S. Hrg. 105-193
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE AND PROSPECTS FOR
U.S.-RUSSIA ABM TREATY ACCOMMODATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 13, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1997
39-382cc
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware JOHN GLENN, Ohio
TED STEVENS, Alaska CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Counsel
Leonard Weiss, Minority Staff Director
Michal Sue Prosser, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL
SERVICES
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mitchel B. Kugler, Staff Director
Linda Gustitus, Minority Staff Director
Julie Sander, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Cochran.............................................. 1
Senator Levin................................................ 2
Senator Stevens.............................................. 4
Senator Collins.............................................. 4
Senator Durbin............................................... 19
WITNESSES
Thursday, March 13, 1997
Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, Vice Chairman, U.S. Institute of
Peace.......................................................... 5
Dr. Keith B. Payne, President, National Institute for Public
Policy......................................................... 8
Dr. Andrei Kortunov, President, Moscow Public Science Foundation. 12
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Kampelman, Amb. Max M.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Kortunov, Dr. Andrei:
Testimony.................................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Payne, Dr. Keith B.:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 29
APPENDIX
Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on a Global Protection System....... 22
Questions and Responses for Dr. Payne............................ 35
``Cold Peace'' or Cooperation? The Potential for U.S.-Russian
Accommodation on Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty by Dr.
Keith Payne, Dr. Andrei Kortunov, Dr. Andrei Shoumikhin, and
Mr. Willis Stanley............................................. 43
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE AND PROSPECTS FOR UNITED STATES-RUSSIA ABM
TREATY ACCOMMODATION
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Collins, Levin, and
Durbin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The Subcommittee will please come to
order.
I first want to welcome everyone to today's hearing of our
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services. The topic of our hearing
today is ``National Missile Defense and Prospects for U.S.-
Russian ABM Treaty Accommodation.''
At the Subcommittee's first hearing on nuclear deterrence
last month, there were questions about the relationship between
U.S. deployment of a national missile defense and Russian
ratification of the START II treaty. During today's hearing, we
will have the opportunity to listen to and ask questions of the
principal authors of a just-published study sponsored by the
U.S. Institute of Peace entitled ``Cold Peace or Cooperation?
The Potential for U.S.-Russian Accommodation on Missile Defense
and the ABM Treaty.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The study referred to appears in the Appendix on page 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important to note that the study and its findings
have been endorsed by former Ambassador to the United States
Vladimir Lukin, who is now Chairman of the International
Relations Committee of the Russian Duma. The study, which has
already been briefed to National Security Council officials,
concludes that the deployment of a national missile defense by
the United States and reductions to strategic offensive weapons
in both the United States and Russia need not be mutually
exclusive.
That being said, while the Senate provided advice and
consent to the ratification of START II more than 1 year ago,
the treaty has not yet been ratified by Russia. While various
Russians have included in their reluctance to ratify START II
concern over U.S. plans for national missile defense, the fact
of the matter is that there are many other reasons Russians in
both the Yeltsin administration and the Duma have given for
their failure to ratify START II.
In October, for example, Alexi Arbatov, who is Deputy
Chairman of the Duma's Defense Committee, listed some of these
reasons when he said, ``First, there is no money for it.
Secondly, the treaty is considered to be unfair on technical
grounds. And thirdly, the general background--the determination
of NATO to expand to the east--is very unfavorable to the
treaty.''
The United States must take Russian concerns into account
before deploying a national missile defense system and S. 7,
the National Missile Defense Act of 1997, seeks to take these
concerns into account. S. 7, in fact, specifically ``urges the
President to pursue, if necessary, high-level discussions with
the Russian Federation to achieve agreement to amend the ABM
Treaty to allow deployment of the national missile defense
system.''
Ultimately, though, we cannot make our security dependent
upon Russian willingness to cooperate. The world has changed
greatly in the quarter century since the ABM Treaty was
negotiated. There now are many nations who are hostile to the
United States working hard to acquire long-range missiles armed
with weapons of mass destruction.
My own bottom line on the ABM Treaty is very simple. We
seek to cooperate with Russia, but ultimately, the defense of
our country is more important than the defense of a treaty that
puts our country at risk. Indeed, this study proposes that in
the context of mutual accommodation, a new arms control
agreement integrating strategic offensive and defensive forces
could supercede the ABM Treaty.
Today's witnesses have addressed these issues in their
fascinating study and we are indebted to the U.S. Institute of
Peace for funding their work. We will hear first from
Ambassador Max Kampelman, a highly respected arms control
negotiator in both Republican and Democratic administrations
who is the Vice Chairman of the U.S. Institute of Peace.
Next, we will listen to Dr. Keith Payne, the principal
American author of the study. Dr. Payne is the President of the
National Institute for Public Policy and is also a member of
the faculty of Georgetown University's National Security
Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service.
Then we will hear from Dr. Andrei Kortunov, principal
Russian author of the study, who is President of the Moscow
Public Science Foundation. Dr. Kortunov is the former Head of
the Department of Foreign Policy at the Institute of USA and
Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and is a
close advisor to the Russian Defense Ministry and senior
members of the Duma.
Before hearing from our witnesses, I will be happy to yield
to the distinguished ranking member of the Subcommittee, Carl
Levin, Senator from Michigan.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my
welcome to your welcome to our three witnesses today. It is a
very important topic, this question of the future of U.S.-
Russian cooperation in security affairs, particularly as it
relates to nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defense and
the ABM Treaty.
A prior commitment which had long been scheduled at the
Armed Services Committee is going to take me away, I am afraid,
and perhaps not allow me to come back. We have the Commanders
in Chief at the Armed Services Committee today who are
responsible for our nuclear forces and our space command, so it
is kind of the operational end of the issues which we are
considering here today.
I think we all share the view that it is important for both
the United States and Russia to try to understand and
accommodate each other's legitimate security concerns.
Cooperative U.S.-Soviet efforts on arms control were one of the
positive constants of the Cold War. There were not too many
positive parts to that period, but at least on arms control, we
had some cooperation. Those efforts helped to avert crises and
they established predictability and understanding that served
the Nation and served the world well.
Those efforts, including the ABM Treaty, permitted both
sides to reduce their nuclear arsenals in a manner which
increases our mutual security. That is what the ABM Treaty is
about, at least partly; the reduction of nuclear weapons which
it allowed.
So we have to treat very carefully suggestions that we
unilaterally withdraw from or violate the ABM Treaty because
the consequences could include the end of nuclear arms
reductions that we either have secured or that we are trying to
secure, including START I and II. So precipitous or unilateral
withdrawal or violation could jeopardize American security.
I agree with our Chairman, that it is America's security
that we have a responsibility to protect and defend and
maintain. It is not the ABM Treaty itself that counts. It is
what that treaty has permitted us to do, which is to have
significant reductions in weapons, which is what I believe,
this discussion is all about.
We have made some important gains in cooperative security
arrangements since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of
the Soviet Union, including the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program that has helped to completely denuclearize
three nations that inherited nuclear weapons from the former
Soviet Union. We have already moved away from the old days of
mutual assured destruction and we have removed many of our
nuclear forces from alert. Both nations have detargeted our
nuclear missiles, which substantially eliminates the problem of
an accidental missile launch, and these gains must be protected
and enhanced.
I understand that the study which our witnesses are going
to discuss today concludes that it is desirable and possible
that the U.S. and Russia reach a level of accommodation on
these interrelated issues. That strikes me as a good common
goal and I would hope that is the alternative that we seek,
namely a mutual level of accommodation between ourselves and
Russia.
If we cannot achieve something mutual, if it is in our
interest to move unilaterally, then so be it. But if it is not
in our interest to move unilaterally, to violate an agreement
which has allowed us to achieve significant reductions in
nuclear weapons, then it would not be in our interest to
violate unilaterally or withdraw from that treaty.
I look forward to hearing at least part of our witnesses'
testimony and I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling
the hearing today, even though it is at a time when I am afraid
I cannot attend most of it.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Senator Stevens.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STEVENS
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. As a young
Senator, I sat here on this Subcommittee with Senator Henry
``Scoop'' Jackson when he used the Subcommittee on
International Security for the purpose of exploring the
relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union. I
am delighted that you are proceeding now as Chairman of the
Subcommittee to expand the concepts of the Subcommittee and you
have a distinguished panel here this morning.
We have had the Arms Control Observer Group now since 1985
but we have not had the power to hold public hearings and one
of the things that has been missing from the dialogue, I think,
is the opportunity to explore in depth some of the new concepts
that are really affecting our balance of power with Russia and
the world, as far as our missile capability and as far as the
development for our systems of protection against the threat of
the use of such weapons against our country.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator Stevens.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to thank you and commend you for calling this very
important hearing this morning.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a
critical issue that demands the attention of this Subcommittee
and, indeed, the entire Congress. The world today is very
different than it was 25 years ago when the United States and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed the treaty on
the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. Today, rogue
nations with fanatical leaders are freely pursuing ballistic
missile delivery systems. It is imperative that today's issues
and capabilities are reflected in a fully encompassing
deterrence doctrine.
I would like to commend the authors of the study that we
are going to be focusing on today for producing such a thorough
and extensive work on this complex and critical issue. I look
forward to hearing their witnesses and learning more about this
critical issue. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Ambassador Kampelman, please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR MAX M. KAMPELMAN, VICE CHAIRMAN, UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Ambassador Kampelman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was
pleased to receive your invitation to participate in the
Committee's session this morning.
The missile defense issue, in my opinion, will increasingly
come to the forefront of public discussions, particularly as
the American people come to understand that our government has,
to this point, not committed to the deployment of defenses
against missiles that may reach us carrying nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons. The desirability of exploring
the potential for accommodation in this area between our
country and Russia, the subject matter of the paper before you
authored by Dr. Keith Payne, Dr. Andrei Kortunov, and others,
is self-evident.
At the very outset, let me say, as the Vice Chairman of the
United States Institute of Peace (USIP), that we were pleased,
through a grant, to help stimulate that study. In 1984, during
the administration of President Reagan and with his support,
the Congress established the Institute of Peace as a non-
partisan and bi-partisan one and charged it with the task of
pursuing ideas, plans, and studies that might open up
intellectual and practical paths toward peace. We do that in
association with experts, academicians, non-governmental
organizations, government agencies, and wherever we see
opportunities, here and abroad, for creative thinking.
The application for a grant by Dr. Keith Payne in
cooperation with Dr. Kortunov, which led to this paper, met our
criteria. The U.S. Institute of Peace takes no public policy
positions. Our only condition for this grant was that the study
and the report be ``track two,'' non-governmental, with no
government officials involved in writing the study.
I appear before you this morning, however, in a personal
capacity, as well. I support missile defenses, and I would like
to elaborate on that within the context of the paper before
you.
In March 1985, President Reagan asked me to head the U.S.
negotiating team for a renewed effort with the Soviet Union to
reduce and eliminate nuclear arms. In addition, he asked me to
concentrate on the issue of missile defenses as reflected in
his Strategic Defense Initiative. This followed an article on
the subject published in the New York Times Magazine and
coauthored by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Dr. Robert Jastrow, and
me.
Critics of the President's SDI program, fortuitously from
their point of view, labeled the SDI program as ``star wars.''
This was inaccurate because its object was to avoid rather than
project war in space. The existence of attack missiles
traversing space was already a reality. The SDI program was
designed to stop and destroy those weapons in space.
The President instructed that the SDI research be non-
nuclear, and he offered the prospect of U.S. cooperation with
the Soviets in the development of the defenses. The President's
instruction also included the admonition that the research be
undertaken within the confines of the ABM Treaty.
Reference to the Treaty leads me to share with you a
conversation I had in Geneva at the time with one of the
leaders of the Soviet Union, a Politburo member, who wanted to
understand our American negotiating position. The irony of our
respective positions on how to define the ABM Treaty became
evident to him as well as to me as I pointed out that the
Soviet Union was now defining the Treaty just as we had
interpreted it in 1972. And we were interpreting the Treaty as
the Soviets had in 1972. We were both energetically defending
our reversed positions with fervor. Didn't that seem a foolish
way for grown adults to behave, I suggested to him? He smiled,
agreed, and asked for my suggestion.
At first, I suggested that he look at the Treaty's Agreed
Statement ``(D)'', which clearly recognized that the state of
our scientific knowledge in 1972, the date of the Treaty's
signing, would be surpassed by new knowledge. It, therefore,
provided for new discussions and agreements in the event of
``ABM systems based on other physical principles.'' In effect,
it called for us to renegotiate the applicability of the ABM
Treaty in the face of new technologies.
I went on to acknowledge that the Soviet Union was looking
at the ABM Treaty as a holy document. There were many in the
United States similarly oriented. How to treat a holy document?
The U.S. had another holy document, I pointed out, our
Constitution, adopted in 1787. It has been amended. It has been
interpreted and reinterpreted. Indeed, in many respects, it is
barely recognizable as it has evolved, but it is still our holy
document. (Parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I am here reminded of
the Yoga Berra type insight that if any of our revered founding
fathers would be alive today, they would look at our
Constitution and how it has been interpreted and turn over in
their graves.)
In any event, I pointed out to my Soviet colleague that if
we want the ABM Treaty to continue as a holy document, we
should stop the foolish debate about what was intended in 1972
and instead sit down and negotiate what is in our mutual best
interest today. We could then assert, if we wish, that was the
1972 intent, as well.
That remains my position today, Mr. Chairman. That is why I
am encouraged by the paper before you today. That is also why I
was so disappointed that our government did not respond with
alacrity and enthusiasm to President Yeltsin's proposal in 1992
to create a Global Protection System, an internationalizing of
ballistic missile defense with a global early warning and
missile defense capability.
The Bush administration first delayed its response, but bi-
lateral talks on the subject did begin and seemed to hold
promise for joint understanding. The Russians, we were told,
looked upon those talks as indicative of U.S. willingness to
work closely with them on security problems and on missile
defenses in particular. The Clinton administration,
regrettably, downgraded and then discontinued the talks. The
paper before you recommends that the talks be reconvened in a
new forum.
I welcome your hearings, Mr. Chairman, in the hope that the
unofficial but effective talks which you will now learn about
may lead to high-level, meaningful government-to-government
talks on how best to cooperate as we both develop ballistic
missile defenses. An effective national missile defense program
is in our interest, particularly as we take into account the
development of long-range missiles in other parts of the world.
It is also in the long-range interest of the Russian
Federation which may well find its existing defenses to be
inadequate. It would, obviously, be best if our programs could
be undertaken within an agreed-upon formula with the Russian
Federation following negotiations provided for in the ABM
Treaty.
I personally have no problem looking at the ABM Treaty as a
holy document. For it to so survive, however, its original hope
that it be a ``living agreement'' must be respected. Articles
13 and 14 provide for amendments. Agreed Statement ``D''
provides for talks to deal with negotiations in the light of
new technologies. Article 15 provides a procedure for
withdrawal.
I would personally not flaunt or threaten our withdrawal.
Everyone knows we can do so should it become clear to us that
the Treaty handcuffs us from defending ourselves against likely
ballistic missile threats. It is not necessary publicly to
emphasize withdrawal and thereby subject ourselves to being
perceived as a de-stabilizing influence, when, indeed, our
intent and interest is in the reverse.
It is, however, also clear that engaging in discussion of
amendments or definitions with the Russians for the purpose of
permitting limited national missile defense is not contrary to
the treaty's letter or spirit.
The paper before you represents a good foundation for new
high-level talks. Instead of threats and instead of arguments
about what was intended by us in 1972, we should seriously
explore what is now in our separate national interests and how
we can harmonize these interests in a joint program which meets
both of our interests. We can then find the words and agreement
that will interpret the ABM Treaty accordingly.
I must add, however, that I do not want my words to convey
the impression that the negotiation will be easy or inevitably
successful. The subject is serious and important for both of us
and the talks may take time. But they are necessary.
To overcome the suspicion that now exists, our country must
demonstrate that our intent and policy is not ``anti-Russian.''
We want the people and government of the Russian Federation to
be secure and prosperous and democratic. We expect the Russian
Federation to demonstrate to us in return that they can be
trusted to be a force for stability rather than a supporter of
``rogue states'' that threaten the stability of other peoples
and states.
Your proposed legislation, Mr. Chairman, goes far in the
direction which I am urging. For that I commend you and your
colleagues. But I wish to close with an earnest appeal that
this Committee produce a bi-partisan piece of legislation that
can help create a national consensus behind an effective
national missile defense program. Partisanship is a necessary
part of the democratic process, but on issues of vital national
interest, particularly on national security, we should make a
serious effort to avoid the costly divisiveness which it
produces.
This past weekend, I had the occasion to read a commentary
on George Washington's Farewell Address to the Nation. He
warned of the ``baneful effects of the Spirit of Party,'' which
he said tended to stimulate the ``strongest passion of the
human mind'' and, therefore, presented a ``constant danger of
excess,'' which, he said, overpowers reason, distracts
governments, and agitates the community. Let us make an effort,
Mr. Chairman, to avoid that divisiveness and digression. Thank
you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Ambassador Kampelman,
for your excellent and thoughtful statement.
We will now hear from Dr. Keith Payne, President of the
National Institute for Public Policy.
TESTIMONY OF KEITH B. PAYNE,\1\ PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Dr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be
here today and I thank you for the opportunity to summarize the
findings of the U.S.-Russian study that the United States
Institute of Peace generously sponsored, as Ambassador
Kampelman has described.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement by Dr. Payne appears in the Appendix on
page 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This study has been complicated, it has been occasionally
difficult, but it is a great pleasure at long last to have
findings that are worth presenting.
Our goal was to examine a sensitive national security
question on which the United States and Russia have sharply
differing perspectives, that being the future of national
missile defense (NMD) and the ABM Treaty. As we initiated this
study, we hoped to drop the Cold War blinders that still seem
to burden most thinking on the subject and to identify a route
to mutual accommodation on national missile defense and the ABM
Treaty.
I would like to take a few minutes to outline the basic
U.S. and Russian interests that need to be accommodated and
summarize briefly how this study reached its primary conclusion
that mutual accommodation should, in principle, be feasible.
First, the U.S. interest in national missile defense
clearly is driven by the threats posed by proliferation. A
significant number of countries are seeking or already have
acquired chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as well as
advanced missile delivery systems. Rogue proliferant states,
such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya, seek these
capabilities, at least in part to deter and coerce the United
States.
The Gulf War taught the mistake of challenging the United
States at the conventional force level. The lesson,
unfortunately, of the Gulf War for rogue military and political
leaders is that U.S. conventional power can only be trumped by
the capability to deter and coerce the United States with
weapons of mass destruction and the ability to deliver those
weapons reliably.
In at least one case, that of North Korea, there appears to
be a missile in development, the Taepo Dong II, that is, in
fact, intended to strike U.S. territory or threaten U.S.
territory directly, and rogue states themselves have declared
that weapons of mass destruction and missiles offer them the
potential necessary to deter and coerce the United States.
The U.S. answer to this emerging threat includes ballistic
missile defense. The Bush and Clinton administrations refocused
the U.S. missile defense program away from the large Soviet and
now Russian missile capabilities and toward the emerging, far
more limited missile threats from regional powers, the
proliferant states.
The Clinton administration has declared its willingness to
pursue limited national missile defense along with ABM Treaty
modification, if necessary, when it deems a new long-range
threat to be emerging. This position, as stated, is not far
different from the expressed Congressional position in favor of
an immediate decision to deploy a limited national missile
defense in anticipation of long-range rogue missiles.
As former Secretary of Defense Perry declared on this
subject, and I quote, ``The only difference between us and
Congress is an issue of timing. There is not a philosophical or
technical difference between us. It is a matter of judgment on
the timing of how quickly we have to move to meet the threat.''
In general, however, Russia opposes U.S. national missile
defense plans and programs. The dominant view in Moscow, as Dr.
Kortunov will elaborate, I am sure, the dominant view in Moscow
clearly is that U.S. intentions toward Russia are hostile and,
correspondingly, that U.S. missile defense initiatives are not
for counterproliferation purposes. Rather, they are an element
in a well-orchestrated plan to undermine Russian security while
Russia is relatively weak. Russian officials and analysts point
to NATO expansion, START II, and some U.S. counterproliferation
activities as elements of this overall anti-Russian grand
design.
Many, perhaps most, in the Russian military and political
establishment subscribe to this pessimistic view, as it is
termed in our study. They conclude that even an initially
limited national missile defense would be intended to weaken
Russia, and once deployed, it would grow inevitably to threaten
the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis the United
States.
Concern in Moscow over Russia's nuclear deterrent is
particularly high at this point as the deterioration of
Russia's conventional forces has strengthened the role of
nuclear weapons in Russian military strategy. Therefore, we see
strong Russian opposition to U.S. NMD aspirations and support
for preservation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
While this pessimistic school dominates in Moscow, a more
pragmatic approach to these issues maintains that Russia
should, in fact, pursue mutual accommodation with the United
States. This more pragmatic position is not based on a
philanthropic perspective or romantic expectations of an
immediate U.S.-Russian strategic partnership. Rather, its
starting point is that U.S. national missile defense is
inevitable over time.
Pragmatists consider the worst future course to be one
wherein an inflexible Russian position on national missile
defense leads the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty
and move towards national missile defense without any
constraints. In this context, mutual accommodation is judged to
be a better alternative because it offers a means of protecting
the basic Russian interest in maintaining its strategic nuclear
deterrent.
Our study presents a specific proposal for reaching a
pragmatic mutual accommodation that safeguards Russia's
fundamental interest in maintaining its strategic nuclear
deterrent while at the same time facilitating the U.S.
initiative for a limited national missile defense.
The key to this mutual accommodation is U.S. willingness to
commit in concrete ways to limiting its national missile
defense capabilities, and Russian acceptance of the U.S. NMD
deployment and the potential need to modify or replace the ABM
Treaty.
There is no necessary inconsistency between limited
national missile defense and the preservation of mutual nuclear
deterrence. Limited national missile defense designed to defend
against ``a few dozen warheads,'' to use former Secretary of
Defense Perry's statement, need not undermine U.S.-Russian
strategic deterrence, even at offensive force levels below
START II.
This compatibility of limited national missile defense with
mutual deterrence was outlined as early as 1969 by Harold
Brown, who subsequently served as Jimmy Carter's Secretary of
Defense. At that time, in 1969, when the two sides had fewer
than 1,700 strategic missile warheads, about half of the START
II ceiling that we are looking forward to, Dr. Brown proposed
that the U.S. deploy several hundred national missile defense
interceptors to deal with third country attacks without
upsetting the U.S.-Soviet deterrence balance.
The mutual accommodation that we identify in our study is
based on striking this balance between limited national missile
defense capabilities and continued mutual deterrence. The study
suggests that such a balance could be based on a new strategic
arms control framework that integrates offensive and defensive
forces.
In principle, an agreement could specify, for example, a
single ceiling for offensive and defensive missiles with each
side having the prerogative of choosing its specific balance
between offense and defense. In the terms of the trade, that is
referred to as a freedom to mix.
The goal of this arms control framework would be to ensure
that the limitations on offensive and defensive forces would
combine to help protect each side's strategic retaliatory
capabilities. Greater leeway for national missile defense, for
example, would be complimented by restrictions on those
offensive forces capable of threatening retaliatory forces,
called counterforce systems. These include, for example, large
MIRVed ICBMs. This new offensive/defensive arms control
framework would supercede the ABM Treaty, although restrictions
on NMD clearly would remain.
It is important to note here that this proposal is radical
in form, but it is not radical in substance. For decades, the
goal of the U.S. strategic arms control policy has been to
limit national missile defense and counterforce offensive
systems so as to help preserve the survivability of strategic
retaliatory forces.
In the past, we severely limited national missile defense
but found it exceedingly difficult to gain Soviet agreement to
limit offensive counterforce systems. The mutual accommodation
suggested in our study pursues the same objective of protecting
retaliatory capabilities while this time making room for
limited national missile defense.
I would also like to note that my preference and the
preference of each contributor to our study, both on the U.S.
side and the Russian side, is that the United States and Russia
move away from a strategic deterrence relationship based
ultimately on mutual nuclear threats ``mutual assured
destruction,'' frequently referred to as MAD. We are not
satisfied with our own outline for mutual accommodation that
essentially revises MAD only to allow for limited national
missile defense protection against rogue missiles.
Nevertheless, and I believe unfortunately, it is obvious
that the condition necessary for moving away from MAD is a
level of political amity that does not yet exist, and we were
reduced to the hope that the mutual accommodation we outline
can serve as a step toward the political relationship that
ultimately will allow us to abandon MAD.
In our study, we did not attempt to suggest the specific
type of limited national missile defense the United States
should pursue or the specific types of limitations to be placed
on either offensive or defensive forces under this new arms
control framework. The important details can be determined and
negotiated only after the United States identifies the level of
NMD it deems necessary to address the existing and anticipated
third party missile threat, and after Russia determines the
type of strategic offensive deterrent that it seeks to
maintain. These are the two key factors that must be balanced
if mutual accommodation is to be possible and they would drive
the specific character of a new arms control regime.
I would like to conclude with two final points. First, our
study points to a potential roadblock to mutual accommodation,
even if Russia and the United States are inclined towards
mutual accommodation, and that roadblock is ABM Treaty
multilateralization. The Clinton administration has expressed
its commitment to recognize multiple new countries in addition
to Russia as the legitimate successors to the ABM Treaty. Our
concern is that any negotiations to revise the treaty can only
be complicated, slowed, and perhaps rendered impossible by the
introduction of many new agendas and interests.
Finally, I have had the opportunity to read S. 7, the
National Missile Defense Act of 1997, and I am encouraged to
see that it is entirely compatible with the path towards mutual
accommodation outlined in our study. In fact, it confirms the
important points that, one, the United States' national missile
defense goal is for the capability to protect against limited
missile threats, it is not anti-Russian; two, the expressed
desire in section 6(a) is for a cooperative, negotiated
approach to ABM Treaty revision, not unilateral treaty
withdrawal or violation; and however, three, there is some
prospect for unilateral U.S. movement if a good faith
cooperative approach does not bear fruit.
For reasons already discussed, each one of these points
will be important if we are to pursue the pragmatic mutual
accommodation presented in our study. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Dr. Payne, for your
excellent contribution to the hearing and particularly for your
leadership in the drafting of this impressive paper that is the
subject of our hearing today.
Dr. Andrei Kortunov, you may proceed. Welcome.
TESTIMONY OF ANDREI KORTUNOV,\1\ PRESIDENT, MOSCOW PUBLIC
SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Dr. Kortunov. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is really an
honor for me to be here today. I appreciate the privilege of
presenting for your consideration the results of the Russian-
American study that Dr. Keith Payne and I have worked on
together cooperatively for almost 2 years.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement by Dr. Kortunov appears in the Appendix
on page 37.
\1\ The study ``Cold Peace'' or Cooperation? The Potential for
U.S.-Russian Accommodation on Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, by
Dr. Keith Payne, Dr. Andrei Kortunov, Dr. Andrei Shoumikhin, and Mr.
Willis Stanley appears in the Appendix on page 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am pleased to report that the study is receiving
favorable attention in Moscow, most notably that it has been
reviewed and its findings endorsed by Ambassador Vladimir
Lukin, the Chairman of the International Relations Committee of
the Russian State Duma.
After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the Russian
Federation finds itself in a quite unique position. Russia is a
unique product of things new and old. It began by boldly
rejecting most of the Communist legacy, yet the Soviet past
continues to bear heavily on Russian thinking and the behavior
of its political, military, and other elites.
Russian positions on the array of issues related to
countering proliferation and ballistic missile defense, and
particularly to the U.S. plans and activities aimed at creating
and deploying NMD, give ample evidence of the contradictory
influences on, as well as to the ambiguity of, Russian national
goals.
At the current stage, the predominant official Russian
position tends to be quite negative as far as the U.S. BMD
agenda is concerned. Generally, it appears that Russia sees no
pressing need for endorsing a move toward greater BMD
activities because of a couple of reasons. First of all, it is
concerned about and suspicions of U.S. BMD intentions and
programs.
Second, it has a very different view from that of the
United States on the nature and scope of threats emanating from
WMD and ballistic missile proliferation.
Third, it lacks resources for any major new large-scale
military programs.
And finally, it considers her existing NMD and nuclear
deterrent capabilities inherited from the former USSR
sufficient to take care of current and future challenges,
especially from third world countries. On top of that comes
considerable Russian confusion about U.S. NMD goals and the
outcome of U.S. legislative-executive controversies on issues
related to NMD deployment.
It might be assumed that unless prevailing Russian
attitudes and positions change, Russia may pursue harsh and
perhaps disproportionate responses to any U.S. NMD deployment,
especially if it is accompanied by Washington's unilateral ABM
Treaty withdrawal. To prevent these issues from becoming a
major ``bone of contention'' in Russian-American relations,
extra efforts at understanding each other's position on the
entire range of BMD-related problems and a determined search
for mutual accommodation should be undertaken.
Admittedly, since the collapse of the system of Soviet-
American superpower competition, only a very narrow minority of
Russian politicians and experts actually fear that the two
countries will become engaged in renewed hostilities. At the
same time, earlier idealistic hopes that Russia and America
would be able to engage in a ``strategic partnership'' turned
out to be unrealistic.
In view of their country's current serious weaknesses,
Russian leaders and public opinion tend to react in a most
pained way to any U.S. moves that appear to be aimed either at
isolating or taking advantage of Russia. Admittedly, many
Russian fears and doubts vis-a-vis the West are based in a
peculiar ``psychology of the underdog,'' developed through
previous periods of East-West adversarial relations. However,
some Western actions and attitudes, for example, the NATO
expansion, START II, as well as U.S. activities in the BMD
area, particularly including U.S. discontinuation of the Ross-
Mamedov talks, substantiate the position of those in Moscow
expressing a fairly high level of acrimony and suspicion.
Russia does not have comfortable answers to many questions
related to U.S. BMD efforts. For example, would a limited U.S.
NMD inevitably expand in the future, if Russia agreed to its
deployment by revising the ABM Treaty as desired by the
American side? And, why are the attempts at increasing American
defensive and power projection capabilities taking place at the
time of Russia's greatest economic and military vulnerability?
Another serious problem for the Russian side is
understanding--and believing--that ``limited'' U.S. NMD
activities are indeed driven by the fear of ``rogue'' states'
ballistic missile potential. The notion that U.S. NMD plans
are, in fact, directed against Russia seems to be much more
plausible in Moscow, especially as the U.S. intelligence
estimates themselves claim that there is no immediate threat
from so-called rogue states.
Additionally, the Russian side is alarmed that U.S. NMD
would upset the mutual deterrence relationship between the two
nations and is intended to do so. Russian suspicions were
intensified in the light of the fact that future reductions of
Russia's strategic offensive nuclear forces in accordance with
START II provisions coincided with the stated U.S. goal of
having an operational NMD system by the year 2003.
The question, then, of whether and how a Russian-U.S.
accommodation may be reached is as difficult as it is
important. The Russian willingness to accommodate will depend
largely on how serious the United States is about NMD, and the
evolution of the Russian internal political context and on the
leadership's general orientation toward relations with the
United States--which in turn will be greatly influenced by U.S.
behavior.
The current political reality in Moscow on the issues of
missile defense, the ABM Treaty, and proliferation includes the
existence of a variety of often diametrically opposite views
among elite groups. The following distinct ``schools of
thought'' may be identified.
The ``traditionalists'' or ``pessimists'' currently enjoy
the greatest prominence and influence on the Russian political
scene, although, as we all know, the situation in Moscow is
quite fluid. They demand that the ABM Treaty should be left
totally intact and stipulate that any attempt by the United
States to expand its current BMD potential should be met with
resolute Russian countermeasures. There is obviously very
little room for accommodation on these issues from the
traditionalist perspective.
Another ``extreme'' position in the spectrum of Russian
views on these issues may be labeled as the ``revisionist''
position. It is held by those who consider the ABM Treaty as
largely an unnecessary ``relic'' of the Cold War, presenting
nothing more than an impediment on the way to authentically
different, cooperative Russian-American relations in the
strategic area. This is a distinctly minority opinion; it
enjoyed credibility during the early 1990s, but has since then
been eclipsed politically.
A third school of thought, the ``realists'' or
``pragmatists,'' assumes that, under the circumstances of
proliferation, deployment of a limited U.S. NMD is practically
inevitable, and that Russia ultimately will not be unable to
prevent such a deployment. Consequently, these pragmatists
believe that Russia should be able to shape the future
direction of U.S. NMD development and deployment in ways that
promote Russian interests, particularly through the vehicle of
the ABM Treaty. It is noteworthy that many Russian ``realists''
are to be found among military experts who tend to deal more
with hard facts than with political intricacies and ideological
dogma.
The pragmatists seem to occupy an intermediary position
between the traditional pessimists and revisionists. For
pragmatists, it is apparent that accepting modifications to the
ABM Treaty, as an important U.S. goal, is a much better choice
and lesser ``evil'' than unilateral American withdrawal from
the Treaty, leading to a serious disruption of overall U.S.-
Russian relations at a time when Russia is unable to seriously
compete with the United States in any area, particularly that
of extensive military development.
A crucial question arises in this connection: What may help
to move the pragmatist position to the center-stage of the
Russian political spectrum without waiting for some autonomous
and fundamental change in the mentality, principles, and
methods of the traditional Russian policy making elite?
It appears that several processes, especially if they
evolve on parallel lines, may be of significant value. Movement
toward the pragmatic school and mutual accommodation on
outstanding BMD/ABM Treaty issues could be encouraged by the
United States clearly and officially stating its goals on
counterproliferation and especially that its NMD aspirations
are limited. It also would be useful for the United States to
specify the needed amendments or revisions to the specific
limitations of the ABM Treaty.
The diverse and sometimes even contradictory voices and
positions on these issues coming from Washington clearly
provide fodder for those Russians skeptical about any positive
movement in Russian-American relations, and who, for their own
political reasons, present U.S. counterproliferation and
missile defense goals as being ``anti-Russian.''
A clearer and consistent U.S. voice will at least help
remove lingering misunderstandings and intentional
exaggerations of declared U.S. intentions.
Reconciling conflicting positions on missile defense and
ABM Treaty issues may be possible at the background of a high-
level political declaration of mutual interest in finding
accommodation. In view of the unique Russian political culture
and tradition, a top-down approach is essential for changing
policy and the policy debate in Moscow. It would demonstrate
for the Moscow elite that seeking mutual accommodation is an
acceptable option for discussion and compatible with Russian
interests. A proper venue for developing and making such a
declaration may be a future summit between the Presidents of
the two nations specifically devoted to addressing this issue.
Further search for accommodation could then be pursued
within a framework similar to the discontinued Ross-Mamedov
talks that were set in motion by President Yeltsin's January
1992 proposal for a Global Protection System (GPS), and the
subsequent June 1992 summit of Presidents Yeltsin and Bush. We
all remember that the purpose of the Ross-Mamedov talks was to
establish the basis for moving forward together on GPS. It must
be acknowledged that the American refusal to continue the GPS
dialogue after 1992 left quite an unfortunate ``after-taste''
with the Russians, indicating perhaps a lack of sufficient U.S.
interest in cooperation on missile defense, as proposed by
President Yeltsin.
The establishment of a new forum akin to Ross-Mamedov could
be dedicated to integrating joint consideration of several
issues related to proliferation and BMD, including: the ABM
Treaty, early warning, strategic stability, export control
restrictions, and offensive and defensive strategic arms
control efforts after START II (whatever its disposition).
In this fashion, the subject of accommodation on missile
defense and the ABM Treaty would not be separated from the
broader fabric of related issues, and it would not be
vulnerable to Russian criticism that the U.S. agenda for
accommodation and cooperation is limited to the lone case of
missile defense and the ABM Treaty. Rather, accommodation and
potential cooperation in this area would be part of a broader
range of related issues in Russian-American relations.
Russian readiness to pursue joint ventures in the area of
missile defense, embracing joint ABM, particularly TMD systems,
cooperation in early warning, development of multilateral
control regimes, etc., has been expressed in the past on
different occasions. Indications of a similar U.S. readiness
will be crucial to alleviating current Russian doubts and fears
about U.S. plans and intentions.
The pragmatists are convinced that dealing with arms
control in a novel way--one that goes beyond merely
``codifying'' the current situation of mutual deterrence, and
creates preconditions for substantive qualitative change in the
foundations of bi-lateral relations--has clear long-term mutual
advantages. Both sides must, however, find and demonstrate
sufficient political will to effect needed changes in their
perceptions and ``modus operandi'' in the strategic area.
In this connection, it may be crucial to consider an
approach to arms control that links the reduction of strategic
offensive forces with greater license for limited NMD programs.
As a means of achieving mutual accommodation on the issue of
limited NMD and the ABM Treaty, a renewed bi-lateral venue
could be very useful for examining the potential for
integrating offensive and defensive forces under a single arms
control framework.
In conclusion, let me note that establishing the necessary
conditions for broad-based strategic cooperation--moving beyond
the level of simple accommodation on particular issues--may
ultimately be possible only by changing the political-
psychological environment of bi-lateral Russian-American
relations; that is, moving away from reflexive Cold War
suspicions and anxieties.
However, getting outside past philosophies, e.g. Mutual
Assured Destruction, etc., would be extremely beneficial for
both societies. As is witnessed by some important processes
currently developing in our relations--from summitry to
interparliamentary dialogue--the appropriate tools and will-
power to achieve this honorable goal is already in place, and
have to be maximally expanded and strengthened. My colleagues
and I hope that our cooperative bi-lateral study will
contribute to that end.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for your excellent
contribution to our hearing, Dr. Kortunov. We appreciate your
being here.
Ambassador Kampelman, in your statement on page 5, you
refer to legislation which has been proposed that you say goes
far in the direction of establishing a national consensus or
helping to create a national consensus behind an effective
missile defense program. I wonder whether you have had an
opportunity to analyze S. 7, the National Missile Defense Act
of 1997, to the extent that you can say whether you think it is
compatible with the conclusions of the Payne-Kortunov paper. Is
it the kind of balance between the maintenance of deterrence
and the deployment of missile defense that you think can be
achieved with a renewed discussion and dialogue between our two
countries?
Ambassador Kampelman. I do think, Mr. Chairman, that it is
compatible with the paper and the objectives of the paper. I
would suggest, however, that the specific reference in the
legislation to withdrawal after a year, assuming no results
come from the talks during the course of that year, would, in
my view, certainly not be welcome by the Russian co-authors of
this paper, and in my opinion, as you could tell from my own
testimony, is not necessarily in our national interest, as I
see it.
I do not personally believe in exclamations of aggression.
I would rather have the strength, have the capacity to do it,
and we have the capacity to withdraw and everybody knows we
have the capacity to withdraw.
In addition, the kind of talks that are necessary, I think,
might be talks that would be extended far beyond the year. We
face a very complicated issue and require, as Dr. Kortunov
points out, require not only technical understandings but
breakthroughs psychologically with respect to attitudes. We are
also dealing with a long history through the Cold War of
mistrusts and these are not the kinds of issues that can be
resolved quickly or by a certain date.
Senator Cochran. I notice also on that same page in your
prepared statement you caution that you do not want your
testimony to convey the impression that the negotiations
between Russia and the U.S. would be easy or inevitably
successful. The subject is serious and important for both of us
and the talks may take time but they are necessary.
There is almost a pessimistic ring to that, as I read it.
Is it intended to be?
Ambassador Kampelman. That is a very perceptive comment,
Mr. Chairman. What is clearly intended by me is for both sides
in the negotiation to understand that there can be results from
a negotiation that are worse than having no agreement at all. I
have certainly, in my role as the negotiator for the United
States in the arms field, have attempted always to convey that
our aim not an agreement at any price, that the issues are
complicated, they have to meet our standards, they have to meet
our needs and our security interests, and I am sure the other
side feels the same way about it.
What my sentence was intended to convey it is certainly to
convey to negotiators and to the public, there is nothing
certain about getting a result out of a negotiation. If the
other side feels you are obligated to get a result, it
interferes adversely with your negotiating position and your
negotiating strength and also conveys the wrong message to the
body politic.
As a lawyer, for example, I frequently would advise our
younger lawyers in our firm that sometimes arriving at no
agreement is better than arriving at an agreement that is not
in your client's interest, and that is really primarily what I
am attempting to convey. This is tough, no inevitability about
it, but if we are serious about it and genuine about it, I
think we can come to an agreement.
Senator Cochran. The fact is that the Clinton
administration broke off the discussions that had begun in the
Bush administration on this global protection system. Is that
also the kind of action or decision that makes it more
difficult in our relationship with Russia to reach some
accommodation on this subject?
Ambassador Kampelman. I think we made a mistake in breaking
off those talks. On the other hand, I do not believe it is the
kind of a mistake that cannot be retrieved. There are,
obviously, in the last couple of years, renewed talks and
exchanges between our Vice President and the Russian Prime
Minister and between the two Presidents. I think our
administration today understands the need for talks and I think
the Russians are beginning to understand the utility of these
talks, as well.
So I do not think that it is a kind of irreconcilable
problem that was created by the withdrawal. I think we lost
valuable time. I think we also strengthened some negative
influences in Russia by the withdrawing from those talks, which
is going to make it a little bit tougher for us, but I would
hope that we could get started and it is not too late.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Payne, in your study, you say that
multilateralizing the ABM Treaty could seriously impair the
potential for achieving mutual accommodation with Russia on the
ABM Treaty. Is that a potential problem because you get other
nations involved in the ABM Treaty? How does that undermine the
potential to achieve accommodation with Russia?
Dr. Payne. That is a good question, Senator. By and large,
our experience in the past, and perhaps Ambassador Kampelman
would be the best to comment on this, but our experience in the
past has been as you add parties to negotiations, particularly
two, three, or four, possibly five additional parties, those
parties obviously bring their own agendas to the table. They
bring their own goals to the table.
In trying to address an issue as sensitive, as complicated
as the ABM Treaty, and possible revisions to the ABM Treaty,
there's just no doubt in my mind that as you load up the
various agendas that countries would bring to the table and the
various goals that they might have in any sort of negotiations,
that even if the United States in that context, even if the
United States and Russia were inclined towards mutual
accommodation, and that would be quite an achievement in
itself, mutual accommodation could be prevented simply because
so many agendas would have to be negotiated. So many interests
would have to be protected that we might never be able to reach
the goal of accommodation. That is my major concern with
multilateralization.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Kortunov, could you describe for us
the Yeltsin proposal for a Global Protection System? And let us
have your perspective as to the impact of the breakdown in the
talks. What were the talks achieving, or were they making
progress in the talks from the Russian point of view to help
develop some kind of understanding for a Global Protection
System?
Dr. Kortunov. At the time when Mr. Yeltsin made this
proposal Russia was going through a unique period in her
history. She was busy revising the heritage left over from the
former Soviet Union, including that in the field of arms
control.
The new leaders who came to power in Moscow tried to break
away from old pattern of strategic relations with the United
States to prove that to their own people and to the Americans
that the situation of mutual assured destruction, mutual
vulnerability, is not something that we would have to live with
forever. As you probably remember, it was also the time when
Russia even tried to get into the NATO Alliance as a full
member.
So the idea behind the talks was to look for some
different, more positive basis for strategic interaction
between the United States and Russia, to change the principles
of strategic stability on the assumption that Russia and
America are allies rather than adversaries. Therefore, the
initial idea was to work jointly in the field of early warning.
However, if the United States was ready to go further on that,
both nations could start developing a global defense system
against accidental launches or launches from rogue states.
To the best of my knowledge, during that period, Russia was
seriously considering the use of the system of former Soviet
raders to protect not just the Russian Federation but countries
interested in such a protection against launches from rogue
states. I think that interaction in this area could be very
beneficial for both nations because it could open an avenue for
an entirely different pattern of their relations in the
strategic area.
The termination of those talks was interpreted in Russia,
at least by many, as a sign that the United States would prefer
to stick to the traditional pattern of relations, i.e. that
mutual assured destruction was, is, and will be the ``name of
the game'' between the two countries. Such a situation helped
improve the positions of those who opposed any revisions of the
ABM Treaty, by bringing them back to their traditional track.
Senator Cochran. Senator Durbin, you have been very patient
during my questioning. I am happy to recognize you at this time
for any comments or questions that you might have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN
Senator Durbin. Senator, it has been a learning experience.
Thank you. And if I could ask a few questions of the panel, I
would appreciate it.
First, since President Reagan announced the concept of a
Strategic Defense Initiative, I believe that was 12 or 13 years
ago, how much money have we spent on this concept in the United
States?
Dr. Payne. The figure that is usually mentioned is around
$30 billion.
Senator Durbin. Total expenditure? And does anyone give an
estimate as to how much more will need to be spent before we
have achieved the creation of a system that we can fairly
characterize as an NMD or a national missile defense system?
Dr. Payne. Well, the CBO, I believe, last year came out
with several estimates. For a very limited national missile
defense system, the estimates ranged from, I believe, $4 to $14
billion. For a thicker, more robust system, the estimate went
up to, I believe, $50 to $60 billion.
Senator Durbin. Over what period of time?
Dr. Payne. I believe it was 5 to 7 years, something in that
area.
Senator Durbin. Ambassador Kampelman, does my memory serve
me correctly? When President Reagan announced this concept, did
he not suggest that we would reach a point where we would share
this technology with the Soviet Union?
Ambassador Kampelman. Exactly, and as a matter of fact,
that was part of the proposal. As I indicated in my testimony
earlier, another part of the proposal was that our defense
system would be totally non-nuclear. The third part of the
proposal was that the research that is to be underway be within
the context of the ABM Treaty.
Senator Durbin. Can you tell me, in this debate with Russia
concerning the status of the ABM Treaty and any need to change
it to pursue the national missile defense system, has there
been an ongoing discussion about our actually sharing this
technology with Russia once we have put it in place and are
confident that it would defend the United States?
Ambassador Kampelman. To the best of my knowledge, there
has been no such discussion by this administration with the
Russian Federation on this question. I do know, having
personally heard this, that President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev,
President Gorbachev, did talk about this. There was an initial
skepticism, a deep skepticism on the part of the Soviet Union
at the time that we were genuine about sharing this know-how.
President Reagan on one occasion that I can think of
energetically attempted to persuade President Gorbachev that he
was quite genuine about the suggestion, and in private
conversations, I know President Reagan indicated that there are
no secrets here.
Senator Durbin. As proof positive of the defensive nature
of this system, do you think it is advisable for us to share
this technology with Russia?
Ambassador Kampelman. I think it is advisable for us,
strongly advisable for us to sit down and figure out how we can
develop joint approaches, sharing of information, see what our
needs are. Yes, I do.
Senator Durbin. Dr. Kortunov, if the debate moves to that
level, would this allay some of the fears of the Russian
government that, in fact, our national missile defense system
is not totally defensive in nature?
Dr. Kortunov. Absolutely. I can tell you that it is a
matter of very heated discussions. Even at the highest levels
of Russian government, there are doubts of American sincerity
and good intentions. However, if the United States could
demonstrate even limited readiness, for example, on the issue
of TMD, I think it would make a major breakthrough. In effect
this may positively affect other aspects of the bi-lateral
relationship, including, for example, the issue of the NATO
enlargement.
Senator Durbin. So, Dr. Payne, if we were to pursue this,
and I am going to ask you for your reaction to these questions
that I have asked, if we were to pursue this concept of sharing
technology with the Russians to assure them that this is a
defensive effort by the United States and not to put them in
jeopardy, could you see this as a way to really build toward a
new thinking on this issue? What I am suggesting is sharing
information on missile defense while at the same time asking of
those nations who share this information that they aggressively
pursue counterproliferation.
Dr. Payne. Yes, Senator. In fact, if you go back and look
at the results of the Ross-Mamedov talks, which Ambassador
Kampelman referred to and Dr. Kortunov referred to, there are
unclassified summaries of what was actually--the ground that
was covered in those talks and it included, for example, U.S.
willingness to share processed early warning information with
the Russian side and a U.S. willingness to share the results of
ballistic missile defense capabilities.
So in some ways, what you proposed or described in this
concept was ground covered during the Ross-Mamedov talks. That
is why I believe, and I believe my colleagues at the table
believe, that was a very fruitful venture and would have gone a
long way towards ameliorating the skepticism on the Russian
side that we know now exists.
Senator Durbin. It has been a long time since I took
courses at the School of Foreign Service and I do not know if
anything I have suggested today is along the lines that might
put us back to the table in a more positive frame of mind. We
have large questions to resolve with the Russians and Russian
leadership in terms of the future of NATO and the future of
national missile defense, but I do go back to President
Reagan's promise, and I will concede that I was skeptical then
and I am skeptical today as to whether this can be achieved.
But I thought the one promising statement that he made was that
if we achieved it, we would share it in a show of faith that it
is defensive in nature.
I continue to believe that we have threats, even nuclear
threats, to this country that are far greater that do not
involve missiles and that we should be looking to protect the
American citizenry as aggressively on those fronts as we do
when it comes to missile defense.
I thank you for your testimony and for your hard work on
this study, and Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to ask
questions.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator, for your contribution
to the hearing.
In connection with the status of effort to develop jointly
with the two governments, the U.S. and Russia, a Global
Protection System, I think it is worth noting for the record
that there was at the June 17, 1992, summit here in Washington
between Boris Yeltsin and President George Bush a statement
issued on that subject and it confirms the commitment of both
countries to work together to develop such a system and to
share the technology. I am going to ask that be printed in the
record at this point to reflect the understanding that was
reached at that time.
I think, appropriately, the wording, in part, is as
follows. ``The two Presidents agreed it is necessary to start
work without delay to develop the concept of the GPS,'' the
Global Protection System. ``For this purpose, they agreed to
establish a high-level group to explore on a priority basis the
following practical steps: The potential for sharing of early
warning information through the establishment of an early
warning center; the potential for cooperation with
participating states in developing ballistic missile defense
capabilities and technologies; the development of a legal basis
for cooperation, including new treaties and agreements and
possible changes to existing treaties and agreements necessary
to implement a Global Protection System. For the United States
of America, George Bush. For the Russian Federation, Boris
Yeltsin.'' And this statement was issued along with the
statement announcing the framework for START II.
Without objection, this statement will be printed in the
record.
[The Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on a Global Protection
System follows:]
Documentation
Document No. 2
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
June 17, 1992
JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN STATEMENT ON A GLOBAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
The Presidents continued their discussion of the potential benefits
of a Global Protection System (GPS) against ballistic missiles,
agreeing that it is important to explore the role for defenses in
protecting against limited ballistic missile attacks. The two
Presidents agreed that their two nations should work together with
allies and other interested states in developing a concept for such a
system as part of an overall strategy regarding the proliferation of
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Such cooperation
would be a tangible expression of the new relationship that exists
between Russia and the United States and would involve them in an
important undertaking with other nations of the world community.
The two Presidents agreed it is necessary to start work without
delay to develop the concept of the GPS. For this purpose they agreed
to establish a high-level group to explore on a priority basis the
following practical steps:
<bullet> LThe potential for sharing of early-warning information
through the establishment of an early-warning center
<bullet> LThe potential for cooperation with participating states
in developing ballistic missile defense capabilities and technologies
<bullet> LThe development of a legal basis for cooperation,
including new treaties and agreements and possible changes to existing
treaties and agreements necessary to implement a Global Protection
System.
For the United States of America:
George Bush
For the Russian Federation:
Boris Yeltsin
----------
Senator Cochran. Just to confirm the outlook, is it the
consensus of our panel that this can still be the basis for the
establishment of a new round of talks and the beginning of a
new dialogue between the two countries to achieve the goal of a
Global Protection System? Let us start with Dr. Kortunov.
Dr. Kortunov. Senator, I think that right now, it will
probably be a little bit more difficult than it was back in
1992. However, I think that we should try to make such an
attempt and I think that it may be the best way to resolve the
problem related to the ABM Treaty.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Payne.
Dr. Payne. I agree that there has been some water under the
bridge since 1992. Nevertheless, we would like to see a new
forum, at least similar to the Ross-Mamedov talks initiated so
that we could perhaps get back to that political situation
where we were able to consider a Global Protection System.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Kampelman. I do not believe it is too late. I
think we should do that.
Senator Cochran. One question that I have, Dr. Kortunov, is
on the subject of the attitude in Russia today about the mutual
assured destruction doctrine. You talked about the fact that it
was the impression in Russia that the U.S., because of the
break-off of these discussions, had reverted to this old
doctrine. There are many of us who want to disavow it and are
working to try to change it and to try to explore ways to do
that would be compatible with a stable relationship and a
mutual relationship of trust between Russia and the United
States.
Does Russia continue to embrace the mutual assured
destruction doctrine? Does it see the United States as the
primary focus of its nuclear deterrence threat?
Dr. Kortunov. As far as the Russian public opinion on the
nature of political relations between the two countries is
concerned, the answer is no. I do not believe that the Russian
people considers the United States to be the prime opponent.
Nor does it feel the need for Russia to maintain a serious
deterrent capability against the United States.
However, at the level of operational planning, the concept
of mutual assured destruction remains to be the fundamental
principle for defense planning, even though, to reiterate, the
Russian people, like the public in this country, has never been
comfortable with the concept of mutual assured destruction. It
is even less comfortable with it right now since the United
States is perceived as mostly a friendly country.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Payne, I know that former Secretary of
Defense Perry has expressed a desire to change the U.S.-Russian
strategic relationship from one that is based on mutual assured
destruction to one based on mutual assured security. Would you
tell us what you think Secretary Perry had in mind with this
mutual assured security suggestion and how does it fit in with
your study and the comments that you have made today?
Dr. Payne. I never heard or read of any follow-up or a
definition of what mutual assured security was meant to imply.
What I assume was suggested there would be a continuing
reduction of offensive forces, strategic nuclear offensive
forces, to a point where both sides' defensive forces then
could, in fact, provide each side with mutual assured security
vis-a-vis one another. Although both sides still would retain
presumably a nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis third states,
providing security for Russia and the United States and
providing both sides with a continuing deterrent against other
parties that they might be concerned about.
Senator Cochran. You have indicated that you think there is
broad support in Congress to change the ABM Treaty to reflect
the modern dangers emerging in the security environment in
which we are in. Ambassador Kampelman pointed out we need to
have a bipartisan effort here and national security is not a
partisan issue.
Do you see any evidence of support on both sides of the
aisle? Obviously, there is support on the Republican side since
this legislation that has been introduced is primarily a
Republican initiative. How likely do you see the development of
bipartisan support for modifying the ABM Treaty to be?
Dr. Payne. Sir, I simply look at the votes going back to
the Missile Defense Act of 1995, the Missile Defense Act of
1996, and the Defend America Act of 1996, and the votes in
support of those seemed to be overwhelming and bipartisan, so I
take great encouragement in that.
Senator Cochran. Senator Levin, we welcome you back to the
hearing. I apologize for having this conflict develop on your
account because I know you are keenly interested in these
issues and you have been very active in the Senate on these
issues. I am happy to yield to you for any comments or
questions you might have of the witnesses.
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I do not know that we ever had a vote on the National
Missile Defense Act, by the way, but we recently in the Senate,
at least, did have a vote on the adoption of an approach to
this which Senators Warner, Cohen, Nunn, and myself had agreed
upon. Are you familiar with that agreement, that language?
Dr. Payne. If you are referring to, for example, the Cohen
Amendment to, I believe it was to the Missile Defense Act of
1995 or 1996, surely.
Senator Levin. It was the four of us who agreed on the
language, which was offered as an amendment, which basically
said that we will continue to develop and to be in a position
where we can deploy a system but not commit ourselves at this
time to such a deployment. We would leave that determination
instead to a time after we have developed such a system, when
we know what the technology is, know what the threats are, know
what the cost is--both in terms of ballistic missiles and in
terms of other threats like cruise missiles and other kinds of
threats to us, so we can weigh all the conditions and
circumstances at that time. So the agreement was to continue to
develop but not commit to deploy, since such a commitment,
regardless of the ABM Treaty, would be a threatening statement
that we are going to deploy regardless of what the
circumstances are and regardless of what the impacts are on
nuclear arms reduction.
Is your conclusion consistent with the Nunn-Warner-Cohen-
Levin approach?
Dr. Payne. In some ways, it is not consistent with the
findings of the study. One of the points that our Russian
colleagues made to us consistently was that the dynamic behind
the Russian willingness to engage in mutual accommodation is a
level of seriousness that the U.S. displays with regard to its
intent to deploy. And, in fact, it is written in the study by
the Russian authors that the motivation on their side for
mutual accommodation does not come from some romantic hope for
an immediate strategic partnership but from the view that NMD
deployment by the U.S. is inevitable and, therefore, mutual
accommodation is the better alternative.
As a result of that, it seems to me that anything that
suggests that the United States is serious about NMD and
intends to go in this direction actually contributes to the
potential for mutual accommodation, as long as we on the U.S.
side do not overstep and become highly provocative.
Senator Levin. Well, that is the question, where is that
line? Now, Ambassador Kampelman has suggested that we not talk
about withdrawing from the treaty. If you say now that,
regardless of the impact on nuclear arms reduction, regardless
of what the Duma is going to do in terms of ratification of
START II, regardless of circumstances that exist 2 years from
now and what other threats there are, we are going to deploy a
system, you have stepped over that line. You are saying
effectively, we are going to pull out of ABM. That is what you
are saying if you take the position that we are deciding right
now we are going to deploy rather than we are going to put
ourselves into a position where we can decide whether or not to
deploy.
I would like to ask Ambassador Kampelman this question, and
then I will get to Dr. Kortunov. Should we decide today that we
are going to withdraw from the ABM Treaty if we cannot get a
modification of it that would allow us to deploy a system?
Ambassador Kampelman. My own view is that the Russians have
to be made to understand that should our national interest
require it, we will withdraw from that treaty. I welcome the
kind of legislation you talked about because we are not then
delayed in our research, in our preparation, in our capacity to
deploy. The will to deploy in the event it is in our national
interest, I think, is universal.
There is always a question as to what is in our national
interest, when do we face that point. The thrust of my comment
was that we not necessarily waive the withdrawal alternative
about.
In other words, what I am saying is that the concern that
Keith Payne is expressing, which is that the pragmatists in
Moscow have to be made to understand that we may very well
deploy, that is something which I think we can communicate
without the necessity for making statements about it or making
decisions now to deploy.
Senator Levin. Well, you have put your finger right on it.
They should understand that we may, indeed, deploy, but that is
very different from a decision now to deploy, would you agree?
Ambassador Kampelman. I do.
Senator Levin. Dr. Kortunov, on that question, do you wish
to add a comment on that question?
Dr. Kortunov. First, it appears that those in Moscow who
are trying to follow events on the Hill cannot fail to notice
that there are some positive dynamics, at least in the wording
used in the new legislation. Indeed, if we are to compare the
National Missile Defense Act of 1997 with previous documents,
the Russians may indeed observe some positive changes which
open more ways for accommodation.
Second, it is really important for Russians to get a
realistic picture of U.S. threat perceptions. Presently we are
getting pretty conflicting messages from Washington about the
seriousness of the threat from the so-called rogue states.
There are also very different official U.S. assessments on this
score.
In Moscow's perception, there indeed may be a serious
threat to the U.S. mainland in 10 or 15 years. However, this
threat is not immediate and does not require the United States
to withdraw from the ABM Treaty right now. Therefore if such a
decision is to be taken tomorrow, it might be interpreted in
Russia as an unfriendly act by the United States. A clear
definition of threat to the U.S. and U.S. threat perception
might give Russians an opportunity to adjust themselves to the
strategic requirements and problems of the United States.
Senator Levin. Ambassador, it seems to me you are basically
where the four of us that I mentioned were when we said, let us
put ourselves in a position as quickly as we can to make a
decision based on whatever technology is the best and on what
the threats are at that time. I want to make sure, then, that I
have heard you right.
We all would agree, I think, that we will act in the
national interest, whatever that national interest appears to
be when we act. If it is in our national interest to withdraw
from the ABM Treaty, we would do so, and if it is not in our
national interest to withdraw, we would not do so.
I think some of us have already decided whether it would be
in our national interest. Others are saying, let us wait until
we are in a position to make the decision and let us in the
meantime try to negotiate a modification which would allow us
to move mutually towards defenses which would make us more
secure. Hopefully, we can modify the treaty in such a way that
limited national missile defenses are possible if the
technologies are there and the threats are there and the
funding makes sense relative to other threats. But to make a
decision now to deploy a limited national missile defense goes
beyond what I just said.
Ambassador, just so I get you clearly on the record, do you
think we should decide now to deploy a national missile
defense, or should we continue our development stage and
indicate a determination that we are going to act in the
national interest and that may well indeed involve a
deployment, but that decision should be made later and not now?
Ambassador Kampelman. I think you have stated my view, but
I would like to add an explanation, which is I am not in favor
of now withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. The act of deployment
would, in effect, be a withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and it is
for that reason, since I do not wish us now to withdraw from
the ABM Treaty, but indeed see damaging consequences from that,
without an actual requirement that we do that. I do not want
our country to be put into that aggressive position.
I do, however, want to start the talks with the Russian
Federation as quickly as possible and as seriously as we can
based on the assumption and understanding that we may very well
be withdrawing once it is in our national interest to do so.
The fact that ABM is considered a holy document for the
Russians would not keep us from doing so if our national
interest requires it.
Senator Levin. OK. That is helpful.
Am I out of time?
Senator Cochran. No. You go ahead.
Senator Levin. Just one final comment, and that is the
executive summary of this study has a statement that there is a
Congressional position in favor of an immediate decision to
deploy a limited NMD and I do not think that is accurate if it
implies that Congress has decided to deploy. Congress has
decided to proceed to develop but has left open the deployment
decision, basically. But I do not think that statement in your
executive summary is accurate, if I read it correctly. I may
not be reading it correctly, but I think I am. It is the fourth
paragraph on page 123.
Dr. Payne. The pagination on the copy I have is different
from yours, sir, but we will be a happy to take a look at it
and if it is incorrect, we will revise it.
Senator Levin. I think there is obviously not an action
that Congress has yet taken, other than to put in significant
development money, which we are doing and will continue to do
so we can be in a position to make the right decision at the
right time.
But I think I agree with the thrust, that we should
continue to negotiate, to look for ways that we can act in our
mutual defense and that if we can find a way to do so, to
deploy a limited national missile defense with the Russians,
that we would both be in a stronger position, whether or not it
is worth the money, whether or not the technology is good
enough, whether or not the threats are real enough compared to
a cruise missile threat. I just heard about the cruise missile
threat in a hearing room in another building where the head of
our Strategic Command says the threat from cruise missiles are,
I believe greater than the threat from ballistic missiles. I
think most people would agree with that. Both threats are
limited and remote in the eyes of the intelligence community
but one is a little less remote than the other; the cruise
missile threat is a little less remote than the ballistic
missile threat.
So, yes. Would we be safer if we could do it mutually
without messing up our START I and START II agreement? Yes. Is
it worth the money? Maybe, when we know the costs and know what
the technology is. But again, I believe that the right time to
do that would be after we do the development, assess the cost,
assess the capability, assess the threat, and try to work out
something mutual with our Russian friends. That, to me, is the
way to do it.
But then I would agree with what I think you are saying. If
at some point it is in our national interest to deploy a
system, we will deploy that system. But until then, to make a
commitment which could drive the arms reductions in exactly the
wrong direction and tear at a friendship which is growing
between ourselves and the Russians and to do so needlessly
because we have not gotten to the point where we need to make
that decision, it seems to me would be the wrong way to go.
But being an optimist, I view what I just said as being
basically consistent with the thrust of what you are trying to
do in this paper, and if I am giving it more optimism from my
perspective than it deserves, then ship it over to me and I
will rewrite it.
Dr. Payne. Senator Levin----
Ambassador Kampelman. I would like to suggest, if I may--
Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment----
Senator Cochran. Certainly, Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Kampelman [continuing]. That the mutuality
should not only be a mutuality between the United States and
Russia, it ought to be also a mutuality within the Congress
itself rather than a partisan issue as a way to develop a
national consensus behind this increasingly serious problem.
Senator Cochran. Thank you. Dr. Payne.
Dr. Payne. I just wanted to make a comment with regard to
the language suggesting Congressional intent behind the
decision to deploy as opposed to a decision to develop. I am
thinking back, for example, to the Missile Defense Act of 1991,
the Missile Defense Act of 1995. I do not have that language
here in front of me, but I believe each of those Acts included
Congressional language calling for the deployment of national
missile defense, at least of some variety. Perhaps that is what
the executive summary sentence that you are referring to,
Senator Levin, was referring to, because I believe there is
language on the record from the Congress calling for the
deployment of national missile defense.
Senator Levin. Relative to that, on page 2 of your
testimony, you make that same statement, that there is express
Congressional position in favor of an immediate decision to
deploy. I think if you read all of what Congress has done, you
may want to modify that because it is a little more complicated
than that.
Dr. Payne. Fair enough.
Senator Cochran. But is it not true, Dr. Payne, on that
subject that a single missile defense site is permitted by the
ABM Treaty?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir.
Senator Cochran. Is it a suggestion that the deployment is
somehow directly flying in the face of the ABM Treaty is just
wrong?
Ambassador Kampelman. Good point.
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. I think that is accurate.
Senator Cochran. So in S. 7, that is one reason why I think
the Secretary of Defense is given the latitude to determine if
a national missile defense system is necessary to defend all of
the United States from a limited attack and if the NMD system
selected by the Secretary is outside the bounds of the ABM
Treaty, he is urged under the terms of the legislation to
pursue the necessary discussions with the Russian Federation to
achieve an agreement, if it is necessary, to amend the treaty,
to allow deployment of such an NMD system.
Dr. Payne. Mr. Chairman, the reason why I mentioned in my
prepared statement that it seems to me that S. 7 is consistent
with our findings is specifically because the language with
regard to the ABM Treaty does not call for the withdrawal from
the ABM Treaty. It does not call for the violation of the ABM
Treaty. It says that if the negotiations suggested do not bear
fruit within a year, the Congress and the President could
consider that option----
Senator Cochran. Right.
Dr. Payne [continuing]. And that is a self-evidently true
statement and I think it is useful to put that marker down but
to put it down in the gentle way that it is, it says we will
consult on the issue. It does not say we will withdraw from the
treaty, and that is why, in my opinion, it threads the needle
nicely.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. Let me say, I think
this has been an outstanding hearing in every way. It has been
helpful to our better understanding the issues that are
currently involved in the dialogue between Russia and the U.S.
on these subjects.
We have had, I think, a much better understanding developed
among the members of our Committee who will, I am sure, benefit
from the testimony and the contribution of the witnesses that
have been made today, and for that we are very grateful, Dr.
Kortunov, for your presence here and your contribution to this
paper with Dr. Payne. I think your collaboration on it has been
one of the important contributions to the understanding of the
importance of this issue and of further talks.
Ambassador Kampelman, your perspective from your
involvement in negotiations in the past and your following the
issues today as you continue to has been a high point for all
of us to consider.
Let me say that this Subcommittee will continue to explore
these issues as we convene another hearing on April 10. At that
time, we will consider proliferation, Chinese case studies.
Until then, the Subcommittee is in adjournment.
[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
The remainder of this hearing is the testimony of Dr.
Keith B. Payne. It is in graphic format and is unavailable in this
document.
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