I am pleased to report that the study is receiving favorable attention in Moscow; most notably it has been reviewed and its findings endorsed by Amb. Vladimir Lukin, the chairman of the International Relations Committee of the Russian State Duma. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation finds itself in a unique position. Russia is a unique product of things new and old. It began by boldly rejecting most of the Communist legacy; yet the Soviet past continues to bear heavily on Russian thinking and the behavior of its political, military and other elites. Russian positions on the array of issues related to countering proliferation and ballistic missile defense, and particularly to U.S. plans and activities aimed at creating and deploying NMD, give ample evidence of the contradictory influences on, as well as to the ambiguity of, Russian national goals. At the current stage, the predominant official Russian position tends to be quite negative as far as the U.S. BMD agenda is concerned. Generally, it appears that Russia sees no pressing need for endorsing a move toward greater BMD activities because she (1) is concerned about and suspicious of U.S. BMD intentions and programs; (2) has a very different view from that of the United States on the nature and scope of threats emanating from WMD and ballistic missile proliferation, (3) lacks resources for any new large-scale military programs; and (4) considers her existing NMD and nuclear deterrent capabilities inherited from the former USSR sufficient to take care of current and future challenges, especially from Third World countries. On top of that comes considerable Russian confusion about U.S. NMD goals and the outcome of U.S. legislative-executive controversies on issues related to NMD deployment. It may be assumed that unless prevailing Russian attitudes and positions change, Russia may pursue harsh, and perhaps disproportionate responses to any U.S. NMD deployment, especially if it is accompanied by Washingtonís unilateral ABM Treaty withdrawal. To prevent these issues from becoming a major ìbone of contentionî in Russian-American relations, extra efforts at understanding each otherís position on the entire range of BMD-related problems and a determined search for mutual accommodation should be undertaken. Admittedly, since the collapse of the system of Soviet-American superpower competition, only a narrow minority of Russian politicians and experts actually fear that the two countries will become engaged in renewed hostilities. At the same time, earlier idealistic hopes that Russia and America would be able to engage in a ìstrategic partnershipî turned out to be patently unrealistic. In view of their countryís current serious weaknesses, Russian leaders and public opinion tend to react in a most pained way to any U.S. moves that appear to be aimed either at isolating or taking advantage of Russia. Admittedly, many Russian fears and doubts vis-a-vis the West are based in a peculiar ìpsychology of the underdog,î developed through previous periods of East-West adversarial relations. However, Western actions and attitudes, e.g., NATO expansion, START II, as well as U.S. activities in the BMD area, particularly including U.S. discontinuation of the Ross-Mamedov Talks, substantiate the position of those in Moscow expressing a fairly high level of acrimony and suspicion. Russia does not have comfortable answers to many questions related to US BMD efforts. For example, would a limited U.S. NMD inevitably expand in the future, if Russia agreed to its deployment by revising the ABM Treaty as desired by the American side? And, why are attempts at increasing American defensive and power projection capabilities taking place at the time of Russiaís greatest economic and military vulnerability? Another serious problem for the Russian side is understandingóand believingóthat ìlimitedî U.S. NMD activities are indeed driven by the fear of ërogueí statesí ballistic missile potential. The notion that U.S. NMD plans are, in fact, directed against Russia seems much more plausible in Moscow, especially as the U.S. intelligence estimates themselves claim that there is no threat from so-called rogue states. Additionally, the Russian side is alarmed that U.S. NMD would upset the mutual deterrence relationship between the two nations and is intended to do so. Russian suspicions were intensified in the light of the fact that further reductions of Russiaís strategic offensive nuclear forces in accordance with START-II provisions coincided with the stated U.S. goal of having an operational NMD system by 2003. The question then of whether and how Russian-US accommodation may be reached is as difficult as it is important. The Russian willingness to accommodate will depend largely on how serious the United States is about NMD, and the evolution of the Russian internal political context and on the leadershipís general orientation toward relations with the United Statesówhich in turn will be influenced by U.S. behavior. The current political reality in Moscow on the issues of missile defense, the ABM Treaty and proliferation includes the existence of a variety of often diametrically opposite views among elite groups. The following distinct ìschools of thoughtî may be identified. The ìtraditionalistsî or ìpessimistsî currently enjoy the greatest prominence and influence on the Russian political scene, although as we all know the situation in Moscow is quite fluid. They demand that the ABM Treaty be left totally intact, and stipulate that any attempt by the United States to expand its current BMD potential should be met with resolute Russian countermeasures. There is obviously little room for accommodation on these issues from the traditionalist perspective. Another ìextremeî position in the spectrum of Russian views on these issues may be labeled the ìrevisionistî position. It is held by those who consider the ABM Treaty as largely an unnecessary ìrelicî of the Cold War, presenting nothing more than an impediment on the way to authentically different, cooperative Russian-American relations in the strategic area. This is a distinctly minority opinion; it enjoyed credibility during the early 1990s, but has since been eclipsed politically. A third school of thought, the ìrealistsî or ìpragmatists,î assumes that, under the circumstances of proliferation, deployment of a limited U.S. NMD is inevitable, and that Russia ultimately will be unable to prevent this deployment. Consequently, these pragmatists believe that Russia should be able to shape the future direction of U.S. NMD deployment in ways that promote Russian interests, particularly through the vehicle of the ABM Treaty. It is noteworthy that many Russian ìrealistsî are to be found among military experts who tend to deal more with hard facts than with political intricacies and ideological dogma. The pragmatists seem to occupy an intermediary position between the traditional pessimists and the revisionists. For pragmatists, it is apparent that accepting modifications to the ABM Treaty, as an important U.S. goal, is a much better choice and lesser ìevilî than unilateral American withdrawal from the Treaty, leading to a serious disruption of overall U.S.-Russian relations at a time when Russia is unable to seriously compete with the United States in any area, particularly that of extensive military development. A crucial question arises in this connection: what may help to move the pragmatist position to the center-stage of the Russian political spectrum without waiting for some autonomous and fundamental change in the mentality, principles and methods of the traditional Russian policy making elite? It appears that several processes, especially if they evolve on parallel lines, may be of significant value. Movement toward the pragmatic school and mutual accommodation on outstanding BMD/ABM Treaty issues could be encouraged by the United States clearly and officially stating its goals on counterproliferation and especially that its NMD aspirations are limited. It also would be useful for the United States to specify the needed amendments/revisions to the specific limitations of the ABM Treaty. The diverse, contradictory voices and positions on these issues coming from Washington clearly provide fodder for those Russians skeptical about any positive movement in Russian-American relations, and who, for their own political reasons, present U.S. counterproliferation and missile defense goals as being ìanti-Russian.î A clearer and consistent U.S. voice will at least help remove lingering misunderstandings and intentional exaggerations of declared U.S. intentions. Reconciling conflicting positions on missile defense/ABM Treaty issues may be possible at the background of a high-level political declaration of mutual interest in finding accommodation. In view of the unique Russian political culture and tradition, a top-down approach is essential for changing policy and the policy debate in Moscow. It would demonstrate for the Moscow elite that seeking mutual accommodation is an acceptable option for discussion and compatible with Russian interests. A proper venue for developing and making such a declaration may be a future summit between the Presidents of the two nations specifically devoted to addressing this issue. Further search for accommodation could then be pursed within a framework similar to the discontinued Ross-Mamedov talks that were set in motion by President Yeltsinís January 1992 proposal for a Global Protection System (GPS) and the subsequent June 1992 summit of Presidents Yeltsin and Bush. We all remember that the purpose of the Ross-Mamedov Talks was to establish the basis for moving forward together on GPS. It must be acknowledged that the American refusal to continue the GPS dialogue after 1992 left an unfortunate ìafter-tasteî with the Russians, indicating perhaps a lack of sufficient U.S. interest in cooperation on missile defense, as proposed by President Yeltsin. The establishment of a new forum akin to Ross-Mamedov could be dedicated to integrating joint consideration of several issues related to proliferation and BMD, including: the ABM Treaty, early warning, strategic stability, export control restrictions, and offensive and defensive strategic arms control efforts after START II (whatever its disposition). In this fashion, the subject of accommodation on missile defense and the ABM Treaty would not be separated from the broader fabric of related issues, and it would not be vulnerable to Russian criticism that the U.S. agenda for accommodation and cooperation is limited to the lone case of missile defense and the ABM Treaty. Rather, accommodation and potential cooperation in this area would be part of a broader range of related issues in Russian-American relations. Russian readiness to pursue joint ventures in the area of missile defense, embracing joint ABM, particularly TMD systems, cooperation in early warning, development of multilateral control regimes, etc., has been expressed in the past on different occasions. Indications of a similar U.S. readiness will be critical to alleviating current Russian doubts and fears about U.S. plans and intentions. The pragmatists are convinced that dealing with arms control in a novel wayóone that goes beyond merely ìcodifyingî the current situation of mutual deterrence, and creates preconditions for substantive qualitative change in the foundations of the bilateral relationshipóhas clear long-term mutual advantages. Both sides must, however, find and demonstrate sufficient political will to effect needed changes in their perceptions and ìmodus operandiî in the strategic area. In this connection, it may be critical to consider an approach to arms control that links the reduction of strategic offensive forces with greater license for limited NMD programs. As a means of achieving mutual accommodation on the issue of limited NMD and the ABM Treaty, a renewed bilateral venue could be very useful for examining the potential for integrating offensive and defensive forces under a single arms control framework. In conclusion it should be noted that establishing the necessary conditions for broad-based strategic cooperationómoving beyond the level of simple accommodation on particular issuesómay ultimately be possible only by changing the politico-psychological environment of bilateral Russian-American relations; that is, moving away from reflexive Cold War suspicions and anxieties. However, getting outside past philosophies, e.g. Mutual Assured Destruction, etc., would be extremely beneficial for both societies. As is witnessed by some important processes currently developing in our relationsófrom summitry to interparliamentary dialogueóThe appropriate tools and will-power to achieve this honorable goal is already in place, and have to be maximally expanded and strengthened. My colleagues and I hope that our cooperative bilateral study will contribute to that end. |
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