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It is true that missile technology is proliferating more rapidly than we could have predicted. And this is of grave concern to us all. Certainly, the proliferation of ballistic missile technology constitutes a serious threat to U.S. national security. The question before us is, Will deciding today to deploy a National Missile Defense system--as yet untested, unproven and un-paid for--advance our national security interests? The answer, in my view, is that it will not.

First, I believe this bill will undermine long-term U.S. national security interests, by placing too much emphasis on just one of the many threats we face today.

While the United States is enjoying a period of relative safety and security in world affairs, we must prepare to face a multitude of diverse challenges in the international security environment in coming years. These include: transnational threats, such as terrorism and drug trafficking; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and the chaos of failed states, as we have seen in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia--just to name a few. The threat from ballistic missiles is one of many.

Ballistic missiles are a threat, because they are capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to American soil. The United States has faced this threat for decades, posed by the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and China. Russia and China maintain their ability to strike American soil. But even though both nations are today struggling through a period of great uncertainty, the threat to the United States of a ballistic missile attack from either nation is low.

The threat of a missile attack from a rogue state, such as North Korea or Iran, is obviously growing. Last fall, North Korea tested its new Taepo-Dong One missile, with a range of up to 3000 km. We also know the North Koreans are developing a Taepo-Dong Two missile, which could have a range two to three times greater. Pakistan has tested a 1500 km range missile. Iran is expected to have one of similar range in the near future.

But ballistic missiles are only one means of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons can be delivered in trucks, ships, and suitcases; chemical and biological weapons can be delivered through the mail, dispersed in a crowded subway, or inserted into our water supply. These methods of delivery are far simpler, less costly, and far less detectable than ballistic missiles, and they pose a much more immediate threat to U.S. security. A National Missile Defense won't protect us from these threats.

The proposed NMD system would only allow us to defend ourselves against an unsophisticated long-range missile threat with a single warhead. We would not be able to defend against a missile that carried decoys along with the warhead. Multiple objects would readily defeat the proposed system. We would have no defense against a warhead containing chemical or biological agents divided into many small `bomblets' for better dispersion. This would simply overwhelm the NMD system. The NMD system would be ineffective against cruise missiles or missiles launched from air or sea platforms.

An NMD system also has very limited use as a deterrent to the threats we currently face. In the case of a ballistic missile attack, the perpetrator is readily identified, and U.S. retaliation could be swift and devastating. That alone is a serious deterrent, a much greater deterrent than a deployed NMD system. Deploying an NMD system would simply encourage potential adversaries to develop appropriate countermeasures or to pursue other, more effective means of attack. It is exactly this logic--that an NMD system would be more destabilizing than deterrent--that underpins our commitment to the ABM Treaty.

Which brings me to my second point. I oppose this bill because it will undermine decades of U.S. leadership in international efforts to reduce the nuclear danger.

A unilateral decision by the United States to proceed with a National Missile Defense would sound the death knell for the ABM Treaty, a development that is apparently quite welcome to many of my colleagues across the aisle. This is puzzling to me, because a U.S. signal that we intend to circumvent, violate or withdraw from the ABM Treaty would almost certainly kill prospects for Russian ratification of START II. This would delay any further reductions in the large remaining Russian nuclear force, a goal we have worked for decades to achieve.

I would remind my colleagues that, in 1991, the United States--under the leadership of President George Bush--reached agreement with Russia that it would legally succeed to all international treaties of the former Soviet Union. These include the UN Charter, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT/START, and others, as well as the ABM Treaty. If we refuse to recognize the validity of the ABM Treaty, we not only undermine the credibility of our past commitments to international arms control agreements--such as the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty--we also weaken U.S. leadership in future international efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

If we proceed with this legislation and deal a blow to international arms control efforts, we will have succeeded in fostering precisely the threats we intend to reduce. And furthermore, we can encourage this threat without ever deploying an NMD system, simply by establishing our intention to deploy an NMD system.

Finally, I have deep concerns about the technical feasibility, operational effectiveness and costs of the proposed NMD system.

I have consistently supported development of effective missile defense technology, and continue to do so. In particular, I have supported the development and deployment of effective theater missile defense systems, to protect our forces and our regional allies. But we have encountered tremendous technological challenges in trying to build defenses against these theater missile systems. We have spent billions of dollars and experienced many failures in our efforts to `hit a bullet with a bullet.' The THAAD system has experienced five successive failures. Yet, THAAD is much simpler to develop than NMD.

On cost, the Administration's FY 2000 budget request calls for an additional $6.6 billion in new funding for National Missile Defense. This would bring total FY 1999 - 2005 funding for NMD to $10.5 billion. But the Defense Department does not anticipate that we will be able to test key components of the proposed system until 2003. If we encounter problems with this system that are the least bit similar to those we have seen in testing THAAD, we can expect delays well beyond the projected deployment date of 2005--and costs far above the $10.5 billion we are currently contemplating. And, while I have every confidence that American technological know-how will eventually produce a feasible system, I wonder: At what cost, and with how much real benefit to our national security, will this technological marvel be achieved?

In addition to the financial costs of deploying a feasible NMD system, we must also acknowledge the opportunity costs that pursuing this project will entail. America's leadership in world affairs relies on ready military forces. And the fact is, if we dedicate tens of billions of dollars to developing a National Missile Defense system, we will not be able to devote the resources and energy we should to ensuring the long-term readiness of America's fighting forces. At a time when the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have publicly and repeatedly expressed their concerns over our ability to attract and keep bright young men and women in the U.S. armed forces, I am not convinced that we should move NMD to the top of our list of defense priorities.

With so much at stake, it would be irresponsible for us today to commit to the deployment of a National Missile Defense system, without further consideration of the implications and potential consequences of that commitment. We must not devote these resources to defending against the wrong threat with the wrong system. We must not create a world where weapons of mass destruction proliferate because arms control agreements are no longer credible. And we must not become so focused on this one defense issue that we leave our nation defenseless against other, more imminent threats.

Mr. President, this legislation poses tremendous risks to our long-term national security interests.

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