S. Hrg. 105-243
COMPLIANCE REVIEW PROCESS AND
MISSILE DEFENSE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 21, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
42-600cc WASHINGTON : 1997
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOHN GLENN, Ohio
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire MAX CLELAND, Georgia
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Counsel
Leonard Weiss, Minority Staff Director
Michal Sue Prosser, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL
SERVICES
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mitchel B. Kugler, Staff Director
Linda Gustitus, Minority Staff Director
Julie Sander, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Cochran.............................................. 1
Senator Levin................................................ 3
WITNESSES
Monday, July 21, 1997
Dr. Kent Stansberry, Deputy Assistant for Arms Control
Implementation and Compliance of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Technology)................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
APPENDIX
Questions and responses for the record........................... 23
COMPLIANCE REVIEW PROCESS AND
MISSILE DEFENSE
----------
MONDAY, JULY 21, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation and Federal Services,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran and Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The meeting for the Subcommittee will
please come to order. Today we have as the subject of our
hearing, ``The Compliance Review Process and Missile Defense.''
This past March in Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and Yelstin
issued a joint statement announcing the outlines of an
agreement that would draw a demarcation line between theater
and strategic missile defenses, and they sent their negotiators
back to Geneva to finalize an agreement. As has happened so
many times in the past, however, the negotiators were unable to
agree on the important details and returned last month empty-
handed. But even if they had reached an agreement based on the
Helsinki joint statement, it would not have drawn a clear
demarcation line. Any agreement based upon the Helsinki
statement, after all, offers clarity only for far less capable
theater missile defenses over which there has been little
dispute. For the more capable systems, which have been at the
heart of the nearly 4-year-long ABM-TMD demarcation
negotiations, Helsinki contains no agreement on demarcation,
only an acknowledgment that the Treaty parties will continue to
determine for themselves whether their more capable systems
comply with the ABM Treaty.
The process by which the United States makes those
determinations will continue to be critically important, not
only for TMD systems, but also for National Missile Defense,
and is the subject of our hearing today.
The U.S. Compliance Review Process has, in the past,
produced results that are unfortunate. For example, early in
1994, the administration declared that testing the prototype
THAAD interceptor would be non-compliant and that it would have
to be treated as an ABM system, even though it could never be
usefully employed as an ABM system. A year later, the prototype
was determined to be compliant, provided the capabilities of
the system were substantially reduced by removing its ability
to receive satellite cuing data for its radar. According to the
Administration, the effort required to modify the software in
accordance with that decision cost the U.S. taxpayer several
million dollars. Then the Administration announced in September
of 1996 that not only could the prototype THAAD be tested, so
could the final, objective system, and both could now be
equipped with the same satellite cuing capability that we had
paid to take out of the system earlier. These inconsistencies
raise serious questions about how these reviews are conducted.
The Compliance Review Process also passes judgments on our
National Missile Defense System, and compliance determinations
will be increasingly important as we move forward on that
program. Numerous Administration officials, including the
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in
testimony before this Subcommittee in May of this year, have
said that our NMD deployment program may have elements that do
not comply with the ABM Treaty, and might require further
negotiation with the Russians. For example, Article I of the
ABM Treaty explicitly prohibits defense of the Nation's
territory from strategic ballistic missile attack, yet that is
precisely the purpose of our NMD program. There are numerous
other potential features of an NMD system that seem to conflict
with the ABM Treaty, as Director Holum of ACDA testified in our
May hearing. Whether these apparent incompatibilities can be
rationalized away will be determined by the same Compliance
Review Process that governs our TMD programs.
We have as our witness at today's hearing someone who deals
with these issues every day. Dr. Kent Stansberry Chairs the
Defense Department's Compliance Review Group in his capacity as
Deputy Director for Arms Control Implementation and Compliance
in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology. As Chairman of the Compliance Review Group, he
is responsible for running the process that determines whether
U.S. weapon systems comply with our treaty obligations. We are
pleased to have him here to help us better understand the
Compliance Review Process as it applies to missile defense.
Today's hearing may touch on matters that are classified
and we are prepared to move to a closed session if that becomes
necessary. Our questions will be unclassified, but if your
answers require a classified response Dr. Stansberry, let us
know and we will return to those specific questions in closed
session.
I am happy to be joined by my distinguished colleague from
the state of Michigan, Senator Carl Levin today and I yield to
him at this point for any opening statement or comments that he
would care to make. Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And with you, I
want to join in welcoming our witness here today. This hearing
is going to provide the Subcommittee and the Senate and the
public with an opportunity to learn more about how the
Executive Branch reviews U.S. military programs and systems for
arms control compliance, particularly with respect to missile
defenses and the ABM Treaty. This is an important National
Security topic that is not widely understood.
Success of Administrations from President Nixon onward have
viewed the ABM Treaty as an important Treaty because it has
contributed to strategic stability, prevented an arms race in
defensive and space weapons systems, and permitted very
significant reductions in nuclear arsenals that were built up
during the cold war. Secretary of Defense Cohen and General
Shalikashvili, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, have stated
clearly, these reductions in excess nuclear weapons are
squarely in our security interests. Now others may disagree
with the value of the ABM Treaty, but I think most of us
believe that we should live up to our Treaty obligations, just
as we expect others to live up to theirs, unless and until we
or other parties withdraw from or abrogate a Treaty.
United States Compliance Review Process is a key element in
ensuring that the United States is in compliance with our arms
control obligations. It is not a new function. It was set in
place during the early 70's at the beginning of the era of
nuclear arms limitation and has been supported by every
Administration from President Nixon to President Bush through
to the current Administration.
In the context of missile defense systems in the ABM
Treaty, the compliance review process is a contentious issue.
The treaty has a provision, Article VI(a) that prohibits either
side from giving non-ABM systems, ABM capabilities, and
prohibits testing non-ABM systems in an ABM mode. Thus, we need
to know what the demarcation is between theater missile
defenses and strategic or National missile defenses. Congress
has urged the President to negotiate this demarcation and has
provided guidelines for the demarcation. If we can negotiate a
demarcation agreement with Russia, it will remove these theater
systems from the table as potentially contentious issues. The
Administration is currently negotiating this issue in Geneva.
The Senate has a uniquely constitutional role in providing
advice and consent to treaties. Consequently, we have a strong
interest in matters relating to arms control treaty issues,
including compliance. This hearing will help to inform the
Senate on these important issues and I want to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for convening this hearing to help us to understand
the issues more fully and to have a record which will be
available to all of our colleagues.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator Levin, for
your comments and your participation in this series of hearings
that we are having on the subjects that are related to this
issue today.
Dr. Stansberry, we have a copy of your prepared statement
for which we thank you and we will make that a part of the
record in full. We encourage you to make whatever comments you
think would be helpful to our Subcommittee at this time. You
may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF DR. KENT STANSBERRY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT FOR ARMS
CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY)
Dr. Stansberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and
staff. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and
discuss the Arms Control Compliance Review Process.
I plan to focus primarily on the application of that
process, the ABM Treaty, and particularly theater missile
defenses (TMD), under the ABM Treaty.
The Department of Defense decides the treaty compliance
questions through an established review process. It was created
in connection with the SALT I agreements, which includes the
ABM Treaty, back in 1972. The process is defined completely and
more clearly in a DOD Directive which I believe the staff has a
copy of. Under this process, the military services and other
defense agencies must seek compliance approval before taking
any action that might reasonably raise a question of
compliance. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology, who is my boss, has been authorized by the
Secretary to ensure compliance of the Department of Defense and
to provide guidance to the services and agencies in
coordination with the DOD General Counsel, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. In practice, most of the detailed work is carried out by
a Compliance Review Group. I Chair that group for the ABM
Treaty.
Let me just speak briefly to the details of the process. A
formal compliance review generally begins when a service or
defense agency brings forward a particular plan or program with
proposed activity. That activity is then compared with our
obligations to determine whether it is acceptable or whether
there may be a need for modifying the activity. In doing that,
we determine the obligations through a general pattern that
includes reading the Treaty text and its associated documents,
and examining the record of Senate approval to determine how
the Executive Branch explained the Treaty to the Senate as a
part of our Constitutional process of making treaties. We also
examine the relevant practices of the parties to determine how
the parties have behaved in the past with respect to particular
obligations and we often examine the negotiating record to
consider how the parties understood the text as they negotiated
it.
This formal process of compliance review ends typically
with guidance to the service or agency that initiated their
request. The guidance is generally provided by the Under
Secretary for Acquisition and Technology with the concurrence
of representatives of the Under Secretary for Policy, the
General Counsel, and the Joint Staff. One particular strength
of that process is that the final decisions represent consensus
of those organizations. And in fact, every single past
compliance determination has been a consensus. There has not
been a dissenting view in any past decision.
Occasionally, we will raise issues with other agencies of
the Executive Branch, particularly the State Department, the
Arms Control Agency and the National Security Council staff,
when the issues involve matters that may effect them.
Now, let me talk specifically about theater missile defense
for a little bit. The ABM Treaty does not explicitly limit
theater missile defenses, but implicitly limits them through a
provision which was intended to prevent upgrade. Let me read
that: Article VI of the Treaty States in part, ``To enhance
assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM
systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each party
undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars,
other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM
radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or
their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an
ABM mode.''
The United States was the sponsor of that language back in
the early 1970's, when the Treaty was negotiated, primarily
because of our concern about widely deployed air defenses in
the Soviet Union and the possibility that those air defenses
may represent a defensive capability against our ICBMs and
SLBMs. That prohibition on upgrading non-ABM systems and
components in Article VI(a) defines two quite specific
obligations: (1) not to give capabilities to counter strategic
ballistic missiles, and (2) not to test in an ABM mode. For the
purpose of evaluating the capabilities to counter, we must use
hypothetical capabilities because we cannot test our theater
missile defense systems against strategic ballistic missiles to
determine actual capabilities. Thus, we have assessed these
capabilities to counter on the basis of computer simulations of
performance of theater missile defense systems to counter
strategic ballistic missiles. For example, in our evaluation of
the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System, we used
computer simulations of the hypothetical performance of THAAD
against Russian ICBMs and Russian SLBMs.
In assessing these simulations, we look extensively at past
practices of the parties. A key element of that past practice
was a report that was provided to Congress in February of 1986
by the Executive Branch where we discussed U.S. views about
Soviet activity regarding air defenses. A key part of that was
concluding that in making these determinations to apply Article
VI(a), they must be made taking into account the military
significance of whatever ABM capability is present in these
non-ABM systems.
Now, as a practical matter we have assessed this military
significance on the basis of the simulated hypothetical
performance of a single TMD interceptor missile and radar to
intercept a single reentry vehicle from certain Russian ICBMs
and SLBMs.
As I mentioned, there is a second obligation of Article
VI(a), not to test in an ABM mode. The meaning of that Article
is substantially clearer because in the mid and late 1970's, we
negotiated an agreed statement that provided substantial
definition of the term, ``tested in ABM mode'' as it applies in
the Treaty.
The Department of Defense has a number of TMD programs in
various stages of development and deployment. All of these TMD
programs are going forward without ABM Treaty effects on the
capabilities necessary for them to meet their requirements. As
the Department has previously informed the Congress, we have
certified the compliance of the Patriot, Navy Area Defense, and
Navy Theater Wide Systems and the THAAD System--in the case of
THAAD, both the User Operational Evaluation System and the
objective system. We have certified those compliant, as all of
those programs are currently planned. Thus, we have certified
as Treaty compliant all existing TMD programs that have matured
to the point where it is possible for us to assess their
compliance. These programs are proceeding without ABM Treaty
effects on their intended capabilities for theater missile
defense.
If the programs change, we will of course review them for
compliance purposes in the future and make any additional
compliance assessments as necessary based on program changes.
Now, let me speak briefly about National Missile Defense.
The administration's policy with respect to ABM Treaty
compliance in National Missile Defense is somewhat subtle. The
policy is that development and testing of a National Missile
Defense system will comply with the existing treaty. However,
the system that we would deploy would be determined by the
threat we face if we were to decide to deploy. That threat
would decide the nature of the system architecture and then if
that architecture requires that we change the ABM Treaty, we
are prepared to seek those changes.
With respect to National Missile Defense, the Department is
currently in the process of selecting a lead system integrator
which will be responsible for development and if necessary
deployment of an integrated National Missile Defense system.
Given the immature status of that system design and the testing
plans at this moment, it is not possible to make any definitive
compliance assessments regarding National Missile Defense
development testing. However, since the Treaty already
specifically allows ABM testing, fully capable testing, of ABM
systems in a fixed land-based mode, we expect that we will be
able to carry out our National Missile Defense development and
testing consistent with the Treaty. As I have mentioned, we
would be willing to modify the Treaty to proceed with
deployment.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
Subcommittee and I am prepared to help answer any questions
that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Stansberry follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENT G. STANSBERRY
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, and Staff: I wish to
thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you the DOD arms control
compliance review process. I plan to address the application of that
process to the evaluation of missile defense programs and their
compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. I plan to
focus particular attention on the DOD theater missile defense CFMD)
programs. I understand that ABM Treaty compliance for these programs is
a specific interest of the subcommittee.
The Department of Defense decides treaty compliance questions
through an established compliance review process. This process was
created in connection with thee SALT I agreements, which included the
ABM Treaty, in 1972. (This process is defined in DOD Directive 2060.1)
Under this process, the Military Services and Defense Agencies must
seek compliance approval before taking any action that would reasonably
raise a compliance issue. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition
and Technology) has been authorized by the Secretary to ensure
compliance for the Department of Defense and to provide compliance
guidance to the Services and Agencies in coordination with the DOD
General Counsel, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In practice, most of the
detailed work supporting the compliance review process is carried out
by the DOD Compliance Review Group, which is made up of representatives
from the organizations just mentioned. I chair that Compliance Review
Group for the ABM Treaty.
The advent of the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1984 led to
increased activity in the DOD compliance review process for the ABM
Treaty. Prior to that time, our ballistic missile defense program
consisted primarily of studies and technology development. Since then,
however, the arms control compliance review process has approved more
than 100 individual tests or complete programs as consistent with the
ABM Treaty. In summary, we have been successful in assuring that
programs achieve their objectives while remaining in compliance with
the ABM Treaty.
General Approach to Compliance Review
We have found through long experience in evaluating compliance
questions that we need specific and detailed information in order to
make compliance decisions. This is so because these decisions generally
depend on the detailed nature of both the activity to be undertaken and
the performance of the particular devices involved. Said differently,
we have not found it useful or appropriate to try to address treaty
compliance-questions in the abstract, but rather we address them in the
context of information about specific and detailed plans. This
consideration is important as we deal with compliance questions for our
TMD programs.
A formal compliance review generally begins with a Military Service
or Defense Agency bringing forward a plan or program for proposed
activity. That activity is compared to U.S. arms control obligations to
determine whether it is acceptable or would need to be modified. In
determining the obligations, we follow a general pattern to assure that
our interpretations are accurate and consistent in the complicated and
ambiguous circumstances which often apply. The text of the Treaty and
its associated documents, such as agreed statements and common
understandings, fundamentally define the obligations. We can
occasionally clarify the obligations by examining the Senate approval
record to determine how the Executive Branch explained the treaty as
part of our constitutional process of making treaties. We can further
clarify the obligations by examining the relevant practices of the
treaty parties to determine how the particular text has been
interpreted in the past. These past practices can involve both the
actions and the statements of the parties. Finally, we can clarify the
obligations by examining the treaty negotiating record to consider how
the parties understood the meaning during the process of drafting the
text.
The formal compliance review process ends in guidance to the
initiating Military Service or Defense Agency. The guidance is
generally provided by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) with the concurrence of representatives of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Policy), the DOD General Counsel, and the Joint
Staff One basic strength of the compliance process is that the final
decisions represent consensus. In fact, every past formal compliance
determination has been a consensus. Compliance issues are also
occasionally considered in the interagency context with the State
Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National
Security Council Staff
Theater Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty
Although the ABM Treaty does not explicitly limit TMD, it does so
implicitly. Article VI of the ABM Treaty states, in part:
To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations
on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty,
each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or
radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or
ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic
missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to
test them in an ABM mode; . . .
This provision supports other Treaty limitations on the development,
testing, and deployment of ABM capability by prohibiting ``upgrading''
non-ABM components to give them ABM capabilities.
When the ABM Treaty was negotiated, the issues associated with
Article VI(a) were reasonably straightforward. At that time, the United
States was concerned about the potential ABM capability of the widely
deployed Soviet air defense systems and, thus, pressed during the
negotiations for the inclusion of a prohibition on upgrading non-ABM
components. More recently, however, particularly with the development
of highly capable TMD systems, the issues associated with Article VI(a)
have become more complex.
The prohibition on upgrading non-ABM systems and components in
Article VI(a) of the ABM Treaty defines two specific obligations: (1)
not to give ``capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles''
and (2) not to ``test in an ABM mode.'' For the purpose of evaluating
compliance of TMD systems with the first obligation, we assess
hypothetical ``capabilities to counter.'' They must be hypothetical
capabilities because we cannot test TMD systems against strategic
ballistic missiles to determine actual capabilities. Thus, we have
assessed those capabilities on the basis of the simulated performance
of TMD systems to counter strategic ballistic missiles. For example, in
our evaluation of the compliance of the Theater High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) System, we used computer simulations of the
hypothetical THAAD performance against Russian ICBMs and SLBMs.
In assessing the results of these simulations, we look extensively
at the past practices of the ABM Treaty Parties. In February 1986, the
Executive Branch, in a report to Congress submitted by the Director of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, discussed past Soviet air
defense practices and reached the following conclusions:
Clearly, the phrase ``capabilities to counter'' as used in
the ABM Treaty was intended to have the ordinary meaning of
``blocking'' or ``stopping'' a reentry vehicle. In the context
of the ABM Treaty giving a [surface-to-air missile system]
``capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles'' meant
giving them actual ABM capabilities.
Since virtually any air defense missile system has some level
of ABM capability, the Treaty was not intended to preclude an
incidental or insignificant ABM capability. Such a
determination must ultimately be a factual determination taking
into account the military significance of whatever ABM
capability is present.
As a practical matter, we have assessed this ``military significance''
on the basis of the simulated, hypothetical performance of a single TMD
interceptor missile and radar to intercept a single reentry vehicle
from certain Russian (formerly Soviet) ICBMs or SLBMs.
The meaning of the second obligation of Article VI(a), not to
``test in an ABM mode,'' is substantially clearer than the meaning of
the first. The United States and the Soviet Union held discussions in
the Standing Consultative Commission (the organization established by
the ABM Treaty to promote the Treaty's objectives and implementation)
during the 1970's on questions related to air defense activities under
the Treaty. Those discussions resulted in an Agreed Statement of
November 1978 giving a detailed definition of ``tested in an ABM mode''
as used in the Treaty.
The Department of Defense has a number of TMD programs in various
stages of development and deployment. All of these TMD programs are
going forward without ABM Treaty effects on the capabilities necessary
to meet their requirements. As the Department has previously informed
the Congress, we have certified the compliance of the Patriot, Navy
Area Defense, and Navy Theater Wide systems and the THAAD system--both
the User Operational Evaluation System and the objective versions of
THAAD--as they are currently planned. DOD has now certified as treaty
compliant all existing U.S. TMD programs that have matured to a point
where it is possible to assess compliance. These programs are
proceeding without any ABM Treaty effects on their intended
capabilities for theater missile defense. We will of course, review for
compliance purposes any changes to these programs. DOD will make any
further compliance assessments that are necessary for U.S. TMD systems
at the appropriate points in their programs.
The United States has been negotiating with Russia and other newly
independent states to reach agreement on demarcation between ABM
systems and non-ABM TMD systems. We have not yet concluded an
agreement, and the negotiations are continuing. In the meantime,
compliance determinations for TMD systems will remain a national
responsibility. In light of the fact that we have already certified as
treaty compliant all existing U.S. TMD programs that are sufficiently
mature to allow a compliance assessment, we do not need the demarcation
agreement in order for our TMD programs to proceed as currently
planned.
National Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty
The DOD program for National Missile Defense (NMD) is currently in
development. The program will be prepared, within three years, to
deploy a NMD system within an additional three years, should a
ballistic missile threat to the United States warrant such deployment.
The Administration's policy is that development and testing in the NMD
program will comply with the existing ABM Treaty. Should we decide to
deploy, the system which we would deploy would be determined by the
threat and might comply with the existing Treaty, or might require
Treaty modification.
The Department is currently in the process of selecting a Lead
System Integrator which will be responsible for developing and, if
necessary, deploying an integrated NMD system. Given the immature
status of the system design and testing plans, it is not possible at
this time to make any definite compliance assessments regarding NMD
development and testing. Since the ABM Treaty specifically allows
development and testing of fixed, land-based ABM systems and
components, we expect that we can carry out NMD development and testing
consistent with the Treaty.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee. I
would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Dr. Stansberry.
You may have heard in my opening statement that I made a
comment about inconsistencies that have raised questions about
how the reviews under the current process are conducted.
Specifically, I referred to the decision that was made in 1994
about the testing of the prototype THAAD interceptor. That it
would be non-compliant and it would have to be treated as an
ABM system, even though it could never be usefully employed as
an ABM system, and then later the prototype was determined to
be compliant provided that capabilities of the system were
substantially reduced by removing its ability to receive
satellite cueing data for its radar.
According to our information, the effort required a
modification of software with that decision costing U.S.
taxpayers several million dollars. And then the administration
in 1996 announced that not only could the prototype THAAD be
tested, so could the final objective system and both could now
be equipped with the same satellite cuing capability that we
had paid to take out of the system earlier.
Do you recall the circumstances surrounding those decisions
and can you explain to us what happened in that situation and
why?
Dr. Stansberry. I do recall. Some of that occurred while I
was in my current position. Some of it preceded me. It does
seem inconsistent on its face and I hope I can help clarify.
The Administration, as a part of a process of reviewing the ABM
Treaty when the Administration first took office, examined some
of these questions. That review ended in the decision to
proceed with negotiations on demarcation. Part of that review
also examined what was then understood of THAAD's performance
capability and concluded that THAAD, as then we understood it,
would have to be treated as an ABM system under the ABM Treaty.
In January 1995 the THAAD Demonstration and Validation
Program, basically the initial test program for THAAD, was
approved on the basis that THAAD would not have some particular
software to allow it to process information from external
sensors to allow it to help perform its mission. That software
was not needed for the Demonstration and Validation Program and
it was on the basis that it was not going to be either needed
or procured for that program that the approval was given.
As the program proceeded, it got to the point where it
either needed to proceed with development of that software, or
risk delays in the program. It was at that point that we did a
much more substantial review of the performance consistent with
the compliance review process I described earlier. Several
things were different between 1993 and 1994 when the first
reviews were carried out and in 1996 when we finished. There
were several changes in the projected THAAD performance which
were different. If the Subcommittee is interested, I can get
into those changes in detail in closed session, but I am not
prepared in open session.
There are several changes in the details of the
performance. In one area we made some assumptions about the
performance, assumptions which were conservative in the context
of that analysis. It was conservative in the sense that it
would err on the side of having the U.S. not do something
illegal under the Treaty. Later, by September 1996, we
understood the performance of THAAD much better and we
understood the application of some of the particular
assumptions much better so that with no changes to THAAD based
on Treaty reasons, and no changes to the compliance review
process, we were able with a much more detailed evaluation of
THAAD's performance, we were able to conclude that it would
have no ABM capability. It was on that basis that it was
approved back in September.
Senator Cochran. You mentioned in your statement that one
of the centerpiece considerations in the review process is the
military significance standard. My staff tells me that in a
recent briefing, Mr. O. J. Sheaks, who is Acting Assistant
Director for Intelligence, and Verification Information
Management at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said
that in judging compliance of Russian systems, their
evaluations are ``partly technical, partly political, and
partly military significance.''
Is military significance the standard used in assessing
compliance of U.S. systems?
Dr. Stansberry. Mr. Chairman, I believe we also take into
account the other two elements--the technical and the
political. As I described in my statement--the simulated
hypothetical performance of TMD systems against Russian
strategic missiles is the technical element. The compliance
review process, as I mentioned, involves participation from the
Policy part of OSD and the General Counsel part of OSD. Part of
the reason for their participation is to try to make sure that
we maintain consistency between the way we are applying the
treaty to the other side and the way we apply the treaty to
ourselves.
Senator Cochran. In your assessments of the military
significance, do you take into account operational factors,
including basing modes, the number of launch platforms and
missiles, the location of TMD systems and the character of a
likely strategic attack?
Dr. Stansberry. To date, we have not. We have done that
assessment on the basis of a single TMD system to counter a
single incoming strategic reentry vehicle. We have been using
that approach, as I mentioned earlier, to approve the
compliance of all existing TMD systems. So, similar to many
elements of law, we have gotten to the point in reviewing the
practices of the parties and the meaning of the Treaty, that we
needed to assess compliance and have simply left undecided
further questions that are not necessary to make individual
decisions.
Senator Cochran. We have been advised that the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency relies upon the Joint Staff in judging
whether Russian TMD capabilities are militarily significant.
Do we also rely on the Joint Staff to judge U.S.
capabilities in terms of their military significance? If we do
not rely on the Joint Staff or involve them in any way, why do
we not do that?
Dr. Stansberry. The Joint Staff is a part of the compliance
review process as directed by the Secretary in the DOD
Directive. The Joint Staff, you probably need to talk to them
to understand in more detail their view about this, but I
believe, again, one of the things that they are sensitive to is
making sure that we apply the Treaty to ourselves in a way that
is consistent with the way that we apply it to other parties.
Senator Cochran. It would not be fair, then, to say that we
are judging the Treaty against ourselves more narrowly than we
judge it against possible Russian compliance with the treaty.
Would that be fair or would it not be?
Dr. Stansberry. Well, in the end we have not found--let me
back up. In the sense that we have allowed all existing
programs to proceed, we have not found it necessary to identify
some particular outer boundary--the outer boundary of
compliance.
Senator Cochran. But it seems that there have been
modifications and changes in plans and programs because of
constraints imposed by those who are judging compliance with
ABM provisions, is that not correct?
Dr. Stansberry. The THAAD program was not allowed to
develop cueing software for more than a year based on
compliance considerations. However, with the approval of THAAD
last September, they were free to proceed with the development
of that software without any restrictions on the way they
planned to develop the program.
Senator Cochran. Thank you. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Was there a change in the software between
the time it was not approved and the time it was approved?
Dr. Stansberry. I think in minor detail there was a change
in specific requirements, but no change that was important to
this particular issue. The software was allowed to proceed
without any restrictions.
Senator Levin. What had changed then? Was it an
understanding of what the software did or was it an
interpretation of the Treaty requirements or something else
that I can't think of?
Dr. Stansberry. Two general areas: The system itself
changed in technical ways.
Senator Levin. You are saying those are unrelated to these
considerations that we are talking about?
Dr. Stansberry. That is right. There were changes because
of programmatic considerations.
Senator Levin. So then my question then remains was it
approved relative to Treaty compliance a year later because of
a different interpretation of where the demarcation line is or
where the prohibitions were in the treaty in some other area?
What changed in that year? I am not talking about the technical
changes which are unrelated to the issue we are talking about.
What changed relative----
Dr. Stansberry. Relative to the interpretation of the
Treaty, nothing.
Senator Levin. What did change?
Dr. Stansberry. The capabilities intended to be in THAAD
and some capabilities that were originally assumed to be in
THAAD that we later found out were not going to be there. I
would be prepared in closed session to discuss that in whatever
detail that you are interested in.
Senator Levin. No, I do not for this session need the
details as to what those changes were specifically. But it was
the understanding then of what the capability of that system
was that changed during the year?
Dr. Stansberry. That is correct, not the interpretation of
Article VI(a) of the Treaty.
Senator Levin. Does the Department of Defense have the sole
responsibility for compliance review of U.S. military systems
and activities? I know there are consultations with the State
Department or the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but is
it the DOD's responsibility ultimately for that compliance
review of military systems?
Dr. Stansberry. In a strict sense, yes. The Secretary is
responsible for making sure that the activities of the
Department are legal. He has designated the Under Secretary for
Acquisition of Technology the responsibility to make sure that
the Department's activities are consistent with arms control
obligations, and then he has laid out a process for review of
things within the Department. Occasionally when there are
issues that we know are of concern to other agencies, we will
go to them and discuss these issues with them as well.
Senator Levin. Now, does the Compliance Review Group for
instance on the ABM Treaty, obtain the advice and the expertise
of the Joint Staff and the JCS?
Dr. Stansberry. Yes. The Joint Staff participates. They are
a member of the Compliance Review Group.
Senator Levin. What about the JCS, do they get involved or
is their advice sought?
Dr. Stansberry. Do you mean the Chairman?
Senator Levin. Themselves.
Dr. Stansberry. The Joint Chiefs themselves?
Senator Levin. Right.
Dr. Stansberry. Occasionally issues of particularly
sensitive issues will go all the way to the Chairman for his
approval; and while I do not have a lot of insight into the
details of the way the Joint Staff runs its process, I believe
that their approval always represent the views of the Chairman
and the Chiefs.
Senator Levin. So that these compliance reviews are not a
matter of just a few attorneys sitting around theorizing as to
what might or might not be compliant, you get the inputs here
of the Joint Staff and the JCS?
Dr. Stansberry. And the Joint Staff coordinates on the
decision.
Senator Levin. You have had a consensus on every compliance
decision?
Dr. Stansberry. Every single one.
Senator Levin. The Compliance Review Group that you Chair
has made over 100 certifications, as I understand it, for tests
or programs as being compliant with the ABM Treaty, is that
accurate?
Dr. Stansberry. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Over what period of time would that be?
Dr. Stansberry. I went back and counted that number. That
is 100 since the advent of the SDI Program in about 1984.
Senator Levin. So in the last maybe 13 years?
Dr. Stansberry. Yes, sir. And I believe the number is 107
at the moment.
Senator Levin. And climbing. What is the relationship
between your group and the Standing Consultative Commission
delegation?
Dr. Stansberry. The delegation to the Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC) is the U.S. Government delegation that
discusses Treaty implementation issues with the other side in
the Treaty. The SCC delegation is an Executive Branch-wide
delegation, so it includes representatives from the Defense
Department, the State Department, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, and the Intelligence Community. I am
generally aware of what is going on because what they do can
have some effect on my responsibility. As a matter of fact,
about 16 or 18 years ago, I participated in a couple of
sessions with that group. I do not directly participate
anymore.
Senator Levin. You are assuring this Subcommittee that
except for that 1 year period where there was an understanding
relative to the software, which turned out to be inaccurate for
whatever reason we could learn in a closed session, that the
United States has not reduced the capability of any theater
missile defense system in order to make them compliant with
ABM, is that correct?
Dr. Stansberry. That is correct. That applies to all the
other systems and in fact----
Senator Levin. All the other systems?
Dr. Stansberry. The Patriot, the Navy Theater Wide System,
the Navy Area System are all theater missile defense (TMD)
systems that are underway and that this statement applies to.
With respect to THAAD, what happened was that THAAD did not
need that capability through its demonstration and validation
program and so it never actually limited the necessary
capability. What it did was cost, as the Chairman said, I
believe about $3.2 million dollars to assure during that period
of time that we did not inappropriately develop the software.
It did not result in any capability limitation of THAAD or any
delay of THAAD, however.
Senator Levin. Does the United States and Russia each make
their own National compliance determinations?
Dr. Stansberry. We do and it appears that the Russians do.
They have not brought any to us asking for our approval.
Senator Levin. Are you familiar with the provision of the
1996 Defense Authorization Act which defines the ABM qualifying
flight test as a flight test against the ballistic missile
which in that flight test exceeds a range of 3,500 kilometers
or a velocity of 5 kilometers per second?
Dr. Stansberry. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator Levin. Is that the test which is also sought to be
agreed upon in our negotiations with the Russians? Is that the
demarcation line?
Dr. Stansberry. That is the demarcation line. The
characteristics for targets against which we would test theater
missile defense systems under the ongoing demarcation
negotiations.
Senator Levin. But that is the position that we have taken
for the target demarcation line, is that correct?
Dr. Stansberry. Yes.
Senator Levin. And that is the same demarcation line as
Congress has put into its, I think it was the Sense of the
Congress language of 1996?
Dr. Stansberry. Yes, Senator.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Stansberry, our staff has prepared a
chart showing the compliance status of U.S. theater missile
defense systems as they stand today and as they would under the
Helsinki demarcation agreement. If this chart is accurate, it
seems like the Helsinki agreement does not help us much in
determining compliance. In fact, with the exception of making
clear that lower velocity systems can use data from the space-
based SMTS sensor, the net effect seems to be to ban systems
whose compliance status is uncertain at this time. I invite you
to take a look at that chart. One is on display on the easel
and you have been given a small copy there for your review.
[The chart referred to follows:]
Compliance Status of TMD Systems With and Without the Helsinki
Demarcation Agreement
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Status Without Status With
System Demarcation Demarcation
Agreement Agreement
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PAC-3 Compliant Compliant
Navy Area Compliant Compliant
THAAD Compliant Compliant
Navy Theater Compliant Compliant
(``baseline'')
Navy Theater ? ?
(improved radar)
Navy Theater ? ?
(launch on composite data)
Navy Theater ? ?
(use of SMTS data)
Airborne Laser ? ?
Space-based Laser ? Non-complaint
Space-based Interceptor ? Non-complaint
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Cochran. The suggestion this chart makes is that
those systems that you have already described that have already
been approved--the advanced Patriot system, in the Navy Area,
THAAD and Navy Theater have all been considered compliant by
your group. Even without a demarcation agreement in accordance
with the Helsinki statement, they would be compliant. Is that
not correct?
Dr. Stansberry. That is correct.
Senator Cochran. And then these other systems are
mentioned: Navy theater without an improved radar, launch on
composite data, and use of SMTS data. Tell us what that is.
Dr. Stansberry. That is the Space Missile Tracking System.
It more recently is called the low altitude component of the
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRs). Years ago, 2, 3 or 4 years
ago, it was known as ``Brilliant Eyes.''
Senator Cochran. Right. SMTS is more politically correct
than Brilliant Eyes I think is what they decided. And then the
airborne laser is listed in the same category. Now, all of
those we have put questions marks by is because their status is
in question without a demarcation agreement and with an
agreement based on the Helsinki statement would still be
uncertain. And for the last two--the space-based laser and
space-based interceptor--under the column ``Status Without
Demarcation Agreement'' their compliance is in question, but
with the Helsinki statement both would be non-compliant.
Do you agree with that depiction on this chart of those
conclusions and if you do, tell us why you do and if you do
not, tell us why you do not.
Dr. Stansberry. Most of them, Mr. Chairman. The three
entries involving Navy Theater Wide with various levels of
upgrade and the airborne laser are all uncertain today because
there is no well-defined program to do either of those that
would allow us to assess the compliance.
Senator Cochran. You mean any?
Dr. Stansberry. I'm sorry. Any of those, yes. The various
upgrades to Navy Theater Wide are just simply too immature to
understand the performance of the system well enough to be able
to apply the process I discussed before. The airborne laser, an
Air Force program, is in a similar state where it is not
sufficiently mature to allow us to make compliance judgments.
Our current understanding is that that program would probably
not carry out the kind of test that would raise ABM Treaty
issues for about another 5 years.
Now, where I guess I would take a certain exception to the
chart is with respect to space-based lasers and space-based
interceptors without a demarcation agreement. In the
preparations for the Helsinki summit, the administration--well,
let me back up for a second. The ABM Treaty contains an
unequivocal ban on ABM systems and ABM components that are
space-based. The question arose, ``Can you have a theater
missile defense system that is space-based, consistent with the
ban on ABM systems, consistent with the understanding that it
must not have capability to counter, must not be tested in an
ABM mode?''
In the preparations for the Helsinki summit, the
administration considered that question and, for a variety of
technical reasons, concluded that it was probably impossible to
have a space-based theater missile defense system which was not
also a space-based ABM system and it was on that basis that the
administration--the President--agreed at the Helsinki summit to
ban space-based TMD, both interceptors and systems based on
other physical principles.
Senator Cochran. Was that a decision made in consultation
with Russian counterparts, or just here within the United
States?
Dr. Stansberry. I believe that was a unilateral U.S.
decision.
Senator Cochran. Was there any reason to suspect that the
Russians would have lodged a complaint or protest if we had
proceeded to use a space-based component in a theater missile
defense system?
Dr. Stansberry. Well, based on past Russian performance, I
would suspect that it would, almost certainly. They would raise
a compliance issue.
Senator Cochran. Is there any way to have an early
detection of a launch from a missile site aimed at us if you do
not have a space-based detection system?
Dr. Stansberry. We currently have a ballistic missile early
warning system. It is a sort of evolution of the system that
goes back to the early 1970's, the Defense Support Program, and
it provides notification of the launch within tens of seconds
after it occurs.
Senator Cochran. And that is not prohibited under the ABM
Treaty, right?
Dr. Stansberry. That is correct.
Senator Cochran. And what is prohibited, the ability to
track?
Dr. Stansberry. No--Article VI(a) prohibits giving
components the capability to counter and testing them in ABM
mode. In Article V, it prohibits development, testing and
deployment of space-based ABM systems; and we have defined
systems as those which have in effect capability to counter as
ABM systems in the past.
Senator Cochran. According to your testimony, we perform a
comprehensive review of our systems every year to be sure they
are compliant, but according to ACDA, which is responsible for
evaluating Russian compliance with the Treaty, the U.S. does
not systematically review Russian capabilities to ensure they
are compliant; instead I am advised that we wait for evidence
of non-compliance to appear and then we investigate that. But
even then, if we do not turn up clear evidence of non-
compliance, the Russians would not be charged with a violation.
Is this a double standard by which the burden of proof on
the U.S. is to demonstrate conclusively to itself that any
system we have could not possibly, even on a theoretical basis,
have ABM capability, while with respect to Russian systems, the
proof is related to a demonstration that they do have
capability?
Dr. Stansberry. If there is a double standard here, Mr.
Chairman, it is with respect to the timing of the issues, much
less than the substance of the performance. Timing in the sense
that we generally do not know what the Russians are doing until
they have actually demonstrated something in a test. For our
purposes, we would not pay the money to carry out a test that
would be a violation. So we stop activity which might be
inconsistent with the Treaty substantially earlier in the
natural development of a program when we might see the
comparable activity that the Russians undertake.
Now, with respect to the substance, I think basically we
are consistent. As I have mentioned in my prepared statement,
we have been concerned for a long time, going back into the
early and mid--1970's about the potential ABM capability of
Soviet air defenses. That concern was based on, as I would
characterize today, hypothetical capability. We never saw the
Soviet air defenses tested to intercept a strategic ballistic
missile. So in that sense, again, the substance I believe is
consistent, the timing may be different.
Senator Cochran. In your opinion, do any of our TMD systems
or the potential or planned upgrades that are being considered
have a militarily significant ABM capability? Specifically, do
you think that the Navy Theater Wide equipped with a
Cooperative Engagement Capability would have militarily
significant ABM capability that would affect compliance
decisions?
Dr. Stansberry. My honest answer to that is I do not know
at the moment. The Navy has not proposed a concrete application
of the Cooperative Engagement Capability for use with Navy
Theater Wide so that we could assess how it actually impacts on
ABM Treaty issues.
Senator Cochran. What about a more powerful radar for the
Navy Theater Wide System, would that invalidate the compliance
judgment that was rendered earlier?
Dr. Stansberry. The compliance judgment is based on the
currently planned program. If the program changes we would have
to review the compliance, so yes it would. A different radar
would invalidate the existing compliance determination.
Senator Cochran. And what about the ability to launch its
interceptor missiles based on information from external
sensors, would that change the compliance judgment for the Navy
Theater Wide?
Dr. Stansberry. That would also, for the same reason. They
currently do not plan to do that and we only evaluated the
currently planned program.
Senator Cochran. Back to the hypothetical, you do not deal
in hypothetical questions?
Dr. Stansberry. Well, we have found it counter productive
in the sense, and I am sure your legal background will be able
to appreciate this, counter productive to try to make decisions
in the abstract.
Senator Cochran. Like the Supreme Court. They do not like
to----
Dr. Stansberry. I hesitate to compare what I do to what
they do, but in that sense, yes.
Senator Cochran. Well, we are all supposed to be on the
same side anyway. But if the Navy Theater Wide was able to
launch its missiles based solely on data from the Space and
Missile Tracking System, we mentioned that a while ago, the
SMTS data, would that invalidate the previous compliance
decision?
Dr. Stansberry. It would invalidate it. Whether it was OK
under the treaty would depend on details that we do not have
yet.
Senator Cochran. I have a few more specific questions, but
I am going to yield at this point to Senator Levin for any
questions he might have.
Senator Levin. Just a couple of more questions, Mr.
Chairman.
I want to go back to that chart. As I understand your
testimony, under Article V of the ABM Treaty, each party
undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based which
are the words used there or mobile land-based, is that correct?
Dr. Stansberry. That is correct.
Senator Levin. That is Article V?
Dr. Stansberry. That is Article V; yes, sir.
Senator Levin. In your judgment when you looked at that
analysis prior to Helsinki, you reached a conclusion that those
systems were banned by the ABM Treaty, is that correct?
Dr. Stansberry. The DOD compliance review process did not,
it was the administration as a whole that made that judgment,
but it was essentially what you say, that any TMD system--
space-based TMD system that actually had TMD capability--would
also have ABM capability and, hence, be an ABM system.
Senator Levin. Did you participate in that decision?
Dr. Stansberry. I did not.
Senator Levin. Did the DOD?
Dr. Stansberry. I do not know, sir.
Senator Levin. Would you get us, for the record, and tell
us who was involved in reaching that?
Dr. Stansberry. I can do that, yes.
Senator Levin. If each party undertakes not to develop test
or to deploy an ABM component which is space-based, is that not
opprobrium or am I missing something here? Is it not by
definition a violation of the ABM? Is there a way it does not
violate the ABM Treaty to have a space-based laser or space-
based interceptor?
Dr. Stansberry. Only if it did not have ABM capability. As
I say, the judgment in the run up to the Helsinki summit was
that, just as a practical matter, it was not possible to build
a TMD laser that did not have ABM----
Senator Levin. Space-based.
Dr. Stansberry. Space-based, I'm sorry.
Senator Levin. That did not have ABM capability?
Dr. Stansberry. That is correct.
Senator Levin. If that is correct, that status would be
non-compliant without a demarcation agreement, is that not
correct?
Dr. Stansberry. That was the point that I made when I said
I would take some exception to the chart. On that basis, it is
not possible to make a TMD space-based system that is not also
an ABM system. The two red question marks would be non-
compliant.
Senator Levin. That is what I want to just clarify. Is that
your judgment?
Dr. Stansberry. Yes.
Senator Levin. Other than that, do you have any
disagreement with the chart?
Dr. Stansberry. No, I do not think so.
Senator Levin. In every other case it is the same with or
without a demarcation agreement, right?
Dr. Stansberry. Yes.
Senator Levin. It is only in those two cases where the
chart shows a difference and you disagree with the chart?
Dr. Stansberry. Yes.
Senator Levin. That is all I have. Thanks.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Stansberry, was the ABM capability
attributed to THAAD in 1994 deemed militarily significant? If
not, then why did the U.S. spend millions of dollars, $3.2 as
you said, taking the cueing capability out of that system and
then putting it back in?
Dr. Stansberry. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it was deemed militarily
significant. It was deemed that it passed the threshold set up
for Article VI(a).
Senator Cochran. In the National Missile Defense area, on
its face, the Treaty seems to say that any system capable of
protecting all of the U.S., even from a limited long-range
ballistic missile threat, is prohibited.
How do we ever get around that in developing--or how can
you ever decide that a National Missile Defense System is
Treaty compliant?
Dr. Stansberry. I think the best way to characterize it is
as sort of open to discussion at the moment. There has been no
need to decide at the moment whether we believe that a National
Missile Defense System is consistent or inconsistent with it.
The Administration has already said that if we plan to deploy a
National Missile Defense System and if that system is
inconsistent with the Treaty, we would move to change the
Treaty, not the system.
Senator Cochran. We had a meeting with our Subcommittee
members and staff to become acquainted with what plans are
underway for developing a National Missile Defense system and
we learned that a request for proposals for a Lead System
Integrator contract asked the contractors to consider a number
of potential NMD architectures, including options to deploy x-
band radars forward of the ABM deployment area. I know that
none of these plans are firm yet, but let's assume that meeting
a threat from North Korea, as an example, required a forward-
based radar on the west coast of the United States. The Treaty
defines an ABM radar as one constructed and deployed for an ABM
role. If deployment of a forward based radar was necessary to
complete intercepts of ICBMs, would not that radar meet the
definition of an ABM radar in Article II?
Dr. Stansberry. It would certainly raise questions and it
would depend upon the detailed nature of the radar and whether
and what its other roles might be. That is an example of the
kind of system architecture that might require us to seek
modification of the Treaty.
Senator Cochran. Article III requires ABM radars to be
located in the ABM deployment area or at test ranges. There
again is a possible conflict with a forward-deployed radar that
we might need, but which might not be Treaty compliant, is that
not correct?
Dr. Stansberry. If that forward-deployed radar were deemed
an ABM component, it clearly would be outside the allowed
deployment area, yes.
Senator Cochran. What about a forward-deployed radar placed
in South Korea or Japan?
Dr. Stansberry. The same comment, that if it were an ABM
radar, it would clearly be outside the deployment area. Whether
it is an ABM radar and whether it meets the requirements for an
ABM component would be based on answers that are not available
at the moment simply because the details are not here.
Senator Cochran. At this meeting in April that we had,
General Cosumano said that if forward-based x-band radars were
required, they will likely be less powerful versions of the
ground-based radar, which is the NMD system's ABM radar. If
this were the case, would not that radar be of the same type as
the radar tested in an ABM mode and therefore an ABM radar
under Article II's definition?
Dr. Stansberry. Not necessarily, because the type of rules
set out in Article II carry some implications about sort of
being identical and if it is a similar radar, but of a smaller
size, that may mean it is a different type. Again, we cannot
make judgments on questions like that until we see the actual
system design of the particular characteristics of the radar.
Senator Cochran. The suggestions about the space-based
components bothers me to some extent. I am going to read a
statement made by Mr. Bob Bell in March of 1997. He is of
course from the National Security Council staff. I am going to
quote this from a press conference statement:
``When we looked at this, both as a matter of compliance
law and as a matter of technological assessment, we determined
that in fact it would be impossible to distinguish between an
orbiting laser and orbiting battle station armed with kinetic
kill missiles that one side would claim was only designed to
intercept theater range missiles coming through space and
somehow not have the capability to destroy strategic missiles
going through space.''
Are you familiar with that assessment and did you
participate in that decision or that conclusion about the
space-based TMD system?
Dr. Stansberry. That is the same assessment I was
discussing with Senator Levin as part of the run-up to
Helsinki. I am familiar with it and no, I did not participate.
It is the thing that leads to dispute about the two red
question marks on the chart.
Senator Cochran. He also said the following: ``After all,
if you have a laser in space that has the power to burn a hole
through the side of a missile and blow it up, it can do that
whether the missile was an ICBM or an intermediate range
missile. So from our perspective, there was no demarcation
possible between space-based TMDs and space-based ABMs and we
see this agreement as a logical corollary of the existing
prohibition in the Treaty.''
Is this the position of the review group on this subject?
Dr. Stansberry. The Compliance Review Group has not
addressed that specific question and so I do not have any
particular position on it. I can understand that for a number
of technical reasons it is probably easier to kill, to destroy
strategic missiles from space than it is to destroy theater
missiles from space. The strategic missiles get closer to the
laser or the interceptor and hence, are just easier to destroy.
It is on the basis of considerations like that that any TMD
system that is space-based will probably have capability to
destroy strategic systems as well, and hence, be a violation of
the Article V ban on space-based ABM.
Senator Cochran. What would be the difference then between
that and an airborne laser? Would it not be able to burn a hole
in a missile and kill it just as well whether it is a strategic
missile or a theater missile?
Dr. Stansberry. It would, depending on where the airborne
platform is. The space-based platform for a space-based laser
is subject to the laws of physics determining satellite orbits.
An airborne platform is subject to some substantially different
considerations and I think that those differences would
probably come into play in evaluating an airborne laser
compliance.
Senator Cochran. But they are both prohibited in Article V.
It is the same article prohibiting space-based systems as
prohibits air-based systems.
Dr. Stansberry. That is correct--space-based and air-based
ABM; and it is important to understand the distinction here.
The assessment prior to Helsinki was that a space-based
interceptor or a space-based laser for TMD would likely have
ABM capability. That is not the conclusion for an airborne
laser. While we have not had to look at the airborne laser in
any detail, I suspect that we can come to a different
conclusion. The use of an airborne laser for theater missile
defense is not necessarily an airborne laser contrary to the
ABM Treaty.
Senator Cochran. It sounds in conclusion that, first of all
we have rules that we are applying against ourselves that may
make our costs of developing theater missile defense systems,
even if they are Treaty compliant, more expensive than they
would otherwise be if we were not constrained by our own
interpretations of the ABM Treaty. Is that not correct? Is that
not borne out by the record?
Dr. Stansberry. We have at least the one instance of THAAD
where it has been more costly to abide by the Treaty than if
were there no Treaty.
Senator Cochran. My next question then is do you not agree
that our interpretations of the ABM Treaty constrain us to the
extent that we have no plans or proposals to deploy theater
missile defense systems that are sophisticated enough to fully
protect us in the case of missile attack? In other words, we
are not preparing and not planning to deploy the systems that
are so advanced that they guarantee us a higher state of
security because of our own interpretation of the ABM Treaty,
is that not correct?
Dr. Stansberry. I do not think so, Mr. Chairman. The
process by which we define and approve programs starts with
requirements. The Theater Missile Defense programs that are
currently underway have their requirements defined in that
process. These are requirements that are not limited by the ABM
Treaty and all of the systems that we are currently developing
and deploying meet the requirements.
Senator Cochran. The requirement is judged on the basis of
the threat that you perceive exists, is that correct?
Dr. Stansberry. That is correct.
Senator Cochran. Well, I know that to assess the threat, we
end up having to be in a closed session to really find out the
details about what the emerging threats are, so we cannot get
into that part and we do not purport to say that that is a part
of this discussion. We are looking at our compliance review
process and I think you have been very helpful to us in
understanding how it works and what the standards are. It seems
to me that the standard we have may be subject to question.
I am going to ask you what your assessment of it is. If you
were the only person and you did not have to develop a
consensus, would you say that the standard that we have now is
the best standard or the standard that we ought to have in
place or how would you improve it if you could do that?
Dr. Stansberry. I think the standard works as we have
applied it. We have not limited the performance capability of
any TMD system that we have otherwise wanted to develop and
test. On that basis, I think the standard is working. I do not
believe we have gone as far as we can go because there are
additional questions about additional performance based on
potential improvements and the chart that the staff put
together is an example. There are potential improvements for
the Navy Theater Wide System that raise some questions. We have
not evaluated those questions, but I think it is fair to
evaluate them in the context of the same compliance standards
and practices that we have used in the past.
Senator Cochran. Well, why then is it necessary for us to
reach an agreement based on the Helsinki statement? All of our
systems that we have in place now or that we have planned are
compliant.
Dr. Stansberry. I think there are two or three reasons. One
is that the question marks on the chart are question marks. We
do not know what we might want to do in the future and a
demarcation agreement would take away the question marks.
Another element is that it would, and I think this is a
substantial sort of political consideration, it would remove as
potential item of dispute between us and the Russians this area
of the ABM Treaty. As you mentioned in your opening statement,
the connection between the ABM Treaty and strategic offensive
limitations with the Russians is important here, so that if we
have an element of dispute between the Russians, it has the
potential to undercut strategic offensive limitations, such as
START, START II, and maybe a future START III.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. Senator Levin?
Senator Levin. Just one additional question. There has been
long-standing differences in the Congress over the ABM Treaty
and its value and its impact on arms control and arms reduction
and so forth, but where I think there has been a consensus is
on theater missile defense systems. I think all of us want to
develop and to deploy effective TMD systems.
Can we develop and deploy effective TMD systems and still
comply with the ABM Treaty in your judgment?
Dr. Stansberry. I believe so, Senator Levin. The systems
that we have currently under development, TMD systems, have
been designed to meet the approved TMD requirements and we can
do that consistent with the existing ABM Treaty. Whether that
continues to hold in the future with additional potential
threats is as you know, a future question.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Dr. Stansberry, thank you very much for your assistance and
your testimony today at this hearing. We will continue our
series of hearings on subjects under the jurisdiction of this
Subcommittee. We thank all of the staff who have worked so hard
to help make these such a great success. The Subcommittee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Question No. 1
DEMARCATION STANDARD OF THE HELSINKI PRINCIPLES
Question: At their Helsinki summit in March, Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin announced a set of elements for a demarcation agreement. If
that agreement is ever codified--and in June the Standing Consultative
Commission adjourned once again without finalizing that agreement--
would an agreement based on the Helsinki principles set an unambiguous
demarcation standard for your use in making compliance decisions for
higher velocity systems or for other advanced systems such as the
airborne laser?
Answer: The agreement for higher velocity theater missile defense
(TMD) systems based on the elements agreed by the Presidents at
Helsinki does not establish a definitive demarcation standard.
Compliance assessment for higher velocity theater missile defense
systems and other advanced systems such as the airborne laser would
remain a national responsibility. The agreement for lower velocity TMD
systems does establish a definitive demarcation standard.
Question No. 2
CLARITY OF ``DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY'' STANDARD
Question: The Clinton Administration had proposed a ``demonstrated
capability'' standard that would deem any TMD system compliant as long
as it was not tested against a target missile exceeding 5 km/s or 3500
range during TMD testing. Would such a standard give you the clarity
you need to make unambiguous compliance judgments, and is this an
adequate standard to ensure TMD systems do not have significant ABM
capability?
Answer: Adoption of such a standard, as agreed in the draft
demarcation agreement on lower velocity systems, would certainly
facilitate our compliance determinations. In the U.S. view, such a
standard, together with various confidence building measures, would be
adequate to ensure theater missile defense (TMD) systems do not have
significant ABM capability, but we believe it is important that all ABM
Treaty parties agree on such a standard. However, without the benefit
of the ``demonstrated capability'' standard, we have already certified
as treaty compliant all existing U.S. TMD programs that are
sufficiently mature to allow a compliance assessment, including the
higher velocity Navy Theater Wide system.
Question No. 3
NUMBERS OF MISSILES IN COMPLIANCE CALCULATIONS
Question: Do the actual numbers of offensive and defensive
missiles--not types but the actual quantities--enter into your
compliance calculations? Should these numbers be part of those
calculations?
Answer: The Department of Defense has not used the actual numbers
of offensive and defensive missiles as a consideration for compliance
assessments. We have made such assessments on the basis of estimating
the ability of a single TMD interceptor and a single TMD radar to
counter a single incoming strategic reentry vehicle. Using this
approach we have been able to certify as Treaty compliant all TMD
systems that are sufficiently mature to make evaluation possible. The
Administration has made no determination regarding whether the use of
the numbers of offensive and defensive missiles in a compliance
assessment would be appropriate or how that would be done.
Question No. 4
``FORCE-ON-FORCE'' COMPLIANCE CONSIDERATIONS
Question: In their May 10, 1995 joint Summit Statement, Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin declared that ``TMD systems may be deployed by each
side . . . will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear
force of the other side. . . .'' This suggests that your compliance
determinations should be judged on the basis of whether a TMD system
could negate a large scale strategic attack and not just have some
theoretical capability against a single reentry vehicle under
``perfect'' conditions.
<bullet> LAre such ``force-on-force'' calculations the basis for
your compliance determinations? If not, why not?
<bullet> LHave Defense Department legal authorities issued any
opinions on whether such a standard might be used? If so, please
provide that opinion for the record, as well as the written request to
the OSD General Counsel which generated this legal opinion.
<bullet> LIf so, is this legal opinion the basis for your current
compliance standards?
Answer:
<bullet> LNo. The Helsinki Summit principles served as the
political basis for the demarcation agreements. The principles
themselves have not been agreed to be legal standards for compliance.
All of the principles, including force-on-force, served as the basis
for negotiators in reaching agreements and will serve as the basis for
paying increased attention to practical and realistic assessments in
implementing the Treaty.
<bullet> LYes, one opinion. For reasons of confidentiality, we do
not believe it would be appropriate to provide for the record the
opinion or the written request.
<bullet> LNo.
Question No. 5
``TRIVIAL'' PORTION OF THE OTHER SIDE'S MISSILES
Question: The unclassified section of the October 31, 1996, Report
to Congress on ABM Treaty Compliance Certifications of Theater Missile
Defense Systems states: ``A non- ABM system under consideration would
only be inconsistent with the obligations if it had capabilities to
counter strategic ballistic missiles of types that comprise more than a
trivial portion of the other side's strategic ballistic missiles
reasonably projected to be in existence when the system is to be
deployed.''
<bullet> LHow is the term ``trivial'' defined? Is this a legal
definition, or one based on assessments of militarily relevant
capabilities? How is ``non-trivial'' different from ``militarily
significant''?
<bullet> LThis report refers to capability against ``types'' of
strategic ballistic missiles, not numbers of missiles.
<bullet> LThis logic implies that if a TMD system were
determined to have some limited theoretical capability to intercept
strategic missiles--for example, the same capability THAAD was
determined to have in 1994--and the other side had only one type of
ballistic missile, then that TMD system would be deemed to have
capability against 100% of the opposing side's strategic ballistic
missile force. Is this what is implied by the report?
<bullet> LSince the number of actual missiles is not
considered in compliance determinations, if the United States had only
one of the type of TMD interceptor in the above example, and the other
side had 10,000 of their one type of strategic missile, would the TMD
system then be deemed to have capability to counter the other side's
entire force?
Answer:
<bullet> LIn this case, trivial is meant to have its ordinary
meaning (e.g., of little significance) and has no special legal
significance. It has not been specifically quantified. In considering
THAAD compliance in 1994, it was noted that certain Russian strategic
ballistic missiles, which are relatively easy to counter, comprise
approximately one and one-half percent of the projected Russian
strategic force. This was characterized as a trivial portion of that
force. No effort was made to relate ``non-trivial'' and ``military
significance.''
<bullet> LNo. What is meant is that one TMD interceptor and radar
would have capability against one of that type of ballistic missile
(i.e., one reentry vehicle).
<bullet> LNo, for the reasons provided above.
Question No. 6
FORWARD-BASED X-BAND RADAR
Question: You stated in your testimony that whether a forward-based
radar for use in national missile defense was an ABM radar ``would
depend upon the detailed nature of the radar and whether and what its
other roles might be.'' Please explain how ``other roles'' served by a
forward-based X-band radar which was constructed and deployed
explicitly as part of the NMD architecture could prevent it from being
deemed an ABM radar in accordance with the definition of that term
contained in Article II of the ABM Treaty.
Answer: We have not found it useful or appropriate to try to
address treaty compliance questions in the abstract, but rather we
address them in the context of information about specific and detailed
plans. Questions regarding the use of a forward-based radar for
national missile defense and other purposes fall into this category.
Question No. 7
THRESHOLD FOR MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT ABM CAPABILITY
Question: Your written testimony contains a statement regarding
``military significance'' but it quotes a passage from a 1986 report to
Congress on Soviet compliance, not U.S. compliance. ``Military
significance'' is part of U.S. evaluation of Russian TMD systems, but
is it, and has it been since 1993, an explicit part of the Compliance
Review Group's assessment of U.S. TMD systems? If so, how is ``military
significance'' quantified? What is the threshold above which TMD
systems are deemed to have militarily significant ABM capabilities?
Answer: Military significance is taken into account in compliance
assessments of both U.S. and Russian TMD systems. However, the term
``military significance'' is not explicitly defined; it has not been
applied as a standard for compliance, and there is no defined
``threshold.'' Rather, it is taken into account inasmuch as military
considerations, such as the nature of the opposing strategic ballistic
missiles and the simulated, hypothetical capability of the TMD system
against those missiles, are considered in compliance determinations.
Judgments about compliance are made on a case-by-case basis in light of
the particular circumstance of each case.
Question No. 8
JOINT STAFF ASSESSMENT OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT ABM CAPABILITY
Question: According to a briefing presented to subcommittee staff
on June 23, 1997, by officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the Joint Staff is responsible for determining whether Russian
TMD systems have militarily significant ABM capability. When was the
last time the Joint Staff made such an assessment? Does it also make
these assessments for U.S. systems? If not, does the CRG use the same
analytical model the Joint Staff employs?
Answer: The Joint Staff participates fully in the interagency
assessments of Russian TMD systems as well as DOD assessments of U.S.
TMD systems, providing military advice for both. Rather than making
assessments of ``military significance'' per se, the Joint Staff
provides its views on military considerations such as the nature of the
opposing strategic ballistic missiles and the capability of the TMD
systems against those missiles. Neither the Joint Staff nor the DOD
Compliance Review Group has adopted an ``analytical model''
specifically for evaluation of ``military significance.''
Question No. 9
MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THAAD'S ABM CAPABILITY
Question: You stated in your testimony that, in 1994, THAAD's
theoretical ABM capability was deemed ``militarily significant.'' That
statement directly contradicts what was reported to Congress in the
January 1994 report on THAAD compliance, as well as a response for the
record from BMDO Director O'Neill in testimony before the SASC on May
11, 1994, in which be stated, ``This `theoretical' ABM capability,
however, would not be militarily significant in light of system
limitations and operational considerations. That is, in real-world
scenarios, THAAD could not perform its defensive mission against
strategic-class missiles, even in limited engagements. . . . In sum,
THAAD simply would not suffice as an ABM system; it would be easily
overwhelmed by the Russian strategic missile force.'' Does your
testimony change the Administration's position as previously reported
to Congress, or was your testimony incorrect?
Answer: My response to the Chairman's question on this point was
incorrect. What 1 should have said was that military significance was
taken into account in the evaluation of THAAD. As noted above, the term
``military significance'' is not defined and has not been applied, as
such, as a standard for compliance.
Question No. 10
ONE-ON-ONE ANALYSIS TO MEASURE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
Question: Your testimony states that you assess the ``military
significance'' of U.S. TMD systems on the basis of ``the simulated,
hypothetical performance of a single TMD interceptor missile and radar
to intercept a single reentry vehicle from certain Russian [strategic
missiles].'' But according to General O'Neill's testimony, the THAAD
system was declared non-compliant using this measure even though it had
no militarily significant operational capability. Given his testimony,
how can the one-on-one analysis you described be considered a measure
of military significance?
Answer: As noted above, military significance is taken into account
in compliance assessments. However, ``military significance'' is not
explicitly defined and has not been applied as a standard for
compliance. Rather, military significance is taken into account
inasmuch as military factors such as the nature of the opposing
ballistic missiles and the capability of the TMD system against those
missiles are considered in compliance determinations. The conclusion
that General O'Neill described in his testimony resulted from including
certain operational considerations, such as numbers and locations of
deployments, that went beyond the one-on-one analysis used in the
compliance assessment for THAAD. Subsequent to General O'Neill's
testimony, and using our current approach, THAAD was determined to
comply with the ABM Treaty.
Question No. 11
``MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE'' AS A STANDARD FOR COMPLIANCE
Question: Since THAAD's capability was deemed not militarily
significant in 1994, but THAAD was still determined to be non-
compliant, how is it possible to state that ``military significance''
is the standard by which the CRG judges the compliance of U.S. systems?
Answer: As noted above, ``military significance'' has not been used
as a standard for judging compliance of U.S. systems.
Question No. 12
``MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE'' AS A STANDARD FOR COMPLIANCE
Question: You stated in your testimony that you do not take into
account operational factors of TMD systems in making compliance
assessments. On what basis did you state that ``military significance''
is a compliance standard if operational military factors are not
considered?
Answer: As noted above, ``military significance'' has not been used
as a standard for judging compliance of U.S. systems.
Question No. 13
JOINT STAFF CONCERNS
Question: You stated that all compliance determinations have been
consensus decisions which included the concurrence of the Joint Staff.
Has the Joint Staff made known to you any concerns on its part that
current compliance methodologies, assumptions, or standards are
inadequate and should be replaced with ones that better measure the
true military significance of the capability of TMD systems? If so,
what are the nature of those concerns?
Answer: The Department of Defense will continue to ensure that DOD
programs fully comply with all treaty obligations, but it also will
continue to refine compliance methodologies and assumptions to ensure
that these programs are not unnecessarily constrained. Our compliance
methodology has evolved to incorporate additional relevant
considerations. The Joint Staff has participated fully and
constructively in this process.
Question No. 14
ONE-ON-ONE ENGAGEMENTS AS A MEASURE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
Question: Please explain how the ``simulated, hypothetical one-on-
one engagements'' you mentioned in your testimony represent a
reasonable operational scenario from which a true measure of military
significance can be derived?
Answer: As noted above, our one-on-one compliance methodology has
not taken all operational considerations into account, and no claim is
made that a ``true measure of military significance'' has been derived.
Question No. 15
NEGOTIATED OR UNILATERAL STANDARD
Question: Is the current standard by which TMD programs are judged
for ABM Treaty compliance the result of a negotiated agreement with
Russia or the U.S.S.R., or was the standard determined unilaterally by
the United States?
Answer: Compliance judgments, which are derived from the provisions
of the Treaty, have been made unilaterally on a case-by-case basis
rather than on the basis of a particular standard for compliance. The
methodologies used thus far to evaluate TMD systems for compliance are
not the result of negotiated agreement.
Question No. 16
ASSESSMENT OF SPACE-BASED TMD
Question: Robert Bell of the National Security Council Staff has
stated that prior to the Helsinki summit, the administration examined
space-based lasers and- interceptors ``as a matter of compliance law
and technological assessment.'' Presumably the compliance expertise for
this assessment would come from the executive branch agency responsible
for making compliance judgments on U.S. systems, which by Defense
Department directive is the DOD Compliance Review Group, with
technological assessments from the missile defense experts in the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Yet you stated in your
testimony that the CRG was not involved in this assessment and that
you, as chairman of the CRG, did not know if the Defense Department was
involved in the determination. Please provide the subcommittee the
technological and ``compliance law'' assessments that formed the basis
for this decision, as well as a list of the participants in those
assessments.
Answer: The USG decision to agree at the Helsinki Summit to
prohibit space-based TMD interceptor missiles and components based on
other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such
interceptor missiles was made, like other decisions on the
negotiations, through the interagency process, in which all relevant
agencies, including DOD (both OSD and the Joint Staff) participated at
senior levels. Issues concerning space-based TMD systems, including
technical and legal considerations, were discussed in appropriate
detail during interagency deliberations, although no formal (i.e.,
written) technological or ``compliance law'' assessments were prepared.
The Administration concluded that, as a practical matter, no
demarcation between space-based ABM and space-based TMD systems was
feasible. The USG has maintained the position that it could accept a
ban on space-based TMD interceptor missiles since Spring of 1994.
Question No. 17
COMPLIANCE OF SPACE-BASED TMD SYSTEMS
Question: You stated in your testimony that you could not speculate
on whether certain specific capabilities--for example, an upgraded
Aegis radar, Navy Theater Wide aided by Cooperative Engagement
Capability or launch on composite data, and forward-based X-band NMD
radars--would be compliant because ``there are no well-defined programs
. . . that would allow us to assess the compliance'' and because the
capabilities ``are just simply too immature to understand the
performance of the system.'' Yet you said in your testimony that it was
your judgment that ``it's not possible to make a TMD space-based system
that isn't also an ABM system,'' even though you had not participated
in and were not privy to the analysis that led to this conclusion.
Please explain how you can be certain that an undefined space-based TMD
capability would necessarily be non-compliant when, according to your
own testimony, any other definitive compliance determination requires
``mature'' and ``well-defined'' programs?
Answer: I did not mean to imply in my testimony that it was my
judgment that an undefined space-based TMD capability would necessarily
be non-compliant. Rather, I was attempting to explain the
Administration's conclusion that, as a practical matter, no demarcation
between space-based ABM and space-based TMD systems was feasible. That
conclusion was not reached in the context of a compliance review of
specific and detailed program plans, which are required for DOD
compliance determinations.
Question No. 18
COMPLIANCE CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRBORNE LASER TMD
Question: You stated the following in your testimony: that Article
V of the ABM Treaty prohibits space-based ABM components and thus would
also prohibit space-based TMD components which had ABM capability; that
U.S. compliance assessments are made on the basis of ``simulated,
hypothetical performance'' in one-on-one engagements; and that
``operational factors including basing modes, the number of launch
platforms and missiles, the location of TMD systems and the character
of a likely strategic attack'' were not part of your compliance
evaluations. Yet you also stated that whether an airborne laser is
compliant might depend ``on where the airborne platform is'' and that
such a system would be ``subject to some substantially different
considerations.'' If the locations of TMD systems are not considered in
your compliance determinations, why would ``where the airborne platform
is'' matter in a compliance determination for the airborne laser? On
what basis would ``different considerations'' be introduced for the
airborne laser, what would they be, and why wouldn't the same
considerations be used for determining compliance of all TMD systems?
Answer: In my testimony, I was speculating in response to a
general, hypothetical question from the chairman, so my response should
not be taken as a considered compliance assessment. With respect to the
particular question, however, since we evaluate Th4D compliance on a
case-by-case basis taking into account detailed characteristics of each
system, the considerations relevant to compliance for an airborne laser
would likely be different from those for systems with ground-based
interceptors. These considerations would be evaluated when the system
design is appropriately mature.
Question No. 19
SPACE-BASED AND AIRBORNE LASERS
Question: Article V of the ABM Treaty bans both space-based and
air-based ABM systems, and you testified that a space-based TMD laser
would ``have capability to destroy strategic systems as well, and
hence, be a violation of the Article V ban on space-based ABM.'' Please
explain why the capability of a laser to, in the words of Robert Bell,
``bum a hole through the side of a missile and blow it up,'' is
sufficient to deem a space-based laser non-compliant but is not
sufficient to make the same determination for an airborne laser.
Answer: The Administration concluded that, as a practical matter,
no demarcation between space-based ABM and space-based TMD systems was
feasible. Neither DOD nor the Administration as a whole has addressed
the compliance question for the TMD airborne laser, and DOD has no plan
to do so until the program is sufficiently well defined.
Question No. 20
ARTICLE BY LAWRENCE GOLDMUNTZ
Question: Did the analysis you said preceded the Helsinki agreement
to ban space- based TMD consider contrary analysis which argues that
space-based-TMD systems could be deployed without having ABM
capability, such as that contained in Dr. Lawrence Goldmuntz's article
``Poor Man's MRVs and Space Defense,'' in the Fall 1996 Strategic
Review? If so, on what basis were these arguments rejected?
Answer: Arguments such as those in the article by Dr. Goldmuntz
were considered, but were not accepted. The USG has maintained the
position that it could accept a ban on space- based TMD interceptor
missiles since Spring of 1994.
Question No. 21
INTERAGENCY LAWYERS
Question: You stated in your testimony that DOD has sole
responsibility for making compliance determinations and DOD Directive
2060.1 confirms this. To what extent have lawyers from other executive
agencies had a significant role in past compliance decisions? Do they
have an official role and, if so, what is it and where is it prescribed
in regulation or other administration policy statement? Has an
interagency lawyers' group always been involved in these decisions to
the extent it has since 1993? Who decides when to involve the
interagency lawyers' group and based on what criteria?
Answer: As a general rule, lawyers from the other agencies do not
get involved in DOD compliance assessments. Sometimes, however, the
interagency legal community is consulted. The Department has the
obligation to ensure that its activities comply with arms control
agreements and takes that obligation very seriously. Accordingly, when
certain significant issues of treaty interpretation have arisen, the
office of the DOD General Counsel has consulted the interagency legal
community in order to ensure that we proceed under correct treaty
interpretations and that our activities will remain in compliance.
Decisions to consult are made on a case-by-case basis by the Office of
the DOD General Counsel, generally in consultation with representatives
of the other offices represented in the Compliance Review Group.
Interagency consultations have become more frequent in the 1990s as the
issues have become more complex.
Question No. 22
RUSSIAN COMPLAINT ABOUT THAAD
Question: Have the Russians ever charged that THAAD was not
compliant with the ABM Treaty?
Answer: No.
Question No. 23
RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE REVIEW
Question: Has the United States ever briefed or otherwise informed
Russia of the results of its compliance decisions? Has Russia ever
shared with the United -States any information on its compliance review
process or the results of its reviews?
Answer: The United States has informed Russia of the results of
certain compliance decisions. For example, during discussions in the
Standing Consultative Commission we have briefly discussed thel996
decision on the THAAD system's compliance, and addressed the U.S.
compliance process and the 1995 compliance report on the Navy Theater
Wide system. There have been no instances of Russia providing
comparable information to the United States regarding its compliance
review process or the results of its reviews.
Question No. 24
INCREASED COST OF THAAD
Question: The October 31, 1996 Report to Congress on ABM Treaty
Compliance Certifications of Theater Missile Defense Systems stated
that the ``current estimate'' of the increased cost of the THAAD system
due to the decision to withhold, and then reinstate, cueing software,
was $3.4 million. This figure differs somewhat from the amount you
cited in your testimony. What are the current and estimated final
amounts-spent by the United States to keep THAAD from having a
capability which was later determined to be compliant?
Answer: The number I quoted, $3.2M, was incorrect. The number that
was reported in the October 31, 1996, Report to Congress is the correct
number--$3.4M.
Question No. 25
REASONS FOR CHANGE IN THAAD COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT
Question: Was the change in THAAD's compliance status between 1994
and 1996 due primarily to improved knowledge of the actual (vs.
intended) technical capabilities gained through the demonstration/
validation test program, or to changes in the assumptions used to make
the compliance assessment?
Answer: As I noted in my testimony, the changes to THAAD were of a
programmatic nature (i.e., related to system design). I also stated
that the capabilities assumed for THAAD in early compliance
deliberations were revised based on a better understanding of the THAAD
performance when the CRG conducted its review of the program in 1996.
When the CRG conducted the 1996 review, nothing had changed regarding
our approach to determining ABM Treaty compliance. What did change was
our understanding of the capabilities of THAAD as the system had
matured and preliminary conservative performance assumptions were
replaced by more accurate information.
(all)
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