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Part D amendment No. 33 offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania and Mr. Spratt:
At the end of subtitle C of title II (page 29, after line 21), insert the following new section:

SEC. 236. RESTRUCTURING OF THEATER HIGH-ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM ACQUISITION STRATEGY.
(a) Establishment of Alternative Contractor: (1) The Secretary of Defense shall select an alternative contractor as a potential source for the development and production of the interceptor missile for the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system within a `leader-follower' acquisition strategy.
(2) The Secretary shall take such steps as necessary to ensure that the prime contractor for that system prepares the selected alternative contractor so as to enable the alternative contractor to be able (if necessary) to assume the responsibilities for development or production of an interceptor missile for that system.
(3) The Secretary shall select the alternative contractor as expeditiously as possible and shall use the authority provided in section 2304(c)(2) of title 10, United States Code, to expedite that selection.
(4) Of the amount authorized under section 201(4) for the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system, the amount provided for the Demonstration/Validation phase for that system is hereby increased by $142,700,000, of which $30,000,000 shall be available for the purposes of this subsection, and the amount provided for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase for that system is hereby reduced by $142,700,000.
(b) Cost Sharing Arrangement: The Secretary of Defense shall contractually establish an appropriate cost sharing arrangement with the prime contractor as of May 14, 1998, for the interceptor missile for the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system for flight test failures of that missile beginning with flight test nine.
(c) Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase for Other Elements of the THAAD System: The Secretary of Defense shall proceed as expeditiously as possible with the milestone approval process for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase for the Battle Management and Command, Control, and Communications (BM/C3) element of the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system and for the Ground-Based Radar (GBR) element for that system. That milestone approval process for those elements shall proceed without regard to the stage of development of the missile interceptor for that system.
(d) Requirement Before Procurement of UOES Missiles: The Secretary of Defense may not obligate any funds for acquisition of User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) missiles for the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system until there have been two successful tests of the interceptor missile for that system.
(e) Limitation on Entering Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase: The Secretary of Defense may not approve the commencement of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase for the interceptor missile for the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system until there have been three successful tests of that missile.
(f) Successful Test Defined: For purposes of this section, a successful test of the interceptor missile of the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system is a body-to-body intercept by that missile of a ballistic missile target.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania.

The two major amendments I wanted to focus on, first off all is the THAAD amendment. We had, unfortunately, the fifth unsuccessful test of the THAAD program. Working with my colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), we have gone in and we have tweaked the contractor. We are giving the Department of Defense the authorization to impose liability on any further failures of the test of THAAD. We break off the missile program to allow the radar and the BMC cube to move forward. They are both very successful. And we say to the Pentagon, bring in a second contractor team to help oversee the THAAD program.

• Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Weldon-Spratt amendment.

• On May 12 the U.S. Army performed its eighth test of the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system. The test was a failure, and this failure comes despite almost a year of preparation following a string of 3 earlier unsuccessful intercept tests.

• The Weldon-Spratt amendment addresses this problem in an aggressive manner. The amendment directs the Department to identify and contract with a company capable of producing the THAAD system in a leader-follower contract arrangement. In other words, we are telling Lockheed Martin that if they cannot fix the THAAD interceptor, the contract may be taken away from them. The amendment also directs DOD to modify its contract to ensure that THAAD's primary contractor shares in the cost of future test failures. Both steps are needed to bring necessary accountability to this program. Both steps are taken in the sincerest desire that they help the program succeed.

• We take steps for the simple reason that THAAD is too important to fail. The THAAD system is the archetype upon which we are patterning our family of systems for missile defense. It is the mother of all missile defense systems, if you will.

• THAAD is not the first system to experience difficulties in testing, and the Weldon-Spratt amendment builds on past experience in utilizing the prospect of competition to encourage improved program performance. Many members will remember the numerous problems experienced with the C-17, where the prospect of competition was used effectively by the Congress to bring focus back to the program. And the C-17 is now a success.

• It is important to recognized that large portions of the THAAD system are and have been working well. The THAAD radar and its battle management command, control, and communications systems are working well. The Weldon-Spratt amendment allows these components of THAAD to proceed to the Engineering Manufacturing and Development (EMD) phase when they are ready.

• Finally, the Weldon-Spratt amendment clarifies the criteria for allowing the program to proceed with the procurement of 40 UOES test missiles. We mandate two successful kinetic kill intercepts before any funding is committed for UOES procurement.

• Mr. Chairman, these steps are necessary and prudent and I urge all members to support the Weldon-Spratt amendment.