or aircraft systems fall into the post-2005 timeframe.  This is regrettable but not fatal to NMD.   The deployment of the system(s) can follow closely behind and complement the land-based system, increasing overall defense effectiveness and frustrating countermeasures planning. 

The mix of boost and mid-course interceptors we choose to deploy between now and 2010 ought to depend on their technical performance, the size of the threat and the state of countermeasure efforts.  What is critical is that a deployment decision provides for both boost and mid-course interceptors. 

 Whether we need in time to deploy space-based boost phase interceptors ought to turn on the same calculations.  But in any case, we should develop and test them as part of the research, development and testing program that supports an NMD deployment.  That program, and the development and testing of space-based boost phase interceptors in particular will serve to deter the further acquisition of ballistic missile capabilities by emerging powers and to discourage the development of countermeasures.  

Sensor deployments should begin immediately. 

IV. Consequences

             The decision to deploy a limited defense will have a number of consequences.  The US needs to begin addressing them even as we make a deployment decision.

             ABM Treaty.  The US cannot develop and deploy an NMD system that meets our objectives while it is constrained by the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). 

 How we remove the constraints of the ABMT is a matter of consequence.  Withdrawal from the treaty is preferred for domestic political and diplomatic reasons.  No withdrawal is possible without an informed, public debate on the issue here at home.  Our political leaders need to be unambiguous about our intentions in deploying a limited defense, the cost of the system over time and that it may need to be improved periodically to counter an evolving threat.  They need to assure the public that it is not designed to create a "fortress America" or a "hyperpower" anxious to intervene unilaterally in the affairs of other states.  They need to firmly place missile defense in the context of an effort to restructure American military capabilities.  We are already committed to reducing the size of both our conventional and strategic offensive forces.  The addition of missile defense helps to posture these forces to meet the threats of the present and future and to function closely in coalition with allies and friends.

The US is the only nation that observes a legal prohibition against deploying a missile defense that meets its needs.  Russia deploys a treaty-compliant ABM system around Moscow that offsets China's threat.  In addition, according to Mr. Putin, it is willing to develop theater missile defense systems to defend its territory-- and that of Europe-- by intercepting early in flight missiles launched from along its periphery.  This, presumably, is the capability he has put on offer to our European allies.  Interestingly, if it is capable of defending London from attack by Iran, it is a capability likely prohibited by the ABMT.  (The ABMT prohibits the intercept of a strategic ballistic missile in its flight trajectory.  The distance from Iran to the UK is of ICBM range.)  China, which opposes any form of US missile defense, has no restrictions on it own missile defense and is reported to be purchasing from Russia theater missile defense-capable systems.  Our allies face no prohibition on missile defense, though the ABMT prohibits assistance from us to them in developing or deploying a system that would defend London if attacked by Iran.

 A decision rooted in the informed judgement of the American people will make it easier for our leaders to consult with our allies and to address the objections raised by Russia and China.  The American people will want a clear statement of the "limits" beyond which a limited defense will not go and the options available should the threat evolve, for better or worse.  These, and other factors, will inform their consent.   Legislation passed by the Congress enabling deployment will reflect that consent. 

A national decision made in this way, embodying such terms, provides an unshakable foundation for consultation.  Others cannot deny the right of the American people to defend themselves.  Nor are they justified in ascribing motives to the US that are not reflected in the public debate and decision.  Our leaders should assure allies of our commitment to cooperate in missile defense with them.  Our leaders should offer to negotiate a basis for defensive cooperation with Russia.  The depth of cooperation will depend on the progress made toward normalizing our strategic relationship.  Cooperation with China should not be ruled out, but it would have to wait until its attitude toward Taiwan changes, its intentions with respect to its ballistic missile modernization program is better understood and more progress is made toward a normal relationship.  A minimal condition for cooperation with either Russia or China is a cessation of its support to the programs of the emerging ballistic missile powers.

            Russian Attitudes.  Declaring that we are no longer legally bound by the ABMT will not reduce Russian opposition to NMD.  Nevertheless, the Russians know they have nothing to fear from a limited NMD system with regard to their own offensive deterrent, especially one deployed on the basis of national consent outlined above.  They fully understand that the political leadership in the US is prepared to reduce American offensive forces to levels approaching those proposed by Russia.  They know as well that the US is willing to develop a new relationship, based on recognition of each other's legitimate interests and cooperation on matters of mutual concern.  The sooner we put the issue of an NMD deployment behind us, the sooner we can get on with the too-long delayed process of reconstructing our relationship.  

China's Attitudes.  In my view there is little at the moment we can do to assuage Chinese concerns.  The leadership in the government and the armed forces has occupied a position from which they can move only over time.  Until the relationship between the mainland and Taiwan is put on a new footing, the Chinese will continue to protest that all that we do in the region-- on missile defense, alliance relations with Japan or troop deployments-- is aimed at undermining Beijing's position. 

 US strategic policy relative to China should be unambiguously clear.  We have no interest in a relationship with Beijing similar to that, which prevailed between Moscow and Washington during the Cold War.  The US has no interest in guaranteeing to China, as we did to the USSR in signing the ABMT, that it can place nuclear weapons on American soil.  We have not offered an "assured destruction" relationship to China.  The balance of forces between the sides and the nature of our relationship does not suggest such an approach.  The assured destruction relationship with the USSR was developed in the hostile context of the Cold War.  Why we would choose to base our relationship with China on assured destruction and the hostility it implies is hard to understand.

 What we must do in the coming years is express clearly our intentions for limited missile defense and in turn assess Chinese capabilities and intentions.  The intelligence community now projects that by 2015 China will add a "few tens" of newly designed ICBMs to the roughly twenty ICBMs it now deploys.  This modernization and expansion program, begun some time ago, would provide more capability than China has today.  In relation to a limited US defense, after China completes this program the balance will be roughly where it is today.  If China expands its modernization effort beyond current projections, then they do so out of strategic ambition and not in response to a US deployment.

 European Allies.  Based on recent private discussions with senior officials in France, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, I believe our European allies are not overly concerned that a limited NMD deployment will decouple the US from Europe's defense or undermine deterrence.  Nevertheless, the US might consider a more explicit commitment of missile defense to our allies, perhaps as part of our obligations under Article V of the NATO treaty.  We might also consider lending support to the development of a European missile defense capability, perhaps based on ships for both boost and mid-course operations.  And, we might engage in contingency planning, to include Russia if it desired, aimed at defining a response to the launch of a missile toward Europe.  This would relieve the perception that Europe is dependent on the US for its defense while sharing responsibility across the Atlantic for a decision to retaliate. 

Allies do worry about what they call "destabilization."  It means that they want assurances those diplomatic, arms control and non-proliferation regimes that have grown up in the last twenty years will not break down as missile defense is deployed.  They are committed to these regimes for two reasons.  First, they believe the regimes provide mechanisms to increase the probability of cooperation, reduce the likelihood of crises, and limit the consequences of conflicts should they occur.  Second, these regimes are a key source of leverage for them in the international system. 

 In deploying an NMD system, the US should not deny the utility of diplomacy, arms control and non-proliferation regimes.  At the same time we cannot continue to rely so heavily upon them for our security.  Many of these regimes date their origins to the Cold War, and like the ABMT, are badly in need of being rethought.  This is most especially true of existing regimes affecting the transfer of technology.  If these regimes are to have effect, they need the support of our allies.  It is in our interest to engage them in an explicit effort to reform those regimes that are still credible, dismantle those that are counterproductive, and formulate if appropriate and feasible new regimes.  But in all cases the emphasis must be on joining our allies in effective measures to address real security problems so that international norms based on universal adherence to agreements are not violated in future with near-complete impunity.

Most importantly, we need to persuade the allies that an NMD deployment is a national decision based on strategic calculation and not a result merely of partisan politics.  If allies continue to believe we are not committed to our own policies and programs, there is little reason for us to expect their support.  If we make the NMD decision with purpose and confidence, they may not be persuaded NMD is a good idea.  But they will have far greater confidence that we will address with vigor and coherence the many consequences they believe will flow from an NMD deployment.

 Offensive force reductions.    Another element of an NMD deployment decision is offensive force reductions.  The US is prepared to consider reductions to or below the levels agreed with Russia at Helsinki.  But we have taken offensive reductions about as far as we can by employing the START formulae.  Subsequent reductions need to be linked to concepts for deterrence that reflect current and future risks and tied to a restructuring and modernization of the force. We need to take an unbounded look at both our requirements and the concepts of deterrence they support. 

At the same time we are reducing total numbers, we need to be certain that we have not inadvertently created vulnerabilities for the force.  For example, as the number of weapons in the force declines, so too will the number of different types of weapons.  In the same way we do not want to be dependent on a single type of defensive interceptor, we do not want to find ourselves dependent on one type of warhead.  We will need to consider developing new designs to assure the reliability of deployed warheads.  New designs may prove appropriate as well to address what could prove to be very different targeting requirements in the future as compared to those of the Cold War era.  In addition, maintaining the safety and security of the warheads may require new designs.  If new designs are needed, they will likely require testing.

 Intelligence.  Our confidence in deterrence, willingness to make reductions in the offensive forces and commitments to limit our defensive deployments turn on our intelligence collection capabilities.  Good intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of the emerging ballistic missile powers, as well as the extant powers is essential.  With respect to intentions we need to improve our ability to learn secrets as well as to mine open sources.  With respect to capabilities, our assessment of the scientific and technological efforts of others needs improvement.  We need to invest resources in overcoming the denial and deception efforts of others and conducting counterintelligence operations against those who seek to acquire our secrets.  Without improving intelligence deterrence, arms control and defense will suffer, and with them our hopes for enhancing our alliances and improving our relations with Russia and China.

V. Conclusions  

             Despite recent diplomatic activity, NMD deployment is still a high priority for the US.  The threat from emerging ballistic missile powers is broad, increasingly mature and continuing to evolve.  The dynamic nature of the international system coupled with the increasingly easy flow of advanced technologies should leave us of wary of sharp reversals in policy trends abroad and of the likelihood of strategic surprise.  No effective defense against ballistic missiles is possible so long as we are restricted by the terms of the ABMT.  Proceeding without the treaty's constraints is the only way to acquire the limited defenses we need and normalizing our relationship with Russia.

            I am not persuaded that we should give up on deploying a land-based component of an NMD system by 2005.  It responds to an immediate threat.  It, or some other mid-course intercept system, is needed to complement a boost phase intercept capability.  The combined boost and midcourse capability will increase the effectiveness of an NMD defense and make it robust against countermeasures by 2010.  The final distribution of intercept capability between boost and midcourse need not be decided now.  We do need to decide now to deploy both systems, however, if we are to develop and test both efficiently and bring them on line in a timely fashion.

            As we move to deploy NMD, we need to take our allies into our confidence.  We need to take measures to assure a NATO-based capability to conduct continental missile defense.  While we work with our European allies we must keep in mind the political and technical needs of our allies in Asia and in the Middle East with respect to missile defenses.  Japan in particular depends on our steadiness of purpose for it to play a stabilizing role in the region.  We should seek to negotiate cooperative defense efforts with Russia.  Steadiness and transparency is needed with respect to China.  There should be no ambiguity in Chinese minds that we will not acknowledge that a normal relationship depends on our recognition of their right to attack the US with nuclear weapons. 

            Finally, as part of the restructuring of US capabilities and policies to reflect the new era in which we live, the US needs to reconsider its retaliatory deterrence requirements, revise as appropriate its offensive force structure and enhance its intelligence capabilities.