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• Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, during this Member visit to several East Asian countries in January, considerable Japanese interest in developing a missile defense system was mentioned in the region's news media as a result of the North Korean missile launch over Japanese territory on its course to the Pacific. Also noted was very substantial public discussion and media coverage of the possibility of a missile defense system in Taiwan because of the Chinese missile firings in the run-up to the last Taiwanese presidential elections and because of the Chinese mainland missile build-up in the Taiwan Strait region.

• The following editorial from the February 20, 1999, edition of The Economist magazine notes not only the impact on Japan of the North Korean's provocative action and demonstrated advancement of their missile development program, it also suggests that `[w]ith its missile, North Korea was thumbing its nose as much at China as at Japan and America.' This Member has long felt that China's influence on North Korean is generally over-estimated, but certainly it has more influence on the isolated, paranoid North Korean regime than any other country. The Economist editorial notes what is almost certainly true, that `North Korea felt it could take such missile liberties in part because China has stoutly opposed all international pressure on North Korea to curb its nuclear and missile activities.' China is complaining loudly and threateningly against the possible deployment of missile defense systems in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan rather than examining its own culpability in increasing its missile threat against Taiwan and ignoring, to its own danger, the destabilizing missile and nuclear development programs of North Korea. The United States, threatened itself by the North Korean missiles under development, cannot ignore their threat to our allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan, nor its commitment that Taiwan not be forcibly placed under the control of Beijing. As The Economist concludes, China `has mostly itself to blame' for any new tilt in East Asia's unease balance of power may have been caused by more Potent missile forces and the resultant urgent interest in American assistance for missile defense systems.

• This Member urges his colleagues to read the entire Economist editorial on this important set of related developments.

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Are America and China heading for another bust-up? The `strategic dialogue' inaugurated by Presidents Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin has been shrilly interrupted, this time by Chinese concern about America's discussions with Japan and others of possible missile defences in East Asia, and by American worries about Chinese missiles pointed at Taiwan (see page 37). The row threatens to sour preparations for the visit to America in April of China's prime minister, Zhu Rongji. Handled sensibly, the missile tiff need not produce a crisis. Yet it goes to the heart of what divides China from America and most of its Asian neighbours: China's pursuit of power by at times reckless means.

China may never be a global power to rival America. It is, however, an increasingly potent regional power, with territorial scores to settle. It makes plain that it intends to recover sovereignty over Taiwan, to extend jurisdiction over almost all the rocks and reefs of the South China Sea, and ultimately to displace America as East Asia's most influential power.

Until recently, events had seemed to be moving China's way. Recognising China's extreme sensitivity on the Taiwan issue, on a visit to China last year Mr. Clinton made clear that America did not support independence for the island, despite the protective arm America throws round it at times of military tension with the mainland. Meanwhile China had skilfully used the region's economic turmoil to reinforce its claims in the South China Sea, blame rival Japan for not doing enough to aid regional economic recovery and play on sharp economic differences between America and Japan. Hence China's fury that the question of missiles and missile defences could blow a hole in these stratagems.

The launch of a North Korean rocket over Japan last August reminded the Japanese of the importance of their alliance with America, and persuaded the government to set aside China's objections and start discussions on missile defences. Without such defences in a dangerous neighbourhood, America had worried and China had calculated that pressure would eventually grow in Congress to pull back the 100,000 or so American troops in Japan and South Korea. China's reaction has been all the shriller for knowing that any missile defences eventually deployed to protect America's troops and close allies from rogue North Korean missiles could be used to help protect Taiwan from China.

With its missile, North Korea was thumbing its nose as much at China as at Japan and America. Yet the success of its engineers owes at least something to past Chinese collusion. North Korea felt it could take such missile liberties in part because China has stoutly opposed all international pressure on North Korea to curb its nuclear and missile activities.

The Taiwanese had their reminder of the potential value of missile defences three years ago, when it was China lobbing missiles, these ones falling near the island's shipping lanes in a crude effort to intimidate voters before Taiwan's first democratic presidential election. China now has snazzier missiles. Its belligerence drove Taiwan to seek better defences, not, as China would have it, the other way around.

There is still time to calm tensions over Taiwan, and still time for the regional powers to talk over the problems raised by any future (limited) missile defences. Yet these issues give a new tilt to East Asia's uneasy balance of power. If this tilt upsets China, it has mostly itself to blame.

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