S. Hrg. 105-199
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE ABM TREATY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 1, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
40-586cc WASHINGTON : 1997
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware JOHN GLENN, Ohio
TED STEVENS, Alaska CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma MAX CLELAND, Georgia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Counsel
Leonard Weiss, Minority Staff Director
Michal Sue Prosser, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL
SERVICES
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mitchel B. Kugler, Staff Director
Linda Gustitus, Minority Staff Director
Julie Sander, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Cochran.............................................. 1
WITNESSES
Thursday, May 1, 1997
Hon. John D. Holum, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
APPENDIX
Charts on ABM Treaty Issues...................................... 21
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE ABM TREATY
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 1, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran and Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The committee will please come to order. I
apologize for the delay in commencing the hearing.
I would like to first welcome everyone to today's hearing
of the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International
Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services. Our topic for
discussion today is ``National Missile Defense and the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty.'' The administration's plan for
national missile defense--the ``3+3'' program--appears to have
serious problems, one of which is the possible conflict with
provisions of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Legislation calling for the deployment of national missile
defense has been criticized by the administration for allegedly
requiring violation of the ABM Treaty. For example, commenting
on the 1996 Defense Authorization Bill--which the President
vetoed--former Secretary of Defense William Perry said it would
have ``put us on a pathway to abrogate the ABM Treaty . . .''
Ashton Carter, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy, said the bill ``obliges us to
violate or ignore the ABM Treaty.'' And President Clinton, in
explaining why he would veto last year's Defend America Act,
said it would ``violate the arms control agreements that we
have made and that make us more secure.''
The administration said that its ``3+3'' NMD plan
contrasted sharply with past Republican proposals. The ``3+3''
plan, according to some administration spokesmen, was better
because it could defend America from limited ballistic missile
attack without violating the ABM Treaty.
Secretary Perry told the Senate that ``There is nothing we
are doing now or planning to do which would be in violation of
the ABM Treaty.'' Lieutenant General O'Neill, then Director of
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, said that ``Within
the confines of the language of the ABM Treaty, we can and will
build missile defenses to meet our national security needs.''
And in an August 1995 letter to the editor of USA Today
recommending a veto of the Senate NMD proposal, Robert Bell of
the National Security Council staff said that the Pentagon's
``3+3'' plan ``complies with the ABM Treaty and does not
threaten to undo our strategic arms agreement. . . .''
Now the administration seems to be changing its story, by
saying that only the development phase of the NMD program will
be ABM Treaty-compliant, while the system ultimately deployed
``might require modification of the Treaty.'' The recent DOD
request for proposals for the ``3+3'' lead systems integrator
contract states that ``Treaty compliance of the deployed NMD
system is not a requirement, and will not be evaluated as part
of the source selection process.''
Members of this Subcommittee were recently told by the
Director of BMDO that, contrary to previous administration
statements, all of the ``3+3'' options under consideration by
the administration pose ABM Treaty problems.
These recent statements indicate the administration
realizes that its own plan to protect America from ballistic
missile attack, even a limited attack, could be in conflict
with the 25-year-old ABM Treaty. In today's hearing, we will
examine the extent to which ``3+3'' proposals are compatible
with the ABM Treaty, and the administration's plan for
addressing any incompatibilities.
If negotiations to modify the ABM Treaty are part of that
plan, we would like to know what provisions have been made for
these negotiations in the ``3+3'' program schedule. This is
particularly important given the failure--after 3\1/2\ years of
negotiations--to reach agreement on a clarification of the ABM
Treaty regarding theater missile defenses.
Today, we are pleased to welcome to this hearing John
Holum, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Mr.
Holum heads the agency responsible for negotiating,
implementing, and verifying the Nation's arms control
agreements. We will benefit both from his expertise on treaty
issues and his experience directing arms control negotiations.
Mr. Holum, thank you very much for your attendance at our
hearing. We appreciate that very much. And we encourage you to
proceed with your statement. We will make a point of including
your entire statement in the record as it is submitted, and
encourage you to make whatever comments or remarks in
connection with that statement that you think would be helpful
to the Subcommittee. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN D. HOLUM, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Mr. Holum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My statement is quite
short, so I will run through it quickly.
Since February of 1996, as you know, the administration has
been committed to developing a system that could defend the
United States against a potential limited strategic ballistic
missile threat from rogue states and that would have some
capability to defend against a small accidental or unauthorized
launch from more nuclear-capable states.
In response to the Chairman's invitation, I am pleased to
have the opportunity today to present the administration's
views on the prospects for negotiating amendments to the ABM
Treaty, should that become necessary as a result of a future
decision to deploy a National Missile Defense System.
I want to make it clear that I am not speaking on the
programmatic aspects of NMD, NMD deployment decision criteria,
or on OSD's procedures for determining the ABM Treaty
compliance of any NMD system or its components. My colleagues
in the Defense Department have the lead responsibility for
those issues.
I want to stress at the outset that the administration is
fully committed to the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic
stability. President Clinton reaffirmed that commitment
following the administration's review in 1993 of ballistic
missile defense policy and the ABM Treaty.
Moreover, in February of 1996, following a thorough review
of the U.S. ballistic missile defense program, when Secretary
Perry announced the decision to establish a National Missile
Defense deployment readiness, or ``3+3'' program, the
administration stated that our commitment to the ABM Treaty
remained unchanged. Finally, President Clinton repeated our
commitment to the Treaty in the context of the Helsinki summit.
I believe it is premature to speculate on whether, or when,
we may need to seek to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty in
the event of a future U.S. decision to deploy a national
missile defense. It is even more premature to speculate
hypothetically about specific changes to the Treaty that might
be required to permit an NMD deployment that we might select.
Nevertheless, it is my understanding that the evaluation of
Treaty issues within the Defense Department will be
accomplished in a timeframe that is supportive of the DOD NMD
program schedule. This should allow compliance analysis to be
based on concrete system designs without delaying the program's
schedule.
Our NMD policy is that our NMD development program will be
compliant with the ABM Treaty. If there is a decision to deploy
a NMD, we would determine whether the system we intend to
deploy would comply with the ABM Treaty. If we determined that
deployment of an NMD system required modifications to the ABM
Treaty, we would seek agreement with our ABM Treaty partners.
Indeed, the Treaty, as you know, contains a mechanism for its
amendment.
Recognizing that the ABM Treaty is a ``living'' Treaty, we
have stressed to the Russians and others that for it to remain
viable, it must be adaptable to changing political or
technological circumstances. For example, we have taken a
cooperative approach to implementation of the Treaty in
negotiations with Russia and other potential successors on
demarcation between theater ballistic missile defense and ABM
systems. We would view any future NMD negotiation in the same
light.
However, proposing changes to the Treaty and conducting
such negotiations now would be premature--we are now only in
the early developmental phase of the program. At present, none
of the so-called rogue states have the capability to attack the
territory of the United States with ballistic missiles. The
Department of Defense has not selected a specific architecture
for a system. Thus, no USG decisions have been made about
whether it will be compliant with the Treaty and whether any,
and what kind of, Treaty amendments it would necessitate.
We must expect, however, that any future negotiations with
other treaty parties to amend the ABM Treaty would also be
difficult. It is not possible at this point to predict what the
reaction of Russia and the other states would be to proposals
to amend the Treaty. During the TMD demarcation negotiations,
both sides have been tough defenders of what they regard as
their security interests. Russia has made clear the importance
it attaches to the viability of the ABM Treaty and to continued
U.S. compliance with the Treaty as a prerequisite for further
negotiated reductions in Russian strategic forces.
At the same time, the Russians have also recognized the
need to respond to the threat of ballistic missile
proliferation, and agree with us on the need to develop and
field effective systems to counter shorter-range ballistic
missile threats.
Russia's willingness to accept any future proposed changes
to the ABM Treaty to permit a National Missile Defense System
against limited ballistic missile threats will in the first
instance depend on their assessment of the compatibility of
deployment of limited missile defense systems with their
security and deterrence requirements.
In our dialogue with Russia, we continue to stress that our
NMD programs are not directed against Russia's nuclear
deterrent nor will our NMD programs provide the capability to
threaten that deterrent. But Russian willingness to amend the
Treaty would also depend on the commonality of interests,
including cooperation and their assessment of the threat. The
Russians might also want to reassess their own requirements in
light of ballistic missile proliferation developments in their
region.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the administration is
committed both to the ABM Treaty and the development of an NMD
capability. If a rogue state missile threat emerges that
requires deployment of an NMD system, such a system could
require modifications to the ABM Treaty; however, it would not
be incompatible with the central purpose of the ABM Treaty--
that is, the preservation of strategic stability and the
achievement of further strategic offensive force reductions as
part of the START process.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Holum follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Holum
Since February 1996, the administration has been committed to
developing a system that could defend the United States against a
potential limited strategic ballistic missile threat from rogue states
and that would have some capability to defend against a small
accidental or unauthorized launch from more nuclear-capable states. In
response to the Chairman's invitation, I am pleased to have the
opportunity today to present the administration's views on the
prospects for negotiating amendments to the ABM Treaty should that
become necessary as a result of a future decision to deploy a National
Missile Defense system. I want to make it clear that I am not speaking
on the programmatic aspects of NMD, NMD deployment decision criteria,
or on OSD's procedures for determining the ABM Treaty compliance of any
NMD system or its components. My colleagues in the Defense Department
have the lead responsibility for those issues.
I want to stress at the outset that the administration is fully
committed to the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.
President Clinton reaffirmed that commitment following the
administration's review in 1993 of ballistic missile defense policy and
the ABM Treaty. Moreover, in February of 1996, following a thorough
review of the U.S. ballistic missile defense program, when Secretary
Perry announced the decision to establish a National Missile Defense
deployment readiness (or ``3 plus 3'') program, the administration
stated that our commitment to the ABM Treaty remained unchanged.
Finally, President Clinton repeated our commitment to the Treaty in the
context of the Helsinki summit.
I believe it is premature to speculate on whether, or when, we may
need to seek to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty in the event of a
future U.S. decision to deploy a national missile defense. It is even
more premature to speculate hypothetically about specific changes to
the Treaty that might be required to permit an NMD deployment that we
might select. Nevertheless, it is my understanding that the evaluation
of Treaty issues within the Defense Department will be accomplished in
a timeframe that is supportive of the DOD NMD program schedule. This
should allow compliance analysis to be based on concrete system designs
without delaying the program's schedule.
Our NMD policy is that our NMD development program will be
compliant with the ABM Treaty. If there is a decision to deploy NMD, we
would determine whether the system we intend to deploy would comply
with the ABM Treaty. If we determined that deployment of an NMD system
required modifications to the ABM Treaty, we would seek agreement with
our ABM Treaty partners. Indeed, the Treaty contains a mechanism for
its amendment.
Recognizing that the ABM Treaty is a ``living'' Treaty, we have
stressed to the Russians and others that for it to remain viable, it
must be adaptable to changing political or technological circumstances.
For example, we have taken a cooperative approach to implementation of
the Treaty in negotiations with Russia and other potential successors
on demarcation between theater ballistic missile defense and ABM
systems. We would view any future NMD negotiation in the same light.
However, proposing changes to the Treaty and conducting such
negotiations now would be premature--we are now only in the early
developmental phase of the program. At present, none of the so-called
rogue states have the capability to attack the territory of the United
States with ballistic missiles. The Department of Defense has not
selected a specific architecture for a system. Thus, no USG decisions
have been made about whether it will be compliant with the Treaty and
whether any, and what kind of, Treaty amendments it would necessitate.
We must expect, however, that any future negotiations with other
treaty parties to amend the ABM Treaty would also be difficult. It is
not possible at this point to predict what the reaction of Russia and
the other states would be to proposals to amend the Treaty. During the
TMD demarcation negotiations, both sides have been tough defenders of
what they regard as their security interests. Russia has made clear the
importance it attaches to the viability of the ABM Treaty and to
continued U.S. compliance with the Treaty as a prerequisite for further
negotiated reductions in Russian strategic forces. At the same time,
the Russians have also recognized the need to respond to the threat of
ballistic missile proliferation, and agree with us on the need to
develop and field effective systems to counter shorter-range ballistic
missile threats.
Russia's willingness to accept any future proposed changes to the
ABM Treaty to permit a National Missile Defense System against limited
ballistic missile threats will in the first instance depend on their
assessment of the compatibility of deployment of limited missile
defense systems with their security and deterrence requirements. In our
dialogue with Russia, we continue to stress that our NMD programs are
not directed against Russia's nuclear deterrent nor will our NMD
programs provide the capability to threaten that deterrent. But Russian
willingness to amend the Treaty would also depend on the commonality of
interests, including cooperation and their assessment of the threat.
The Russians might also want to reassess their own requirements in
light of ballistic missile proliferation developments in their region.
In conclusion, the administration is committed both to the ABM
Treaty and the development of an NMD capability. If a rogue state
missile threat emerges that requires deployment of an NMD system, such
a system could require modifications to the ABM Treaty; however, it
would not be incompatible with the central purpose of the ABM Treaty--
that is, the preservation of strategic stability and the achievement of
further strategic offensive force reductions as part of the START
process.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for your statement.
In the first article of the ABM Treaty there is a provision
as follows: ``Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems
for defense of the territory of its country.'' Last Friday, we
were advised that the Department of Defense has awarded $16
million worth of contracts for the ``3+3'' lead system
integrator. The request for proposals for the lead system
integrator says the NMD system will provide defense of all
territory in the 50 States.
On its face, the ABM treaty seems to say that any system
capable of protecting all of the United States, even if it is
from a limited long-range ballistic missile threat, is
prohibited by the treaty. In your view, is any NMD program, to
include ``3+3'', fundamentally incompatible with Article I of
the ABM Treaty?
Mr. Holum. Mr. Chairman, that is a question that we have
not specifically determined. And the basic reason is that we do
not have a system architecture. It is possible to imagine a
national missile defense system that would clearly violate the
treaty. There are others that would be closer questions.
And our approach to this--and it originates, as you know,
in the Department of Defense in the Compliance Review Group--is
to wait until there is a specific program architecture or until
the details are sufficiently developed to make it possible to
examine not only the compatibility with the treaty but, more
specifically, what amendments to the treaty would be necessary,
if any, in order to permit deployment to proceed. That would
give us our negotiating instructions, our working papers for
negotiations. But until we have that structure, we have not
gone through the formal process to make a determination.
Clearly, you can say that if the system required more than
100 interceptors, based on the threat, or if the system
required deployment at more than one site, that would violate
the treaty and require an amendment to the treaty. But as you
get to closer questions, we just have not made the assessment.
Senator Cochran. Yes. Well, in connection with the system
architecture, what if we were to build a limited NMD system
that could protect the entire territory of the United States,
but was only capable of shooting down one incoming missile.
Would such a system be permitted under Article I of the treaty?
Mr. Holum. It is conceivable. But I just do not know the
answer, because I would have to know all of the details of the
system and make a systematic analysis of the defensive system
against all the provisions of the treaty to determine if it
could go forward.
The key point, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, is that what
we will do, what our colleagues in the Department of Defense
will do, is design a system as the threat emerges to answer the
threat. The determinant of the character of that system will be
the threat, not the treaty. But then once the system has been
selected, once the architecture has been selected, we will
assess specifically what amendments are required, and commence
negotiations to adopt them.
And we certainly do not limit, as you indicated, the
developmental work to systems that would clearly be in
compliance with the treaty.
Senator Cochran. Has your agency, ACDA, attempted to
research this in terms of getting an opinion from the ACDA
general counsel, or exploring with the Russians what their
reaction would be to the meaning of the language of Article I
in connection with a limited national missile defense system?
Mr. Holum. We have not undertaken that type of a discussion
with the Russians, no. We have continuous discussions
internally, informally, on the meaning of the various articles
of the treaty, but we do not have a formal conclusion.
Senator Cochran. I know there was a provision in the
Helsinki summit statement that President Clinton and President
Yeltsin issued that related to theater missile defense, trying
to outline the content of future negotiations and a possible
agreement on demarcation. But I do not recall whether there was
any statement or suggestion about any negotiations in
connection with a national missile defense system. Were there
any such statements?
Mr. Holum. No, there was not. But I would emphasize,
though, that there is one consistent thread running through our
discussions with the Russians on theater missile defense, and
that is that it is very important that the treaty be a living
document that allows us to maintain the strategic stability
benefits of the treaty but at the same time address emerging
threats. That has been the theme of our negotiations on theater
missile defense on the demarcation issue.
And we would carry that same principle into the context of
national missile defense. It is quite conceivable to me that
you can design a national missile defense against limited
threats that would not in any way undercut the basic objectives
of the ABM Treaty, that would in fact preserve its benefits for
strategic stability and protecting the process of strategic
offensive arms reductions. That would be our goal. And I think
over time the Russians should come to accept that principle.
Senator Cochran. It does seem confusing if we start talking
about a system to protect the entire territory of the United
States, that we may be running head-long into the clear
violation of Article I of the Treaty.
We know that there are later on two specific exceptions in
the ABM Treaty. One permits the defense of the capital, and the
other the defense of missile fields. And we have made a
selection to defend the missile fields. The Russians have made
a selection to defend the capital with a ballistic missile
defense system.
Are there any other exceptions which allow ABM protection
against any, or all, of the territory of the United States that
are spelled out in the treaty, other than those two?
Mr. Holum. That would allow deployment of strategic
defense?
Senator Cochran. Yes, deployment of strategic defense to
defend the territory of the United States.
Mr. Holum. Not that I am aware of. If I have to correct
this for the record, I will; but I do not know of any.
Senator Cochran. We had a briefing, incidentally, earlier
in the week from the program manager of the ``3+3'' program on
the request for proposals for the lead system integrator
contract. And it suggests that the contractor study several
national missile defense options.
Two of these--the so-called CI and CII architectures--
anticipate that meeting the threat from a rogue Nation might
require the NMD site to be located outside of the Grand Forks
ICBM deployment area, possibly in Alaska. My understanding,
based on these briefings, is that this might be required so
that portions of Alaska and Hawaii are not left unprotected.
I know that the administration believes it is too early to
make a decision to deploy an NMD system, but let us assume that
we make that decision and the results of the BMDO work show
that an interceptor site in Alaska is required to provide
adequate protection for the territory or the citizens in Alaska
and/or Hawaii. Does the ABM Treaty, in your opinion, allow such
a deployment in Alaska; or would a decision to deploy an
Alaskan ABM site be subject to a negotiated amendment to the
treaty?
Mr. Holum. I think on a broad question like that it would
fall into the same category as the ones I mentioned earlier;
that if you need more than 100 interceptors, or more than one
site, then you would require an amendment to the treaty. I
think this one would fall into that category, as well.
But I hasten to add that I do not want to be in a position
of making specific compliance determinations on hypothetical
deployments. I think we need a specific system before we do
that.
Senator Cochran. Do you think we could make a decision to
change our selection? For instance, if we were under the
authority of Article III in the treaty where we selected to
defend the Grand Forks area, the missile field, and we decided
to change that, do we need to go back then and negotiate any
kind of modification with our treaty partner? Or can we just
unilaterally change that designation of deployment area, to
Alaska, for example?
Mr. Holum. Well, the first requirement would be that it be
a deployment at an offensive missile site. So if it went
elsewhere than a missile site----
Senator Cochran. We could change the area even though it
could defend against a missile site, could protect a missile
site from that new area?
Mr. Holum. Yes, you would either have to have a missile
site there, or put the National Capital there, in order to----
Senator Cochran. Senator Stevens would probably go for
that.
Senator Levin. Which one? Which capital?
Senator Cochran. Oh, I thought you were talking about the
Capital. He will probably go for both of them.
I am going to yield to my good friend from Michigan for
some questions. And I apologize to our good witness that we
started this 30 minutes late. So I hope we are not going to
keep you here until suppertime or anything like that, so do not
worry. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. We reserve that just for the Attorney
General.
Mr. Holum. I see.
Senator Levin. What is the relationship between the ABM
Treaty and nuclear arms reductions?
Mr. Holum. Well, I think both in principle and in practice
there is a very intimate relationship between the two.
Obviously, in this field, as in most others, there is a
relationship between offense and defense. As the number of
defensive interceptors goes up that could potentially or
arguably intercept an offensive missile, the offensive side
would begin to worry about the viability of its deterrent
capability.
That is the basic relationship that the ABM Treaty
established in 1972, recognized in 1972; that our prospects for
strategic arms offensive limitations depended on and were
supported by the limitation on defense. Now, that is in
principle.
In practice, it is also the case that the Russian
instrument of ratification for START I specifically relates to,
or depends upon, the viability of the ABM Treaty. They have
made it quite clear that their plans to go forward with START
II ratification are also related to the ABM Treaty's viability.
So I think in practice as well as in principle, the ABM Treaty
remains a very important document for protection of strategic
arms reductions.
And we have to always keep in mind that this is a threat
that exists today. This is a concern that exists today. These
are missiles in being that have the potential to rain
devastation on the United States. It is not something we can
set aside lightly.
Senator Levin. Now, are the reductions of offensive nuclear
weapons by the Russians in our interest?
Mr. Holum. Absolutely so, Mr. Levin. I recall--and I am
sure you recall better than I do--the discussions in the 1970s
and the 1980s about the Russian SS-18 heavy missiles, the most
devastating weapons ever aimed at the United States, opening a
window of vulnerability to a potential first strike because
each one had 10 independently targetable reentry vehicles on
300-and-some missiles that could strike an ICBM silo and
disable weapons in a first strike.
It has been a lead negotiating priority of the United
States for years to eliminate those SS-18 missiles and other
land-based multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles.
The START I and START II treaties, in combination, do that.
We are not even contemplating a national missile defense of
a kind that could do that. I have no idea what it would cost,
or whether it is feasible. The treaties are doing that--
verifiably, certainly, and without a shot being fired. That is
indisputably in the U.S. national interest. It is a leading
goal of our national security strategy.
Senator Levin. Now, S. 7, which is the National Missile
Defense Act of 1997, requires deployment of a national missile
defense system by the year 2003, whether or not such a
deployment would violate the ABM Treaty. Do you believe that
the adoption of that commitment to deploy would make it more
likely, or less likely, or have no effect, on reductions of
nuclear missiles by Russia?
Mr. Holum. I think it would make the reductions less
likely, based on the earlier answer of both the principle and
the practice of the relationship between the ABM Treaty and
strategic reductions. I think it is indisputable that we would
encounter problems very early on.
I have several problems with S. 7, several that are more
appropriately addressed by my colleagues in the Department of
Defense, relating to locking us in to an architecture or to a
technology earlier than we need to be, based on the emergence
of the threat.
What I am most concerned about from the standpoint of the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is protecting the
process of strategic arms offensive reductions, and the time
table for negotiating an amendment to the treaty to allow this
within a period of about a year. It seems to me that that sets
a clock ticking--and would in the minds of the Russians--toward
abrogation of the ABM Treaty, because we have only a year to
complete it.
Senator Levin. We would only have a year to complete it
under that bill.
Mr. Holum. Under that bill. And that would, in itself, I
think raise problems for the strategic arms reduction process.
Now, that is not to say that over time we cannot successfully
negotiate with the Russians to allow deployment of a limited
national missile defense. But I think we need to know what kind
of defense that is, what the specific elements of it are, and
what amendments to the treaty are needed in order to commence
those negotiations.
Senator Levin. Does the ``3+3'' approach allow for that?
Mr. Holum. Yes, it does.
Senator Levin. Now, tell us about START III. What are the
discussions underway about the next stage, assuming START II is
ratified by the Russians?
Mr. Holum. That is an important point, because the
negotiations will not commence until the START II Treaty has
been ratified. But President Clinton and President Yeltsin have
agreed that we will, upon that action, be prepared to begin
negotiating further reductions and limitations down to a level
of 2,000 to 2,500 deployed warheads. In addition, we will look
at new steps in the area of transparency and irreversibility,
including reviewing the actual dismantlement of the warheads
themselves.
We are very interested, obviously, in beginning those
negotiations. They will not begin until START II is ratified.
Senator Levin. Relative to theater ballistic missile
defenses, TMD's, does the ABM Treaty restrict the development
of current TMD's, the ones that are currently being developed?
Mr. Holum. No. Five of the six systems that are currently
being developed are covered and protected under the demarcation
agreement relating to slower fliers, those with interceptor
velocity of 3\1/2\ kilometers per second or less. The sixth
system, the Navy theater-wide, is clearly compliant with the
principles established for the Part II negotiation covering
faster fliers, which in essence allows us to make our own
compliance determination, which we have done.
Senator Levin. We are allowed under the agreement to make
our own determination relative to that sixth system?
Mr. Holum. That is right.
Senator Levin. And we have already made that determination?
Mr. Holum. That is right. We would agree, and I emphasize
that the summit principles are not yet formalized in an
agreement. But with regard to faster flying systems, we would
use the same flight testing limitations that we have agreed to
for slower systems. That is, they could not be tested against
target missiles of a velocity of 5 kilometers per second or
greater, or with a range of 3,500 kilometers or more.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. I thought it was interesting the way you
changed your reference to that agreement, saying that it is not
really an agreement yet. But you are referring to the statement
that was issued by President Yeltsin and President Clinton?
Mr. Holum. That is right.
Senator Cochran. Contemplating that an agreement might be
reached----
Mr. Holum. That is right.
Senator Cochran [continuing]. That would make the TMD
systems treaty-compliant.
Mr. Holum. Well, we have, independently of the Helsinki
agreement, made a determination that the Navy theater-wide
system is compliant.
Senator Cochran. But that has not been the subject of any
agreement that has been reached, or any amendment to the treaty
that has been decided upon between the two principals?
Mr. Holum. No.
Senator Cochran. Now, one thing that we discussed when we
had our briefing with the Defense officials this week was that
one of the ingredients or elements, options, that the
contractor was to consider under this request for proposals was
the use of forward-based radars to help detect missile
launches, and otherwise make an overall national missile
defense system workable.
If there were a forward-based radar, on the West Coast of
the United States for example, outside the immediate area of a
deployed national missile defense system, would that be
consistent with the treaty, or would that be in violation of
the treaty?
Mr. Holum. You are getting me into an area of technical
analysis that I do not feel prepared to pursue. For example, it
may depend on whether the radar faced in only one direction or
not.
Senator Cochran. Well, Article II has a provision in it
that says that an ABM radar is one constructed and deployed for
an ABM role. And since we are requesting proposals from a
contractor that specifically ask for a system to be developed
that calls for a forward-based radar as part of that system, is
not that radar one constructed and deployed for an ABM role?
Mr. Holum. Mr. Chairman, I do not dispute at all, and will
hasten to agree with you, that the request for proposals
contemplates national missile defenses that would not be
compliant with the ABM Treaty. That request for proposals is
not designed to fit the treaty. It is designed from the
Department of Defense's standpoint to develop options for
national missile defenses against the threats we have been
talking about.
So it is unquestionable that this could produce recommended
programs and a national missile defense architecture that would
not be in compliance with the treaty. Under those
circumstances, we would seek to negotiate an amendment to the
treaty.
Senator Cochran. Article III also has a provision relating
to radars. And it says that ABM radars must be located in the
ABM deployment area or at test ranges. That is a requirement.
So in connection with my question about forward-deployed radars
being requested as part of a new national missile defense
system, it not only fits the definition of an ABM radar in
Article II, but is clearly prohibited in Article III unless it
is located in the ABM deployment area or a test range.
And I think the reason my question is relevant is that the
administration officials whom I quoted in my opening statement
keep saying that the ``3+3'' plan, or the administration's
proposal for a national missile defense, will comply with the
ABM Treaty. Yet, the request for proposals is requiring a
contractor to develop a national missile defense system which
seems clear to me violates the ABM Treaty in a number of
respects, and I have cited two or three right now, and there
are more.
But how do you rationalize that? If you are not negotiating
now with the Russians an amendment that will permit this kind
of system to be built, why are you spending $16 million as of
last week on contractors to develop a system that will be out
of compliance?
Mr. Holum. Because, as I said, Mr. Chairman, we intend to
negotiate an amendment to the treaty, should that prove to be
necessary, based on the system that is produced as a result of
these investments. But we are in a very early stage. I would
not know what kind of amendments to negotiate to the treaty, or
whether any amendments are necessary.
One thing is clear, and that is that the development of a
national missile defense system can proceed within the terms of
the treaty. The development process is not constrained by the
treaty. We have some period of time during the development
phase. We also have a period of time when development may well
continue after the first 3 years, when we are assessing the
threat and moving up on a decision to deploy. And negotiation
now would not only be premature but impossible, because we
would not know what specific amendments to the treaty we might
be required to accomplish.
Senator Cochran. In the schedule for ``3+3''--3 years to
develop, 3 years to deploy--where is there time to negotiate an
agreement with the Russians? If the administration and Congress
together agree that we have a threat that requires a national
missile defense in order to protect the security of our
country, where is the time to negotiate that agreement in the
``3+3'' plan?
Mr. Holum. It is at the point, or during the period, more
precisely, when we have designed a system architecture, there
has been a compliance review analysis of the architecture that
has been fixed, and we are preparing to deploy. The actual
completion of deployment over a period of 3 years would allow
time from the time of the compliance review and the deployment
decision to commence negotiations.
Senator Cochran. One other request in the document
submitted to the contractors, the request for proposals for the
lead system integrator, requires the contractors to consider
using a Minuteman ICBM system as the booster for a ground-based
interceptor. Obviously, the Minuteman is not an ABM interceptor
missile.
If the United States were to decide to use the Minuteman
ICBMs as the booster, do you think that would be compliant
under Article VI(A) of the treaty which prohibits giving
capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles to
missiles other than ABM interceptors?
Mr. Holum. It may, or it may not, Mr. Chairman. I just have
not made the kind of analysis that would be necessary to
determine that and, again, would prefer not to engage in a
hypothetical analysis rather than making a real analysis when
we have a specific system that we want to develop.
Senator Cochran. Let me ask you about another possible
conflict between the administration's proposals and actions and
the ABM Treaty. DOD plans to incorporate the Space and Missile
Tracking System into its national missile defense system when
it becomes available. One possible architecture using this
missile-tracking system would make it possible to conduct
intercepts outside the range of the ground-based radar, making
an ABM radar unnecessary. If we decided to deploy a national
missile defense architecture in which a space-based sensor made
an ABM radar unnecessary, would that sensor be regarded as a
space-based ABM component, which is banned by Article V of the
ABM Treaty?
Mr. Holum. Mr. Chairman, I will have to give you the same
answer. I just have not made a considered analysis of that
issue.
Senator Cochran. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Who makes those analyses?
Mr. Holum. It begins with the Compliance Review Group in
the Department of Defense analyzing whether a particular system
is treaty compliant.
Senator Levin. Do you know whether they have made the
assessment of the Chairman's hypothetical?
Mr. Holum. No. I do not believe they have, but I would
prefer that they answer for themselves.
Senator Levin. I want to ask you about the ``3+3''
approach. That approach, as I understand it, permits us to
consider various options and to develop a system which would
then be ready for deployment should we decide to deploy. Is
that correct?
Mr. Holum. That is correct.
Senator Levin. And that approach, the ``3+3'', allows us to
consider a whole menu of options, some of which are treaty-
compliant and some of which are not. Is that correct?
Mr. Holum. That is correct.
Senator Levin. But there is a difference between
considering options which are not treaty-compliant, and making
a commitment now to deploy a system whether or not it complies
with the treaty. Is that not true?
Mr. Holum. That is correct.
Senator Levin. I think that is kind of the heart of the
difference. You are not denying, I gather--and you have
explicitly said this--you are not denying that we are looking
at options, some of which are treaty-compliant, and some of
which are not?
Mr. Holum. That is right. And the difference, really,
between our approach and the approach of, for example, S. 7 is
the timing of the deployment and the timing of the decision to
deploy. I think the prudent approach is to continue the
development, also to continue to watch the threat as it
emerges--and it may or may not; we do not know the answer to
that at this stage--and to continue to refine the development
and advance the process until we feel a deployment decision is
necessary; a decision that will need to be made in advance of
the arrival of the threat, but the intelligence community is
watching that issue closely. Then, make a decision, and go with
the best technology available at that time, in a context where
I think we are much more likely to be able to negotiate an
amendment to the treaty because the security environment should
be clear to all concerned, including our treaty partners.
Senator Levin. So that the threat at the time the
technology is developed, if it exists in a defined enough way
so that the intelligence community can make an assessment that
it needs to be addressed, would be clear enough, you believe,
or might be clear enough, to give us a better chance at
negotiating an amendment to the treaty, than a threat which is
more abstract or less clear?
Mr. Holum. That is right. Keep in mind that we, as I said
earlier, have made clear in the theater defense demarcation
discussions with the Russians that it is very important to us
that the treaty be a living document and susceptible to
modification and updating to address real security threats.
At this stage, because the intelligence analysis is pretty
widely available in the public realm that we are 14 years away,
roughly, from a rogue state threat, it would clearly appear to
our Russian colleagues that we are gratuitously trying to get
rid of the ABM Treaty, as opposed to amending the treaty in
light of a realistic assessment of a then-current emerging
threat.
I think once we have further evidence of a changing
security environment, as has been the case with the theater
systems, we will have a much better prospect for negotiating
changes in the treaty.
Senator Levin. You made the distinction between the joint
statement which President Clinton and President Yeltsin issued
at Helsinki and a treaty. What is the next step in negotiating
a treaty or an agreement to implement or to embody the
principles set forth in that joint statement at Helsinki?
Mr. Holum. On theater missile defense, or on strategic
reductions?
Senator Levin. Well, whatever treaties or agreements were
contemplated for negotiation at Helsinki, what is the next
step? How many different treaties and agreements are there that
are going to be negotiated to embody and implement the concepts
and the principles that they agreed to?
Mr. Holum. The two that are directly relevant here would be
a completion of the demarcation negotiations and follow-on
strategic arms reductions. The Standing Consultative Commission
is scheduled to meet again the middle of this month to try to
wrap up and incorporate the agreed principles established in
Helsinki on theater defenses. As far as further strategic arms
reductions are concerned, there would be a follow-on
negotiation, a formal negotiation, after the Russians ratify
START II.
Senator Levin. So since we do not know when that is, we do
not know when the START III negotiations would begin?
Mr. Holum. That is right. We do not have a time table.
Senator Levin. And is it hoped that the Standing
Consultative Commission wrap-up of the treaty demarcation issue
would occur within a matter of months, a few months?
Mr. Holum. I certainly hope so. These have, as the Chairman
noted, been long and difficult negotiations, so I will not
assume success until it is completed. But I think that the
leadership of the two countries has been very clear that the
principles are now established for wrapping up the demarcation
negotiations. And we should complete them in the next round of
the SCC.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator.
There are a number of statements appended to the agreement.
One is related to components based on other physical principles
and capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles,
launchers, or radars. And it restricts and imposes limitations
on such systems, and says that, and I quote this, ``They would
be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and
agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.''
Does it not appear to you very clear that the development
of a national missile defense system, as the administration is
now proposing and has actually issued request for proposals to
contractors to develop, is a clear statement of intent that
requires us to discuss with our treaty partner, and agree, in
accordance with Article XIV of the treaty, before we undertake
that development?
Mr. Holum. Again, Mr. Chairman, I have not made an
assessment of that. I just do not know the answer.
Senator Cochran. The facts seem to be clear from the
actions being taken by the administration, first of all to
propose that a national missile defense system be developed,
then to set out a time frame for the development and the
deployment if the threat is perceived to justify the
deployment, that will clearly violate the clear and unambiguous
terms of this treaty in a number of different respects. And I
have tried to identify at least five during my statement and
questions to you.
Would it not seem appropriate to at least engage the
Russians at this point in a preliminary round of discussions,
to see if they agree with your interpretation or this
administration's interpretation that we can proceed to develop
a system under the request for proposals that we have issued,
to get an indication as to whether or not they think that
violates the treaty or does not, so we will know whether we are
going to make the decision to amend the treaty, to have
negotiations similar to the ones we are having on TMD, or
whether we ought to consider terminating or withdrawing from
the treaty?
I do not think we can continue along this path very much
longer before we recognize that those are the only options that
we have.
Mr. Holum. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be a grave
mistake to peremptorily withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for the
reasons I have described in my statement. I also think it would
be a mistake to prematurely begin discussions with the Russians
on what may or may not be required in terms of amendments to
the ABM Treaty, until we have made our own judgment as to what
we want to accomplish.
It seems to me that the determinant here of our national
missile defense program, designed to deal with rogue state
threats is going to be what the threat requires, not what the
Russians think or what the treaty says. We will begin by
determining what the national security requires. And once there
is a program that is sufficiently developed in terms of its
architecture and its details that we can make our own
compliance judgment, then it seems to me that is the time to go
to the Russians and say, ``We have an emerging threat that we
take very seriously. We have designed a system to redress that
threat and it requires--'' if this proves to be the case ``--
modification of the ABM Treaty in these specific respects.''
That would be the time to then begin discussions with the
Russians, when we would have, it seems to me, a good basis for
negotiations.
And it seems to me that we need to approach these three
different concerns in the proper order. The first one that we
have--and it is a risk right now--is the Russian strategic
arsenal. It is the only arsenal in the world that could rain
overwhelming devastation on the United States. And that has a
relevance to the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty is important to be
able to continue the process of reducing those forces.
There is a second danger that we need to worry about, which
is the theater offensive threat. And that is a current risk.
And we need to develop theater defenses to be able to deal with
that, robust theater defenses. And we have gone to negotiate
with our treaty partners to make clear that the treaty permits
those.
And remember that in the early days of the treaty the
thought was, and the Department of Defense was limited by the
premise that, we could not test against an incoming missile of
more than 2 kilometers per second velocity, or engage at more
than 40 kilometers above the earth's surface. We are now
talking about interceptors or target missiles of 5 kilometers
per second. That has been agreed by the two sides already. So
that we have demonstrated in this process that this treaty can
be adjusted and we will be able to meet our security
requirements for theater missile defense.
The third threat that the treaty is also relevant to is the
danger of missile attack, ICBM attack, from rogue States. And
that is a threat that is some time in the future. We are not
complacent about it, and the ``3+3'' program is designed to
deal with it.
But in order to deal with that threat in the future, my
argument is we should not throw away the benefits of the ABM
Treaty for dealing with the larger immediate threat that exists
right now. I think we can have our cake and eat it too, if we
approach these dangers in the order in which they are arising.
Senator Cochran. One of the ingredients of the statement
that the Presidents issued following the Helsinki meeting was
that the treaty ought to be enlarged to include additional
parties. And that was, of course, made in connection with the
theater missile defense demarcation discussions that are going
on.
Is it your impression that that extension of the treaty to
include other parties would require us to negotiate with other
parties in connection with a national missile defense system,
as well as theater missile defense demarcation issues?
Mr. Holum. Any subsequent amendment to the treaty would
require agreement of the parties at that time. That is correct.
Senator Cochran. Would that prolong, do you think, the
period of time within which you could get an agreement like you
are contemplating trying to get if we decide we need to deploy
a national missile defense system?
Mr. Holum. It is impossible to say for certain, but on the
basis of our experience in the demarcation area, when the
potential successor States have been participating in the
discussions, that has not proved to be a complicating factor.
They have sometimes had ideas of their own. They have
participated to lesser or greater degrees in the discussions.
But I think all of the additional participants--there are only
three--have not impeded the negotiations.
I suspect they would have a very strong interest, if the
United States and Russia agreed on amendments dealing with
national missile defense, in preserving the viability of the
treaty and the strategic relationship between the United States
and Russia, and would not impede action. But I cannot predict
the future precisely.
Senator Cochran. Do you have, based on your experience in
this area, any confidence that once we developed a system--if
we are able to achieve it in 3 years, the development of a
system--and we decide to deploy it, that the deployment can
take place in 3 years?
Mr. Holum. In terms of the treaty inhibitions, obviously,
it is hard to say. I am not going to comment on the technical
aspects that are in the province of the Department of Defense.
But I do not in any sense say that hard is hopeless. I think
that almost everything we do in this field currently is
difficult to accomplish. But I think that there is a reasonable
prospect that we could negotiate a treaty amendment.
And remember that if we cannot, then we always have the
option of making a determination about extraordinary
circumstances in our supreme national interests, if it came to
that. I do not think it will, because I think we will be able
to negotiate the necessary amendments to the treaty.
Senator Cochran. Well, I am hopeful that, as we move down
this path, whether it is ``3+3'' or 3-plus-infinity, that we
keep in mind that our national security is more important than
a treaty agreement, and particularly this ABM Treaty. And that
is the issue that we may have to confront at some time. I am
not ready to prejudge that, either.
But I think it is important for us to reassure the American
public that this Government is not going to refrain from
protecting the security of our country against missile attack
if we see that threat has emerged--if we have the technical
capacity to do so, that we have the will to do so. I think they
ought to be assured that we do have the will and the capacity
to protect our nation's security, and not just wring our hands
over whether we are going to get an agreement negotiated in
time to save our lives.
Mr. Holum. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that comment. It is
very important to emphasize, I think, to have on the record,
that we are not defenseless against strategic missile attack
now.
Any country that would contemplate an attack on the United
States, based on our overwhelming retaliatory capability, knows
that their society would suffer an intolerable, devastating,
overwhelming blow. So we should never neglect the fact that our
deterrent capability exists and we have the will to use that.
When you make the comment about our security and the
treaty, part of the reason why I am adamant in trying to
protect the ABM Treaty is, I think it is an instrument of our
security. It is an important element in continuing the
strategic arms reduction process. But at the same time, you are
absolutely correct that the United States has to be prepared to
defend itself. And if the treaty is in the way and cannot be
amended--and I believe it can--then we have to contemplate
further action. But this is something that I think there is a
great deal of agreement on, more than we often appreciate,
between the administration and Members of the Congress.
Senator Cochran. We all do hope that our deterrent capacity
has an effect, as we think it had on the old Soviet Union and
its nuclear capability. But I do not know that anybody is
reassured that it will have the same effect on rogue states who
now seek to possess long-range missile capability and weapons
of mass destruction. And so assuming that the deterrent works
against those who do not seem to be rational to start with, or
who measure costs and benefits very differently from the way we
do, is problematical and is unsettling, at best. And so that is
not a defense at all, if it does not work.
Mr. Holum. That is why we should proceed with the ``3+3''
program. I agree.
Senator Cochran. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Again, I want to just ask you about the
options which are being looked at under the ``3+3'' program.
Some of those options are treaty-compliant; some of them are
not treaty-compliant. Is that correct?
Mr. Holum. I have not made a considered judgment on any of
them, but we certainly contemplate the possibility that options
would be not compliant with the treaty.
Senator Levin. Do we also contemplate the possibility that
options will be compliant with the treaty?
Mr. Holum. It is conceivable. I just do not know the
answer.
Senator Levin. So we are looking at all the options.
Mr. Holum. Right.
Senator Levin. Whether or not they are treaty-compliant.
Mr. Holum. Right.
Senator Levin. I do not think we ought to exclude the
possibility that one of the options, or more, that may be
selected as the best technology will be treaty-compliant.
Mr. Holum. Yes, I certainly would not exclude that outcome.
Senator Levin. All right. So that is point number one.
Number two: In addition to the question of the threat, as
to what it looks like at the end of the 3 years, there are a
couple of other important issues that we do not want to
prejudge, it seems to me. One is the technology development and
how far advanced it is. Is it not possible that we are going to
be at a point in 3 years where the technology is simply not
effective to do what we might want to do if there is a threat?
Mr. Holum. I think that is possible, although I am not
competent to assess the technology. I have read the assessments
of the military leadership and others who are working on this,
and they describe the program as high-risk in a number of
respects because of the tight time limits.
Senator Levin. All right. So that when the ``3+3'' program
talks about assessing the threat at the end of 3 years, they
are also in addition to that talking about looking at the
effectiveness of the technology development as of that point,
and the cost. Is that also true?
Mr. Holum. That is true.
Senator Levin. Because there are many threats out there,
some of which can be delivered by other than a ballistic
missile--including a suitcase, or a cruise missile--which may
be more likely, and against which we are spending an awful lot
less money than we might be urged to spend on national missile
defense.
So we would want to look at all of the potential threats,
how they could be delivered from rogue nations, what would be
the cost of defenses against them, and how it is best to spend
our resources to defend against whatever that threat is. Would
that be a fair statement?
Mr. Holum. I agree with that.
Senator Levin. Does the ``3+3'' allow for all of that?
Mr. Holum. Yes.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Holum, we appreciate very much your
being here today. I think it is clear from the discussion that
we have had that this is a complex issue. It is not easy to
answer questions ``Yes'' or ``No,'' as we tend to have put them
to you today. But at the very least, I think we can agree that
there are many ambiguities that will have to be resolved, if we
are going to both develop and deploy a defense against
ballistic missile attack, even rogue ballistic missile attack;
and that compliance determinations on specific system elements,
even though they may be premature at this point, do not mean
that they ought not to be considered and seriously confronted
in terms of how we will deal with them if the administration
ever acknowledges the threat emerging and convinces itself to
deploy a missile defense system.
So if now is not the right time to start answering these
questions, I do not know when the right time is going to be. We
can hope it is going to be far into the future, but we have no
assurance of that. And so the fundamental question is whether
Congress and the Executive Branch are going to work together to
try to answer these questions, keeping in mind the security
interests of the United States. It is something that I think we
need to seriously consider and at least begin the discussion on
at this time, rather than waiting until it may be too late.
We appreciate your being here. We will continue these
hearings. We are hopeful to have one hearing, at least one,
each month during this session of the Congress, to try to
understand further what our challenges are in this situation
and in the proliferation area and the international security
area.
And we appreciate very much the excellent contribution made
by my friend from Michigan, who is on the Armed Services
Committee as well. Senator?
Senator Levin. Well, thank you very much. And thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings. These are really
critically important subjects, and I appreciate the Chairman
taking the time and putting in the effort that he has and his
staff has in holding these hearings. I think they are going to
be very useful to Members of the Senate.
And I appreciate your testimony today, also, Mr. Holum,
with I think some of the clearest statements of the importance
of putting our security interests first, because that is the
guiding star for all of us, I hope; but then trying to figure
out how best we can achieve that interest through a combination
of nuclear arms reductions and defenses against threats that
are either real or could emerge over a reasonable period of
time. And I think your testimony was very, very helpful in that
regard. Thank you.
Mr. Holum. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Charts submitted for the record follow:
ABM TREATY ISSUES
3+3 National Missile Defense Program
Issue Article
Defense of the Territory........... I
Location of NMD Deployment Areas... III
Forward-Deployed X-Band Radars..... III
Ground Based Interceptor Using VI(a)
Minuteman ICBMs.
Space and Missile Tracking System V, Agreed
(SMTS). Statement D
__________
ABM TREATY ISSUES
Defense of the Territory
Article I
Treaty Text:
Article I: ``Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for
a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for
such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an
individual region except as provided for in Article III of this
Treaty.''
Compliance Issue:
Request for proposals for NMD lead system integrator contract
states, ``The NMD system will provide defense of all territory in the
50 states.''
__________
ABM TREATY ISSUES
Location of NMD Deployment Areas
Article III
Treaty Text:
Article III: ``[W]ithin one ABM system deployment area having a
radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo
launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM
launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at
launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars . . . and (3) no
more than eighteen [smaller] ABM radars . . .''
Compliance Issues:
1. An NMD site in Alaska (request for proposals for NMD lead
system integrator, C1/C2 architecture) would violate Article III's
requirement to base ABM components within an ICBM deployment area.
2. 200 interceptors (request for proposals for NMD lead system
integrator, C3 architecture) at two sites would violate numerical
constraints on missiles, launchers, and deployment areas.
ABM TREATY ISSUES
Forward-Deployed X-Band Radars
Article III
Treaty Text:
Article II: ``[A]n ABM system is a system to counter strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently
consisting of (a) ABM interceptor missiles . . . (b) ABM launchers . .
. and (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an
ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.''
Article III: ``Within one ABM system deployment area having a
radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo
launchers, a Party may deploy . . . two large-phased array ABM radars
and . . . eighteen [smaller] ABM radars . . .''
Compliance Issue:
Forward-deployed radars, if deployed for the purpose of
supporting an NMD system or if of the same type as the Ground-Based
Radar, would meet Article II's definition of an ABM radar. Deployment
outside the Grand Forks deployment area would violate Article III.
__________
ABM TREATY ISSUES
Ground-Based Interceptors Using Minuteman ICBMs
Article VI(a)
Treaty Text:
Article VI(a): ``[E]ach Party undertakes not to give missiles,
launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM
launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic
missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them
in an ABM mode . . .''
Compliance Issue:
Minuteman ICBMs are missiles other than ABM interceptor
missiles. If used as ABM interceptors, they will have been given
capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and will have been
tested in an ABM mode.
__________
ABM TREATY ISSUES
Space & Missile Tracking System (SMTS)
Article V/Agreed Statement D
Treaty Text:
Article V: ``Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or
deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, space-based, or
mobile land-based.''
Agreed Statement D: ``[I]n the event ABM systems based on other
physical principles and including components capable of substituting
for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created
in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their
components would be subject to discussion . . . and agreement . . .''
Compliance Issue:
If SMTS makes it possible to intercept ICBMs without detection
by the Ground-Based Radar, SMTS could be considered a space-based ABM
component, or a substitute for an ABM radar based on other physical
principles.
ALL-MARK
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