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The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

VOTE ON AMENDMENT NO. 69

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from California (Mrs. Feinstein) is absent because of illness.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced--yeas 99, nays 0, as follows:

Rollcall Vote No. 49 Leg.

• Abraham
• Akaka
• Allard
• Ashcroft
• Baucus
• Bayh
• Bennett
• Biden
• Bingaman
• Bond
• Boxer
• Breaux
• Brownback
• Bryan
• Bunning
• Burns
• Byrd
• Campbell
• Chafee
• Cleland
• Cochran
• Collins
• Conrad
• Coverdell
• Craig
• Crapo
• Daschle
• DeWine
• Dodd
• Domenici
• Dorgan
• Durbin
• Edwards
• Enzi
• Feingold
• Fitzgerald
• Frist
• Gorton
• Graham
• Gramm
• Grams
• Grassley
• Gregg
• Hagel
• Harkin
• Hatch
• Helms
• Hollings
• Hutchinson
• Hutchison
• Inhofe
• Inouye
• Jeffords
• Johnson
• Kennedy
• Kerrey
• Kerry
• Kohl
• Kyl
• Landrieu
• Lautenberg
• Leahy
• Levin
• Lieberman
• Lincoln
• Lott
• Lugar
• Mack
• McCain
• McConnell
• Mikulski
• Moynihan
• Murkowski
• Murray
• Nickles
• Reed
• Reid
• Robb
• Roberts
• Rockefeller
• Roth
• Santorum
• Sarbanes
• Schumer
• Sessions
• Shelby
• Smith (NH)
• Smith (OR)
• Snowe
• Specter
• Stevens
• Thomas
• Thompson
• Thurmond
• Torricelli
• Voinovich
• Warner
• Wellstone
• Wyden

• Feinstein

The amendment (No. 69) was agreed to.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to add my support to S. 257, The National Missile Defense Act of 1999.

Any questions on whether or not the United States faces a missile threat were answered by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Hughes, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee. In his opening statement Director Tenet described the threat of a new North Korean missile in the following terms:

With a third stage like the one demonstrated last August on the Taepo Dong-1, this missile would be able to deliver large payloads to the rest of the U.S.

General Hughes stated:

The number of Chinese strategic missiles capable of hitting the United States will increase significantly during the next two decades.

This testimony coupled with the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission make an overwhelming case for a National Missile Defense System. We must not be dissuaded by the impact of the National Missile Defense System on the ABM Treaty. The evidence of the missile threat to the United States is too overwhelming.

The bill before us is only a first step toward the deployment of a National Missile Defense System. It provides deployment flexibility to the Department of Defense. It states that it is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system. It does not mandate a specific time nor a specific type of a system.

Mr. President, I want to express my appreciation to Senator Cochran for introducing this legislation and for his passionate and articulate expression of support for a National Missile Defense System. Our citizens owe him a debt of gratitude for his persistence in pursuit of a missile defense program to protect them and the Nation.

Mr. President, there has been enough discussion on this issue, it is time for the Nation and this Congress to act. I urge the Senate to express its support for the security of our Nation by overwhelmingly approving S. 257, The National Missile Defense Act of 1999.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support, along with the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, for the National Missile Defense Act. It is, in my opinion, long overdue and will correct a serious deficiency in our defense policy, one that leaves us utterly defenseless against a threat that is real today and promises to get worse tomorrow.

Last week, Thursday, in the Wall Street Journal, this headline greeted us:

China Buys . . .

Stolen information about the U.S.'s most advanced miniature W-88 nuclear warhead from Los Alamos helped the Chinese close a generation gap in the development of its nuclear force.

This, of course, is a very abbreviated account of what the New York Times expanded on in great detail and great length. I think it describes for us not only a serious breach in our national security but a quantum leap in the ability of the Chinese Government to not only threaten the security of their neighbors in Asia but ultimately and eventually to threaten the security of American cities; thus, the importance of a National Missile Defense Act.

Mr. President, the Clinton administration is in its sunset, but the effects of its failed, flawed China policy are clearly on the horizon. We are faced today with a very disturbing situation. At the same time that the administration is fostering what it calls `constructive engagement' with the People's Republic of China, the Government of China is increasingly posing a threat to the United States and its interests. This policy is nothing if not contradictory and inconsistent. It is no less than a threat to American security.

China has made significant advances in its nuclear weapons program in recent years. By achieving the miniaturization of its bombs, the Chinese military can now attach multiple nuclear warheads to a single missile and hit several targets. China's technical advance means it can now deploy a modern nuclear force and pose an even greater threat to Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, not to mention the United States. The sad fact is that this technical advance was made possible by sensitive W-88 design information stolen from Los Alamos National Laboratory, a facility that we have discovered has very lax security.

The details that I am going to recount in the next few minutes are those that have all been published and have been available to the public in news accounts in recent days.

The W-88 is the smallest and most advanced warhead of the U.S. arsenal. It is typically attached to the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile. With smaller warheads, the Chinese military will be able to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

In the last 2 days, I have attended two briefings with the Secretary of Energy. To me, the accounts that we heard were chilling and alarming. The secret information on the W-88 was probably stolen in the mid-1980s. This active espionage went undetected until April of 1995, when nuclear weapons experts at Los Alamos studying Chinese underground tests detected similarities to the W-88. The CIA found corroborating information 2 months later. The FBI and the Department of Energy's intelligence group, under Notra Trulock, investigated

the matter and were able to narrow its list of suspects to five, including Wen Ho Lee, an employee of the Los Alamos National Laboratory with access to sensitive and classified information. Lee has since been dismissed but not arrested. The other four suspects remain employed.

DOE briefed CIA officials and then Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger on the espionage in early 1996. The FBI subsequently opened a limited investigation in mid-1996 and recommended improved security at DOE labs in April of 1997. But DOE, under Federico Pena, shelved Trulock's counterintelligence program and ignored FBI recommendations, and although some of these accounts in the press have been contested and all of the facts are not yet out, according to press accounts, they ignored FBI recommendations to reinstate background checks. Instead, Chinese officials continued to visit DOE facilities without proper clearances. Meanwhile, Trulock, aware of other possible spy operations at DOE facilities, sought to inform Secretary Pena. It was 4 months before he could get an appointment.

Finally, in July of 1997, DOE briefed National Security Adviser Sandy Berger on the situation and the possibility of current espionage efforts, and Berger kept President Clinton informed.

What was the administration's response? It was back in the 1980s when we believe most of the theft on the W-88 took place. When it became evident in the mid-1990s, what was the administration's response? Unfortunately, the administration swept the matter under the red carpet they were preparing to roll out for President Jiang Zemin of China.

The National Counterintelligence Policy Board made recommendations for strengthening lab security in September of 1997. It was 5 months before President Clinton signed a Presidential decision directive in February 1998. The recommendations occurred in September as to the changes that should be made as to the strengthening of security requirements at our Laboratories. It was 5 months later when President Clinton finally signed a PDD February of 1998 mandating a more vigorous counterintelligence effort at DOE. It took 9 more months to implement those changes that were first recommended back in September of 1997, PDD in February of 1998, and then 9 more months before implementation occurs.

In addition, it is alleged that Acting Energy Secretary Elizabeth Moler ordered Trulock to withhold information from Congress.

That is an allegation, and it is an allegation that is a serious allegation. And it is one that needs to be investigated by this Congress.

She reportedly ordered him not to brief the House Intelligence Committee on the espionage matter, and not to deliver written testimony to the House National Security Committee. It was only when Trulock testified before Congressman Cox' committee investigating this whole matter that Trulock was then able to fully inform Congress. If what Trulock claims is true--that he was hindered, that obstacles were placed before him and he was ordered not to testify, not to provide that vital information to Congress--then I think we have not just a security breach that resulted in stolen secrets, but it involves, in effect, a refusal to give vital information to Congress so that the administration's China policy could move

forward without criticism--significant criticism--from Congress.

Only in the last several weeks was a lie detector test administered to Wen Ho Lee, the main suspect in this espionage. He has now been dismissed. Only now will periodic polygraph examinations be required of certain employees.

The administration's response to this situation seems puzzling at best. But then--if you put it in context of what is going on with our relations with China--it at least raises troubling questions. The administration was fostering its policy of constructive engagement, engaging China by in part selling nuclear technology, supercomputers, and satellites to China.

To bring up this vital issue of national security spying, espionage stealing of secrets--to have brought that up would have disturbed the flow of high-tech trade to China. And so it simply never was brought up.

At the same time that the Clinton administration knew about Chinese efforts to steal nuclear weapons technology, it certified that China was no longer assisting other countries in their nuclear weapons program.

It is amazing that when the administration knew that espionage was occurring at our Laboratories, that secrets were being stolen, it went ahead and certified that China was no longer assisting other countries in their nuclear weapons program.

That certification lifted a 12-year ban on the sale of American nuclear technology to China.

Why would we want to assist China in nuclear technology at the very time we are discovering their intensive efforts to infiltrate our Laboratories?

At the same time that the Clinton administration knew about Chinese efforts to steal militarily sensitive technology, it loosened export control laws on supercomputers and satellites.

Once again, it becomes not just a spy case. It becomes a situation in which the administration was pursuing a policy that to have disclosed what was happening in the security realm would have interfered with the pursuit of that policy goal by the administration. So it loosened export control laws on supercomputers and satellites at the very time the investigation was going on at Los Alamos.

At the same time that the Clinton administration knew about Chinese efforts to steal nuclear weapons technology, President Clinton was seeking reelection, receiving donations from Chinese sources, and allowing White House access to military intelligence officials.

At the same time that the Clinton administration knew about Chinese efforts to steal nuclear weapons technology, administration officials were preparing for a visit by President Jiang Zemin.

At the same time that Congress was investigating illegal campaign contributions with Chinese sources, the Clinton administration withheld vital information regarding security breaches at our National Laboratories from Congress and the American people.

How many briefs there were is yet in dispute. Who was providing the information and who was not, if anyone, is yet in dispute.

But it is troubling that there is evidence of an effort on the part of administration officials to preclude those who

should have known, those who had oversight responsibilities, those who had appropriations responsibilities, from knowing the full extent of the security breaches at our National Laboratories.

President Clinton's China policy, I believe, has been a failure. And I believe that these most recent revelations fit into the broader context of the failure of this administration's policy toward the People's Republic of China.

`Constructive engagement' has proven constructive, but it has been constructive only for the Chinese military.

The implications of this policy extend beyond the United States. In East Asia, our allies, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan will face a new and greater threat because of China's nuclear capabilities. It is ironic that the Chinese Government warns us not to develop a theater missile defense system while it aims more missiles at Taiwan and develops multiple nuclear warheads. The Chinese nuclear advancements will certainly inflame anxieties in India, which may lead to further proliferation in both India and Pakistan.

So President Clinton has left us with a `strategic partner,' as he terms it, pointing 13 of its 19 long-range missiles at us--a strategic partner building new long-range missiles, the DF-31 and DF-41; a strategic partner well on its way to developing multiple warhead missiles. These are the bitter fruits of a policy borne out of warped motives.

There were some in the administration who would like to dismiss this espionage case as a failure of the Reagan administration. I agree. There should have been greater security measures taken at that time. But this administration cannot blame its failure to uphold American security interests on past administrations. National security is a bipartisan issue. But it cannot blame its failure to adequately notify Congress on past administrations. This administration is responsible for a comprehensive policy failure in regard to China. The American people will be suffering the consequences long after the President has left office.

Mr. President, it is a fact that, while there are many facts yet in dispute, and while there are many questions that have gone unanswered, and it is my sincere desire that the appropriate committees of the U.S. Senate will begin immediate hearings and fulfillment of oversight responsibilities--while there are facts in dispute, and while there are questions to be answered, there are some facts that are indisputable.

It is an indisputable fact that the Chinese Government stole nuclear secrets allowing it to build smaller and more efficient warheads.

We can argue and we can debate as to whether it was a 2-year loss of technology or a decade, whether it was a generation, or whether it was less than that, but it is not disputable that China stole nuclear secrets allowing it to build a smaller and more efficient nuclear capability.

It is indisputable that the Chinese Government continues to aggressively seek to obtain technology from U.S. companies allowing it to better target their ICBMs. That is indisputable. Whether legitimate means, whether legal means, or whether serreptitious means, it is indisputable that China today continues on an aggressive pattern of seeking to obtain technology from the U.S. companies.

It is an indisputable fact that the Chinese Government is engaging in an expensive modernization of their weapons system.

While there may be much debate, that is a fact. That is beyond dispute. China today is expending vast amounts of its budget in order to modernize their weapons systems.

Mr. President, while there is much in dispute, it is a fact beyond dispute that the Chinese Government continues to be a major nuclear proliferator in the world, giving North Korea the missile capability even to hit American cities.

It is a fact beyond dispute that the Chinese Government continues to menace our allies in Asia with military threats. And it is a fact that the Chinese Government has again brutally clamped down on democracy advocates within China and seeks to extinguish free expression, whether religious or political.

In the face of all these facts, the administration is still determined to give an irresponsible actor in the world arena a major role by offering to China World Trade Organization accession. It is my sincere desire, it is my sincere hope, that the administration will not seek to bring China into the WTO, will not bend the rules, will not allow China to enter as a developing nation as they desire, and that we will, in dealing with the largest, most populous nation on the globe, take our rightful place and we will regain our voice where, when it comes to the World Trade Organization, we will require that Congress approve China's membership in the WTO before they are allowed to enter.

These facts, all incontrovertible and indisputable, reveal what I think is already obvious. The administration must reexamine its China policy and restore American security as its main priority. It must take responsibility for defending the American people, and it must commit to a national missile defense system. I applaud the efforts of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, Mr. Cochran, for his leadership and his perseverance and his determination to bring this bill forward and to ensure its enactment.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The Senator from North Dakota.

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Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I listened with interest to the Senator from Arkansas. I think there are far more questions than answers on the issues he raised. I think the issues of national security dealing with China are serious. The alleged spying, as I understand it, occurred in the mid-1980s; the transfer of missile technology and agreements for that transfer occurred at the beginning of the 1980s. The Senator raises very important security questions and we need answers to those questions. I am sure in the coming days we will learn more about many of these issues as we discuss them with the appropriate people who have been a part of this matter for, now, a decade or a decade and a half.

But I came to the floor and have waited here to speak about the national missile defense proposal. That is what is on the floor at the moment, national missile defense. Mr. President, 24 years ago our country built an antiballistic missile system in my home State. It is the only ABM, or antiballistic missile, system anywhere in the free world. That ABM--or what we would now call national missile defense--system, that ABM program, cost over $20 billion in today's dollars.

On October 1, 1975, the antiballistic missile system was declared operational. On October 2, 1 day later, Congress voted to mothball it. We spent a great deal of money. I encourage those who are interested in seeing what that money purchased to get on an airplane and fly over that sparsely populated northeastern portion of North Dakota. You will see a concrete monument to the ABM system. It was abandoned a day after it was declared operational.

Did that system make us safer? Did taking the taxpayers' dollars and building that ABM system improve national security in this country? The judgment was it was not worth the money after all. Yet here we are, nearly a quarter of a century later, debating a bill that would require the deployment of a national missile defense system, another ballistic missile defense system, as soon as technologically feasible.

It was technologically feasible 24 years ago. It was a different technology. The technology then was, if you see a Russian missile--or a Soviet missile then--coming in to attack this country, you send up some antiballistic missile defenses, and they have nuclear warheads, and you blow off a nuclear warhead somewhere up there in the heavens and it obliterates the incoming missiles. That was the technology then. It was technologically possible then.

Now the new technology is, we are not going to send a nuclear missile up to wipe out some incoming nuclear missile--or a missile with a nuclear warhead, I should say. What we will do is, we will hit a speeding bullet with another speeding bullet. If someone puts a missile up with a nuclear warhead, we send a missile up with our charge and we hit it--a bullet hitting a bullet. Of course, all the tests now demonstrate that is very hard to do. There have been far more test failures than successes in this technology. But here we are saying, let us deploy a National Missile Defense System as soon as technologically feasible.

It is technologically feasible for my 11-year-old son to drive my car. I wouldn't suggest that someone who meets him on the road would consider it very safe or appropriate for Brendon to be driving my automobile, but it is technologically feasible.

So what does that mean, technologically feasible? What does it mean with respect to missile defense? Will it make us safer? Here is what we do know. A national missile defense system cannot protect us from a low-flying cruise missile launched by a Third World despot who can much more easily access a cruise missile than an intercontinental ballistic missile and put it on a barge somewhere off a coast and lob in a nuclear-tipped cruise missile. Will we, when we deploy this system, defend against that? No, not at all. That is not what this system is for. It is to defend against an ICBM. And not just any ICBM--not a Russian ICBM, for example, because any kind of robust launch of more than a handful of missiles cannot be defended with this new technology, the kind of technological catcher's mitt that we send up to catch an incoming missile.

It is only a missile from a rogue nation. If a rogue nation acquires an intercontinental ballistic missile--unlikely perhaps, but let's assume a rogue nation acquires an intercontinental ballistic missile and uses that with a nuclear warhead attached to its top to threaten this country. What are the likely threats? Among the threats, the least likely would be a rogue nation using an intercontinental ballistic missile. More likely would be their access to a cruise missile, to purchase a cruise missile someplace. Of course this system will not defend against that. More likely than that is, perhaps, a rental truck filled with a nuclear explosive or perhaps a suitcase nuclear bomb planted in the trunk of an old Yugo car parked at a New York dock--a far more likely threat by a rogue nation than access to an intercontinental ballistic missile. Will this protect us against those threats? No.

National missile defense shields us against one threat only--the accidental launch of a ballistic missile from an existing nuclear power or the future possibility of an attack by a rogue nation. But it is not just any accidental launch. It would be an accidental launch of just one or two or a few missiles, because any launch beyond that, of course, would be a launch that would prevail over a limited national missile defense system.

If we deploy a national missile defense system before it is ready--not just technologically possible, but tested and ready --then what are we getting for our money? What does the taxpayer get for the requirement to deploy a new weapons program, albeit defensive, before it is ready to be deployed? Detecting, tracking, discriminating, and hitting a trashcan-sized target traveling 20 times the speed of sound, landing in 20 or 30 minutes anywhere in the world after it is launched--intercepting that with another bullet that we send up into the skies? To put it mildly, that is problematic. Our efforts to date, under highly controlled test environments, come nowhere close to meeting the requirements a ballistic missile system would need to satisfy and justify deployment.

If we deploy without regard to all of the other issues and all of the other considerations, all of the efforts we have made to reduce weapons of mass destruction that pose such a danger to the world, will we make this a safer world? Or a world that is more dangerous? If we deploy this system before we have renegotiated with Russia the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, we are sure to jeopardize the enormous gains we have already made in arms reduction efforts.

I would like to show a picture just for a moment. I also ask unanimous consent to show a piece of an airplane on the floor of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this is a piece of a backfire bomber. I suppose that some years ago, you would have thought the only way a Member of the U.S. Senate could hold a piece of a Soviet bomber or a Russian bomber in his hands would be if it were shot down somewhere in hostile action.

This is a wing strut from a bomber that used to carry nuclear weapons that threatened this country. This bomber, as you can see, no longer flies. This wing strut is a result of a cut from the wing of that bomber that rendered that bomber useless. How did that happen? How does it happen that we are able to cut the wings off Russian bombers, and we are able to destroy Russian missile silos?

Last year I held in my hand on the floor a metal flange from a missile silo in the Ukraine that used to sit on the prairies there in the Ukraine with a nuclear warhead aimed at the United States of America, and that piece of metal now doesn't come from a missile silo. I held it in my hand. The missile silo is gone. The missile is gone. The warhead is gone. Where a missile once sat aimed at the United States, there now is planted a field of sunflowers, sunflowers rather than missiles.

How did it happen that in the Ukraine an intercontinental ballistic missile site was dug up, the missile gone, the warhead gone, and there are now sunflowers? How does it happen that a Soviet bomber has its wings sawed off? I tell you how it happens --Nunn-Lugar. Senators Dick Lugar and Sam Nunn offered a program here in the U.S. Senate trailing the arms control agreements we have had with the old Soviet Union and now Russia. It says the United States will help pay for the destruction of your weapons.

Doesn't it make good sense for us to destroy Russian bombers, not with our bullets but with saws? Doesn't it make good sense for us to destroy Russian missiles in their silo through the use of American taxpayer funds, not with people who have to go in the field and fight and risk their lives, but through a treaty of arms control in which we help pay the cost of the destruction of nuclear weapons and delivery systems controlled by Russia and the old Soviet Union?

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia, the Ukraine and others have destroyed over 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 400.

In the last several weeks, I saw a nuclear weapon. I was in a weapons storage facility on a tour, and I won't describe it in great detail, probably because I couldn't. A nuclear weapon is not very big. A nuclear bomb is not large at all. You can have a nuclear bomb dozens of times the power of the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. It is no bigger than that desk.

The Soviet Union, Russia and the Ukraine, now named, have destroyed over 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRV warheads, over 400 of them gone. Our arms control agreement has rendered them gone. They are gone. We helped pay for it. We cut the wings off the planes. We pulled the missiles out of the ground. We saw those missiles destroyed. We have cut the wings off 37 Soviet bombers. Eighty submarine missile launch tubes are now gone; 95 nuclear warhead test tunnels are now sealed. That is major progress. If the Russians ratify START II, which I think they are likely to do, we will see further dramatic reductions in the number of bombers and missiles and warheads on both sides.

That will happen not because we are fighting but because we

are cooperating, not because there are tensions but because there is an arms control regime we are following and because we are helping them destroy their weapons at the same time we are reducing our weapons. We want to deactivate over 5,000 warheads, destroy 200 missile silos, 40,000 chemical weapons. Look at the success. Eliminate 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium. Would we or should we do anything to jeopardize this progress? What might jeopardize it?

We have a treaty with the Russians, and the treaty is an ABM Treaty. The proposal by some is to say ignore the treaty; it doesn't matter. These treaties are not very important. These treaties START I, START II, ABM, hopefully a START III, these treaties allow us to make this progress and reduce the nuclear threat and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

Thirty-two thousand nuclear weapons remain in the United States and Russian arsenals today. Some of those are theater weapons; thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons, of course. That is half the number of a decade ago, but does that give us great confidence? No. We need to reduce them much, much further.

How can we do that? I know how we won't do that. All of that progress in the reduction of nuclear weapons could come to an abrupt halt if we deploy a national missile defense system without any regard to the concerns raised about whether this legislation would violate the ABM Treaty that we have made with the Russians in order to slow the nuclear arms race. Instead of working cooperatively with other nuclear powers, if we act unilaterally we surely risk a return to a costly and dangerous arms race with Russia and China as well.

A former colleague, Dale Bumpers, said something interesting about this. He said:

We can ignore Russia's concerns now, but in the years to come, she will slowly recover and resume a great power role in the world. By rash actions such as abrogation of the ABM Treaty, we are far more likely to rekindle the cold war with a hostile nation than to produce a constructive relationship with a cooperative Russia.

Senator Bumpers, then, was wisely cautioning us that the calculations that go into our strategic defense decisions today will have enormous consequences and costly consequences for the world that we pass on to our children. Each day we move closer to eliminating the nuclear threat left over from the cold war, thanks to arms reductions mandated in START I and START II and thanks to the Nunn-Lugar threat reduction that has been so successful.

As I indicated, that investment has been a critically important investment in reducing the nuclear threat. I show my colleagues a chart that talks about the imbalance between money that some propose we spend on a national missile defense program versus money we spend on arms reduction. This chart shows what we are prepared to spend on a national missile defense system, a limited one, one that won't protect us against much of the threat, but compare it even at that to what is planned to be spent on arms reduction. I hope this is not a picture of our priorities. I wish it were reversed.

This legislation that we are considering says just do it, in the popular jargon of today. Deploy the system as soon as the military can get it up there. Cost doesn't matter. Arms control doesn't matter. Nothing much matters. Deploy it as soon as is possible. We are nervous.

Mr. President, let me say that I support the strongest possible defense against any threat to our country, but if you rationally think through the range of threats to our country, you must start with the understanding that the largest possible threat to our country comes from thousands of nuclear warheads that now exist, thousands of nuclear warheads already in stockpiles with delivery vehicles, bombers and ICBMs and others. We must continue the work of reducing them, and we have done that very successfully. Anything we do here to jeopardize that would be a profound mistake.

In addition to that, what are the other threats? A rogue nation getting an ICBM? Yes, that is a small threat way over here on the edge. How about a rogue nation getting a rental truck, as I said, with a nuclear device planted in the back somewhere? Probably more likely. Or a deadly vile of the most deadly biological agent? More likely. A suitcase nuclear bomb? More likely.

Should we worry about all of these? Should we prepare for all of these? Of course. We would be foolhardy as a nation to underestimate the threat of terrorism and underestimate the intentions of rogue nations. We would be fools to do that. But it would be shortsighted for us to decide, because we are concerned about all of that, we are willing to push all of our chips to the middle of the table and say we will risk the very substantial achievements we have made in arms control reductions.

The elimination of Russian bombers by cutting off their wings, the destruction of Russian missiles, the dismantling of Russian warheads, making Ukraine nuclear free--did anyone think they would hear that? We risk all of that if we move in a manner in the Senate that says, `You don't matter; all that matters is our short-term nervousness about one small slice of one of the threats that exist.' That is not a balanced approach.

Mr. President, I conclude by saying I think one of the more talented Senators in this country is the Senator from Mississippi, Senator Cochran. I enjoy working with him. I think he is bright and productive, and he is one of the people that makes me proud to be a Senator. The same is true of my colleague from Michigan, Senator Levin. The fact is, they have

pretty big disagreements about some of these issues, but this is a very big issue.

This idea about how this country responds to nuclear threats and what kind of nuclear threat should persuade us to respond in certain ways will have profound implications for all of us and for our children and our grandchildren.

I have a young son age 11 and a daughter age 9 who are in school today, at least I hope they are in school today. They are the most wonderful children any father would ever hope to have. I hope when my service is done in the U.S. Senate, whatever I might contribute to public policy, that they might say I helped in a way to reduce the nuclear threat, I helped in a significant way to have this world move away from the kind of nuclear threat that has existed now for many, many decades.

It is hard for people to believe because it does not get much press and it is not very sexy, but every day we are spending American taxpayer dollars to destroy missiles that used to be aimed at American cities. What a remarkable thing to have happen. What a remarkable success.

I think it was Mark Twain who said once that bad news travels halfway around the world before good news gets its shoes on. That certainly has to be true with respect to this nuclear issue, the nuclear threat. How much attention does this get, the day-to-day success we have in reducing nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles? Let us not jeopardize that. Let us move forward together in a thoughtful way, understanding, yes, we should prepare for some kind of missile defense. Let's do it thoughtfully, let's do it when it is technologically possible, but let's make sure we do it when it is cost effective, technologically possible, will not interrupt and will not pose danger to our arms control agreements. Let us condition it on all of those issues together and, as a country, then do the right thing.

Again, I thank the Senator from Michigan, Senator Levin, for allowing me to have some time in this debate. I hope in the coming hours we will be able to address this just a bit further.

Let me conclude--I know the Senator from Tennessee is waiting--let me conclude with one final statement. The majority leader said this morning that we should be clear in our intentions toward the ABM Treaty. I do not know what that means. I encourage him to tell me what that means. I agree with it, we should be clear, and I hope we are clear with respect to our intentions about the ABM Treaty to say that treaty matters, that treaty means something, and to the extent we seek changes in that treaty, we will, with the Russians, negotiate those changes, but we will not take an attitude that this treaty does not matter to this country. Let us hope that is what the majority leader meant when he said, let's be clear about our intentions toward the ABM Treaty. I yield the floor.

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Mr. THOMPSON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. THOMPSON. I thank the chair.

My friend from North Dakota points out that there are, indeed, other threats to this Nation besides those that pose a threat that this bill is designed to prevent. There are, indeed, other threats. He points out that our missile defense system may not stop all of the threats that are out there, and he, of course, is correct with regard to that, also.

I do not believe that is sufficient grounds for opposing a missile defense system for this country. We have become aware,

much more than we would like, recently of the new threats, the new world that we live in, the new threats that are posed not only from old sources but from many, many new sources, some of which we may not be fully aware of and what their capabilities might be, which apparently have missed the estimates of our own intelligence community, in many instances.

I agree with my friend concerning the Nunn-Lugar program. I have also visited Russia and have seen that program in operation and the many good things that it is doing and its related programs. We have a nuclear cities program over there where we are trying to turn some of their nuclear cities and help them turn their enterprises in other directions.

We have assisted with regard to their scientists hopefully so that they will not leave the country and go to places and spread technology in places that would be detrimental to us.

We have, indeed, destroyed some of the nuclear stockpile, but I think it is important to note that we are essentially still dipping in the ocean as far as that is concerned. We are just getting started in that regard. They have many, many more tons of nuclear materials and many, many missiles that we have not touched yet, even if we are aware of their existence.

We should not in any case believe that we have begun to seriously eat into the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities. We are trying to do that. Those programs must be maintained. It is going to take a period of time before we can make any progress in that regard.

We have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in Russia in order to maintain these programs. Our taxpayers have made a decision that it is worthwhile that we go over there and try to make friends with the Russians and try to help them make this transition. We have put our cash on the barrel head to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars. That money is sorely needed in Russia right now, and hopefully it will be put to good use.

At the same time that we are doing this, our intelligence community and our Government still have serious concerns about proliferation activities of the Russians. When you consider the threats around the world and the so-called rogue nations and the outlaw nations and the dangers they present, oftentimes if you trace back to where they are getting their capabilities, you will go back to Russia, you will go back to China. It is a serious, serious problem.

If what we are saying today is that if the United States protects itself with a missile defense program, not only is Russia going to continue to proliferate but it is going to refuse the hundreds of millions of dollars that we propose to put in there, then so be it. I think we still have to go forward in the best interests of our country.

Make no mistake; we do not want to abrogate understandings lightly. Everyone knows the circumstances have totally changed. Our deal with the U.S.S.R. no longer exists. We have shown our friendship. The Soviet Union for years and years said, `We have to counter the United States of America, because they have all these hostile intentions and they have these aggressive tendencies.'

We have shown that not to be the case. We have reached out a hand of friendship, but we cannot, in turn, be threatened with closing us out, especially when they are still too often spreading nuclear technology and capability and missile capability around the world at a time when we are considering whether or not we want to have a missile defense system to protect ourselves against whomever might be hostile to us in the future.

Clearly, that is not Russia today. But it is a dangerous world out there in many, many more respects than when the old Soviet Union posed its threat.

Many of my colleagues have already recited the growing missile and weapons of mass destruction threats which America faces from many hostile and potentially hostile countries, and I will not take the time to recite them again. Most of these threats in fact were well known when we voted on missile defense last September. What is new since the last time we debated missile defense is the news that China has obtained the design for our most modern nuclear weapon, the W-88 warhead. This technology permits the development of massively destructive nuclear warheads at a fraction of the size previously possible.

Acquiring this technology will allow the Chinese to fit multiple warheads into a single missile for the first time and to deploy more nuclear weapons on submarines. Of course, this revelation must be coupled with the knowledge that because of lax export controls, the Chinese have also been able to obtain American technology to improve the guidance of their missiles and to develop the capability to deliver multiple warheads from one missile.

As we saw in the hearings of the Governmental Affairs Committee in our International Security Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Cochran, last year, cooperation with American satellite manufacturers has actually helped Beijing learn how to build better missiles and deploy multiple payloads from a single rocket. This enhances China's capability to develop this latter technology for use on ballistic missiles. As a result, they will be able to launch multiple warheads from a single missile, a capability called MIRV'ing.

So now the Chinese have more reliable missiles, each of which may soon become capable of delivering multiple warheads with one shot. And now they have stolen the final ingredient to make this work--our own most sophisticated miniature warhead design.

But that is not all the U.S. technology they have. American supercomputers may allow China to maintain the W-88 without nuclear testing. The administration has loosened export restrictions on this technology. The Chinese are also reported to have stolen U.S. laser technology and, in conjunction with advanced computers, may have helped them simulate nuclear explosions in the laboratory.

Now the United States has a huge program underway to develop the means to ensure the viability of its weapons without conducting test explosions. Were the Chinese to develop similar capabilities, then they could maintain this W-88 and other modern warheads without testing. This would enable Beijing to conduct nuclear weapons work without telltale underground explosions and help the Chinese missile force threaten the United States for decades to come.

So what does this actually mean in terms of U.S. national security? Until now, China's nuclear arsenal has been quite small, built around a comparatively tiny force of land-based and mostly liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, thanks to the acquisition, both legal and illegal, of new technologies, Beijing now stands on the verge of both a qualitative and a quantitative breakthrough.

There are at least four new missile programs currently underway designed to provide the People's Liberation Army with dramatically improved capabilities by the first years of the

next century. Moreover, the Chinese now have a class of submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles. These developments are highly relevant to our debates over U.S. missile defense.

Moreover, Mr. President, these developments threaten not only the United States but pose a more imminent threat to our allies in Asia. They are at least as worried as we are about missile and weapons of mass destruction advances by China and North Korea. After all, countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are much more likely targets for these weapons than we are--at least for now.

If ongoing Chinese missile deployments and nuclear proliferation are not addressed, and if we do not provide access to effective missile defenses to U.S. allies in Asia, then such vulnerable countries may have little choice but to try to develop their own means of nuclear defense or deterrence. This would intensify rather than diminish the proliferation problem in Asia and is yet another reason it is imperative that we develop the interrelated technologies and control systems for theater-level and national-level missile defenses.

We should not forget that China has a well established propensity to export its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology. It has been reported in the press, for example, that China provided a fully tested nuclear weapons design and highly enriched uranium to Pakistan. China has also provided ballistic missile technology to Pakistan and other countries. In 1988, China provided a turnkey medium-range missile system to Saudi Arabia. That is an entire weapons system ready to use right out of the box. China has also a record of providing nuclear, chemical, and biological missile technology to Iran.

Furthermore, the Rumsfeld Commission reported that a number of countries hostile to the United States, including Iran, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea, are capable of manufacturing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and that previous United States intelligence assessments had greatly underestimated the danger that such developments pose to the United States. Should China decide to export the W-88 or a complete weapon to such nations, as has been done with so many other dangerous technologies, the consequences for regional and global stability would be grave indeed.

All this, Mr. President, makes it more important than ever that the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 be passed. Faced with new and growing nuclear and ballistic missile threats, in part through our own carelessness, America needs the protection that such a missile defense system would offer. And Americans need the confidence of knowing that a system will be deployed rather than waiting on some future administrative decision on whether to deploy.

It is time for Congress to act. The technology to develop and deliver nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is widely available and is spreading rapidly. If we do not prepare today, when the day arrives that America is paralyzed by our own vulnerability to ballistic missile attack or when an attack actually occurs, we will be reduced to telling the American people and history merely that we had hoped this would not happen.

I urge my colleagues to support S. 257, the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. I yield the floor.

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Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

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Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, proponents of S. 257, the bill we are debating now, suggest that this bill is vital to our country's defense. The very distinguished Senator from Tennessee just got up and made his case, and as an illustration he pointed to the technology that the Chinese Government, apparently through espionage, has acquired.

I want to make it clear for the record, I am not confirming anything at this point. But assume that what was said is accurate--and I am not disputing it either. One of the two things the Senator pointed out, as things we should be worried about, is that they may have acquired the capability of MIRVing missiles. For the public, that means they can put more than one nuclear bomb on the nose of a missile, an intercontinental ballistic missile. And they may have gained the capacity to independently target those warheads.

Put another way, we know what the Russians can do. The Russians have SS-18s and other intercontinental missiles, each with any of 3, 7, 10--depending on the missile--nuclear bombs with a combined capacity that exceeds Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They could launch a missile, and within 30 minutes they could have one of those warheads, one of those nuclear weapons, landing in Wilmington, DE, a small town, in relative terms, in my State, taking out all of the Delaware Valley and its 10 million people, and the same missile could send one warhead to Washington, DC, one to Roanoke, VA, et cetera--all with one missile. That is a very, very, very awesome capacity.

We are worried that the Chinese may have acquired some of that technology.

It is also suggested that the Chinese may have acquired the capacity to target with more accuracy. An accurate missile can breach the overpressure limit of certain missile silos--the pounds per square inch they could sustain from a blast and still be able to launch--so it became important during the time of the arms buildup between the Soviet Union and the United States what the hard kill capacity was. That is, could you fire a missile that would not only kill all the people in all the Delaware Valley, but, assuming there were silos that had Minuteman rockets in those silos with nuclear weapons, could also knock out that missile itself? That is what they called the hard kill. Accuracy became a big deal because you could take out the other guy's missiles, and not just his cities.

We had the capacity to drop these missiles 12,000 or 13,000 miles away within 30 minutes on pinpointed areas the size of a soccer field in the Soviet Union then, in Russia now. We are worried the Chinese may have acquired that capacity. I think my friend from Tennessee is absolutely correct to be worried about that; so am I.

What are we doing here today? We are debating what I believe to be a political document, not a substantive piece of legislation that adds anything to the concept of what our strategic doctrine should be. We are saying that Taepo Dong missiles in the next 1 to 5 years--the Koreans may be able to get up to five of them--may be able to hit the United States, assuming the regime in North Korea lasts that long or outlives the research that would be required to get this done. We are talking about building a thin nuclear defense system to counter that immediate threat and future threats from Iran, Iraq, and other rogue states, and we are talking about it in almost total disregard of what impact it will have upon the ABM Treaty.

People say, `What is the ABM Treaty?' The ABM Treaty, as Senator Dorgan discussed, is the basis upon which we have gone from somewhere on the order of 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear warheads--and the capacity that my friend from Tennessee is worried about the Chinese acquiring--down to 12,000 total, roughly, or 13,000 maybe, roughly evenly divided between the United States and Russia.

Guess what? George Bush came along and said the single most destabilizing thing of all--in what I call `nuclear theology'--are these `MIRVed' missiles, those missiles with up to 10 nuclear bombs on their tip, able to be targeted independently, once they separate, able to go in ten different directions with significant accuracy.

Why are they destabilizing? They are destabilizing because of the nuclear scenarios about who strikes first and whether you can strike back. Anybody who faces an enemy that has this capacity has to target those missiles, because they are the single most dangerous thing out there. That means that in a crisis, if a missile were accidentally launched, or we thought one was launched, what we would have to do is go and strike those missiles first.

What would the Russians now have to do? They would have to launch on warning. Knowing that their MIRVed missiles were logical targets, they would adopt the use-it-or-lose-it philosophy. It is the only rational decision a nuclear planner could make.

So George Bush figured out these are incredibly destabilizing weapons. They are vulnerable to a first attack by sophisticated missiles and they are awesome--awesome, as the kids say--in their destructive capacity. So what do you do? As long as they are around, it means they must be on a hair trigger. No country who possesses them can wait for them to be struck before they fire them. Everybody can understand that. The gallery is nodding; they all get it. They figured it out. When it is explained in simple terms, everybody understands it. That is called crisis instability.

What did we do? George Bush came along and said these are bad things to have hanging around, so we negotiated this treaty called

the START II treaty where, in an incredible bit of negotiation on the part of the Republican administration, they convinced the Russians they should do away with these MIRVed missiles--do away with them. That means we would achieve crisis stability; it adds up to stability.

What is left on both sides are single-warhead missiles that don't have to be launched on warning, because they are less tempting targets in a first strike; therefore, you pull back from the hair trigger. So if, God forbid, there is a mistake, it doesn't mean Armageddon is guaranteed. That is a sound policy.

There is only one little trick. Russia has a quasidemocracy--my term, `quasi' democracy. They have learned the perils and joys of living with a parliament, a congress, a legislative body, called the Duma. The Duma has not ratified this agreement yet.

Why hasn't the Duma ratified the agreement? The Duma has not ratified the agreement for a lot of reasons. Some Nationalists think it is a bad idea; some old apparatchik Communists think it is a terrible idea; some of the democrats there don't quite know what to do as the next step. Here is what happens: Unfortunately for the Russians, the bulk of their nuclear arsenal is in these MIRVed, silo-based weapons, these intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. The bulk of ours are on submarines (which are less vulnerable to a first strike), in single-warhead missiles called Minuteman missiles, or on B-1 bombers and B-52 bombers.

The Russians, if they go forward with the deal to destroy their silo-based MIRVed missiles, at the end of the day will have less destructive capacity in their arsenal than we will. Now, they don't have to keep it as less, because they are allowed to build single-warhead missiles so we would each end up with the same number of warheads. But guess what? They are bankrupt. They don't have any money. They hardly have the money they need to destroy the missiles they have agreed to destroy. That is why we have the Nunn-Lugar program, spending millions of dollars a year to send American technicians over to Russia to help dismantle, destroy, break up, and crush strategic weapons.

Think about that. If I had stood on the floor 20 years ago and said that, my colleagues would have had a little white jacket ready for me. They would have hauled me off to the nearest insane asylum, I having lost my credibility completely by suggesting that the Russians would ever let Americans come over and destroy their nuclear weapons.

The reason they made that agreement is that they realized it is in their long-term interests, and they had no money to do it. If they don't have money to do that, they also don't have money to build these new weapons that only have one bomb on the end. It costs a lot of money to do that. So if they can't do that and they keep the agreement called START II, they end up at the end of the day with fewer nuclear bombs than we have--something we would never do. We would never allow us not to have parity with the Russians.

That is their dilemma right now. That is why the administration is arguing about a thing called START III. At Helsinki, President Clinton said not only should we do START II, we could jump and do START III and take the total number of nuclear warheads each of us has to between 2,000 and 2,500, from 6,000 to 6,500 which is in the first stage of the reduction.

Obviously, the Russians are very interested in being able to go right to START III. They don't want to spend a whole lot of time where we have more bombs than they have, and they don't have the money to build many new missiles. Although they are allowed to build more missiles, they don't have the money to do it.

What are we debating? We are here debating as if it were a serious part of our nuclear strategy whether or not we will deploy some time in the future a system that has not yet been developed, that if it is developed may be able to take out what might end up being up to five weapons that might be able to get to the continental United States, from a government that might be in place 5 years from now.

So, what to worry about, right? No problem, it is not going to stop the Russian missiles, so they are not going to get worried about this. Let's put this in reverse. Let's assume we were about to ratify a START II that was going to put us at having fewer nuclear bombs than the Russians,

and we heard that the Russian Government was about to erect a nuclear shield--they called it a `thin' shield--to intercept missiles that were going to come from Iran. Now, I am sure not a single Member on this floor would say the following:

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You know, what those Russians are really doing is erecting something that is going to stop our missiles from being able to strike. What have they done to us? They have convinced our administration to destroy missiles that we have that can penetrate their territory now; they convinced them to do that. We are going to end up with fewer missiles than them, and they are going ahead at the same time and building this nuclear shield. And you actually have some people in the Duma saying, `The ABM Treaty doesn't mean anything to me.'

What do you think would happen with my right-wing friends, my left-wing friends, my middle friends, all my friends? There would be a mild frenzy. I can hear the Republican Party now; they would be talking about the selling out of America, and they would have good reason to think about that. We would have Democrats joining, and I can hear Pat Buchanan now--he could make a whole campaign out of that.

Well, what do you think is going on in Russia right now with the Nationalists and the old Communists? Are they listening to our debate about the ABM Treaty, which some people say doesn't apply anymore? That is not what the sponsor of the amendment is saying, to the best of my knowledge, but others are. And we say to them that they should not worry. Why worry? We are only building this tiny, thin shield. Our shield isn't designed to affect them.

Yet, to the best of my knowledge, the sponsor of this bill would not even accept an amendment that would say, by the way, if whatever we come up with would violate the ABM Treaty, we will negotiate a change with the Russians first. It seems like a simple proposition, doesn't it?

Now, where does this leave us? I think I can say, without fear of contradiction, that at best, it leaves us with essentially a congressional resolution of no meaning, of no consequence, changing nothing that the administration has said about seeking the ability to have a thin missile defense system, for it doesn't appropriate money; it says this is subject--which is obvious--to the yearly appropriations bill. It doesn't make any guarantees; it doesn't say anything of consequence. In one sense, it is a meaningless resolution.

But in another sense, because we have debated it so vigorously, it is invested with a meaning beyond its substance. What I worry about now is that it will be taken as viewing our national strategy on nuclear weapons as no longer envisioning as the centerpiece of that strategy the ABM Treaty--the very treaty that allows us to keep reducing the number of strategic weapons on each side.

Let me make one more point. You may say, `Well, Biden, what does the ABM Treaty have to do with the START agreement and reducing these nuclear weapons?' Well, there are two kinds of truisms in this nuclear theology. One is, if you are incapable of building a missile shield, and you think the other side might build one, then there is only one thing you can do: build more missiles to overwhelm the defense system. That is axiomatic, it is cheaper, it is consistent with old-line policy, and it is doable. At a minimum, you would say, don't destroy the number of weapons you have.

Look at it this way. If you think the other team is about to put up this missile shield--thin, thick or medium--and you now have 6,500 weapons that can reach their territory, you know, as a matter of course, that if you reduce that number to 2,500 or 2,000, you have a two-thirds fewer opportunities to penetrate that shield. So why would you do that? Why would you do that?

I realize my friend from Louisiana is about to offer an amendment that I hope will at least be read as having the impact of saying, hey, look, arms reduction is still important to us--translated to mean the ABM Treaty still makes a difference. But let's understand that, at best, this bill is hortatory. At worst,

it is a real, real bad idea because, to the extent that the threat is real--and there is a potential threat from Korea--to the extent that it is real, it pales, pales, pales in comparison to the threat that remains in Russia--a country that is, at its best, to be characterized now as struggling to keep its head above water; at worst, it is losing the battle of democratization.

Mr. President, the threat of a missile attack on the United States is real and disturbing, but the true test is not how angry we get, but how rationally we deal with the threats to our national interests. A rational development and deployment of a limited nuclear missile defense does not require us to ignore our ABM Treaty obligations. Only fear and politics drive missile defense adherents to take such a risk in the bill before us.

My generation understands both that fear and the dream of a ballistic missile defense. Anyone who has ducked under his desk in grade school in an air raid drill knows the collective sense of vulnerability and futility caused by the thought of a nuclear holocaust.

We have spent well over $100 billion in our effort to ease that sense of helplessness through civil defense or missile defense. But the role of this Senate, over two centuries, has been to resist those savage fears and passionate dreams that would otherwise take us down a dangerous path. America needs a balanced strategy to meet the rogue state missile threat, while also preserving the ABM Treaty, continuing the START process, and using nonproliferation assistance to combat loose nukes in Russia and, at the same time, advancing entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That is what I believe to be a sound and balanced strategy, and that is what I hope Senator Kerry and Senator Levin and I will propose in a thing called the `National Security Policy Act of 1999.'

I respectfully suggest that it is a far cry from the `bumper sticker' bill that is currently before us. If reason can overcome fear, perhaps reason can also overcome politics. If the Republicans have the courage and foresight to pursue their goal of a limited national missile defense, while preserving arms control and strategic stability, I urge them to get to the business of talking about that.

But right now, what is left uncertain is not whether or not we should have a limited nuclear defense--we should and could if it is capable of being done--but it can and must be done only in the context of the ABM Treaty, START II and START III, as well as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That constitutes a national strategic policy.

Mr. President, I have departed from my text in order to convey the depth of my concern over this bill. Allow me now to restate those concerns in a more precise manner.

When I said that this was nothing more than an exercise in political theater, I may have sounded like the Police Commissioner in the film `Casablanca.' I am `shocked . . . shocked' to discover politics in the U.S. Senate. But we ought to make one thing clear: the issue at stake is not--is not--whether to deploy a national missile defense.

Recent Administration actions make clear that it will deploy a missile defense system if that should be in the national interest. The real issue here is whether we will be pragmatic or ideological about it.

The pragmatic solution considers the cost of a missile defense; this ideological bill ignores it.

Serious technical challenges remain in developing a national missile defense system. But that is not for a lack of trying. In fact, we have committed significant resources to the effort. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre testified last October that the National Missile Defense program `is as close as we can get in the Department of Defense to a Manhattan Project.'

The Clinton administration has submitted plans to spend approximately $30 billion in additional funds between 1999 and 2005 for missile defense development and deployment. Of that, roughly $11 billion is earmarked for deployment of a `thin' National Missile Defense with 20 interceptors. The Defense Department estimated last summer that an expanded 100-interceptor system at a single site would cost upwards of $15 billion to deploy.

That $11-15 billion may very well provide us with a deployed system that is effective against rudimentary countermeasures. It is not at all clear, however, that it will buy a system that is capable against truly advanced countermeasures, such as are claimed for Russia's new SS-27 missile or even other current Russian or Chinese missiles.

Now, before my colleagues remind me that our missile defense system is not aimed at Russia, I would refer them to the Rumsfeld Report. That report warns that technology transfer is the key way that potential antagonists might acquire missile capabilities against the United States.

The danger is that we will spend billions of dollars deploying a missile defense system that may work against SCUD-like technology, but will not work even five or ten years down the road, against the potential threat from rogue states who have bought or developed more sophisticated missile technology.

It may be the case that we will have to spend those $11-15 billion dollars on missile defense deployment. It seems to me, however, that a much smaller sum might suffice to remove much of the threat that concerns us here.

If we could move from START to START Two and START Three, a portion of that $11-15 billion could be spent on dismantling Russian nuclear weapons and securing its large quantity of fissile material. This would make a real, immediate, and lasting contribution to our security.

Another portion of those funds could be used to curb North Korea's efforts to develop intercontinental missiles or weapons of mass destruction. It is clear that we need to inject new life into the 1994 Agreed Framework if we are to curtail North Korea's nuclear program. It is also clear that we need to take proactive steps to halt North Korea's long-range missile capability.

To be taken seriously, any U.S. initiative toward North Korea must combine carrots and sticks. We must bolster our deterrent posture to demonstrate to the North Koreans the penalties they face if they threaten United States security. Improving our theater defenses, increasing our capability for pre-emptive strikes if we should face imminent attack, interdicting North Korean missile shipments abroad, and increasing our security cooperation with other regional actors are all possible sticks we can wield.

At the same time, our policy should also provide adequate incentives to persuade the North Korean elite that their best choice for survival is the path of civil international behavior. These incentives could include our joining Japan and South Korea in funding two light-water reactors in exchange for our possession of the spent fuel in North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear reactor, sanctions relief in return for a verifiable end to North Korea's missile programs, and security assurances that we have no intention of forcing a change in North Korea's political system.

While these initiatives would cost money, together they could be funded for far less than the $11-15 billion we plan to spend for missile defense deployment. Thus, an article in Sunday's Washington Post noted that North Korea has already offered to cease exporting its missile technology in return for only one billion dollars.

We rejected that proposal, and I think we can get that deal for a lower price. But we should remember our experience in negotiating access to that suspect underground site in North Korea. In this time of famine, North Korea would settle for food aid instead of cash. And a billion dollars spent on food aid goes to American farmers, rather than to North Korean weapons.

I don't know how much it would cost to truly end North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, but we might consider putting our money where our mouth is. While an embryonic missile defense program might increase our sense of security, halting the North Korean's missile and nuclear programs would provide real benefit to our national security.

The pragmatic solution considers whether the first `technologically possible' national missile defense will be reliable and effective, especially in light of warnings by the head of the Ballistic Missile Defense Office that national missile defense is a `high risk' program. This ideological bill commits us to spend at least 5 million dollars per day to build and deploy that first system, even if it has only a mediocre test record.

Most importantly, the pragmatic solution considers ballistic missile defense in the context of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.

Perhaps we will need to deploy a national missile defense. But this ideological bill would foolishly sacrifice arms control, non-proliferation and strategic stability with Russia in order to field an imperfect missile defense.

And the fact is, we don't have to make that sacrifice in order to address the ballistic missile threat. But we do have to reject simplistic answers to complex issues.

The basic problem with this bill is not that it advocates a national missile defense, but that it is so narrowly ideological about it. What a shame, that we spend our time debating right-wing litmus tests. A bill that looked more broadly at challenges to our national security would be much more worthy of our attention.

To underscore that point, I intend to introduce in the coming days the `National Security Policy Act of 1999.' Working with me on that bill are Senator Kerrey of Nebraska, who is Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee; and Senator Levin of Michigan, who is Ranking Member on the Armed Services Committee.

We earnestly hope that our bill will provoke a much more serious debate than is possible on the one-sentence bill before us. We invite our Republican colleagues to join with us in forging a comprehensive, truly bipartisan consensus on critical national security issues.

One such issue is the future of deterrence. Is deterrence so weak that we must deploy a national missile defense to combat third-rate powers like North Korea, Iran and Iraq? If so, then I believe we must reinforce deterrence.

Deterrence is--and will remain--the bedrock of U.S. nuclear strategy. Rogue states must never be allowed to forget that utter annihilation will be their fate if they should attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction. We should emphasize that basic fact.

What about the risk of ICBM's in the hands of a leader too crazy to be deterred? If that should happen, we should make it clear that the United States will destroy--pre-emptively--any ICBM's that such a leader may target at us. I intend that our bill will do that, building on our basic deterrence policy.

What is it about nuclear deterrence that makes it so hard for some people to support that strategy? Nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviets, and now between the United States and Russia, is based upon what is sometimes called `Mutually Assured Destruction' or a `balance of terror.' Each country maintains the capability to destroy the other, even if the other side strikes first.

Both the right wing and the left wing of American politics rebel against this. They abhor leaving our very fates to U.S. and Russian political leaders and military personnel. They also hear the warning of some religious and ethical leaders that no nuclear war can ever be a `just war' in moral terms.

But the `balance of terror' remains in place, fully half a century after the Soviet Union joined the United States as a nuclear power. And those of us in the center of the political spectrum continue to support it.

Why is that? To put it simply: `because it works.'

Yet one of the implicit purposes of this bill is to substitute our policy of deterrence with one of defense. Instead of deterring an attack on our territory we would defend against such an attack with missile defenses.

Some people believe we must make this transition from deterrence to defense--in this case using a National Missile Defense--because the leaders of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq cannot be deterred by the same means we have used to deter Russia and China. I disagree. These countries' leaders take tactical risks, but none has been willing to risk complete annihilation.

Let's consider the record of deterrence against extremist leaders.

In the 1950's, the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin was deterred from a conventional invasion of Western Europe. But why? Why did the Soviets not crush the Berlin Airlift? Because Stalin--that great butcher of souls--feared a nuclear war.

Why did the Soviet Union pull back from confrontation in Berlin in 1961 and Cuba in 1962? Because Nikita Khrushchev--that foolish risk-taker who was later deposed by his nervous cohorts--still feared nuclear war.

Why has China not invaded Taiwan? Because every Chinese Communist leader--from the consummate butcher Mao to the would-be capitalist dictators of today--has feared nuclear war.

More recently, Saddam Hussein was deterred from using chemical or biological weapons during the Gulf War, despite his threats to do so, by the United State's promise that such an attack would meet with a devastating U.S. response.

The record demonstrates that extremist states are deterred when we credibly threaten to retaliate, and when our threatened retaliation imperils their vital interests.

That is what has deterred the Iraqis, the Soviets, and the Chinese from using weapons of mass destruction against U.S. interests in the past. That is what has brought the Serbs to the bargaining table, both in the Bosnian and Kosovo crises. That is what has deterred the Syrians from directly attacking Israel.

Yet our concern today is over the North Korean threat. At some point in the near future, the North Koreans may achieve a limited ability to strike U.S. territory. We must ask ourselves whether the logic of deterrence--a logic that has worked in so many other instances--will work against the North Koreans. Again, lets consider the record.

For years, North Korea has had the ability to rain short-range missiles on all of South Korea and to kill untold thousands within range of North Korean artillery. Yet the South Korean and U.S. militaries have kept the peace by threatening punishing retaliation should the North Koreans attack. We have kept the peace by threatening to destroy the very heart of the North Korean regime--its military--which is crucial to its control over its population.

Our military will continue to have that retaliatory capability in the North Korean theater of operations--whether we have a national missile defense or not. We maintain approximately 37,000 troops on the ground in Korea, including the 8th Army and 7th Air Force, to say nothing of the 47,000 American troops in Japan or the portions of the 7th Fleet deployed in the region.

Moreover, the North Koreans must know that our early warning radars could pinpoint the source of any missile attack on the United States and that such an attack would bring a devastating response.

Maintaining U.S. retaliatory forces, and demonstrating our willingness to use them when necessary, are the keys that have kept the peace. There is every prospect that the credible threat of retaliation will continue to deter extremist states in the future.

So let us all think carefully--and rationally--before letting our fears of destruction move us away from a policy that has avoided destruction so well and for so long.

Traditional deterrence may unnerve us because it depends upon rational leaders and weapons control systems. But the alternative--missile defense--depends in turn upon the perfection of complex systems and their human components.

Think of the great computer-assisted systems of our time: the Internal Revenue Service, the air traffic control system, credit bureaus, or the National Weather Service.

Then ask yourselves whether missile defense will really make you safe--especially if the price of it is the end of the START process and, therefore, continued Russian reliance upon MIRVed ICBM's.

Whatever missiles a rogue state might build, however, the one missile threat to our very existence is still from Russia. A rogue state might deploy a few tens of nuclear warheads; Russia has thousands. And what is especially appalling is this bill's cavalier treatment of the U.S.-Russia relationship.

As we debate S. 257, I have to ask myself: Why is the other side so determined to pass this bill, rather than a more serious piece of legislation? The sad truth is that the real goal of many ballistic missile defense adherents is to do away with the ABM Treaty.

Why would they want to do that? Because they know that the `thin' missile defense proposed in this bill is at best a strictly limited defense. It may work against a handful of incoming missiles, but not against an attack of any serious magnitude.

To achieve a defense against a serious ballistic missile attack with nuclear weapons, we would probably need multiple radar sites--perhaps using ship-borne radars--and surely more interceptor sites. (The Heritage Foundation proposes putting the interceptors on ships, as well.)

To stop a serious missile attack using chemical or biological warheads, we might well need a boost-phase intercept system, either ship-borne or space-based. That is because the chemical or biological agents could be carried in scores of bomblets dispersed shortly after boost-phase shut-off. The national missile defense systems currently under development would be nearly useless against such bomblets.

So missile defense is rather like Lay's Potato Chips: it's hard to eat just one. For the real ballistic missile defense adherents, even `Star Wars' is therefore not dead. But the ABM Treaty bars both ship-borne and space-based ABM systems.

Still, the dream persists: if only this bill were passed, if only the ABM Treaty were killed, then `Brilliant Pebbles' or some other system could be pulled out of the drawer, dusted off, and contracted out to every congressional district to keep the money coming.

Many missile defense adherents are quite open about their determination to kill the ABM Treaty, and frustrated because Congress lacks the Constitutional authority to do that. Some fall back on strained legal theories to argue that the break-up of the Soviet Union left the ABM Treaty null and void--while hoping that nobody will apply that reasoning to other U.S.-Soviet treaties.

At other times, missile defense adherents press to deploy a ballistic missile defense regardless of whether this requires violation or abrogation of the ABM Treaty. That is what this bill would do.

If we enact S. 257 and make it U.S. policy to deploy an ABM

system without addressing Russian concerns and U.S. treaty obligations, then Russia will almost certainly use its thousands of ICBM warheads to maintain its nuclear deterrence posture.

That would end strategic arms control. It would also sacrifice our long-standing goal--ever since the Reagan Administration--of removing the greatest threat to strategic stability: land-based, MIRVed ICBM's.

MIRVed ICBM's--with Multiple, Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles--are the cheapest way for Russia to overwhelm a missile defense. But they also put nuclear Armageddon just a hair-trigger away, because a missile with 3, or 7, or 10 warheads is a truly tempting target for a first strike by the other side.

In a crisis, a Russia that relies upon MIRVed ICBM's may feel it has to `use them or lose them.' That's why President Bush signed START Two to ban those missiles.

Today, maintaining the START momentum is a real national security challenge. The Russian Duma has balked at ratifying START Two, largely because Russia cannot afford to replace its MIRVed ICBM's with enough new, single-warhead missiles to maintain the force levels permitted by the treaty.

But major force reductions under START Three, to reduce nuclear forces to a level that Russia can hope to maintain, could get the Russian Duma to permit Russia to give up MIRVed ICBMs.

Serious legislation would call for lower START Three levels than those proposed at the Helsinki summit in 1997. The bill before us, by contrast, would put the final nail in the coffin of START Two.

That is because Russia truly doubts that it can do without MIRVed ICBM's if the United States deploys a national missile defense. Now, U.S. officials are explaining to Russian leaders how a limited missile defense could defend America without threatening Russia or the basic goals of the ABM Treaty.

The Administration thinks there is a reasonable chance of bringing Russia around. But that will take time. Our bill will endorse that process of education and negotiation.

Passage of S. 257, by contrast, risks torpedoing those important U.S.-Russian talks. This bill will very likely be seen by Russia as a slap in the face. And it's hard to blame them, when the litmus-testers set up a vote just a few days before Russia's Prime Minister is due here for talks with Vice President Gore.

If my colleagues want a limited national missile defense without sacrificing the ABM Treaty, we can get that. If, however, their real aim is to kill the ABM Treaty and strategic arms control, then they are making a tragic mistake.

S. 257, which ignores our treaty obligations, could force us to abrogate the ABM Treaty. Enactment of this bill would thus practically guarantee that the START process would collapse, leaving us facing MIRVed Russian ICBM's for decades to come.

One of the fascinating questions in the missile defense debate is why missile defense adherents are so willing to sacrifice the START process. The answers tell us a lot about isolationist ideology and the politics of paranoia.

Isolationists in the Senate--mostly Republicans--have a long history of opposing international obligations. Henry Cabot Lodge opposed the League of Nations after World War I. Republicans opposed Franklin Delano Roosevelt's preparations for World War II, and some continued to accuse him of `getting us into' that war for another 20 years, as though America would have been better off accepting a Nazi Europe. And some Republicans opposed the United Nations in the post-World War II world.

Conservative Republicans have opposed arms control treaties as well, from the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 to the SALT Treaty of 1972, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, the START Treaties of 1991 and 1993, and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. Today they oppose the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and call for an end to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.

Imagine their frustration, then, with the tendency of Republican Presidents to negotiate and sign arms control treaties. Dwight Eisenhower's pursuit of a test-ban treaty was the first betrayal, even though it was John F. Kennedy who finally signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

Richard Nixon was truly a turncoat, to many Republicans. Aside from recognizing Communist China, Nixon signed both the ABM Treaty and the SALT Treaty with the Soviet Union. The Soviets promptly used a loophole in SALT to deploy the MIRVed SS-19 ICBM, which the Senate had thought would be illegal under the treaty. Republican anger was hardly lessened when it came to light that the Soviets had told U.S. officials of their plans, and that the word had not been passed to the Senate.

I think that the conservative Republican anger at Henry Kissinger--which continues to this day--is due to his willingness to pursue arms control with the Soviet Union and better relations with China, even as the United States bombed their ships in Haiphong harbor. Nixon and Kissinger pursued the Vietnam War far beyond the point of diminishing returns, and they supported right-wing regimes from Greece to Chile and Guatemala. But their subtle power politics rejected isolationist ideology, and true-blue conservatives never forgave them.

Gerald Ford was hardly better, as he signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Ronald Reagan could never be seen as a traitor to the right wing. He brought it into the White House and brought Republicans to power in the Senate. He opposed SALT Two and breached the limits of that signed-but-unratified treaty. He also brought back the missile defense issue, with his Strategic Defense Initiative--better known as `Star Wars,' as much for its overreaching ambition as for its space-based architecture.

Even Ronald Reagan puzzled many right-wingers, however, when he came out against nuclear weapons and proposed sharing Star Wars technology with the Soviets. Puzzlement turned to frustration in the Bush Administration, as some Reagan proposals were actually accepted by the Soviet Union and its successors: especially the Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement, the START Treaties, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The Clinton Administration has achieved ratification of START Two and the Chemical Weapons Convention, but perhaps only because former Republican officials worked with Democrats to complete President Bush's legacy. The real political problem with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is that it was a Democratic president who signed it.

The truth is that conservative Republicans are still uncomfortable with the whole concept of arms control. They see arms control treaties as either hamstringing the United States or defrauding the world by merely codifying what the two sides would have done unilaterally.

Against this background, it is not so surprising that Republicans are willing to sacrifice the START process in order to kill the ABM Treaty. Conservatives were not very pleased to be signing arms control treaties in the first place. To them, the end of the Cold War is a time to rid ourselves of those `foreign entanglements,' to use President Washington's famous phrase.

As a Democrat, I must admit to being perplexed by some of this behavior. You might expect that conservatives would appreciate the virtues of `law and order' in the field of strategic weapons, just as they preach it at home.

Certainly professional military officers appreciate the virtue of predictability that enables them to prepare more rationally for any future conflict. As a result, the military nearly always supports ratification of arms control treaties, again to the great frustration of conservative Republicans. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is just the latest example, as every Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since General David Jones from the Reagan Administration supports ratification, while conservative Republicans in the Senate vow to keep that treaty from coming to a vote.

Perhaps the real clash here is between ideology and reality. Conservative Republicans idolize self-reliance, both in the individual and in the state.

The Great Depression of 60 years ago and the interdependent world economy of today have made rugged individualism an insufficient guideline in economic and social policy. Two world wars and the threat of annihilation posed by weapons of mass destruction have done the same thing in our international relations.

The American people understand this and vote consistently against those who would sacrifice national or international consensus for the sake of left-wing or right-wing ideologies.

But the dream of unfettered individualism lives on. For some, it is the dream of resuming nuclear weapons tests, even though the price of that would be permitting similar tests by increasing numbers of other countries. For others, it is the dream of fighting the next war in the so-called `high frontier' of outer space. And for still others, it is the dream of a shield against enemy missiles--perhaps a U.S. shield against our enemies or, in some versions, a U.S.-Russian shield against the rest of the world.

To these dreamers, the bill before us is but a first step. A `thin' national missile defense will lead to `thicker' defenses. Demise of the ABM Treaty and strategic arms control will merely usher in an age of unfettered nuclear dominion, as the United States builds an eventually impregnable, space-based defense from missiles of all sorts.

This is only a dream. But it is a dream that energizes the right wing. And it is a dream that has become a litmus test for Republicans in this body.

That is truly a shame. For rational policy must be built on reality, not on dreams.

Mr. President, the threat of a missile attack on the United States is real; it is disturbing. But the true test of statecraft is not how angry you get, but how rationally you deal with threats to the national interest.

A rational development and deployment of a limited national missile defense does not require us to ignore our ABM Treaty obligations. Only fear and politics drive missile defense adherents to take such a risk in the bill before us.

My generation understands both that fear and the dream of a ballistic missile defense. Anyone who has ducked under his desk in a school `air raid' drill knows the collective sense of vulnerability and futility caused by the thought of a nuclear holocaust. We have spent well over a hundred billion dollars on efforts to ease that sense of helplessness through civil defense or missile defense.

But the role of this Senate, for over two centuries, has been to resist those savage fears and passionate dreams that would otherwise take us down dangerous paths.

America needs a balanced strategy, to meet the rogue-state missile threat while also preserving the ABM Treaty, continuing the START process, using non-proliferation assistance to combat `loose nukes' in Russia, and achieving entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.

That is what I hope Senator Kerrey, Senator Levin and I will propose in the `National Security Policy Act of 1999.' It is a far cry from the bumper-sticker bill currently before us.

Let me make a special appeal to those Republican members with whom we Democrats make common cause to support threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union. Some of those programs, like the Nunn-Lugar program, further the START process by underwriting the destruction of former Soviet weapons.

Others guard against proliferation by safeguarding or downgrading special nuclear material and by improving export and border controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Still others help weapons scientists and technicians to find non-military employment, so they will not have to consider contracts with rogue states for their dangerous goods or services.

Economic collapse and resurgent nationalism may be closing Russia's window to the West. But these programs help to keep that window open. The Clinton Administration has seen the risks and opportunities that are inherent in Russia's economic plight: the risk of rogue-state recruitment has increased, but so has the buying power of every dollar and Deutschmark that we and our allies can devote to threat reduction and non-proliferation assistance.

The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative announced last month deserves our support, and I am confident that it will gain that support. I believe that we should do even more, including financing retired officer housing in return for Russian withdrawal of troops from Moldova and Georgia.

We should also consider more programs that employ former weapons experts in non-military pursuits, even if their activities are not likely to result in commercially viable ventures. Eventually the Russian economy will turn around and provide new careers for the talented experts from the Soviet Union's nuclear, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and long-range missile programs. Until that happens, however, it is clearly in our national interest to keep that talent off the international market.

Democrats will support our moderate Republican friends on these issues, and I believe that Republicans will support our similar efforts in return. But my moderate Republican friends should not deceive themselves: these programs will not survive if right-wing policies on national missile defense bring down the ABM Treaty and the START process.

Russian pride is already damaged by its shattered power and by the need to accept our money. If a precipitous decision to deploy missile defense leads Russia to preserve its MIRVed ICBM's, Cooperative Threat Reduction will be ended. Once that goes, I predict that Russian cooperation on non-proliferation will go as well.

Then our nuclear and chemical and biological weapon fears will expand from the fear of missile warheads to the fear of every ship or plane or truck that approaches our borders. And the far-sighted legacy of Sam Nunn and his concerned co-sponsors will have been but a blissful rest stop on the highway to destruction.

If reason can overcome fear, perhaps reason can also overcome the politics behind S. 257. If Republicans have the courage and foresight to pursue their goal of a limited national missile defense while preserving arms control and strategic stability, I urge them to withdraw S. 257 and talk to us.

Otherwise, I urge all my colleagues to reject this bill and avert the substantial peril that it risks to our national security.

I hope the amendment of my friend from Louisiana prevails because, although she may not mean it this way, I read it to say arms reduction is still vitally important. Arms reductions are critical and, I would argue, are not capable of being conducted with any efficacy in the absence of an ABM Treaty.

I thank my colleague for allowing me to speak, my colleague from Louisiana who is about to introduce her amendment. I also thank my friend from Mississippi, who is a consummate gentleman for following and listening to what I have to say.

I yield the floor.

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AMENDMENT NO. 72

Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Voinovich). The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Louisiana (Ms. Landrieu), for herself, Mr. Levin, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Breaux, and Mr. Lieberman, proposes an amendment numbered seventy-two:

At the end, add the following:

SEC. 3. POLICY ON REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES.

It is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.

Ms. LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, it is a simply worded amendment but a very important amendment.

The distinguished Senator from Delaware brought up excellent points in terms of the necessity for us, as we consider this important bill that the Senator from Mississippi has brought to us, to continue to talk about our commitments to further reductions of nuclear weapons.

I strongly support a limited national missile defense. It is important that we pursue this program with energy and determination. But we must also keep pursuing other means of enhancing our security.

We need to move our strategic relationship with Russia from the cold war paradigm of mutually assured destruction to one of mutually assured security. We have made great progress in this regard, as has been pointed out in the last hour on this floor by Members on both sides, but much remains to be done.

However, in making this transition, we cannot allow the territory of the United States to be threatened by ballistic missiles from rogue nations, especially if it is in our capacity to protect ourselves from this imminent threat. Nevertheless, we should not allow our missile defense effort to distract from our security relationship with Russia, if at all possible. And that is the essence of this amendment.

Our country and Russia have come a long way in terms of reducing strategic nuclear threats to both countries, and nothing we do today should negate this progress. But, in my view, nothing in the 20th century has contributed more to American security than an end to the imminent threat of nuclear war.

It is important that we carry this momentum to finish the task. No threat from a rogue nation should outweigh the need for us to attain a mutually secure and stable relationship with our Russian partners. On the eve of a visit from Prime Minister Primakov, it is important that we continue to work towards this goal and we use this opportunity to further our negotiations.

Therefore, I offer this amendment, which simply states that it is our policy to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces which will reaffirm the Senate's belief that such reductions are in our national interests. It would also be an important signal to the Russians on the eve of that visit.

Furthermore, this amendment is in keeping with the recommendations of our National Defense Panel. As you know, the NDP was created by Congress to review the Pentagon's conclusion in its Quadrennial Defense Review. It is a nonpartisan panel of defense experts, some of the finest minds working on national security. They are in agreement that a defensive system, such as our national missile defense, is best developed if coupled with limiting our offensive capabilities in our arms reduction efforts.

That is what we are trying to do with this amendment. I believe it will receive bipartisan support. It will help make this bill an even better bill.

Before I conclude, I would like to add just a few things to the Record that I think are very important as we negotiate the passage of this important piece of legislation.

Our distinguished colleague from Mississippi did not include this language in his very simple bill to deploy an effective national missile defense system in his efforts to gain support. And I agree with that. But I think it is important, Mr. President, for those who are considering whether or not to vote for this bill--and I hope they will vote for this amendment and then vote for the bill--for me to take 2 minutes to read into the Record some important statements that have been made by our President, as well as some of the enemies of this country, about why it is important for this bill to pass.

Not last year, not the year before, but in 1994, President Clinton certified that:

[Page: S2719]

I * * * find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (`weapons of mass destruction') and the means of delivering such weapons, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

For those who say the threat is not real, recently--last year--some new information came out about the significance of this threat.

This is 1994.

Let me go on to read:

Several countries hostile to the United States have been particularly determined to acquire missiles and weapons of mass destruction. President Clinton observed in January of 1998, for example, that `Saddam Hussein has spent the better part of this decade, and must of his nation's wealth, not on providing for the Iraqi people, but on developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them'.

Let me also say that it is not just this country. Qadhafi, the Libyan leader, has stated:

If they know that you have a deterrent force capable of hitting the United States, they would not be able to hit you. If we had possessed a deterrent--missiles that could reach New York--we would have hit it at the same moment. Consequently, we should build this force so that they and others will no longer think about an attack.

I could go on. But I think the Record is replete with quote after quote by hostile leaders to the United States that it is most certainly their intention to develop these weapons that could possibly hit our homeland. Although it is hard for people to think about this--and we most certainly don't want people to panic--we want to be realistic to the threat.

I thank the Senator from Mississippi for bringing this bill before us at this time.

I offer this amendment in an attempt to get more bipartisan support for what I consider to be a good bill, and a quite timely one, that will not, and should not, disrupt our ongoing and very beneficial relations with Russia in our reductions, but one that will protect the people of Louisiana, the people of Alaska, the people of Mississippi, the people of Michigan, and everyone in this Nation for this growing and imminent threat that even the President himself has acknowledged over and over is real.

I yield the remainder of my time. I ask the floor leaders to give whatever time they think is appropriate to the discussion of this amendment. I will call for a rollcall vote at the appropriate time.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I believe the minority manager wants to be recognized. I yield, with the understanding that I will follow.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Colorado.

I want to make an inquiry of both him and the Senator from Louisiana as well and, of course, the floor managers, and the sponsors of the bill. We are trying to determine how much time is going to be needed on the Landrieu-Levin amendment which is pending. We are seeking a fairly early vote on this amendment. I wonder if I can inquire of my friend from Colorado approximately how long he plans on speaking.

Mr. ALLARD. Probably 15 to 20 minutes would be adequate for my remarks. I request 20 minutes, and then, if I finish before that, I will yield back.

Mr. LEVIN. There is no time limit, of course, at this point.

Mr. President, I then alert our colleagues. I think I am speaking for Senator Cochran also. We are seeking to know how many people will want to speak on the pending amendment after the Senator from Colorado has completed. Perhaps the cloakrooms can be notified of that promptly, if that is appropriate, so we can determine just whether it is possible to have a vote on the pending amendment sometime prior to the--what was the Senator's goal?

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I would like to see a vote around 4:30, or 4:45 at the latest.

But we don't want to cut any Senators off. If others want to speak on this amendment, then we want to encourage them to come over and let us hear their remarks. This is an amendment we are prepared to recommend be approved by the Senate. We think it is a good amendment, noncontroversial, helps the bill, strengthens the bill, and I compliment the distinguished Senator for offering it.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the privilege of the floor be granted to John Bradshaw, who is a fellow in Senator Wellstone's office, during the pendency of this bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we will propound a unanimous consent agreement hopefully after the Senator from Colorado has completed his presentation. I will need about 10 minutes in support of the Landrieu-Levin amendment, which is a critically important amendment. It should be discussed before we vote on it because of the impact it will have, I believe, on the bill and perhaps on the vote on the bill, because it will also have an impact on the recommendation of the senior advisers to the President as to whether or not he will veto this bill.

Because it is so significant--it is simple but very vital and very significant--it is important that there be discussion of the Landrieu amendment. So I will need about 10 minutes on that, I alert my friend from Mississippi. We can figure out if any time agreement is possible after the Senator from Colorado has completed. I thank him for his courtesy.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 257, the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. Before I make my comments, I ask unanimous consent that Tim Coy be granted the privilege of the floor for the duration of the consideration of S. 257.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Mississippi for his thought and effort in this regard.

Mr. President, I think we get stuck in the way things used to be. The fact is, this is a changing world. We have changing dynamics as far as what other countries are doing in regard to weapons development and what their risks may be to the mainland of the United States.

My colleague from Mississippi has said yes, this is a changing world out there and we need to make sure we have a national missile defense system. If you talk to the average Americans out here on the street, they think we do have a national missile defense system. The fact is, we are no longer in a cold war era where the foreign policy of threat of mutual destruction is going to be effective. We are in a modern era where countries can develop a missile rather quickly, because of the natural resources that they have--maybe it is oil and gas--and with these huge financial resources that all of a sudden become available to them. In fact, we have heard testimony in the committees on which I serve--I serve on both the Intelligence Committee and the Armed Services Committee--that the time required for a newly developed country to build a missile from scratch has halved in the last few years. That is because there is lots of technology out there, that is readily available, that they can acquire quickly. They can put this all together into a very effective offensive system if they so choose.

So I want to take some time today to talk about what the bill means to me, and some of the language in the bill specifically. I would like to talk a little bit about the threats of today's world and talk about the system's feasibility. We have heard comments here on the floor that we are dreaming, that this is really not that feasible an approach. I want to make some comments in that regard and talk a little bit about the cost of the system and how I think we can pay for it. And then, finally, before I conclude, I want to talk a little bit about the ABM Treaty and the treaty ramifications.

What does S. 257, the National Defense Act of 1999, do? Simply, the National Defense Act of 1999 states that it is the policy of the United States `to deploy as soon as technologically possible a National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether that is accidental, unauthorized or deliberate).'

The bill's policy statement is identical to that of S. 1873, which was proposed during the 105th Congress, except for the addition of the statement that missile defense is subject to the authorization and appropriations process, which is an amendment we just adopted here in a vote we had around 2 o'clock or 2:15.

This bill does not mandate a date for deployment of a system, calling instead for deployment as soon as the required technology is mature.

As I mentioned earlier, the United States has no defense against these systems, but I think it is important that we continue to push for their development as soon as it is technologically feasible--that we quickly move ahead. I think this is completely compatible with the January 20, 1999, statement of the Secretary of Defense: `The United States in fact will face a rogue nation threat to our homeland against

which we will have to defend the American people.' And, he goes on to say, `technological readiness will be the sole remaining criterion' in deciding when to deploy a national missile defense system.

Secretary Cohen stated on February 3, 1999, during the Armed Services hearing, that any country which fires ballistic missiles at us will face immediate retaliation. Again, this is the old, cold war attitude of mutual destruction. While I agree with this statement, we again decide to place ourselves at the mercy of rogue states instead of being proactive in protecting our citizens, because these rogue states have the capability of developing a system of missiles with some type of warhead--whether it is bacteriological, chemical, or nuclear--and we do not have any defense system today to counteract any missile that would be headed towards the United States.

I would like to talk a little bit about the threats that are posed to the U.S. mainland today. I want to refer to the July 1998 Rumsfeld report on ballistic missile threats to the United States. The commissioners who put together the report concluded:

[T]he threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence community.

The report goes on and further states:

[T]he warning times that the U.S. can expect of new ballistic missile deployments are being reduced.

I believe the missile threat to the United States is growing at an accelerated pace. Numerous hostile nations have declared their intent to obtain missiles capable of attacking the United States, and are succeeding in doing so. These include launches that have been made from North Korea and China, the old missile fields of the former Soviet Union--now in the Commonwealth of Independent States. I happen to believe that very soon Iraq, Iran, Libya, India, and Pakistan will have the same capability.

Two of the worst proliferators of ballistic missiles are North Korea and Russia. North Korea has tested a missile capable of attacking Alaska and Hawaii, and is apparently developing a second missile which will be capable of reaching the entire United States mainland. North Korea has sold every missile it has developed, and the associated technology, to other rogue states.

During the Armed Services hearing on February 2, 1999, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet said:

North Korea is on the verge of developing ballistic missiles capable of hitting the continental United States.

Again, relating to the North Koreans' launch when they set off a second-stage rocket that went over the tip of Japan, Tenet said:

The proliferation implications of these missiles are obviously significant.

During the hearing, Director Tenet also warned that Russia is reneging on their earlier commitment to the United States to curb the transfer of advanced missile technology to Iran. Again, he stated:

The bottom line is that assistance from Russian countries is still contributing substantially to progress in Iran's dangerous missile programs.

He added:

India, Pakistan, and Iran, who have traditionally been considered technology customers, now have developed capabilities that could, in some cases, be exported to others.

So here we are. We have a commission set up by the United States to analyze our defensive posture and our ability to counteract a missile attack, and we have the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency both warning us that we need to update our defense system to a current situation that exists throughout the world. I happen to believe both the report as well as the comments by George Tenet. I think that we need to move forward.

The President's 3+3 Missile Defense Plan has already been pushed back to 2005, but the problem is that the threat is right now. It is not in 2005. In December, Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, said in a speech that the Central Intelligence Agency was caught by surprise by North Korea's flight testing of a three-stage missile. While the third stage of the missile failed, CIA analysts had to agree to the Rumsfeld report, as I stated earlier in my comments, that the threat is here despite the CIA's dismissal of the report when it was released.

I want to talk a little bit about the feasibility of us moving ahead with the technology that we have today. We have the pieces of a national missile defense system with proven technology. However, the risk to development lies not in the pieces but in the integration of these pieces into an effective system in a timely manner, which is exactly what this bill does. When we talk about the term `technologically possible,' it includes system integration. There is no date in the bill. The bill just calls for the policy to deploy when technologically possible.

During a February 3, 1999, Sea Power interview, General Shelton said:

[Page: S2721]

The simple fact is that we do not have the technology to field a national missile defense. . . . My colleagues--the Joint Chiefs and I--believe that when we have the technology for NMD, we ought to have the capability to be able to transition right into the deployment, if the threat warrants.

A followup on that, Ted Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, said that the threat is no longer the issue holding back national missile defense, but technical feasibility is all that drives deployment.

During a February 3, 1999, Armed Services hearing, Secretary Cohen stated that the Department is committed to advancing its missile defense efforts as technology risks allow, without any mention of when the threat is there. He admits that the threat is here now.

I will discuss the architecture of a national missile defense system. The architecture for national missile defense consists of three pieces: the battle management system, the radars that detect incoming missiles, and the booster and ground-based interceptor that will comprise our response.

The battle management command, control and communications system will receive data on the incoming missiles, calculate the number of interceptors needed to destroy the missiles, and monitor the status of the test elements, giving decisionmakers a prioritized set of choices for our response. Portions of this system have already been tested and performed flawlessly in previous tests.

Our current detection system consists of a combination of upgraded early warning radars, new ground-based radars and our space-based satellites. Once the satellites detect a launch, they will pass the data to our ground-based radars, which will create a detection net to gather high-fidelity data on the incoming missile that will help our interceptor strike its target. The upgraded early warning radars have been rigorously tested using both computer simulations and actual test launches and are more than capable of performing their mission.

Their replacement, a space-based infrared radar system, will vastly improve our detection. Moreover, our targeting capabilities will be increased with the eventual deployment of a complementary low space-based infrared system which performs cold-body tracking of incoming missiles.

The least proven piece of the architecture may very well be the booster and interceptor. Various parts of the interceptors, such as the seeker, have been tested many times, and the test objectives have been met. Actually, just yesterday the PAC-3 missile collected, detected, tracked and gauged and then hit an incoming test missile.

The technology exists to build a national missile defense system. Further testing of integration should show whether the system is ready to deploy. Requiring more studies and analysis to see if the technology is here, which it is, before we decide to deploy will only place us at the mercy of a threat we already know is out there.

Let me speak a little bit about the cost of the system. With regard to the national missile defense budget, on one hand, the administration added $600 million from its fiscal year 1999 emergency supplemental but has yet to put forward exactly where this money will be spent. There was discussion to use part of this money for the Wye peace agreement. Then the administration added $6.6 billion over the 5-year plan for the national missile defense but pushed the majority of the money into the outyears, making it vulnerable to future cuts and the whims of another administration. I happen to believe that we should field an NMD system as soon as it works. Given that most of the system is technologically feasible already, we should be putting money in military construction and procurement starting in fiscal year 2000 and deploy much earlier than the year 2005.

To make a few comments about the ABM Treaty and the treaty ratification, this bill is not about the ABM Treaty, specific architecture, deployment dates, or reports. The cold war is over, and we shouldn't hold to the cold war ways of protecting ourselves, the ABM Treaty. MAD, referred to as mutually assured destruction, should not rule our defense posture. We are no longer facing a superpower but now face rogue states.

We keep hearing that if we deploy a missile defense system, Russia will not ratify START II. They have used this threat entirely too many times--in the bombing of Iraq, they used it; in the sanctions for missile proliferation with Iran.

As columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote:

What standing does Russia, of all nations, have to dictate how and whether the United States will defend itself? Russia is the principal supplier to Iran of the missile and nuclear technology that could one day turn New York into a Hiroshima.

The administration has been saying that any national missile defense is not directed at Russia. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger said:

It's directed at rogue states that have long range missiles. These are threats not only to us, but to the Russians.

In conclusion, Mr. President, a firm policy to build a defense against ballistic missiles will send a clear message to rogue states that they are wasting their money building ballistic missiles with which to attack or threaten the United States. If rogue countries decide to ignore this message, the United States will be prepared to protect itself as soon as the technology is ready against such attack or threat of attack.

The bill is a policy declaration, making clear to the citizens, allies, and adversaries of the United States that it will not remain defenseless against a ballistic missile attack. I believe there is a need to have a bipartisan bill, and this is a bipartisan bill. This bill was introduced by Senator Cochran and Senator Inouye, and the exact same bill in the 105th Congress had three Democrat cosponsors, with four voting for cloture.

Let me end with a final conclusion from the Rumsfeld report and our ability to protect the threats for the future:

Therefore, we unanimously recommend that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which there may be little or no warning.

I yield the floor, Mr. President, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous-consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, has anyone propounded the unanimous-consent request?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. No.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be 20 minutes for debate on the pending amendment, with the debate divided as follows: 10 minutes for Senator Levin; 5 minutes for Senator Landrieu; 5 minutes for Senator Cochran. I further ask unanimous consent that following that debate, the Senate proceed to a vote on, or in relation to, the amendment, with no other amendments in order prior to the vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the amendment of Senator Landrieu that is pending is a very simple and a very straightforward amendment, but it is a vital amendment. It will make a major difference in this bill, because if this amendment is adopted, this bill will contain two policy statements. It now contains but one. The policy statement that it currently contains has to do with the deployment of a missile defense system. The policy statement, which the Landrieu amendment will add, is that it is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.

This is a very significant policy statement, and I want to take just a minute and explain why.

In my opening comments on this bill, I addressed what I consider to be a number of flaws or omissions in this bill. I talked about the fact that there is no reference here to `operational effectiveness.' One can look at the word `effective' in this bill's language and argue, I think reasonably, that operational effectiveness is included in that term `effectiveness.' Nonetheless, I think the bill would be stronger if that were clearer. That was one of the issues which was raised.

It is a very important question to our uniformed military and to the Secretary of Defense, because they want to be sure that before any decision is made to deploy, that we have an operationally effective system, that it works. And those are not just casual words. `Operational effectiveness' are words that have a very important technical meaning to our military.

I also pointed out in my opening remarks that there was no reference in here to cost. Now there is.

With the Cochran amendment that was adopted earlier this afternoon, we now at least have an acknowledgment that the usual authorization and appropriation process is going to apply to national missile defense. The authorizers and the appropriators naturally look at cost. So there is now, at least in this bill with the adoption of the Cochran amendment, a way in which the cost issue will be addressed in the years to come.

Another factor which the uniformed military and our civilian leadership wanted to look at is the threat. I think it is clear to most of us that there is a threat that was not predicted to come this quickly but which is either here or will soon be here from states such as North Korea.

Finally--and this was the one which to me was the greatest sticking point--is the omission in this bill, until Senator Landrieu's amendment was introduced and hopefully will be adopted, of the acknowledgment of the importance of continuing to negotiate reductions in Russian nuclear forces. Those reductions are critically important to our security. Those reductions have been carried out, and hopefully additional reductions will be carried out, because we have a treaty with Russia which has allowed for these reductions to be carried out in a way which is strategically stable.

That treaty, called the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, has been critically important to nuclear arms reductions. Hopefully, there will be further reductions negotiated. Hopefully, the Duma will ratify START II. But it is important that we be aware of the fact that arms reductions, nuclear arms reductions, are very important in terms of reducing proliferation threats and very important in terms of the terrorist threat.

If we act in such a way that leads Russia to stop the reduction of the nuclear weapons on her soil, to stop the dismantling of the nuclear weapons on her soil, to stop negotiating further reductions in nuclear weapons, we are taking a very dangerous step in terms of our own security.

That is why the fourth point which our uniformed military has pointed to as being important, in terms of considering national missile defense deployment, is the effect of that deployment on nuclear arms reductions. Nobody is going to give Russia or any other country a veto over whether or not we deploy a national missile defense system. That issue has got to be resolved in terms of our own security. If it adds to our security, we should do it. If it diminishes our security, we should not.

But whether or not it adds to our security is dependent upon a number of factors. And one of those factors is the effect on the nuclear weapons reduction program on Russian soil. This has been pointed out at the highest level between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. In their Helsinki summit statement in March of 1997, they emphasized--and these are their words-- `the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms' and they recognized explicitly, in their words, `the significance of the ABM Treaty for those objectives.'

Secretary Cohen, has recognized and stated the importance of that treaty between ourselves and Russia in terms of accomplishing these nuclear arms reduction objectives.

Sandy Berger, in a letter which he has addressed to us, has recognized and stated the importance of that treaty between ourselves and Russia in terms of reducing nuclear arms and the threat of proliferation to this country.

In his letter he said:

[Page: S2722]

The Administration strongly opposes S. 257 because it suggests that our decision on deploying this system should be based solely on a determination that the system is `technologically possible.' This unacceptably narrow definition would ignore other critical factors that the Administration believes must be addressed when it considers the deployment question in 2000. . . .

And then he went on to say:

A decision regarding national missile defense deployment must also be addressed within the context of the ABM Treaty and our
objectives for achieving future reductions in strategic offensive arms through START II and [START] III. The ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability, and Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agree that it is of fundamental significance to achieving the elimination of thousands of strategic nuclear arms under these treaties.

What this amendment before us does is simply acknowledge the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces. That is all that it says. In that sense it is very straightforward, very direct. But it also, to me at least, and I think to many other Members of this body, acknowledges that we have a number of policy goals that we should be achieving.

One is the deployment of an effective national missile defense system to meet a threat--I believe that is a legitimate policy goal that Senator Cochran's bill sets forth--a policy to deploy a cost-effective, operationally effective national missile defense to meet a threat. We do not have that system yet. It is being developed as quickly as we possibly can.

Hopefully, someday we will have a cost-effective, operationally effective national missile defense system. And hopefully, we can take that step after negotiating modifications with the Russians to that treaty, so that we can proceed consistent with a cooperative relationship with the Russians and not in a confrontational way. If we cannot do it cooperatively and with an amendment to that treaty, and if our security interests indicate that we should do it because we have something operationally effective and cost effective, and the threat is there, then we should do it anyway.

But what the Landrieu language does is state a very important policy objective that I hope all of us share: to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces. It is that straightforward. It is that important. I commend the Senator from Louisiana for framing an amendment in a way which hopefully will attract broad bipartisan support but at the same time makes a very important addition to this bill by setting forth, if this is adopted, two important policies of this Government.

Ms. LANDRIEU addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.

Ms. LANDRIEU. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I thank our ranking member, the Senator from Michigan, for his good work in this area. He is a national leader and has been outspoken on this issue. His guidance and counsel have been very important as we have worked through this very important piece of legislation. I thank him.

I also thank the Senator from Mississippi for his graciousness and being open to working out this bill--although simple, it is quite important and quite historic--and to make sure it is done in the right and appropriate way.

I am convinced, Mr. President, that if this amendment I have offered, on behalf of myself, Senator Levin, and some of my colleagues here and on the other side of the aisle, is adopted, it will enable us to vote in good faith and in good conscience for this bill, which I have said earlier I support but have some hesitation.

This amendment will make sure it is the policy that we have a national missile defense system capable to deploy, as soon as technologically possible, an effective system and one that also states, with this amendment, that while we are developing this we will continue to negotiate reductions in Russian nuclear forces. It is the policy, a joint policy. It makes this bill stronger and better. And it enables us to pass this bill that recognizes the threat is real, that the world has changed significantly.

The record is replete, as I have mentioned earlier in my remarks, with hostile neighbors to the United States, with

the development of these weapons that could, in fact, now threaten parts of our homeland--Hawaii, for instance, which is why the distinguished Senators from Hawaii are supporting this bill. And it is clear to many of us now that this threat is more real than ever before, so the need for this bill is important.

I think this amendment helps to strengthen the bill. It most certainly will enable several of us on this side of the aisle to vote for this bill and to pass it with bipartisan support and, I believe, with the administration's support.

I thank my distinguished ranking member. I thank the author and sponsor of this bill, and I yield back the remaining time I have.

I strongly urge my colleagues to give consideration to this amendment which will make a good bill even better.

[Page: S2723]

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I am pleased to support the amendment of the able Senator from Louisiana (Ms. Landrieu) because I interpret that it refers to the policy of pursuing Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. Any proposed reduction below the START II level should, of course, be considered on its specific merits.

I commend Senator Landrieu for offering the amendment consistent with my interpretation stated above.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, as I indicated earlier, I support the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Louisiana and thank her for her contribution to strengthening the legislation. Like the statement of policy already contained in S. 257, this is a straightforward statement of an important national security goal.

The high levels of strategic forces deployed during the cold war are no longer necessary in today's vastly changed strategic environment. Already our two countries have reduced levels significantly through START I and will reduce them further under START II. Both policies articulated here, our determination to deploy a missile defense against limited threats and our continued interest in further offensive reductions, are in our interests. Of course, inclusion of both in this bill does not imply that one is contingent upon the other, but that is completely consistent with what we have been saying all along--that defensive and offensive reductions are not incompatible. I urge all Senators to support the amendment.

I also urge Senators, if they have other amendments, to let us know about them. I am hoping that we can get an agreement that would identify any other amendments and that we can have a time limit agreed upon with respect to those amendments. If there are no other amendments, it would be our expectation that we could go to third reading within a short period of time. Senators communicating that to the managers or their intentions to the managers would be appreciated very much so we could go forward with the expeditious handling and conclusion of the bill.

I yield back whatever time remains, and I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment of the Senator from Louisiana.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, a brief 10 seconds. As I indicated earlier, I have been informed by the President's National Security Adviser that if this amendment is adopted, the recommendation to the President to veto this bill will be withdrawn. I think that is a very significant development and I think folks may want to consider that as part of the overall debate on this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The yeas and nays have been ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from California (Mrs. Feinstein) is absent because of illness.

The result was announced--yeas 99, nays 0, as follows:

Rollcall Vote No. 50 Leg.

• Abraham
• Akaka
• Allard
• Ashcroft
• Baucus
• Bayh
• Bennett
• Biden
• Bingaman
• Bond
• Boxer
• Breaux
• Brownback
• Bryan
• Bunning
• Burns
• Byrd
• Campbell
• Chafee
• Cleland
• Cochran
• Collins
• Conrad
• Coverdell
• Craig
• Crapo
• Daschle
• DeWine
• Dodd
• Domenici
• Dorgan
• Durbin
• Edwards
• Enzi
• Feingold
• Fitzgerald
• Frist
• Gorton
• Graham
• Gramm
• Grams
• Grassley
• Gregg
• Hagel
• Harkin
• Hatch
• Helms
• Hollings
• Hutchinson
• Hutchison
• Inhofe
• Inouye
• Jeffords
• Johnson
• Kennedy
• Kerrey
• Kerry
• Kohl
• Kyl
• Landrieu
• Lautenberg
• Leahy
• Levin
• Lieberman
• Lincoln
• Lott
• Lugar
• Mack
• McCain
• McConnell
• Mikulski
• Moynihan
• Murkowski
• Murray
• Nickles
• Reed
• Reid
• Robb
• Roberts
• Rockefeller
• Roth
• Santorum
• Sarbanes
• Schumer
• Sessions
• Shelby
• Smith (NH)
• Smith (OR)
• Snowe
• Specter
• Stevens
• Thomas
• Thompson
• Thurmond
• Torricelli
• Voinovich
• Warner
• Wellstone
• Wyden

• Feinstein

The amendment (No. 72) was agreed to.

Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith of Oregon). The Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, we understand that it is possible to reach an agreement on the identity of amendments that are yet to be offered to the bill. I will, on behalf of the leader, propound a unanimous consent request regarding the amendments that would be in order to the bill and a time agreement on each, in the hope that we can complete action on this bill tomorrow and have final passage. If we do get the agreement, we would then proceed to hear any further statements that Senators might have on the bill tonight. Senator Ashcroft, I know, is here and available to speak on the bill, but there would be no further votes on amendments tonight.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following amendments be the only amendments remaining in order, that they be subject to first- and second-degree amendments where applicable, and they must be relevant to the first-degree they propose to amend.

I further ask that all first-degree amendments be limited to 1 hour, equally divided in the usual form for debate, and any second-degree amendments limited to 30 minutes in the usual form.

I further ask that following the disposition of the listed amendments, the bill be immediately advanced to third reading

and passage occur, all without intervening action or debate, and that no motions be in order other than motions to table.

The list is as follows: a Bingaman amendment on operational success of system; Conrad amendment, space-based missile defense; Dorgan amendment on NMD deployment; a second Dorgan amendment on NMD deployment; Harkin amendment on study on relevant risks, and a second amendment on condition on relevant; Kerry amendment, relevant; a Levin amendment, relevant; a Robb amendment, relevant; and a Wellstone amendment, relevant.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we have no objection to that, and I believe that all of the Senators on this side of the aisle now are included. I wanted to make sure that they all understand there is, in addition to this list, a time agreement here, as the Senator from Mississippi has indicated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, in light of this agreement limiting amendments, there will be no further votes this evening, and I thank all colleagues for their cooperation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Stephanie Sharp of my staff be granted the privilege of the floor during the pendency of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of S. 257, the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. I commend the two principal sponsors of the bill, Senator Cochran and Senator Inouye, for their commitment to this legislation and for their dedication to the national security of our country.

The fact that we are having a debate on this bill at all, in the sense of trying to overcome opposition to this legislation, is somewhat troubling to me. The foreign missile threat has come to our very door in the last 6 years, and yet the administration and many of my Democratic colleagues continue to oppose this legislation, which simply says we will defend the American people as soon as we can.

A recent poll shows that more than 85 percent of Americans favor the deployment of a missile defense system and that three out of every four Americans were surprised to learn that the United States cannot destroy an incoming ballistic missile. The American people would be even more surprised to learn that they remain defenseless today, not so much due to the cost or technological hurdles of missile defense as to a lack of political leadership here in Washington.

The administration's record on missile defense has been plagued with the same inconsistency and lack of foresight that is characteristic of our more general foreign policy over the last 6 years. In each of the critical areas that we are facing today in deploying a missile defense system--modifications of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, program management and budgeting, and the assessment of the missile threat--the administration is having to reverse astoundingly shortsighted policies adopted only a few years ago.

Secretary Albright has encountered firm resistance from Russia in modifying the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, but Russia eagerly discussed possible modifications to the treaty in the Ross-Mamedov talks in 1992. To Russia's great surprise, one of the first things President Clinton did after coming to office was suspend this dialogue on modifying the ABM Treaty. Now, 6 years later, with a greatly altered diplomatic landscape, the window of opportunity for active Russian cooperation on modifying the treaty may be permanently closed. Regardless of one's views on the ABM Treaty, squandering opportunities such as the Ross-Mamedov dialogue is serious negligence.

The lack of foresight in program management and budgeting for missile defense also has undermined the development and deployment of an effective system. When President Clinton entered office in 1993, promising missile defense initiatives fostered under the Bush administration were limited or curtailed. Ambassador Hank Cooper, President Bush's Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, had a procurement program in place in 1992 for the first site of a ground-based missile defense system which potentially could have been deployed by the year 2000. This effort was suspended, and the budget for the national missile defense system was slashed by an astounding 71 percent in the first year of the Clinton administration.

Here is a chart which shows our commitment to missile defense. During the Reagan and Bush years, we saw a consistent and strong commitment to missile defense. In the years when the budgeting was under the control of this administration, we saw an astounding drop, a 71-percent drop in the funding to develop a national missile defense system.

Now, after 4 years of undermining the National Missile Defense Program, the administration is rushing to increase the funding levels because the threat can no longer be ignored or denied.

The administration has used faulty intelligence estimates of the foreign missile threat to justify a missile defense policy of delay and obfuscation. Based in part on a National Intelligence Estimate in 1995 that said the Continental United States would not face a new ballistic missile threat until 2010, the President vetoed the FY 1996 defense authorization bill because of language which called for the deployment of a missile defense system by the year 2003.

Now, 3 years after the President's veto, with North Korea and Iran developing ballistic missiles to strike the United States, with China modernizing its nuclear weapons, possibly with U.S. technology, and with the threat of accidental missile launch from Russia rising, 2003 is, if anything, too late to deploy a national missile defense system.

The administration has relied on faulty intelligence to our collective peril. North Korea's test of the Taepo Dong 1 in August of 1998 was the last nail in the coffin of the National Intelligence Estimate and a strong indictment of the administration's complacency in preparing for an imminent foreign missile threat. But the Taepo Dong test was a result of proliferation trends that have been detectable and discernible for over a decade.

We could see the threat coming as proliferation accelerated in the 1980s. We saw the threat arrive when the largest single loss of life of U.S. soldiers in the Gulf War occurred when an Iraqi ballistic missile killed 28 of our soldiers and wounded 89 more on February 25, 1991.

The threat was apparent by 1991, at the latest, and that is why the Senate passed the National Missile Defense Act that year as part of the Defense Authorization bill. The National Missile Defense Act was a strong piece of legislation calling for modifications to the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and calling for deployment of an effective missile defense system by a date certain, that date to be 1996.

Yet now, 8 years after passage of the National Missile Defense Act, 8 years in which two terrorist governments, Iran and North Korea, have come to the threshold of acquiring ICBM capability, this administration and many of my Democratic colleagues continue to oppose legislation which simply states that it is United States policy to defend the American people as soon as we can.

Winston Churchill once said, `Occasionally you must take the enemy into consideration.' This administration would be well advised to heed Mr. Churchill's words and to grasp the seriousness of the multiple missile threats posed to the United States.

At least 25 countries have or are pursuing weapons of mass destruction programs that could threaten not only their neighbors but the stability of this globe, and nearly all of those countries also have ballistic missiles of one kind or another. The technology is out there and is being proliferated at an alarming rate.

In spite of these rising missile threats to the United States, the administration continues to speak of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. Although the legal status of the treaty is in doubt after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the accord continues to guide administration policies that have undermined the entire missile defense effort.

As William Graham, former science adviser to President Reagan, stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

[Page: S2724]

Not only has the ABM Treaty prohibited the deployment of national missile defenses, it has led to the prohibition of funding for the research and development on systems which might, if deployed, conflict with the ABM Treaty. Moreover, it has made Defense Department program managers unwilling even to propose missile defense systems and programs that might. . .be viewed as conflicting with the largely ambiguous details of the ABM
Treaty. . . .

Mr. Graham's point is simply this: that the ABM Treaty has kept people in the administration from even exploring alternatives that might well defend the people of this country.

This administration's commitment to the ABM Treaty has precluded our best space-based options for national missile defense and limited the more advanced capabilities of our theater missile defense programs.

A host of critical missile defense initiatives under the Bush administration were derailed or downsized in 1993. Brilliant Eyes, now known as SBIRS Low, a satellite program to provide essential tracking capabilities for national missile defense, has seen its deployment delayed by as much as a decade.

Brilliant Pebbles, a system of hit-to-kill vehicles in low Earth orbit and still potentially the best national missile defense option, was canceled as a result of this administration's policies.

A space-based national missile defense system could best defend the American people. So why isn't it being pursued? Even President Clinton's current Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, General Lester Lyles, stated before the Armed Services Committee last month:

[Page: S2725]

I think all of us recognize that the optimum way to do missile defense, particularly in a robust manner in the future, is from space.

This is President Clinton's Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.

Space-based national missile defense systems have been shelved for one simple reason: this administration's commitment to the outdated and dangerous Antiballistic Missile Treaty.

If the administration is so concerned about the cost of missile defense, why is it expending precious missile defense dollars on the least effective systems, rather than the most effective ones acknowledged by the administration's own Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization?

If the administration is so concerned about deploying a technologically sound missile defense system, why is a ground-based system that has the highest technological challenges the administration's only near-term missile defense initiative? As Ambassador Cooper testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1996, ground-based systems are the most expensive, least effective defense that will take the longest to build. The administration has cut the national missile defense budget and diverted those scarce funds into the least effective national missile defense programs.

All of this, because the administration refuses to relinquish its tight grip on the ABM Treaty.

Finally, the ABM Treaty is undermining the robustness of theater missile defense programs. For example, limiting the use of additional off-site radars for theater missile defense programs out of concerns for the ABM Treaty increases the cost of missile defense exponentially. Bill Graham, former science adviser to Presidents Reagan and Bush, states:

. . .the area that a surface-based interceptor system can defend using only its. . .radar is one-tenth the area that the same interceptor can defend using space-based sensing. Therefore, to defend the same area without space-based sensing, 10 times as many missile/radar systems would have to be deployed at a cost that would be approximately 10 times as much. . ..

So this persistent, dogged determination to honor an outdated treaty, the ABM Treaty, increases the cost of our theater missile defense systems ten-fold, just to cover the same territory.

In almost every theater missile defense program we have, serious constraints have been imposed to try to limit the ICBM intercept capability of regional theater missile defense systems. Software and radar of the Navy Aegis cruisers have been constrained to limit their ability to track ballistic missiles. Software for THAAD has been constrained to limit its intercept capability. The ballistic missile intercept capability of the Patriot system was restrained until the urgency of the gulf war.

Ambassador Cooper stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

. . .the 28 military personnel killed when an Iraqi Scud hit their barracks during the Gulf War might have been spared if Patriot had not been dumbed-down and delayed because of ABM Treaty concerns.

It seems like the loss of life and the injury to dozens and dozens of others in that particular incident should have sounded a wakeup call sufficiently urgent to at least startle this administration into pursuing a course of action which would not be guided by an unwarranted commitment to the ABM Treaty.

In spite of the restrictions the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty imposes on U.S. missile defense efforts, the administration continues to view the accord as the cornerstone of strategic stability and essential for future arms control efforts. Although the past 27 years have demonstrated that the treaty probably accelerated the arms race rather than curtailed it, this administration remains committed to the idea that reductions in nuclear weapons cannot occur unless the American people are completely vulnerable to missile attack.

I want to say that again. This administration remains committed to the idea that reductions in nuclear weapons cannot occur unless the American people are completely vulnerable to missile attack. My view is that we deter aggression through strength, not through increasing our own vulnerability. To continue to risk American lives for thoroughly invalidated arms control policies is a serious abnegation of our duty to protect and defend the United States.

Administration officials seem mortified by the prospect that Russia will reject the START II treaty if the United States builds an effective missile defense. The administration seems to have forgotten however that the size of Russia's nuclear stockpile will continue to decline with or without another arms control agreement. The size of Russia's nuclear arsenal is in freefall thanks in large part to one American President who returned America to the tried and true principle that strength deters aggression.

Ronald Reagan knew that `Nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they mistrust each other.' He confronted and deterred aggression, and although this administration would like the forget it, Ronald Reagan used ballistic missile defense to hasten the demise of the Soviet Union.

This particular graph shows the level of nuclear warheads maintained by the United States and the Soviet Union, later Russia, over the last several decades. The ABM Treaty was negotiated in 1972, and shortly after the ABM Treaty came into force, we see the levels of Soviet nuclear warheads begin to increase dramatically. This graph illustrates that America's weaknesses under the ABM Treaty was one factor behind the Soviet arms buildup, while Reagan's resolve to confront Soviet aggression, in part through the Strategic Defense Initiative--hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union. President Reagan used missile defense to deter Soviet aggression, and the dissolution of the Soviet empire led to the reductions in arms that always proved elusive to advocates of appeasement.

Reagan's success in confronting and undermining Soviet tyranny was one of the greatest contributions to freedom in modern history. As part of that broader policy, Reagan's commitment to missile defense is at once a telling indictment on the failed policies of the more recent past and a shining example of the courage needed to chart a course for the revitalized defense of the American people.

The legislation we are considering today simply says this: We will defend the American people against missile attack as soon as possible. How could there be opposition to this bill when every conflict we have fought in the past has proven that weakness and vulnerability invite aggression? We do not get a reduction in our vulnerability by remaining vulnerable. We get a reduction in our vulnerability by showing strength.

How could there be opposition to this bill when missiles from

North Korea and Iran pose an imminent threat to the United States? How can there be opposition to this bill when China points the majority of its nuclear weapons at the United States and has implicitly threatened Los Angeles if American forces defend Taiwan?

Mr. President, the sad truth is that the United States is completely defenseless against a ballistic missile strike. George Washington once said, `If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it. . .' Why are North Korea and Iran pursuing advanced missile technology at breakneck speed? These terrorist governments are seeking the tools of aggression because they know that we cannot repel their attacks.

Our ambivalence and complacency in providing an effective missile defense for American citizens and for American interests is an unconscionable act of negligence. We should not shrink from or shirk the burden of eternal vigilance in the defense of freedom because the cost of missile defense is high or the technology is complicated or there will be difficulties to overcome in the development of a system.

As Franklin Roosevelt said in September 1941, `Let us not ask ourselves whether the Americas should begin to defend themselves after the first attack, or the fifth attack, or the tenth attack, or the twentieth attack. The time for active defense is now.'

Mr. President, those words ring as true today as they did before World War II and reflect the commitment of the American people to safeguard the blessings of liberty. The defeatist policies which would leave America vulnerable to nuclear, chemical or biological warheads have been followed for too long, to the great detriment of our country. We must return to the sound policies of an active defense system before a missile strike on U.S. soil eclipses the catastrophe of Pearl Harbor. We do not have another 6 years to waste, Mr. President. I applaud Senator Cochran and Senator Inouye for their leadership on ballistic missile defense and I urge my colleagues in the Senate to pass this legislation.

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Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I stand today in support of a very simple yet essential piece of legislation, the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. The bill states:

It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack, whether that attack is accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate.

That is all the language does. Mr. President, this bill may concern rocket science but it does not take a rocket scientist to realize the inherent necessity of this legislation for the safety of this country.

Currently, our nation is defenseless against the threat of ballistic missile attack. Some have shrugged their shoulders and said, `So what, America won the cold war without a missile defense. The Soviet Union never attacked us and no one else will either.' Yet the fact that the United States won the cold war is the very reason that America faces a new and very real missile threat today.

The world is not as simple in 1999 as it was during the cold war. Today, a much less stable Russia still maintains an awesome nuclear arsenal. Communist China is developing into a superpower with interests which are frequently adverse to our own. That development includes a force of ballistic missiles capable of striking the continental United States. And as we have seen in recent weeks, China is persistent in its efforts to acquire the technology necessary to make its missiles more accurate and deadly.

Equally disturbing, today's threat includes the use of ballistic missiles by rogue nations and terrorist groups. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has exacerbated the proliferation of missile technology and lethal payloads. Iran and North Korea are developing and testing longer range missiles. Both countries are potential adversaries in regions vital to the national interest of the United States. Both countries have ties to international terrorist groups. With proliferation rampant, these two countries will surely not be the last to acquire long range missile technology. The failure to deploy an effective national missile defense system could subject this nation to diplomatic blackmail from any rogue state or terrorist group that can purchase or steal ballistic missile technology.

Some have argued, as does the administration, that this bill will disrupt ongoing negotiations with Russia concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Mr. President, if that is the case, then so be it. The ABM Treaty was signed with the Soviet Union. That state no longer exists and as such the treaty should be declared void. A number of constitutional scholars have adopted this view. Nevertheless, if it is the policy of this administration to honor the treaty, that policy should not be permitted to impede the deployment of a missile defense system. The administration can negotiate enough flexibility into the treaty to permit a viable national missile defense.

Mr. President, the bill we are considering states that this nation will deploy a system when it is technologically feasible. That technology is being developed as we speak and is nearly at hand. However, I would urge my colleagues in the months and years ahead to continue investment in missile defense support technology. It is an important yet often overlooked investment. Under funding support technology today will jeopardize the future effectiveness of any missile defense system. Rapid changes in technology and potential development of missile defense countermeasures by our adversaries require that this nation maintain its technological superiority. That superiority does not come without a price. However the cost of losing our technological edge is one I hope this body never has to consider.

Mr. President, some well intentioned opponents of this bill have stated that treaties and superior intelligence gathering will protect us from a future ballistic missile attack. This is nothing more than a gamble with the lives of the American people. Treaties have been broken throughout history. Intelligence is effective only when properly interpreted and disseminated. Ask the men of the U.S.S. Arizona at the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Intelligence collection did them little good. Mr. President, I am not willing to gamble with the lives of the American people. I continue to strongly support the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today to offer my support for S. 257, the National Missile Defense Act currently pending before the Senate. I do so with the firm belief that passage of this legislation will help keep the American people safe. Given the seriousness of the threat posed by ballistic missiles, it is our duty to act to confront this threat through the development of a national missile defense system.

I believe some of the controversy surrounding this piece of legislation comes from the misperception of what national missile defense really is. Mr. President, we are not proposing to build a star wars-style system. We are not proposing to build a system designed to counter a massive nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. That plan was unworkable in the 1980s and is unnecessary today. Instead, the missile defense system we are talking about today is a limited system, designed to protect the United States from rogue-state ballistic missile launches and accidental launches--precisely the kind of threats that will not be countered by our traditional reliance on deterrence.

The truth is, Mr. President, we do not currently possess the ability to protect the American people from these threats. But we should. The legislation we are debating today would take the first step toward protecting the United States by declaring it to be the official policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense system. The bill before us does not identify a particular system for deployment It does not authorize or appropriate a single dollar. These are decisions that will be left up to this and future Congresses. Instead, the National Missile Defense Act simply states that the United States should deploy a missile defense system to protect the American people.

Mr. President, perhaps the only situation worse than not having an adequate missile defense system to protect the American people, is deploying a system that has not been proven feasible. I am pleased with the recent announcement by the Clinton administration that they plan to increase spending on missile defense research by $6 billion over the next five years. I applaud the administration's decision to fund missile defense in the fiscal year 2000 Defense budget so that a decision to deploy a missile defense in 2005 could be made as early as June of next year. We should all take note of the outstanding scientific and engineering efforts which have been ongoing for years in the Defense Department to get us to this point. This administration deserves credit for vigorously attacking the very daunting set of scientific and engineering challenges by which a bullet can strike another bullet. At the same time, development of a system will only come through further research and development and a rigorous testing regime.

Many opponents of this legislation have asked why should we take this step now? It's true, the threat of ballistic missiles is not a new one. The American people have lived for decades under this threat. In fact, during the cold war, the Soviet Union had thousands of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles pointed, ready to shoot at American cities. What has changed is the source of the ballistic missile threat. During the cold war, and even today, we used the power of deterrence to protect ourselves. Nations like Russia and China know that an attack on America would be met with an immediate and overwhelming response by United States forces. They were and still are deterred by a calculation of their own self-interest. However, the underlying assumption of deterrence is rational behavior by the other side. None of the emerging threats--whether they be terrorist states

or rouge or desperate individuals--can be counted on to respond rationally to the threat of retaliation.

In the past, I have voted against cloture on the motion to proceed to this bill. However, two distinct events over the last few months have highlighted the changed nature of the threat and have led me to support this legislation. First, the release of the Rumsfeld Commission Report last July stated that the newer ballistic missile threats are developing from countries like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. The report went on to state that these nations could be able to acquire the capability to inflict major destruction on the United States within about 5 years of a decision to acquire ballistic missiles. Furthermore, the Rumsfeld Report warmed that these emerging threats had more mature capabilities than previous assessments has thought possible.

Then, almost on cue, North Korea tested the Taepo Dong I missile on August 31, 1998. The details of this test have been widely reported in the media. But the real lesson of this missile test was that our intelligence community was surprised by the North Koreans' ability to launch a three-stage missile. We saw that North Korea may have the ability to hit parts of the United States with a missile with a small payload. We also know that the North Koreans continue to work on the Taepo Dong II; an intercontinental missile with the capability of reaching the United States mainland. In addition, North Korea's nuclear capability and nuclear ambitions turn these missile developments into a clear strategic warning.

Mr. President, aside from demonstrating the validity of the conclusions of the Rumsfeld Report, the North Korean missile test put a face on the emerging ballistic missile threat. There may not be a more unpredictable regime on earth than that of Kim Jong II. A government which continues to pour resources into weapons of mass destruction while its people undergo a famine is beyond our understanding. But I have no doubt of North Korea's willingness to use ballistic missiles--in an all-out desperate act of terror--against United States cities. Traditional threats of massive retaliation are unlikely to deter a man as unstable as Kim Jong II. They will not likely deter the Iranian or Libyan governments or other future rogue states. Instead, we must protect our nation through a limited missile defense. Time remains for us to counter this threat. But we must act now.

Mr. President, opponents of this legislation have valid concerns about how national missile defense will affect our relationship with Russia. I share these concerns. Our long-term global interests are best secured by maintaining a cooperative relationship with Russia. While a wide variety of Russian political leaders have expressed their opposition to United States national missile defense, I do not believe Russian opposition is insurmountable.

Just as our allies like Britain and France realize United States national missile defense is not directed against them, the Russians can be convinced the threats we seek to counter through missile defense come from unauthorized and rouge-nation launches. Furthermore, these are threats--given their proximity to countries like Iraq, Iran, and North Kora--Russia must also confront. Although Russia has deployed an ABM system around Moscow, there is nothing particular about Russia that will make it impervious to these threats. Mr. President, in their vulnerability I see a chance to engage Russia; to work cooperatively to confront the mutual threat of ballistic missile proliferation. By jointly developing national missile defense with Russia, we will make our citizens safer and improve our bilateral relationship. Similarly, the problems presented by the ABM Treaty

may in fact present opportunities. There is no reason why we can't work with Russia to adapt the ABM Treaty to reflect the changes that have occurred in the world since the treaty was signed in 1972. At that time, we could not anticipate the proliferation of ballistic missile technology we face today. By changing the treaty to allow each side to develop a limited missile defense system to protect from unauthorized or rogue launches, we can address the threat, maintain the treaty, and not upset the strategic balance ABM sought to create.

Mr. President, I see further opportunity to reduce the threat of ballistic missiles and make significant strides in our relationship with Russia. In the past, and again today, I call on the President to seize this opportunity to make a bold gesture to reduce the danger posed by United States and Russian strategic nuclear weapons. More than 6 years after the end of the cold war, both the United States and Russia maintain thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. My fear, Mr. President, is our maintenance of more weapons than we need to defend our interests is prompting Russia to keep more weapons than she is able to control.

I have proposed that the President, acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief, order the immediate elimination of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in excess of proposed START III levels. Such a bold gesture would give the Russians the security to act reciprocally. Russia not only wants to follow our lead in such reductions, it must. Russia's own Defense Minister recently said, publicly, that Russia is thinking of its long-term nuclear arsenal in terms of hundreds, not thousands. To help Russia accomplish these reductions, Congress must be prepared to provide funding through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We should spend whatever is necessary to help Russia dismantle and secure its nuclear arsenal. The best form of missile defense is helping Russia destroy its missiles.

Mr. President, my support for the bill before you comes from my belief that its passage will make Americans safer. The time to prepare for the emerging threat of ballistic missiles is today. The legislation before us sets us on the path to confront these threats in a real and manageable way. I strongly encourage my colleagues support for this legislation and I yield the floor.

[Page: S2727]

Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

END