Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was pleased to receive your invitation to participate in the Committee's session this morning. The missile defense issue, in my opinion, will increasingly come to the forefront of public discussion, particularly as the American people come to understand that our government has to this point not committed to the deployment of defenses against missiles that may reach us carrying nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The desirability of exploring the potential for accommodation in this area between our country and Russia, the subject matter of the paper before you authored by Dr. Keith Payne, Dr. Andrei Kortunov and others, is self-evident.
At the very outset, let me say, as the Vice Chairman of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), that we were pleased, through a grant, to help stimulate that study. In 1984, during the Administration of President Reagan and with his support, the Congress established the Institute as a non-partisan and bi-partisan one and charged it with the task of pursuing ideas, plans and studies that might open up intellectual and practical paths toward peace. We do that in association with experts, academicians, non-governmental organizations, government agencies and wherever we see opportunities, here and abroad, for creative thinking. The application by Dr. Keith Payne in cooperation with Dr. Kortunov, which led to this paper, met our criteria. The USIP takes no public policy positions. Our only condition for the grant was that the study and the
report be "track two," non-governmental, with no government officials involved in writing the study.
I appear before you this morning in a personal capacity. I support missile defenses, and I would like to elaborate on that within the context of the paper before you. In March 1985, President Reagan asked me to head the U.S. negotiating team for a renewed effort with the Soviet Union to reduce and eliminate nuclear arms. In addition, he asked me to concentrate on the issue of missile defenses as reflected in his Strategic Defense Initiative. This followed an article on the subject published in The New York Times Magazine and co- authored by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Dr. Robert Jastrow and me.
Critics of the President's SDI program, fortuitously from their point of view, labeled the SDI program as "star wars." This was inaccurate because its object was to avoid rather than project war in space. The existence of attack missiles traversing space was already a reality. The SDI program was designed to stop and destroy those weapons in space. The President instructed that the SDI research be non-nuclear, and he offered the prospect of US cooperation with the Soviets in the development of the defenses. The President's instruction also included the admonition that the research be undertaken within the confines of the ABM Treaty.
Reference to the Treaty leads me to share with you a conversation I had in Geneva at the time with one of the leaders of the Soviet Union, a Politburo member, who wanted to understand our American negotiating position. The irony of our respective positions on how to define the ABM Treaty became evident to him as I pointed out that the Soviet Union was now defining the Treaty just as we had interpreted the Treaty in 1972. And we were interpreting the Treaty as the Soviets had in 1972. We were both energetically defending
our reversed positions with fervor. Didn't that seem a foolish way for grown adults to behave, I suggested? He smiled, agreed, and asked for my suggestion.
At first, I suggested he look at the Treaty's Agreed Statement "[D]", which clearly recognized that the state of our scientific knowledge in 1972, the date of the Treaty signing, would be surpassed by new knowledge. It, therefore, provided for new discussions and agreements in the event of "ABM systems based on other physical principles." In effect, it called for us to renegotiate the applicability of the ABM Treaty in the face of new technologies.
I went on to acknowledge that the Soviet Union was looking at the ABM Treaty as a holy document. There were many in the U.S. similarly oriented. How to treat a holy document? The U.S. had another holy document, I pointed out, our Constitution, adopted in 1787. It has been amended. It has been interpreted and reinterpreted. Indeed, in many respects, it is barely recognizable as it has evolved. But it is still our holy document. (Parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I am here reminded of the Yoga Bera type insight that if any of our revered founding fathers would be alive today, they would look at our Constitution and how it has been interpreted and turn over in their graves!)
In any event, I pointed out to my Soviet colleague that if we want the ABM Treaty to continue as a holy document, we should stop the foolish debate of what was intended in 1972 and instead sit down and negotiate what is in our mutual best interest today. We could then assert, if we wish, that was the 1972 intent as well!
That remains my position today, Mr. Chairman. That is why I am encouraged by the paper before you today. That is also why I was so disappointed that our government did not respond with alacrity and enthusiasm
to President Yeltsin's proposal in 1992 to create a Global Protection System, an internationalizing of ballistic missile defense with a global early warning and missile defense capability. The Bush Administration first delayed its response, but bi-lateral talks on the subject did begin and seemed to hold promise for joint understanding. The Russians, we were told, looked upon those talks as indicative of U.S. willingness to work closely with them on security problems and on missile defenses in particular. The Clinton Administration, regrettably, downgraded and then discontinued the talks. The paper before you recommends that the talks be reconvened in a new forum.
I welcome your hearings, Mr. Chapman, in the hope that the unofficial but effective talks which you will now learn about may lead to high-level meaningful government to government talks on how best to cooperate as we both develop ballistic missile defenses. An effective national missile defense program is in our interest, particularly as we take into account the development of long range missiles in other parts of the world. It is also in the long-range interest of the Russian Federation which my well find its existing defenses to be inadequate. It would, obviously, be best if our programs could be undertaken within an agreed-upon formula with the Russian Federation following negotiations provided for in the ABM Treaty.
I have no problem looking at the ABM Treaty as a holy document. For it to so survive, however, its original hope that it be a "living agreement" must be respected. Articles 13 and 14 provide for amendments. Agreed Statement "D" provides for talks to deal with negotiations in the light of new technologies. Article 15 provides a procedure for withdrawal. I would personally not flaunt or threaten our withdrawal. Everyone knows we can do so should it become clear to us that the Treaty handcuffs us from defending ourselves against likely ballistic missile threats. It is not necessary publicly to emphasize withdrawal and
thereby subject ourselves to being perceived as a de-stabilizing influence, when, indeed, our intent and interest is the reverse.
The paper before you represents a good foundation for new high-level talks. Instead of threats and instead of arguments about what was intended by us in 1972, we should seriously explore what is now in our separate national interest and how we can harmonize these interests in a joint program which meets both of our interests. We can then find the words and agreement that will interpret the ABM Treaty accordingly. I must add, however, that I do not want those words to convey the impression that the negotiation will be easier or inevitably successful. The subject is serious and important for both of us and the talks may take time. But they are necessary.
To overcome the suspicion that now exists, our country must demonstrate that our intent and policy is not "anti-Russian." We want the people and government of the Russian Federation to be secure and prosperous and democratic. We expect the Russian Federation to demonstrate to us in return that they can be trusted to be a force for stability rather than a supporter of "rogue states" that threaten the stability of other peoples and states.
Your proposed legislation, Mr. Chairman, goes far in the direction which I am urging. For that I commend you and your colleagues. But I wish to close with an earnest appeal that this Committee produce a bi-partisan piece of legislation that can help create a national consensus behind an effective national missile defense program. Partisanship is a necessary part of the democratic process, but on issues of vital national Interest, particularly on national security, we should make a serious effort to avoid the costly divisiveness which it produces. This past weekend, I had the occasion to read a commentary on George Washington's Farewell Address to the Nation. He warned of the "baneful effects of the Spirit of Party," which he said tended to stimulate the
"strongest passion of the human mind" and, therefore, presented a "constant danger of excess," which, he said, overpowers reason, distracts governments, and agitates the community. Let us make an effort to avoid that divisiveness and digression.
Thank you.
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