59 006
H.L.C.
105 th Congress
Rept. 105 308
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session
Part 1
UNITED STATES-TAIWAN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION ACT
October 6, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. Gilman, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted
the following
R E P O R T
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2386]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on International Relations, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 2386) to implement the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act
concerning the stability and security of Taiwan and United States
cooperation with Taiwan on the development and acquisition of defensive
military articles, having considered the same, report favorably thereon
with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof
the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic
Missile Defense Cooperation Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The stability and security of Taiwan and the balance of power in
the Taiwan Strait are key elements for the continued peace and stability
of the greater Asia-Pacific region, and the indefinite continuation of
such stability and security and balance of power is in the vital
national security interest of the United States.
(2) The People's Republic of China is currently engaged in a
comprehensive military modernization campaign that is enhancing the
power-projection capabilities of the People's Liberation Army, including
the introduction of advanced ballistic and cruise missiles that could
alter the current balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and in the
greater Asia-Pacific region.
(3) The current lack of transparency in the People's Republic of
China military infrastructure and its associated defense establishment
and the opaqueness of the comprehensive efforts of the People's
Liberation Army to modernize its ballistic and cruise missile programs
could spark a regional arms race that would destabilize the East Asia
and Western Pacific regions and threaten vital United States national
security interests.
(4) In March 1996, the People's Liberation Army created a temporary,
but de facto, blockade of both the international shipping lanes of the
Taiwan Strait and the international airspace around Taiwan by conducting
live-fire military exercises which included the launch of several
advanced, nuclear-capable M 9 ballistic missiles to target areas close
to major ports in both the northern and southern areas of Taiwan.
(5) In March 1996, the locations of People's Liberation Army
military activities and M 9 missile target areas nearby to Taiwan's two
largest ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung, created a de facto blockade of the
Taiwan Strait, international waters and airspace, interfered with United
States and international shipping and aviation, and impinged upon the
national security interests of the United States, requiring the
immediate deployment of two United States aircraft carrier battle groups
to the South China Sea.
(6) The actions of the People's Liberation Army in such close
proximity to Taiwan were deliberate attempts to disrupt Taiwan's social
and economic stability and were carried out as attempts to intimidate
the people of Taiwan during the period leading up to Taiwan's historic
first democratic presidential election.
(7) The early development and deployment of an effective United
States theater missile defense system to the Asia-Pacific region, and
the adjustment of United States policy to include Taiwan, including the
Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu, under the protection of such defense
system, would be prudent and appropriate responses to--
(A) the refusal by the People's Republic of China to renounce the
use of force to determine the future of Taiwan;
(B) the nature of the military threat of the People's Republic of
China posed by the increased focus of the People's Liberation Army on
advanced missile development; and
(C) the demonstrated intent of the Government of the People's
Republic of China to use live-fire military exercises and ballistic
missile tests against the people and Government of Taiwan as tools of
so-called coercive diplomacy.
(8) The early deployment of a United States theater anti-ballistic
missile system in the Asia-Pacific region would maintain a balance of
power in the Taiwan Strait and deter the People's Republic of China from
resorting to military intimidation tactics to coerce or manipulate the
people and freely-elected Government of Taiwan in the future.
(9) Taiwan's local air-defense capability provided by the United
States Modified Air Defense System (MADS) is not adequate for the task
of defending local areas of Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands,
Kinmen, and Matsu, from limited ballistic missile attacks or deterring
the threat and use of force against Taiwan by the People's Liberation
Army to achieve the political goals of the core leadership of the
People's Republic of China.
(10) Taiwan has requested further United States cooperation on
missile defense, including the conduct of a joint architecture study of
the requirements for the establishment and operation of a missile
defense system for Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and
Matsu.
SEC. 3. STUDY AND REPORT RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT AND
OPERATION OF A THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a study of the
architecture requirements for the establishment and operation of a
theater ballistic missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region that
would have the capability to protect Taiwan from ballistic missile
attacks. The study shall include a description of appropriate measures
by which the United States would cooperate with Taiwan and provide
Taiwan with an advanced local-area ballistic missile defense system.
(b) Report.--Not later than July 1, 1998, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the Committee on National Security of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a
report containing--
(1) the results of the study conducted under subsection (a);
(2) the factors used to obtain such results;
(3) a description of any existing United States missile defense
system that could be transferred to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan
Relations Act in order to allow Taiwan to provide for its self-defense
against limited ballistic missile attacks.
(c) Form of Report.--The report under subsection (b) shall be
submitted in both classified and unclassified form.
SEC. 4. TRANSFER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS TO TAIWAN.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President, if requested by
the Government of Taiwan and in accordance with the results of the study
conducted under section 3, should transfer to the Government of Taiwan
appropriate defense articles or defense services under the foreign
military sales program under chapter 2 of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2761 et seq.) for the purpose of establishing and operating a
local-area ballistic missile defense system to protect Taiwan, including
the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu, against limited ballistic missile
attacks.
SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO UNITED STATES THEATER
MISSILE DEFENSES FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
The Congress declares that it is in the national interest of the
United States that Taiwan be included in any effort at ballistic missile
defense cooperation, networking, or interoperability with friendly and
allied nations in the Asia-Pacific region.
SEC. 6. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS URGING THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE
CLEAR TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THE COMMITMENT OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE TO SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN TAIWAN.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Clinton Administration
should make clear to the leadership of the People's Republic of China,
the American people's firm commitment for security and democracy for the
people of Taiwan and that the United States fully expects that the
resolution of security issues on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will be
resolved by peaceful means.
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
H.R. 2386, the U.S.-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation
Act, would implement provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act to enhance
the stability and security of Taiwan and to facilitate U.S. cooperation
with Taiwan in the development and acquisition of defensive military
articles; in particular, modern air defense and anti-missile systems.
The security of Taiwan and the maintenance of a balance of power in
the Taiwan Strait are key elements for the continued peace and stability
of the greater Asia-Pacific region. The indefinite continuation of such
stability and peace in a region of vibrant economic growth, expanding
international trade and emerging democratic societies is a vital
national security interest of the United States. Therefore, there is a
basis for cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan in support of
defensive measures that will preserve a balance of power capable of
deterring any resort to force, in particular, any attempt to reunite
Taiwan with the Chinese mainland by violent means.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is currently engaged in a
comprehensive military modernization campaign that is enhancing the
power-projection capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
Included in this campaign is the development and deployment of ballistic
and cruise missiles that could alter the current balance of power in the
Taiwan Strait and in the greater Asia-Pacific region. Besides increasing
the number of medium and short-range ballistic missiles deployed in the
region, the PARC is also striving to improve its guidance systems,
including terminal radar guidance and global-positioning technologies.
Long-range cruise missiles are also under development. The nature and
pace of the PRC's missile programs could spark a regional arms race that
could destabilize the region and threaten vital United States national
security interests.
In March, 1996, the PLA created a temporary, de facto blockade of
both the international shipping lanes of the Taiwan Strait and the
international airspace around Taiwan by conducting live-fire military
exercises which included the launch of several advanced, nuclear-capable
M 9 ballistic missiles to target zones close to major ports in both the
northern and southern areas of Taiwan. These included missile strikes
near Taiwan's two largest ports, Keehung and Kaohsiung. This
interruption of international shipping and aviation impinged upon the
national security interests of the United States. In response, the
United States deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups to the South
China Sea. Subsequently, the U.S. provided the government of Taiwan with
Patriot air defense systems, which have a limited anti-missile
capability.
The actions of the PLA in March, 1996 were deliberate attempts to
disrupt Taiwan's social and economic stability and to intimidate the
people of Taiwan during the period leading up to Taiwan's first
democratic presidential elections.
The early development and deployment of an effective U.S. theater
missile defense system to the Asia-Pacific region, and the adjustment of
U.S. policy to include Taiwan (including the Matsu, Kinmen and Penghu
islands) under the protection of such a defense system, would be prudent
and appropriate. Such an early deployment would maintain the balance of
power in the Taiwan Strait and deter the People's Republic of China from
resorting to military intimidation tactics or other uses of force. The
PRC has refused to renounce the use of force to determine the future of
Taiwan. Furthermore, the rapid modernization and expansion of the PLA
require that a policy of deterrence be adopted to counter these emerging
capabilities.
Taiwan's current local air defense system, provided by the U.S., is
not adequate to this task. Taiwan has requested further U.S. cooperation
on missile defense, including the conduct of a joint architecture study
of the requirements for the establishment and operation of a missile
defense system. H.R. 2386 calls on the Secretary of Defense to carry out
such a study of the architecture requirements, and to include a
description of appropriate measures by which the U.S. could cooperate
with Taiwan and provide Taiwan with an advanced local-area ballistic
missile defense system.
H.R. 2386 also expresses the sense of the Congress that the
President, if requested by the government of Taiwan and if consistent
with the aforementioned study, should transfer to the government of
Taiwan appropriate defense articles and defense systems for the purpose
of establishing and operating a local-area ballistic missile system.
Furthermore, the bill declares that it is in the national interest of
the United States that Taiwan be included in any effort to establish a
ballistic missile defense system for the Asia-Pacific region in
cooperation with other friendly nations and allies.
COMMITTEE ACTION
H.R. 2386, the U.S.-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation
Act, was introduced September 3, 1997. It was referred to the Committee
on International Relations and, in addition, to the Committee on
National Security. The introduction of this bill culminated several
months of work on the subject of how to respond to various provocations
by the government of the People's Republic of China in ways that
prudently address specific problems without adding to regional tensions
of imposing hardships on the common people of China.
On September 30, 1997, the International Relations Committee
considered and marked up the measure, adopting it by voice vote as
amended, a quorum being present. Three amendments were adopted. One
amendment, adopted by voice vote, struck Section 3 of the bill, which
made explicit that the Taiwan Relations Act take precedence over any
provisions of the Joint Communique of the U.S. and China issued in
Shanghai on August 17, 1982. The consensus of the committee was that
such a statement was not necessary. The Taiwan Relations Act already
clearly provides the legal framework for the transfer of defensive
articles and for cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan.
Indeed, according to Susan Shirk, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asia, who represented the Clinton Administration's
position in testimony at the mark-up session, such cooperation is
already underway and consistent with U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific
region. The U.S. is currently holding seminars with Taiwan on air and
missile defense issues. Furthermore, Taiwan has purchased the first
three of eight ordered batteries of PAC II Modified Air Defense
Systems which have an anti-ballistic missile defense capability.
In addition, the Committee adopted, by voice vote, an amendment by
Representative Rohrabacher, adding language expressing the Sense of the
Congress urging that the President to make clear to the People's
Republic of China the commitment of the American people to security and
democracy in Taiwan.
Just prior to reporting the bill, the Committee adopted, by unanimous
consent, a Gilman amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of
the text of the bill as it had been amended through that point.
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee reports the findings and
recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under
clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
No findings or recommendations of the Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight were received as referred to in clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule
XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES
The Committee adopts the cost estimate of the Congressional Budget
Office, set out below, as its submission of any required information on
new budget authority, new spending authority, new credit authority, or
an increase or decrease in the national debt required by clause
2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal mandates
prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to
section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation.
APPLICABILITY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms
and conditions of employment or access to public services or
accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the
Congressional Accountability Act.
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT
In compliance with clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee cites the following specific
powers granted to the Congress in the Constitution as authority for
enactment of H.R. 2386 as reported by the Committee: Article I, section
8, clause 3 (relating to the regulation of commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states); and Article I, section 8, clause 18
(relating to making all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the
United States).
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth with respect to H.R.
2386 as reported by the Committee the following estimate and comparison
prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under
section 403 of the Budget Act of 1974:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, October 6, 1997.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the
enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2386, the United States-Taiwan
Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to
provide them. The CBO staff contact is Joseph C. Whitehill.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill, Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 2386--United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile
Defense Cooperation Act
The bill would require the Department of Defense to conduct a study
of the architecture requirements for establishing and operating a
theater defense system capable of protecting Taiwan from ballistic
missile attack.
Based on information from the Department of Defense, CBO estimates
that the architecture study would cost less than $500,000, assuming the
appropriation of the necessary funds. Because the bill would not affect
direct spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply.
The bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 and would not affect
the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.
The estimate was prepared by Joseph C. Whitehill. The estimate was
approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget
Analysis.
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES AND OTHER MATTERS
This legislation has been referred in addition to the Committee on
National Security.
Committee on National Security,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, September 26, 1997.
Hon. Newt Gingrich, The Speaker, The Capitol,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: I write with respect to H.R. 2188, a bill
concerning the tariff treatment of commercial activities undertaken by
communist Chinese military organizations, and H.R. 2386, the United
States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act. Both of
these bills have been referred to the Committee on National Security, in
addition to other committees.
The Committee on National Security has reviewed H.R. 2188 and H.R.
2386 and, in order to expedite consideration of these measures in the
House, waives its right to take up both pieces of legislation. I
therefore ask that the committee be discharged from further
consideration.
The Committee on National Security wishes to make clear that the
foregoing waiver should not be construed as a waiver of the committee's
jurisdiction with respect to any of the legislative provisions in H.R.
2188 and H.R. 2386 that fall within its jurisdiction. The committee also
wishes to preserve its prerogatives concerning any House-Senate
conference on these bills and any Senate amendments thereto, including
the appointment of conferees with respect to the provisions of the bills
which fall within this committee's jurisdiction.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
With warm personal regards, I am
Sincerely,
Floyd D. Spence, Chairman.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short title
Provides that the Act may be cited as the ``United States-Taiwan
Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act''.
Section 2. Findings
Sets forth relevant findings of Congress, including that the
indefinite continuation of stability, security, and the balance of power
in the Taiwan Strait is in the vital national security interest of the
United States; that the People's Republic of China is introducing
missiles that could alter the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait;
that in March 1996 the People's Liberation Army used ballistic missile
firings to create a de facto blockade of the Taiwan Strait; that the
United States should develop an effective theater missile defense system
and place Taiwan (including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu) under
the protection of such a system; and that Taiwan has requested further
United States cooperation on missile defense, including the conduct of a
joint architecture study for a missile defense system for Taiwan.
Section 3. Study and report relating to establishment and
operation of a theater ballistic missile defense system in the
Asia-Pacific region
Directs the Secretary of Defense to carry out a study of the
architecture requirements for a theater missile defense system that
could protect Taiwan. Not later than July 1, 1998, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress the
results of the study and a description of any existing United States
ballistic missile defense system that could be transferred to Taiwan in
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
Section 4. Transfer of ballistic missile defense systems to Taiwan
Expresses the sense of Congress that the President, if requested by
Taiwan and in accordance with the results of the study under section 3,
should transfer to Taiwan appropriate defense articles or defense
services under the foreign military sales program for the purpose of
operating a local-area ballistic missile defense system to protect
Taiwan.
Section 5. Statement of policy relating to United States
theater missile defenses for the Asia-Pacific region
Declares it to be in the national interest of the United States to
include Taiwan in any effort at ballistic missile defense cooperation,
networking, or interoperability in the Asia-Pacific region.
Section 6. Sense of the Congress urging the President to make
clear to the People's Republic of China the commitment of the American
people to security and democracy in Taiwan
Expresses the sense of Congress that the Clinton Administration
should make clear to the leadership of the People's Republic of China
the American people's firm commitment for security and democracy for the
people of Taiwan, and that the United States fully expects that security
issues on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will be resolved by peaceful
means.
DISSENTING VIEWS
This resolution mandates a Department of Defense study of the
architecture requirements for the establishment and operation of a
theater ballistic missile defense (BMD) system that would include
Taiwan, and declares, as a sense of the Congress, that the President, if
requested by the government of Taiwan, should make a BMD system
available to Taiwan.
This resolution is flawed both substantively and procedurally. While
this bill was improved through the amendment process, it retains its
core serious substantive problems:
First, it is illogical for the bill to mandate a study and
Presidential report concerning the establishment of a theater BMD system
that includes Taiwan, while urging the President, without waiting for
the results of the study, to make such a system available to Taiwan.
Second, inasmuch as China regards Taiwan as an integral part of the
People's Republic of China, the offer to Taiwan of some of the world's
most advanced weaponry appears deliberately designed to provoke China.
Third, Taiwan does not need this technology, and may not even want
it. The U.S. Department of Defense already has an ongoing BMD program
with Taiwan and has sold Taiwan a Patriot derivative (PAC 3) that is
comparable to a system that is so advanced that it has been introduced
into the U.S. Army only in the past year. Moreover, senior Taiwanese
military leaders are reluctant to commit substantial financial resources
for unproved BMD technology.
In short, this bill is simultaneously provocative and unnecessary. It
carries risk, with no prospect for benefit. It will reduce rather than
enhance the security of our friends on Taiwan.
Procedurally, the process followed by the Committee in marking up
this resolution was most unfortunate.
First, the process did not reflect the way a responsible committee
should operate. Members and staff were not given adequate notice to
study this resolution, even though it deals with serious issues that
could have a major adverse impact on the upcoming summit meeting with
the Chinese president. The usual requirement of one week's notice for a
mark up was reduced to barely more than 24 hours. No unusual or
emergency circumstances exist that warranted waiving the customary
one-week rule. No committee hearings have been held on this resolution,
nor were any senior Administration officials permitted to testify on the
policy implications of this resolution prior to the mark up.
Second, this resolution is badly timed. It does not enhance the
ability of the President to advance U.S. non-proliferation goals at the
upcoming U.S.-China summit, the first official U.S.-China summit in over
eight years. It is counterproductive for the Committee--on the basis of
hasty deliberation and inadequate consultation with the Executive
branch--to condemn Chinese actions and criticize Administration policy,
since this approach is unlikely to persuade the Chinese that the
Congress is serious about its commitment to nonproliferation. Adoption
of this resolution will make the President's job more difficult as he
attempts to persuade the Chinese to halt the transfer to Iran of
dangerous weapons. The Congress should be working with the President to
help make the summit successful, not passing bills to put obstacles in
his way, and to create the impression that the Congress is moving in one
direction and the President the other in China policy.
Finally, the cumulative impact of five resolutions on China marked up
and voted out of Committee as a package--plus others that are
circulating and may come to the Floor simultaneously with these five--is
likely to be harmful to U.S. foreign policy interests. Congress of
course has every right to express its views on these important issues.
Nonetheless, when this many resolutions each with a strongly anti
Chinese tilt suddenly come forward simultaneously, and only weeks before
a summit meeting, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
considerations other than foreign policy are also at work here. The
Chinese-American relationship will not advance if it becomes a game
board for the purpose of scoring points of perceived domestic political
advantage.
Lee H. Hamilton.
Gary L. Ackerman.
Amo Houghton.
Bob Clement.
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