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TESTIMONY OF
STANLEY O. ROTH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ASIA PACIFIC SUBCOMMITTEE
JUNE 18, 1998


Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to address the Subcommittee
on the important issue of pending China legislation in the Senate.
This is, of course, a timely hearing, with the President's historic
trip to China only a week away. I therefore welcome this opportunity
to lay out the Administration's position on the bills before the
Senate and look forward to engaging Committee members in a productive
dialogue on this matter.
My testimony will be divided into three parts. First, I will review
the reasons why a stronger, more constructive relationship with China
is in the U.S. interest. Second, I will outline the Clinton
Administration's strategy of engagement, highlighting what we have
accomplished while noting the obstacles we still face. Finally I will
explain the Administration's position on each of the five
China-related bills currently before the Senate, examining the impact
such legislation would have on our ability to engage the Chinese.
China Affects U.S. Interests
Mr. Chairman, peace and stability in East Asia and the Pacific is a
fundamental prerequisite for U.S. security and prosperity. Nearly one
half the world's people live in countries bordering the Asia Pacific
region and over half of all economic activity in the world is
conducted there. Four of the world's major powers rub shoulders in
Northeast Asia while some of the most strategically important
waterways on the globe flow through Southeast Asia. The U.S. itself is
as much a Pacific nation as an Atlantic one, with the states of
Alaska, California, Oregon and Washington bordering on the Pacific
Ocean and Hawaii surrounded by it. American citizens in Guam, American
Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas live closer to
Asian capitals than to our own, vast numbers of Americans work in the
Asia-Pacific region, and an increasingly large number of Americans
trace their ancestry back to the Pacific Rim.
For these and many other reasons, the U.S. has remained committed to
the Asia-Pacific region and has spent its resources and blood
defending and strengthening our stake in the region. Since coming to
office, President Clinton has repeatedly made clear that America will
remain an Asia-Pacific power. We maintain a sizable military presence
in Asia; enjoy a vibrant network of mutual security alliances with
Australia, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Thailand;
and have significant economic ties with most countries in the region.
China's sheer size means we must deal with China in our capacity as an
Asia-Pacific power. China is home to one quarter of humankind and
occupies vast territory that borders on 14 nations. But China's
remarkable economic achievements, increasing diplomatic prominence and
growing military strength make it a nation that affects not only our
interests in Asia but our vital national interests across the board.
In terms of security, China is already a global player. China holds a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It possesses nuclear
weapons, the world's largest standing army, and a rapidly advancing
industrial and technological capacity. It borders some of the globe's
most troubled regions: the Indian Subcontinent to the West, the Korean
Peninsula to the East, and the opium-producing region known as the
Golden Triangle to the South.
Its economic importance is no less profound. The Chinese economy is
already one of the largest in the world, and many observers predict
that if current growth rates can be sustained, it will be the largest
within several decades.
With 1.3 billion people rapidly modernizing, moreover, China is having
and will continue to have a global impact on the environment. Early in
the next century China will displace the United States as the world's
largest producer of greenhouse gases. China will thus be key to
finding a solution to the pressing problem of climate change.
Engagement Works
China, therefore cannot be ignored. In recognition of this reality,
the Clinton Administration is working to encourage the emergence of a
China that is stable and non-aggressive; that tolerates differing
views and adheres to international rules of conduct; and that
cooperates with us to build a secure regional and international order.
The development of this kind of China is profoundly in our national
interest. On this point I think we all agree. The question, then, has
become, how best to encourage the emergence of such a China?
Our strategy has been to engage China by working to identify areas on
which we agree while continuing to forthrightly confront issues on
which we do not. We have made significant progress in many aspects of
our relationship with China by using this approach, and I would like
to take this opportunity to note some of the most recent achievements.
First, the Chinese have played a constructive role in working to
defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula. China encouraged North Korea
to come to the negotiating table and now joins us in Geneva at the
four party talks. China hosted recent North-South negotiations and is
actively addressing the humanitarian crisis in North Korea as its
largest donor of food and fuel.
Second, China is playing a similarly important role in working to
diminish escalating tensions on the Indian Subcontinent. China chaired
a recent meeting of the permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council. It has condemned both India and Pakistan for conducting
nuclear tests and has joined us in urging them to refrain from further
testing; sign and ratify the CTBT; avoid deploying or testing
missiles; tone down their rhetoric; and work to resolve their
differences -- including over Kashmir -- through dialogue. These
efforts have been complementary to our own. By contrast, if China were
on the sidelines or actively opposing us, this message would be both
less effective and the prospects of a solution more distant.
On the non-proliferation front, we have built upon the successful
efforts of this and previous administrations to help bring about
Chinese adherence to international norms. Within the past year the
Chinese have: committed to phase out nuclear cooperation with Iran;
reaffirmed their commitment to refrain from assisting unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities anywhere; implemented strict, nation-wide nuclear
export controls; passed in principle and are prepared to publish
regulations controlling the export of dual-use items with potential
nuclear use; joined the Zangger NPT exporters' committee; signed and
ratified the chemical weapons convention; and adopted chemical export
controls -- which they have just expanded.
There is, of course, still much work to be done. We continue to be
concerned about reports of missile equipment and technology transfers
to Iran and Pakistan and reports that Chinese commercial entities have
done business with Iran's chemical weapons program. Still, we have
come a long way and there is good reason to believe that continued
engagement will lead to a further positive evolution of China's
attitudes and actions vis a vis non-proliferation norms.
Even in the contentious area of human rights, engagement with China is
yielding tangible results. Just six months ago members of this
Congress as well as the international community at large had grave
concerns regarding the health and status of two of China's most
prominent political dissidents, Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan. Against a
backdrop of intensive dialogue with the United States and continued,
public U.S. criticism of China's human rights record, the Chinese
authorities have released both Mr. Wei and Mr. Wang on medical parole
and have permitted some other dissidents to depart China. China has
also signed and submitted for ratification the UN Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and has pledged to sign the UN
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. President Jiang Zemin also
recently hosted a delegation of U.S. religious leaders, and the
Chinese government has agreed to follow up this visit with further
dialogue and exchanges. These exchanges can and do produce results, as
the recent release from prison of Bishop Zeng Jingmu demonstrated.
Perhaps the most significant human rights development is the least
tangible. When Secretary Albright and I traveled to Beijing two months
ago, we both came away with the sense that China is truly changing.
There was, compared to past visits, a more vibrant political
discourse; surprisingly open discussion even in government-controlled
media about economic and political reform; and considerable focus on
improving the rule of law. The Secretary participated in events that
wouldn't have been possible even just a year ago, including a
roundtable with intellectuals and local officials on legal and
political reform, and visited a law class on intellectual property
rights and a newly established training center for judges.
This is not in any way to suggest that human rights abuses in China
are a thing of the past. On the contrary, we have reported to Congress
that serious and widespread human rights abuses continue in violation
of internationally accepted standards and norms. But the steps the
Chinese have taken within the space of just a few months are
nonetheless noteworthy, even if systemic change to protect fundamental
rights remains inadequate.
These are not meant to be exhaustive examples of the fruits of
engagement; nor are they meant to mask the persistence of serious
differences between our two countries. They are intended simply to
show that engagement is working and that we have made progress in
encouraging China's development as a full and responsible member of
the international community.
Pending Legislation
The sponsors of the China-related legislation before the Senate
clearly share our goal of positively influencing China's development.
The bills in question seek to bring an end to human rights violations,
religious persecution, forced prison labor and coercive family
planning policies in China and thus are very much in line with the
Administration's own objectives.
The question, once again, is one of approach. How do we best effect
those changes in the PRC?
HR 967 and HR 2570 both mandate a denial of visas to Chinese officials
alleged to be involved in religious persecution (in the case of the
former) or forced abortions (in the case of the latter). While the
Administration opposes such repugnant practices and wholeheartedly
agrees they must be addressed, these bills would restrict our ability
to engage influential individuals in the very dialogue that has begun
to produce tangible results.
For example, the heads of the Religious Affairs and Family Planning
Bureaus are people we want to invite to the United States again and
again. The more Chinese leaders see of the U.S., the more they are
exposed to our point of view and our way of life. We would be doing a
disservice to the very people we endeavor to help if we cut off
dialogue with those officials who shape the very policies we want to
change. Such unilateral action on our part, moreover, could prompt
Beijing to impose its own visa restrictions, further limiting the
ability of U.S. officials and religious figures to advocate their
views in China.
In addition, these bills impinge upon the President's constitutional
prerogatives regarding the conduct of foreign relations of the United
States. Decisions whether and when to issue visas to foreign
government officials necessarily implicate the most sensitive foreign
policy considerations, concerning which the Executive requires maximum
flexibility.
HR 2605, which requires U.S. directors at International Financial
Institutions to oppose the provision of concessional loans to China,
would have the effect of punishing the Chinese people most in need of
international assistance. The United States, as a matter of policy,
has not since the Tiananmen Square crackdown supported development
bank lending to China except for projects designed to help meet basic
human needs. Concessional loans to China from the World Bank, for
example, are only granted for the purposes of poverty alleviation.
These loans support agricultural, rural health, educational and rural
water supply programs in some of the poorest areas of the country. A
vote against such lending would thus be a vote against the Chinese
people.
Moreover, World Bank member donors agreed in 1996 that China, owing to
its improved credit worthiness, would cease concessional borrowing.
The Bank's concessional loans to China are thus to be terminated at
the end of FY1999.
HR 2358 is fundamentally different than the first three bills in that
it seeks to expand rather than limit U.S. engagement in China. The
bill allocates new monies for additional human rights monitors at U.S.
Embassies/Consulates in China; authorizes funds to the NED for
democracy, civil society, and rule of law programming; and requires
the Secretary of State to use funds from the East Asia/Pacific
Regional democracy fund to provide grants to NGOs for similar
programs. Human rights reporting and the promotion of democracy, civil
society and rule of law have long been among this Administration's
highest priorities in China, and thus we do not oppose, in principle,
any of the above provisions. We would note, however, that the East
Asia/Pacific democracy fund is a limited fund with competing demands.
There is much work to be done to promote democracy at this time of
great change in the Asia-Pacific, and thus we ask that Congress give
Secretary Albright maximum flexibility in allocating these scarce
resources.
The bill further requires the Secretary of State to establish a
Prisoner Information Registry for China. We are sympathetic to the
idea of establishing a prisoner registry and recognize the importance
of such a registry to our human rights work. We caution, however, that
the U.S. government is not the right institution for the task. Aside
from the logistical difficulties of gaining access to the families and
friends of Chinese dissidents, U.S. Government contact with such
individuals could actually place them in further jeopardy. We believe
that NGOs are far better equipped to carry out these kinds of
contacts. Several groups and individual activists, including Human
Rights Watch, Human Rights in Asia, and John Kamm, already maintain
such lists. Thus rather than undertake to compile and maintain an
accurate registry, the State Department might play a more useful role
in coordinating those groups already actively engaged in this issue.
Finally, HR 2358 requires the Secretary of State to submit a separate,
annual human rights in China report to the HIRC and the SFRC.
Documenting and making public the human rights situation in China is
indeed of critical importance. We have accordingly given a great deal
of attention to China in our annual Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices. The Department and our missions abroad expend enormous
energy and resources preparing this report, and the final product
routinely receives high marks for its thoroughness and integrity.
An additional study on China would be redundant and thus wasteful of
taxpayer dollars. We already make extensive efforts to cover those
topics earmarked for attention in HR 2358: religious persecution,
development of democratic institutions and the rule of law. That said,
we welcome suggestions on how to improve the reports and would gladly
open a dialogue with the Congress on this important issue.
The last bill I want to address today, HR 2386, requires the Secretary
of Defense to produce a study of the architecture requirements for the
establishment and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense
system for Taiwan. Let me state up front and emphatically that the
Clinton Administration remains firmly committed to fulfilling the
security and arms transfer provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act. We
have demonstrated this commitment through the transfer of F-16s, Knox
class frigates, helicopters and tanks as well as a variety of air to
air, surface to air, and anti-ship defensive missiles and will
continue to assist Taiwan in meeting its defense needs.
Consistent with our obligations under the TRA, we regularly consult
with Taiwan as to how it can best address a broad range of security
threats, including the threat posed by ballistic missiles. We have
briefed Taiwan, as we have many other friends, on the concept of
theater missile defense (TMD). Officials in Taiwan are currently
assessing their own capabilities and needs, and have not, to date,
indicated interest in acquiring TMD. Requiring a study of this kind
thus gets ahead of the situation on the ground in Taiwan and may not
even be consistent with the approach Taiwan officials will ultimately
want to take. We are accordingly opposed to the legislation.
Again, let me restate that we are steadfast in our commitment to meet
Taiwan's defense needs. But while making it possible for Taiwan to
acquire the wherewithal to defend itself, we must recognize that
security over the long term depends upon more than military factors.
In the end, stability in the Strait will be contingent upon the
ability of the two sides to come to terms with each other. For this
reason the Administration has encouraged Taipei and Beijing to reopen
dialogue, making it clear to both sides that dialogue is the most
promising way to defuse tensions and build confidence. In that regard,
we are encouraged by recent signs of a willingness on both sides of
the Strait to resume talks.
Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Albright has often said, there is no
greater opportunity -- or challenge -- in U.S. foreign policy today
than to encourage China's integration into the world community. While
the Administration shares fully the concerns which inform the bills
before the Senate today, we do not believe that proscribing engagement
with broad categories of Chinese people and mandating U.S. rejection
of aid intended to meet basic human needs will help to change those
policies and practices with which we disagree.
These concerns can be best addressed by continuing to engage Chinese
leaders on the full range of security, economic and political issues.
President Clinton's upcoming trip to China is intended to do just
that, and thus is an opportunity to make progress on the very human
rights issues addressed in today's legislation. Our strategy of
engagement has met with considerable success thus far, and I am
confident that with the support of the Congress we will continue to
make progress in the lead up to the summit and beyond.
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