Space

S 1873 IS

To state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.

March 27, 1998

Mr. COCHRAN (for himself, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. LOTT, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. HELMS, Mr. WARNER, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. BURNS, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. MACK, Mr. MCCONNELL, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. KEMPTHORNE, Mr. ALLARD, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. FAIRCLOTH, Mr. COVERDELL, Mr. SHELBY, Mr. THOMPSON, Mr. BOND, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. FRIST, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. KYL, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. SMITH of Oregon, Mr. MCCAIN, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. ASHCROFT, and Mr. GRAMS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

To state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `American Missile Protection Act of 1998'.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The threat of weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic missiles is among the most serious security issues facing the United States.

(A) In a 1994 Executive Order, President Clinton certified, that `I ... find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (`weapons of mass destruction') and the means of delivering such weapons, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.' This state of emergency was reaffirmed in 1995, 1996, and 1997.

(B) In 1994 the President stated, that `there is nothing more important to our security and the world's stability than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles'.

(C) Several countries hostile to the United States have been particularly determined to acquire missiles and weapons of mass destruction. President Clinton observed in January of 1998, for example, that `Saddam Hussein has spent the better part of this decade, and much of his nation's wealth, not on providing for the Iraqi people, but on developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them'.

(D) In 1996, the Senate affirmed that, `it is in the supreme interest of the United States to defend itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile attack, whatever the source.'

(2) The long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States is increasing.

(A) Several adversaries of the United States have stated their intention to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United States.

(i) Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has stated, `If they know that you have a deterrent force capable of hitting the United States, they would not be able to hit you. If we had possessed a deterrent--missiles that could reach New York--we would have hit it at the same moment. Consequently, we should build this force so that they and others will no longer think about an attack.'

(ii) Abu Abbas, the head of the Palestine Liberation Front, has stated, `I would love to be able to reach the American shore, but this is very difficult. Someday an Arab country will have ballistic missiles. Someday an Arab country will have a nuclear bomb. It is better for the United States and for Israel to reach peace with the Palestinians before that day.'

(iii) Saddam Hussein has stated, `Our missiles cannot reach Washington. If we could reach Washington, we would strike if the need arose.'

(iv) Iranian actions speak for themselves. Iran's aggressive pursuit of medium-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Central Europe--aided by the continuing collaboration of outside agents--demonstrates Tehran's intent to acquire ballistic missiles of ever-increasing range.

(B) Over 30 non-NATO countries possess ballistic missiles, with at least 10 of those countries developing over 20 new types of ballistic missiles.

(C) From the end of World War II until 1980, ballistic missiles were used in one conflict. Since 1980, thousands of ballistic missiles have been fired in at least six different conflicts.

(D) The clear trend among countries hostile to the United States is toward having ballistic missiles of greater range.

(i) North Korea first acquired 300-kilometer range Scud Bs, then developed and deployed 500-kilometer range Scud Cs, is currently deploying the 1000-kilometer range No-Dong, and is developing the 2000-kilometer range Taepo-Dong 1 and 6000-kilometer range Taepo-Dong 2, which would be capable of striking Alaska and Hawaii.

(ii) Iran acquired 150-kilometer range CSS-8s, progressed through the Scud B and Scud C, and is developing the 1300-kilometer range Shahab-3 and 2000-kilometer range Shahab-4, which would allow Iran to strike Central Europe.

(iii) Iraq, in a two-year crash program, produced a new missile, the Al-Hussein, with twice the range of its Scud Bs.

(iv) Experience gained from extending the range of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles facilitates the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

(E) The technical information, hardware, and other resources necessary to build ballistic missiles are increasingly available and accessible worldwide.

(i) Due to advances in information technology, a vast amount of technical information relating to ballistic missile design, much of it formerly classified, has become widely available and is increasingly accessible through the Internet and other distribution avenues.

(ii) Components, tools, and materials to support ballistic missile development are increasingly available in the commercial aerospace industry.

(iii) Increasing demand for satellite-based telecommunications is adding to the demand for commercial Space Launch Vehicles, which employ technology that is essentially identical to that of intercontinental ballistic missiles. As this increasing demand is met, the technology and expertise associated with space launch vehicles also proliferate.

(F) Russia and China have provided significant technical assistance to rogue nation ballistic missile programs, accelerating the pace of those efforts. In June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence, reporting to Congress on weapons of mass destruction-related equipment, materials, and technology, stated that `China and Russia continued to be the primary suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to stem the flow of dual-use goods and modern weapons to countries of concern.'

(G) Russia and China continue to engage in missile proliferation.

(i) Despite numerous Russian assurances not to assist Iran with its ballistic missile program, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation testified to the Senate, that `the problem is this: there is a disconnect between those reassurances, which we welcome, and what we believe is actually occurring.'

(ii) Regarding China's actions to demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to nonproliferation, the Director of Central Intelligence testified to the Senate on January 28, 1998, that, `the jury is still out on whether the recent changes are broad enough in scope and whether they will hold over the longer term. As such, Chinese activities in this area will require continued close watching.'

(H) The inability of the United States to defend itself against weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic missile provides additional incentive for hostile nations to develop long-range ballistic missiles with which to threaten the United States. Missiles are widely viewed as valuable tools for deterring and coercing a vulnerable United States.

(3) The ability of the United States to anticipate future ballistic missile threats is questionable.

(A) The Intelligence Community has failed to anticipate many past technical innovations (for example, Iraq's extended-range Al-Hussein missiles and its development of a space launch vehicle) and outside assistance enables rogue states to surmount traditional technological obstacles to obtaining or developing ballistic missiles of increasing range.

(B) In June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence reported to Congress that `many Third World countries--with Iran being the most prominent example--are responding to Western counter-proliferation efforts by relying more on legitimate commercial firms as procurement fronts and by developing more convoluted procurement networks.'

(C) In June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence stated to Congress that `gaps and uncertainties preclude a good projection of exactly when `rest of the world' countries will deploy ICBMs.'

(D) In 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence testified that Iran would have a medium-range missile by 2007. One year later the Director stated, `since I testified, Iran's success in getting technology and materials from Russian companies, combined with recent indigenous Iranian advances, means that it could have a medium-range missile much sooner than I assessed last year.' Department of State officials have testified that Iran could be prepared to deploy such a missile as early as late 1998, nine years earlier than had been predicted one year before by the Director of Central Intelligence.

(4) The failure to prepare adequately for long-range ballistic missile threats could have severe national security and foreign policy consequences for the United States.

(A) An attack on the United States by a ballistic missile equipped with a weapon of mass destruction could inflict catastrophic death or injury to citizens of the United States and severe damage to their property.

(B) A rogue state's ability to threaten the United States with an intercontinental ballistic missile may constrain the United States' options in dealing with regional threats to its interests, deter the United States from taking appropriate action, or prompt allies to question United States security guarantees, thereby weakening alliances of the United States and the United States' world leadership position.

(5) The United States must be prepared for rogue nations acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.

(A) In its resolution of ratification for the START II Treaty, the United States Senate declared that `because deterrence may be inadequate to protect the United States against long-range ballistic missile threats, missile defenses are a necessary part of new deterrent strategies.'

(B) In September of 1994, Secretary of Defense Perry stated that in the post-Cold War era, `we now have opportunity to create a new relationship based not on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.'

(C) On February 12, 1997, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy testified to the Senate that `I and the administration are quite willing to acknowledge that if we saw a rogue state, a potential proliferant, beginning to develop a long-range ICBM capable of reaching the United States, we would have to give very, very serious attention to deploying a limited national missile defense.'

(6) The United States has no defense deployed against weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic missiles and no policy to deploy such a national missile defense system.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).

END