59 010 Calendar No. 345
105 th Congress 2d Session
SENATE Report 105 175
AMERICAN MISSILE PROTECTION ACT OF 1998
April 24, 1998.--Ordered to be printed
Mr. Thurmond , from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the
following
REPORT
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S. 1873]
[Includes cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Armed Services, to which was referred the bill (S.
1873) having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without
amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.
PURPOSE OF THE BILL
S. 1873 would establish that it is the policy of the United States to
deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile
Defense (NMD) system capable of defending the territory of the United
States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental,
unauthorized, or deliberate).
S. 1873 does not mandate specific architectural elements of the NMD
system, specific deployment dates, or changes to any arms control
agreements. It allows the Defense Department complete flexibility in
designing the NMD system, and, according to the Congressional Budget
Office, ``the bill, by itself, would have no budgetary impact.''
SCOPE OF THE COMMITTEE REVIEW
The Committee is reporting S. 1873 to the Senate for the following
reasons:
Value of national missile defense
A commitment to deploying NMD will have two crucial impacts on the
security of the United States. First, it will signal to nations that
aspire to possess ballistic missiles with which to coerce or attack the
United States that pursuit of such capabilities is a waste of both time
and resources. In this sense, it will have a deterrent effect on
proliferation. Second, if some aspiring states are not deterred, a
commitment to deploy an NMD system will ensure that American citizens
and their property are protected from limited ballistic missile attack.
Need for a national missile defense
Current administration policy on NMD--embodied in the so-called
``3+3'' ``Deployment Readiness'' program--assumes that the United States
will be able to clearly discern the emergence of a ballistic missile
threat to the United States in sufficient time to deploy a defense. The
Committee's review found that this policy bases the security of the
United States against ballistic missile attack on three faulty premises:
(1) that no threat currently exists or is emerging; (2) that when a
threat does emerge, it will be clearly discernable; and (3) that when
the threat emerges or is emerging, the United States will have
sufficient time to put a defense in place to deal with it. S. 1873 would
rectify this insufficient policy by basing the security of the United
States against the extant and emerging threat of ballistic missile
attack on a firmer foundation, committing to deployment of NMD as soon
as the technology is ready.
As the findings in S. 1873 clearly document, a threat of ballistic
missile attack on the United States already exists. Although unlikely,
the threat of unauthorized or accidental launches from Russia or China
is real, and may be heightened as the armed forces of former Soviet
Union undergo their transition to a post-Cold War posture.
But there is also an imminent threat that stems from the growing,
widely acknowledged proliferation problem. The President has for four
consecutive years declared the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems to be a national emergency. The
seriousness of this problem has been articulated on numerous occasions
by other senior administration officials and by Congress.
Evidence of this growing threat abounds. The range of ballistic
missiles possessed by proliferant states has been steadily increasing,
sometimes in sudden leaps. North Korea, for example, first purchased 300
kilometer (short-range) Scud-B missiles in the 1980s, then developed the
500 kilometer Scud-C, is now deploying the 1000 kilometer No-Dong, and
is developing both a 2000 kilometer medium-range ballistic missile and a
6000 kilometer intercontinental ballistic missile. Most recently, Iran
has made dramatic and sudden progress in its Shahab-3 and Shahab-4
medium range ballistic missiles, and Pakistan recently tested a missile
with a range of 1500 kilometers, five times greater than its next most
capable missile.
The proliferation of technology, expertise and hardware with which to
build a long-range ballistic missile is accelerating rapidly, spurred by
advances in information technology and growing demand for space launch
vehicles, which is essentially a ballistic missile without warheads. A
stark reminder of this surfaced on April 4, 1998, when the New York
Times reported that the Justice Department has launched a criminal
investigation into two American companies whose technical assistance,
intended to troubleshoot a failed satellite launch rocket, instead may
have helped China solve critical guidance problems with its
intercontinental ballistic missiles. According to a Pentagon assessment,
because of this assistance ``U.S. national security has been harmed.''
Continuing technological surprise
The Intelligence Community has been repeatedly surprised by advances
in ballistic missile technology achieved by less developed countries,
calling into question its ability to anticipate precisely when the
United States will be threatened by long-range ballistic missiles. In
1997, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) testified that Iran
could have a medium-range missile by 2007. One year later the DCI told
the Senate, ``since I testified, Iran's success in getting technology
and materials from Russian companies, combined with recent indigenous
Iranian advances, means that it could have a medium-range missile much
sooner than I assessed last year.'' A Department of State official
testified in September, 1997 that Iran could develop this missile in
``maybe one to one-and-a-half years, and it may be shorter than that,''
meaning as much as nine years sooner than had been predicted only a year
earlier by the DCI.
Experience has shown that variables like the amount of outside
assistance provided to rogue nations--factors which can significantly
speed the acquisition of ballistic missiles--cannot be predicted
reliably. On April 6, 1998, for example, Pakistan launched a ballistic
missile capable of reaching a range of 1500 kilometers. In November
1998, the Defense Department published ``Proliferation: Threat and
Response,'' its analysis of the world's weapons of mass destruction and
delivery systems. That publication contained no mention of any effort by
Pakistan to develop such a capability, crediting Pakistan with, at best,
a 300 km. short-range ballistic missile. Yet less than six months later,
Pakistan successfully launched a missile with five times the range of
its previous most capable weapon. Pakistan claims its achievements were
indigenous, the government of India charges China with providing
assistance, and United States government officials suggest North Korea
may have provided the technology for the Ghauri missile. Whatever the
source of technological aid, one thing is clear: the United States has
once again been surprised by the ballistic missile achievements of
another state.
There are numerous other examples of our intelligence community's
uneven record in anticipating ballistic missile developments in other
countries. This does not suggest incompetence or a lack of diligence on
the part of the Intelligence Community, which is staffed by competent
and dedicated people. But it underscores that evidence of technological
developments is often difficult to obtain, and that even when such
evidence is available, it is oftentimes difficult to discern just what
it means until after the fact. Indeed, the DCI told the Senate in 1997
that ``gaps and uncertainties preclude a good projection of exactly when
`rest of the world' countries will deploy ICBMs.''
Given this track record, the Committee believes the security of
American lives and property cannot be based on a hope that the United
States will see the next major advance in ballistic missiles long before
it is available to coerce or harm our nation. There may be other
ballistic missiles in development now that seem as far off today as the
Shahab-3 seemed to the DCI only a year ago.
Deployment preparedness is questionable under current policy
Despite United States experience with the technical challenges
presented by missile defense, the administration's policy of not
committing to NMD deployment is based on the assertion that the United
States can continue to tinker indefinitely with NMD technology, and at
any time after 2000 deploy a system within three short years. The
Committee believes this assertion is faulty for at least two reasons.
First, ``technology development'' does not necessarily lead to
deployment readiness. The purpose of a United States acquisition program
is, according to DOD regulation 5000.2, to ``provide the needed
capability to the warfighter in the shortest practical time.'' This
means that alternative technological approaches must be narrowed, and
critical design trade-offs made so that the system can advance toward
deployment. The absence of an end-point--a deployment goal--eliminates
the driving force that moves a system towards readiness for the field.
Second, the U.S. experience has shown that missile defenses are well
within the realm of technical possibility but still technically
challenging. The administration's assertion that it will be able to
spring from technology development to a deployed capability in three
years does not accord with experience.
It is an inefficient aberration of DOD policy and practice to manage
a Major Defense Acquisition program so that it goes into a circling
pattern at some point in its development while awaiting the Intelligence
Community's detailed characterization of some future threat. The United
States is developing and deploying the F 22, for example, because a new
air superiority fighter will be
necessary in the middle of the next decade. Development of
this aircraft is not being put on hold while the United States awaits
information on the thrust-to-weight ratio or low observability of a new
enemy fighter that might appear at some time in the future. The United
States does not take this approach with any other Major Defense
Acquisition Program other than NMD.
Testifying on NMD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology told the House Military Procurement and Military Research and
Development Subcommittees in February, 1998, ``There will be a system
deployed. There is absolutely no question the nation will have to have
missile defense in the future. The question is when.'' Given the
inevitability of the need for NMD, acknowledged by the administration,
the Committee believes the NMD program must be put on a more rational
acquisition path, which includes a commitment to deploy as soon as the
technology is ready.
Summary
The Committee believes the need for deployment of NMD is clear. The
threat exists and continues to grow. The United States has been
regularly surprised at the pace and character of its progress. The
ability of the United States to clearly discern those threats well in
advance of their arrival is limited. And confidence in our ability to
respond rapidly to these threats must be tempered by realistic
assessments of the technical challenges and the ability of the technical
community to deal with them. S. 1873, by committing to deployment of
NMD, will ensure the United States is prepared to meet that threat.
COMMITTEE ACTION
In accordance with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as
amended by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, there is set
forth below the committee vote to report the American Missile Protection
Act of 1998 (S. 1873).
In favor: Senators Thurmond, Warner, McCain, Coats, Smith,
Kempthorne, Inhofe, Santorum, Snowe and Roberts.
Opposed: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Glenn, Byrd, Robb and
Cleland.
Not Voting: Senator Lieberman.
Vote: 10 7.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
On April 15, 1998, the Congressional Budget Office issued a cost
estimate for S. 1873. According to this estimate ``the bill, by itself,
would have no budgetary impact.'' The complete cost estimate and cover
letter from the Congressional Budget Office are shown below.
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, April 22, 1998.
Hon. S trom Thurmond, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
D ear Mr. Chairman: T he Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1873, the American Missile
Protection Act of 1998.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to
provide them. The CBO staff contact is Raymond Hall.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill, Director.
Enclosure.
S. 1873--American Missile Protection Act of 1998
S. 1873 would state that it is U.S. policy to deploy as soon as
technologically possible an effective national missile defense system
capable of defending the United States against limited ballistic missile
attack.
CBO estimates that the bill, by itself, would have no budgetary
impact. Because it would not affect direct spending or receipts,
pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply. Any budgetary impact would
stem from separate implementing legislation or from annual authorization
and appropriation bills. How the costs of implementing the policy
enunciated in S. 1873 would compare with costs likely to be incurred
under current law would depend on the systems and time frame required by
subsequent legislation.
Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 excludes from
the application of that act any legislative provisions that are
necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that all
provisions of this bill fit within that exclusion.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Raymond Hall. This
estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant Director
for Budget Analysis. AEMD11 AF
REGULATORY IMPACT
Paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate
requires that a report on the regulatory impact of a bill be included in
the report on the bill. The committee finds that there is no regulatory
impact in the cost of S. 1873.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
S. 1873 does not include any changes in existing law.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR SMITH
The Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which I chair, has looked closely
at the challenges of creating a workable and adequate schedule for
national missile defense, as well as at the threats which impel these
programs. I strongly believe that the threat is here today and growing.
This legislation calls for placing national missile defense on the same
footing as any other defense system: an executable program based on
sound technology in response to a real threat. It should be adopted.
During the Armed Services Committee's deliberations regarding S. 1873
it was asserted that this legislation would commit the United States to
deploying a National Missile Defense (NMD) system without considering
issues related to cost, technology, the threat of arms control. These
views were also expressed, to varying degrees, in letters to the
committee from the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. A
careful reading of S. 1873 reveals these assertions to be without basis.
Establishing a policy to deploy an NMD system as soon as
technologically possible in no way means that a rigorous acquisition
program should not be followed. Quite the opposite is true: it
specifically implies that such a program would be implemented. Every DOD
acquisition program must pass a series of technical reviews, undergo
strict cost and operational effectiveness assessments and be able to
complete rigorous testing at every stage of the program. S. 1873 would
in no way alter this for NMD. In this sense, S. 1873 would require the
NMD system to become a more ``normal'' acquisition program than is
currently the case with the Clinton Administration's ``3+3'' program,
which the Director of BMDO has characterized as an ``extremely high
risk'' approach.
Regarding the ABM Treaty, nothing in S. 1873 requires or encourages
the United States to abrogate or violate the ABM Treaty. However, the
bill would make clear that discussions between Russia and the United
States must commence relatively soon so that the sides can develop a
cooperative path for amending or otherwise altering the existing ABM
Treaty to allow for deployment of a limited NMD system. Such discussions
are necessary since it now appears that no NMD system capable of
defending all 50 states can be deployed within the current ABM Treaty
restrictions. The ``3+3'' program, on the other hand, allows the parties
to defer commencement of such discussions until such time as the threat
requiring deployment of an NMD system is imminent. In all likelihood, as
a result of this situation, the United States would be faced with a
choice of abrogating the treaty or not deploying an NMD system at all.
This would create forced and unstable conditions for ABM negotiations, a
situation detrimental to both U.S. and Russian interests.
If the administration is concerned about cost and technical risk, it
should welcome S. 1873. Under ``3+3'' the United States might have to
deploy an NMD system four years from now, even though such a program
would be virtually impossible to implement. Indeed, if ``3+3'' were a
real program, this is precisely what DOD would have to do, since a new
threat to the United States before the year 2003 has already been
forecast as possible by the Intelligence Community. Such a program would
truly be what the Welch report called a ``rush to failure.'' The policy
envisioned in S. 1873, on the other hand, would allow DOD to develop a
program characterized by adequate testing and risk reduction. The
timeframe associated with such a program would certainly be adequate to
address concerns regarding the ABM Treaty.
As the Senate considers the red herring arguments concerning cost,
technology, the threat and the ABM Treaty, it is important to bear in
mind that S. 1873 would establish an overarching policy, not a detailed
implementation plan. That would appropriately be left to the Department
of Defense. This was recognized by the Congressional Budget Office when
it concluded that ``the bill, by itself, would have no budgetary
impact.'' As CBO correctly noted, costs would be determined by
subsequent legislation. Since most of this legislation would be annual
authorization and appropriation bills, the administration would play a
key role in determining the cost and schedule of the systems being
developed.
In the end, the only legitimate argument against S. 1873 is one based
on outright opposition to ever deploying an NMD system. If this is the
true basis for opposition to this bill it should be publicly stated and
not cloaked in misleading rhetoric related to issues not even addressed
by the legislation.
Bob Smith. AEMD11 AF
ADDITIONAL VIEWS FROM SENATOR COATS
I fully support the essential policy position of S. 1873; namely,
that we must deploy an effective National Missile Defense as soon as
technologically feasible. However, I am concerned that the program may
suffer from the high-risk development approach that already has led to
significant delays in operational capability in the theater
high-altitude air defense (THAAD) and Navy Theater Wide (NTW) systems.
According to the Welch Panel's Report on Reducing Risk in Ballistic
Missile Defense Flight Test Programs, the failures have had little to do
with technology. Rather, the panel cites an approach to general planning
and execution that is ``inconsistent with the complexity of the task.''
The panel goes on to state that the additional risk inherent to a
concurrent development approach has ``produced little discernible
benefit and has actually delayed operational capability.''
Such delays--and the increased expense that they necessarily
entail--would be an issue of concern at any time, but are especially
worrisome in this era of fixed defense budgets.
I believe it's time to get things back on track. Missile defense is a
difficult, complex endeavor, and we need to pursue far more rigorous
test and development regimes as a consequence.
Dan Coats.
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS LEVIN, KENNEDY, BINGAMAN, GLENN, BYRD, ROBB,
AND CLELAND
We cannot support S. 1873, the ``American Missile Protection Act of
1998,'' as it has been reported to the Senate by the Armed Services
Committee. In our view, and in the view of the Secretary of Defense and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this legislation would
undermine the carefully designed National Missile Defense (NMD)
development and acquisition program currently in place by making a
deployment decision now, before development is completed, without
permitting consideration of all the critical factors that should inform
a deployment decision. The result, in the worst case, could be to cause
an increase in ballistic missile threats to the United States and a
decrease in our security.
The key provision of the bill is the statement of policy in Section 3:
It is the policy of the United States to deploy as
soon as is technologically possible an effective National
Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of
the United States against limited ballistic missile attack
(whether accidental, unauthorized or deliberate).
We share Secretary of Defense Cohen's commitment to ensuring the
American people receive protection from missile threats to the United
States when they need it. That is why we support the current National
Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program, which is also known as the
``3 plus 3'' program. Under this program the Defense Department is
developing the technology for the NMD system for three years so that it
will be in a position to make a deployment determination in fiscal year
2000. If there is a threat that warrants deployment, if the system is
cost-effective, and if deployment would not jeopardize arms reduction
agreements, the system could be deployed in three years, or as early as
fiscal year 2003. If these conditions do not warrant deployment, the
technology would continue to be developed to improve the capability of
the system that could be deployed if and when deployment is warranted.
Last year the Congress endorsed the 3 plus 3 NMD program in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 by requiring the
Secretary of Defense to structure the NMD program in order to meet the 3
plus 3 goals, and to provide Congress with his plan for doing so.
S. 1873 is inconsistent with the 3 plus 3 NMD program in a number of
very significant ways: it ignores the issue of the likelihood and extent
of ballistic missile threats to the United States; it ignores the issue
of affordability and cost-effectiveness; and it ignores the impact on
current and future arms reduction agreements. These points are made in
letters provided to the Committee by Defense Secretary William Cohen,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton, and Defense
Department General Counsel Judith Miller, which are included at the end
of these views.
The threat
One of the critical factors affecting any decision to deploy a
national missile defense system should be an assessment of the threat to
be countered by such a system. If there is not a threat sufficient to
warrant deployment of an NMD system, the United States can continue to
develop the NMD technology so that the capability of the system
continues to improve. This is the current DOD plan, which we believe
makes sense.
By committing to deploy an NMD system solely on the basis of whether
it is ``technologically possible'', S. 1873 ignores the issue of whether
there is any threat that warrants deployment. In his letter to the
Committee, dated April 21, 1998, Secretary Cohen noted that S. 1873
``would alter the `3 plus 3' strategy so as to eliminate taking into
account the nature of the threat when making a deployment decision. This
could lead to the deployment of an inferior system less capable of
defending the American people if and when a threat emerges. Because of
this, I am compelled to oppose the adoption of the bill.''
There are two concerns about the missile threat to the United States:
the emergence of a rogue nation missile threat to the United States, and
the possibility of an unauthorized or accidental missile launch from
Russia or China, the only two nations other than Great Britain and
France with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can reach
the United States today.
As Secretary Cohen noted earlier this year in his Annual Report to
the President and the Congress, the threat of an ICBM reaching the
United States from a country other than Russia or China in the next 15
years is currently very low:
The Intelligence Community has concluded that the
only rogue nation missile development which could conceivably
have the range to strike the United States is the North Korean
Taepo Dong 2, which could strike portions of Alaska or the
far-western Hawaiian Islands, but the likelihood of its being
operational by 2005 is very low. With this exception, no
country, other than the declared nuclear powers, will develop
or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years
that could threaten the United States, although outside
assistance is a wild card that could shorten time lines to
deployment.
Some have questioned the ability of the Intelligence Community to
accurately assess the emergence of a ballistic missile threat to the
United States. These questions, however, are generally based on examples
of short- or medium-range theater ballistic missile developments which
do not pose a direct threat to the United States, rather than on
long-range ICBMs.
It is important to understand the distinction between theater
ballistic missiles and ICBMs. The examples of unanticipated missile
developments cited by the majority in this report are theater-range
systems that cannot be converted into ICBMs. The United States has a
vigorous and robust program of theater missile defenses--which we
support--that are designed to counter the growing theater missile threat
that exists today. ICBMs have considerably more indicators of
development than these short- or medium-range systems, take considerably
longer to develop and test, and are more easily tracked by the
Intelligence Community.
Our senior military leaders have a high degree of confidence that our
Intelligence Community will be able to provide sufficient warning of an
ICBM threat to the United States to allow us to deploy effective
defenses. In General Shelton's letter of April 21, 1998, he states:
I disagree with the bill's contention that the
United States ability to anticipate future ballistic missile
threats is questionable. It is possible, of course, that there
could be surprises, particularly were a rogue state to receive
outside assistance. However, given the substantial
intelligence resources being devoted to this issue, I am
confident that we will have the 3 years' warning upon which
our strategy is based.
Similarly, General Howell Estes, the Commander in Chief of the North
American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Space Command who
would have operational command of any NMD system, testified to the
Committee last year:
Let me reemphasize that the Administration 3 plus 3
program will enable us to deploy an NMD system in time to
field a missile defense system before the threat places our
citizens at risk.
The United States Intelligence Community also believes the risk of an
accidental or unauthorized launch by a declared nuclear power is highly
unlikely. George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, testified
in open session last year that the Intelligence Community assessment is
that it is a ``remote'' risk because of considerable precautions or
procedures taken by Russia and China.
General Eugene Habiger, Commander-in-Chief of United States Strategic
Command, reinforced this view when he testified to the Committee this
year on the Russian command and control measures, which he has witnessed
first-hand, to prevent an accidental or unauthorized launch of an ICBM
against the United States. He has publicly stated that Russia has some
mechanisms and procedures more stringent than our own for nuclear
command and control. General Habiger, who has had a unique opportunity
to visit Russian strategic nuclear weapon bases--including an ICBM base,
a strategic submarine base, a bomber base, a nuclear command and control
center, and a nuclear weapon storage site--has stated publicly that he
does not worry about accidental or unauthorized launches from Russia.
Affordability and cost-effectiveness
S. 1873 also completely ignores the question of cost-effectiveness
and affordability. In effect, it decides now to deploy a system,
regardless of the cost and regardless of whether the system is
cost-effective. This is the first instance we know of where Congress
would legislatively mandate the deployment of a military weapon system
before it is developed and
before we know what it will eventually cost and whether it is
cost-effective.
Any decision to deploy a national missile defense system should
include an understanding of the system's cost and its
cost-effectiveness. It would be very unwise to commit to deployment and
then discover that the cost was unaffordable. Likewise, if there is no
threat warranting deployment, deploying the first technology possible
may require considerable additional expense to deploy a more capable
system later if the threat requires it. As Secretary Cohen pointed out
in his letter to the Committee, a premature decision to deploy an NMD
system ``could lead to the deployment of an inferior system less capable
of defending the American people if and when a threat emerges.''
General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, made the same point when he testified before the Committee last
year that the current 3 plus 3 NMD program is structured to deploy the
most capable and cost-effective system if and when we need it:
The NMD Deployment Readiness Program optimizes the
potential for an effective National Missile Defense System. If
the decision is made to deploy a NMD system in the near term,
then the system fielded would provide a very limited
capability. If deploying a system in the near term can be
avoided, DOD can continue to enhance the technology base and
the commensurate capability of the NMD system that could be
fielded on a later deployment schedule. The objective here is
to be in a position to be three years away from deployment, so
America can respond to the emergence of a threat. This
approach fields the most cost-effective capability that is
available at the time the threat emerges.
A premature decision to deploy an NMD system would also have serious
consequences for funding higher priority military programs. In her
letter to the Committee, DOD General Counsel Judith Miller concludes:
``Commitment to deploy now, in the absence of a threat, would divert
vital defense funds from more pressing military needs and would result
in premature commitment to a technological option that may be outdated
when the threat emerges.''
Arms control impact
Finally, S. 1873 ignores the impact of deciding to deploy a national
missile defense system on arms control reductions, and thus ignores the
possibility that deployment might stop the reduction of hundreds of
ICBMs and SLBMs with thousands of warheads that would otherwise not be
able to threaten us. Before making any deployment decision, we should
understand the impact of deployment on arms reductions.
If we deploy an NMD system that violates the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty, Russia is likely to withdraw from START I and not ratify
START II. In May, 1996, General Shalikashvili wrote to the Committee,
``I am concerned that failure of either START initiative will result in
Russian retention of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons,
thereby increasing both the costs and risks we may face.''
In its December, 1997 report, the Congressionally-mandated National
Defense Panel concluded that ``Defensive systems will be more effective
if they are coupled to arms control agreements that limit offensive
capabilities.'' Before we decide to deploy an NMD system, we should
understand the security implications of deployment. We certainly do not
want to deploy a system that decreases our security.
General Shelton's letter of April 21 concludes with a crucial point
about elements of the current hedge strategy embodied in the 3 plus 3
program that would be ignored and undermined by S. 1873: ``Finally, the
bill does not consider affordability or the impact a deployment would
have on arms control agreements and nuclear arms reductions. Both points
are addressed in the NMD Deployment Readiness Program and should be
included in any bill on NMD. [emphasis added]''
Conclusion
S. 1873 would commit the United States to deploy a national missile
defense system before we know what the nature of the threat will be at
the time of deployment; before we know the cost of such a system and the
impact that funding this system would have on other high priority
military programs; and before we know whether the decision to deploy
such a system would jeopardize current and future nuclear arms
reductions.
We share the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff that the decision to deploy a national missile
defense system before it is even developed is a decision we do not need
to, and should not, make at this time, particularly without considering
the threat, the cost and the impact on nuclear arms reductions.
For these reasons, we cannot support S. 1873, and we urge the Senate
to reject this legislation. As the senior civilian and military
leadership of the Defense Department have clearly and repeatedly stated,
the current 3 plus 3 National Missile Defense program is a prudent
course to address the problem of emerging ballistic threats to the
United States.
Carl Levin.
Ted Kennedy.
Jeff Bingaman.
John Glenn.
Robert C. Byrd.
Chuck Robb.
Max Cleland.
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, April 21, 1998.
Hon. Strom Thurmond, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in response to your request for the
views of the Department of Defense on S. 1873, the American Missile
Protection Act of 1998.
The Department of Defense is committed to ensuring that we properly
protect the American people and America's national security interests.
This requires that we have a carefully balanced defense program that
ensures that we are able to meet threats to our people and vital
interest wherever and whenever they arise. A key element of our defense
program is our National Missile Defense (NMD) program, which as you know
was restructured under Secretary Perry and with the support of Congress
as a ``3+3'' deployment readiness program. Under this approach, by 2000
the United States is to be in a position to make a deployment decision
if warranted by the threat, and if a decision to deploy were made at
that time the initial NMD system would be deployed by 2003. If in 2000
the threat assessment does not warrant a deployment decision,
improvements in NMD system component technology will continue, while an
ability is maintained to deploy a system within three years of a
decision.
The Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed this approach, although it
also determined that the ``3+3'' program was inadequately funded to meet
its objectives. Accordingly, I directed that an additional $2.3 billion
be programmed for NMD over the Future Years Defense Plan. It must be
emphasized, though, that even with this additional funding, NMD remains
a high risk program because the compressed schedule necessitates a high
degree of concurrency.
I share with Congress a commitment to ensuring the American people
receive protection from missile threats how and when they need it. S.
1873, however, would alter the ``3+3'' strategy so as to eliminate
taking into account the nature of the threat when making a deployment
decision. This could lead to the deployment of an inferior system less
capable of defending the American people if and when a threat emerges.
Because of this, I am compelled to oppose the adoption of the bill.
Please be assured, however, that I will continue to work closely with
the Senate and House of Representatives to ensure that our NMD program
and all of our defense programs are designed and carried out in a manner
that provides the best possible defense of our people and interests.
Sincerely,
Bill Cohen,
Secretary of Defense.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, April 21, 1998.
Hon. Carl M. Levin, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Levin: Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the
American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 1873). I agree that the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery
systems poses a major threat to our forces, allies, and other friendly
nations. U.S. missile systems play a critical role in our strategy to
deter these threats, and the current National Missile Defense (NMD)
Deployment Readiness Program (3+3) is structured to provide a defense
against them when required.
The bill and the NMD program are consistent on many points; however,
the following differences make it difficult to support enactment. First
and most fundamental are the conditions necessary for deployment. The
bill would establish a policy to deploy as soon as technology allows.
The NMD program, on the other hand, requires an emerging ballistic
missile threat as well as the achievement of a technological capability
for an effective defense before deployment of missile defenses.
Second, the bill asserts that the United States has no policy to
deploy an NMD system. In fact, the NMD effort is currently a robust
research and development program that provides the flexibility to deploy
an initial capability within 3 years of a deployment decision. This
prudent hedge ensures that the United States will be capable of meeting
of need for missile defenses with the latest technology when a threat
emerges.
Third, I disagree with the bill's contention that the U.S. ability to
anticipate future ballistic missile threats is questionable. It is
possible, of course, that there could be surprises, particularly were a
rogue state to receive outside assistance. However, given the
substantial intelligence resources being devoted to this issue, I am
confident that we will have the 3 years' warning on which our strategy
is based.
Fourth, the bill uses the phrase ``system capable of defending the
territory of the United States.'' The NMD program calls for defense of
only the 50 states. Expanding performance coverage to include all U.S.
territories would have considerable cost, design, and location
implications.
Finally, the bill does not consider affordability or the impact a
deployment would have on arms control agreements and nuclear arms
reductions. Both points are addressed in the NMD Deployment Readiness
Program and should be included in any bill on NMD.
Please be assured that I remain committed to those programs that
discourage hostile nations from the proliferation of WMD and the
missiles that deliver them. In that regard, I am confident that our
current NMD program provides a comprehensive policy to counter future
ballistic missile threats with the best technology when deployment is
determined necessary.
Sincerely,
Henry H. Shelton,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
General Counsel of the
Department of Defense,
Washington, DC, April 20, 1998.
Hon. Strom Thurmond, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your request for the views
of the Department of Defense on S. 1873, 105th Congress, a bill, ``To
state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a
missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United
States against limited ballistic missile attack.''
The Department of Defense and the Administration object to the
American Missile Protection Act of 1998. In response, the Department of
Defense would note that the Administration's National Missile Defense
Deployment Readiness Program is correct, prudent, and positions the
United States to deploy a defense when a threat emerges.
S. 1873 would seek to make it United States policy ``to deploy as
soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense
system capable of defending the territory of the United States against
limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or
deliberate).''
The Administration's National Missile Defense program is premised on
the view that not only must the technology be developed to allow for an
effective defense, but that deployment should be based on an emerging
rogue ballistic missile threat to the United States. To do otherwise is
to waste scarce Defense resources and to forego deploying the most
effective defense when the threat actually emerges.
The Intelligence Community has concluded that a long-range ballistic
missile threat to the United States from a rougue nation, other than
perhaps North Korea, is unlikely to emerge before 2010 but could be
accelerated if those nations acquired this capability from beyond their
borders. The Intelligence Community concluded that the only rogue nation
missile in development that could strike the United States is the North
Korean Taepo Dong 2, which could strike portions of Alaska or the
far-western Hawaiian Islands. However, as Secretary Cohen stated in his
1998 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, the likelihood of
the Taepo Dong 2 being operational by 2005 is very low. The
Administration is not complacent about this assessment. The National
Missile Defense program is designed to account for the uncertainty about
when and where threats may emerge by developing a National Missile
Defense capability that can be deployed well ahead of this estimate. The
Administration agrees that the United States must work to defend all 50
states against potential limited missile threats from rogue nations. The
National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program will position the
United States to deploy an initial capability as early as 2003. But, the
Administration opposes S. 1873 because it would commit the United States
to deploy a National Missile Defense system in the absence of an
emerging rogue state ballistic missile threat. The crucial difference is
in timing of a deployment decision. Commitment to deployment now, in the
absence of a threat, would divert vital defense funds from more pressing
military needs and would result in premature commitment to a
technological option that may be outdated when the threat emerges.
The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint
of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the
presentation of this report for the consideration of the Committee.
Sincerely,
Judith A. Miller.
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