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104th Congress Rept. 104-583
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2nd Session Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
THE DEFEND AMERICA ACT OF 1996
__________
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
H.R. 3144
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
May 16, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
One Hundred Fourth Congress
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina,
Chairman
RONALD V. DELLUMS, California BOB STUMP, Arizona
G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, Mississippi DUNCAN HUNTER, California
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio
IKE SKELTON, Missouri HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia
NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah
JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
OWEN PICKETT, Virginia JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado
LANE EVANS, Illinois JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN TANNER, Tennessee RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,
GLEN BROWDER, Alabama California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi STEVE BUYER, Indiana
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii PETER G. TORKILDSEN, Massachusetts
CHET EDWARDS, Texas TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida
FRANK TEJEDA, Texas JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts JAMES TALENT, Missouri
ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
JANE HARMAN, California ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania HOWARD ``BUCK'' McKEON, California
PETE GEREN, Texas RON LEWIS, Kentucky
PETE PETERSON, Florida J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma
WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
MIKE WARD, Kentucky SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North
Carolina
JAMES B. LONGLEY, Jr., Maine
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
RICHARD `DOC' HASTINGS, Washington
Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Purpose and Background........................................... 1
Legislative History.............................................. 6
Section-By-Section Analysis...................................... 7
Section 1--Short Title....................................... 7
Section 2--Findings.......................................... 7
Section 3--National Missile Defense Policy................... 7
Section 4--National Missile Defense System Architecture...... 7
Section 5--Implementation of National Missile Defense System. 8
Section 6--Report on Plan for NMD Development and Deployment. 8
Section 7--Policy Regarding the ABM Treaty................... 8
Communication From Other Committees.............................. 8
Committee Position............................................... 9
Fiscal Data...................................................... 9
Congressional Budget Office Estimate......................... 9
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate.................... 10
Committee Cost Estimate...................................... 12
Inflation-Impact Statement................................... 14
Oversight Findings............................................... 14
Statement of Federal Mandates.................................... 14
Rollcall Votes................................................... 14
Dissenting Views................................................. 17
104th Congress Rept. 104-583
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
DEFEND AMERICA ACT OF 1996
_______
May 16, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Spence, from the Committee on National Security, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 3144]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on National Security, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 3144) to establish a United States policy for
the deployment of a national missile defense system, and for
other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably
thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.
PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND
The proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction poses a significant threat to the United States,
U.S. military forces, and U.S. global interests. The committee
is concerned, however, that current Department of Defense (DOD)
policies and programs are not sufficiently aggressive in
responding to this threat.
The threat to United States military forces abroad has been
recognized by the Administration. The March 1996 Annual Report
of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress
notes that ``the threat of ballistic missile use in regional
conflicts has grown substantially, and the potential
combination of [weapons of mass destruction] with theater
ballistic missiles poses serious dangers and complications to
the management of regional crises and the prosecution of U.S.
strategy for major regional conflicts.'' The Secretary of
Defense has also referred to the threat posed by shorter-range
ballistic missiles as ``here and now.'' Nevertheless, the
committee judges the Administration's program for dealing with
these shorter-range ballistic missile threats inadequate. Not
only has the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) budget request been
significantly reduced in recent years, but several of the most
promising TMD concepts, such as the Navy's Upper Tier or Wide
Area theater defense and the Army's Theater High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) system, have been delayed, most recently as a
result of the Administration's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
Program Review. Moreover, the committee believes that the
Administration's position in the TMD demarcation negotiations
with the Russians will further restrict the U.S. ability to
deploy advanced TMD systems. Consequently, the committee is
increasingly concerned with the Administration's commitment,
expressed by President Clinton at the Nuclear Safety Summit in
Moscow last month, to conclude such an agreement by June.
The Administration's program for National Missile Defense
(NMD)--a defense of the American homeland--is even more
worrisome. There is currently no commitment to deploy a
national missile defense. The Administration's change in name
of the national missile defense program from ``technology
readiness'' to ``deployment readiness'' is nothing more than
cosmetic. It provides the illusion of progress toward eventual
deployment, without the political commitment, fiscal
investments, or disciplined programmatic efforts necessary to
achieve it. In reality, the Department of Defense plans to
spend over eighty percent less for national missile defense
programs than the spending levels recommended by the previous
Administration--approximately $500 million per year over the
next five years. Moreover, according to the March 6, 1996
testimony of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology, ``the department plans to spend the additional $375
million added by the Congress in the fiscal year 1996
appropriation over two years.* * *'' This funding stretch-out
subverts the clearly expressed will of Congress.
In his December, 1995 veto of H.R. 1530, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, the President
stated that the proposed requirement for a national missile
defense system addresses a long-range missile threat ``that our
Intelligence Community does not foresee in the coming decade.''
The Administration's position is largely based on a November,
1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on ``Emerging Missile
Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years.'' However,
as the President's first Director of Central Intelligence, R.
James Woolsey, has stated, the NIE's estimate of ballistic
missile threats to the United States focused on ``a sub-set,
and not a particularly useful sub-set, of the strategic
problems that are posed for us by other countries' possession
of ballistic missiles in the post-Cold War era.'' In testimony
before the committee on March 14, 1996, Mr. Woolsey noted that
the intelligence community's focus on missile threats to the
continental United States, excluding Alaska and Hawaii, ``can
lead to a badly distorted and minimized perception of the
serious threats we face from ballistic missiles now and in the
very near future.* * *'' Drawing broad conclusions about the
ballistic missile threat to the United States from an
assessment ``of such limited scope,'' he testified, ``would be
a serious error.''
The Administration's decision to abandon plans to deploy a
national missile defense is particularly disturbing in light of
the range of present and potential missile threats to the
United States. Both Russia and China today maintain and are
aggressively modernizing nuclear forces capable of destroying
American cities. For Russia this includes production of follow-
ons to the SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and
SS-N-20 sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). China is
producing two types of long-range ICBMs with ranges of
approximately 7,000 kilometers and 10,000 kilometers
respectively, as well as other strategic systems. Moreover,
various ``rogue regimes'' are seeking a capability to attack
the United States using ballistic missiles.
Indeed, senior U.S. intelligence officials have declared
that it may not take long for an outlaw regime to acquire the
capability to place U.S. targets at risk from ballistic
missiles. For instance, on January 10, 1995, the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General James
Clapper, testified that North Korean missiles now under
development probably have sufficient range to reach targets in
Alaska. On January 18, 1995, the then-Acting Director of
Central Intelligence, Admiral William Studeman, testified that
the proliferation of technology will lead to missiles ``that
can reach the United States toward the end of this decade and
the beginning of [the next] century.'' Former Director of
Central Intelligence Woolsey has also testified that the covert
purchase of missiles would provide a ``shortcut approach'' that
may lessen the time it takes to place the United States
directly at risk. In addition, he stated that ``the acquisition
of key production technologies and technical expertise would
speed up ICBM development.''
Today, as the Secretary of Defense's March 1996 Annual
Report to the President and the Congress makes clear, more than
20 countries have or are developing weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons. A similar number now possess ballistic missiles, which
can be used to deliver these weapons to their targets hundreds
or thousands of miles away. Yet, as the Secretary testified
before the committee on March 6, 1996, ``we have no capability
to shoot down any ballistic missiles fired at the United
States.''
There are numerous reasons why a growing number of nations
seek to acquire ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction. Such weapons provide a military edge against
regional adversaries and serve as symbols of national power and
prestige. Ballistic missiles offer small and medium powers--for
the first time--a strategic weapon potentially capable of
deterring or inflicting tremendous military and political
damage on great powers. An adversary armed with ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction may deter the United
States from undertaking certain actions for fear of retaliation
against U.S. regional assets or allies. Long-range ICBMs are
even more attractive assets for hostile powers wishing to deter
the United States from exercising its power projection
capabilities by placing U.S. territory directly at risk and
threatening our most valued asset: the American people. This
was demonstrated most recently when China warned the United
States not to interfere with its policy of intimidation toward
Taiwan, telling a former U.S. defense official that American
leaders ``care more about Los Angeles than they do about
Taiwan.'' This implicit threat to use nuclear weapons against
the United States could have a chilling effect on the future
conduct of American foreign and security policy.
The proliferation of these weapons heightens the risk that
adversaries will seek to use them or threaten their use against
the United States or U.S. allies and interests. For instance,
in the Gulf War, Iraq used ballistic missiles against Israel as
political weapons in an attempt to draw Israel into the
conflict and fracture the allied coalition. Libya recently
declared its willingness to fire ballistic missiles at Naples,
Italy, the home of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. In fact, Libya
launched ballistic missiles against a NATO base in Italy in
1986. Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has spoken of his desire to
acquire ``a deterrent--missiles that can reach New York,'' and
has stated, ``We should build this force so that they [the
United States] and others will no longer think about an
attack.'' Palestine Liberation Front leader Abu Abbas warned
ominously in 1990 that ``some day we will have missiles that
can reach New York.'' And Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani
has called missiles ``the most important and the most essential
weapons of the world.''
In his April 1996 report on ``Proliferation: Threat and
Response,'' the Secretary of Defense noted that ``the threat of
the use of ballistic missiles has grown enormously over the
past two decades,'' and that the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and the missiles that can be used to deliver
them ``presents a grave and urgent risk to the United States
and our citizens, allies, and troops abroad.'' The committee is
disturbed that the report makes no mention of the role that
national missile defense can play in combating this threat to
the United States and its citizens. Moreover, the committee is
troubled by the fact that the same week this report was
released, the Administration declared its intent to use the
line-item veto against any effort by Congress to remedy the
vulnerability of the American people to ballistic missile
attack.
Importantly, the lack of any effective defenses against
ballistic missiles may actually serve to encourage hostile
states to acquire missile capabilities and makes them the
weapon of choice for nations seeking to threaten others. As the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London has
concluded, ``the ballistic missile, mainly on account of its
range, speed and cost relative to that of a manned aircraft, is
a favored delivery means for proliferating states and is likely
to remain so until a proven anti-ballistic missile defense
system has been deployed.''
Because of their perceived military and political
importance, ballistic missiles are also becoming a valuable
export commodity. However, effective ballistic missile defenses
can raise the cost and lower the attraction of ballistic
missiles to a would-be proliferant by reducing their
effectiveness. Missile defenses also provide a hedge against
the use of such weapons in the event traditional
nonproliferation efforts (e.g., arms control, export controls,
sanctions) fail to prevent proliferation. By providing an
insurance policy against the use of these weapons, missile
defenses could dampen incentives to act (or react)
precipitously in a crisis and could promote the formation of
regional defensive alliances that reduce the risk that
individual member states will be held hostage to attack.
In addition, the committee is concerned about the possible
indigenous development or sale to third parties of space launch
vehicles, which can be rapidly converted with little or no
warning and only minor modifications to ICBMs capable of
delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads against
American cities. According to a 1992 statement by Lawrence
Gershwin, CIA national intelligence officer for strategic
programs, ``India, Israel, and Japan have developed space
launch vehicles that, if converted to surface-to-surface
missiles, are capable of reaching targets in the United
States.''
Several independent assessments have noted that space
launch vehicles could be converted into ICBMs in reasonably
short order. For example, a 1993 report of the Proliferation
Study Team, chaired by former National Security Director
Lieutenant General William Odom (USA, Ret.), concluded that
this conversion would require ``relatively modest effort'' and
noted that ``the conclusion that the probability is quite low
for the emergence of new ballistic missile threats to the
United States during this decade or early in the next decade
can be sustained only if plausible but unpredictable
developments, such as the transfer and conversion of [space
launch vehicles], are dismissed or considered of negligible
consequence.'' The System Planning Corporation found in a 1992
report that conversion of space launch vehicles to military
ballistic missiles would be ``fairly straightforward'' and that
extending the range of missiles had already been achieved by
China, North Korea, Iraq, and Israel. Moreover, a 1992 report
prepared by Science Applications International Corporation
concluded that ``the increasing availability of space launch
vehicles and space launch services could result in the ability
of certain Third World countries to threaten the continental
U.S. with ICBMs carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological
payloads in the mid- to late-1990s.''
Any booster with the capability to lift a payload into
orbit can also be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction
on targets thousands of miles away. Thus, through the purchase
of space launch vehicles, a nation can acquire a threatening
ballistic missile capability under the guise of peaceful
activity. In this regard, the committee notes with concern
continuing reports that Russia is attempting to market its
START-I and START-II systems, which are modified versions of
the SS-25 ICBM, as space launch vehicles. The purchase of space
launch vehicles is one route by which proliferant states may
seek to circumvent existing controls on the transfer of missile
technology.
Given the growing ballistic missile threat to the United
States, the committee is convinced that the deployment of an
affordable and effective national missile defense system is an
essential objective of a defense modernization program that
adequately supports the requirements of the national military
strategy. The committee believes that this Act, the provisions
of which are summarized below, is an appropriate response to
these concerns and is a responsible and prudent first step
toward defending all Americans from the threat of ballistic
missile attack.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
H.R. 3144, the ``Defend America Act of 1996,'' was
introduced on March 21, 1996. The bill was referred to the
Committee on National Security and the Committee on
International Relations.
Although the Committee on National Security did not hold
any hearings specifically on H.R. 3144, several hearings were
held this year on the ballistic missile defense issues that are
the subject of H.R. 3144. These included two full committee
hearings--on February 28, 1996, and March 14, 1996--and three
subcommittee hearings (Military Research and Development and
Military Procurement)--on February 29, March 7, and March 21.
The committee's February 28 hearing examined the long-range
ballistic missile threat to the United States and the
requirement for a national missile defense system. Testimony
was taken from a panel of outside witnesses, and the chairman
of the National Intelligence Council. On March 14, the
committee explored issues related to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty, including its relevance and utility in
the post-Cold War world and its present and projected impact on
U.S. ballistic missile defense programs. The committee heard
testimony from another panel of outside witnesses, including
the Administration's first Director of Central Intelligence.
The Military Research and Development subcommittee hearings
and the joint Military Research and Development and Military
Procurement subcommittee hearing focused on the
Administration's plans and programs for ballistic missile
defense. Witnesses included the Director of the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization, officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, service representatives responsible for
missile defense programs, and former government officials with
experience in ballistic missile defense and ABM Treaty issues.
The hearings conducted in 1996 supplemented an extensive
series of hearings the previous year, which culminated in
inclusion of similar national missile defense policy guidance
in the conference report on H.R. 1530, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (H. Rept. 104-406). The
incorporation of this provision was one of the principal
reasons cited by the President for his veto of H.R. 1530 on
December 28, 1995. A revised version of this bill, S. 1124,
excluding the provision on national missile defense, was
subsequently approved by the Congress and submitted to the
President, who signed it into law on February 10, 1996.
The aforementioned series of hearings on ballistic missile
defense provided the committee with a rich background of
information that framed its consideration of H.R. 3144. The
bill was marked up on May 1, 1996 and, a quorum being present,
reported favorably by a rollcall vote of 31 to 22. One
amendment in the nature of a substitute was offered by Mr.
Spratt and was defeated by a rollcall vote of 24-29. The
individual rollcall results are placed at the end of this
report.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1--Short Title
This section would identify the legislation as the ``Defend
America Act of 1996.''
Section 2--Findings
This section would establish the rationale for the policy
established in the Act. It would note that the threat posed to
the United States by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is
growing and that the trend is toward longer range missiles,
including those with intercontinental reach. It would also find
that the United States has the technical capability to develop
and deploy a national missile defense system and that such a
deployment will help deter countries from seeking long-range
missiles. Moreover, it would note that there are ways for
determined countries to acquire intercontinental ballistic
missiles by means other than indigenous development. This
section would also recognize that the danger of an accidental
missile launch has not disappeared and that deployment of a
national missile defense system will reduce concerns about this
threat. It would note that the deployment of a national missile
defense system can enhance stability in the post-Cold War era
and that the United States and Russia should welcome the
opportunity to reduce reliance on threats of nuclear
retaliation as the sole basis of stability. Finally, this
section would note that the authors of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty envisioned the need to change the Treaty as
circumstances changed, and they provided the mechanisms to do
so in the Treaty. The United States and Russia previously
considered such changes and should do so again.
Section 3--National Missile Defense Policy
This section would establish U.S. missile defense policy in
two areas. It would call for deployment by the end of 2003 of a
national missile defense system capable of providing a highly
effective defense of U.S. territory against limited,
unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks, which
will be augmented to a layered defense as larger and more
sophisticated threats emerge. It would also call for a
cooperative transition to a regime that is not based on an
offensive-only form of strategic stability.
Section 4--National Missile Defense System Architecture
This section would specify the components of the national
missile defense system that are to be developed for deployment,
including an interceptor system that optimizes defensive
coverage of the United States (either ground-based, sea-based,
or space-based, or any combination of these basing modes);
fixed ground-based radars; space-based sensors, including the
Space and Missile Tracking System (formerly known as Brilliant
Eyes); and battle management, command, control, and
communications.
Section 5--Implementation of National Missile Defense System
This section would specify certain actions that the
Secretary of Defense must take in implementing the national
missile defense policy. This would include initiating actions
necessary to meet the deployment goal; conducting by the end of
1998 an integrated systems test; using streamlined acquisition
procedures; and developing a follow-on national missile defense
program.
Section 6--Report on Plan for NMD Development and Deployment
This section would require the Secretary of Defense to
submit a report to Congress by March 15, 1997, which addresses
the Secretary's plan for implementing the national missile
defense policy, including a discussion of the NMD architecture
selected; the Secretary's estimate of the cost associated with
development and deployment of the NMD system; an analysis of
follow-on options; and a determination of the point at which
NMD development would conflict with the ABM Treaty.
Section 7--Policy Regarding the ABM Treaty
This section would establish policy for amending and
otherwise dealing with the ABM Treaty. It would urge the
President to pursue high-level discussions with Russia to amend
the Treaty and stipulates that any amendment must be submitted
for advice and consent. It would also call for the President
and Congress to consider U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty if
amendments are not produced within one year.
COMMUNICATIONS FROM OTHER COMMITTEES
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC, May 1, 1996.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: I write with regard to H.R. 3144, the
Defend America Act of 1996. H.R. 3144 was introduced on March
21, 1996, and was referred to the Committee on National
Security, and in addition, the Committee on International
Relations. I understand the Committee on National Security
intends to mark up H.R. 3144 on Wednesday, May 1.
The purpose of H.R. 3144 is to establish a U.S. policy for
the deployment by the end of 2003 a national missile defense
system that is capable of providing a highly-effective defense
of the territory of the U.S. against limited, unauthorized or
accidental ballistic missile attacks.
The Committee on International Relations has closely
reviewed H.R. 3144 and in order to expedite consideration of
this measure in the House, the Committee waives its right to
take up the bill. I therefore ask that the Committee be
discharged from further consideration.
The Committee on International Relations wishes to make
clear that the foregoing waiver should not be construed as a
waiver of the Committee's jurisdiction with respect to any of
the legislative provisions in H.R. 3144 that fall within its
jurisdiction. The Committee also wishes to preserve its
prerogatives with respect to any House-Senate conference on
this bill and any Senate amendments thereto, including the
appointment of an equal number of conferees to those appointed
for any other House committee with respect to the provisions of
H.R. 3144 which fall within this committee's jurisdiction.
Thank you for your attention to this matter, and I look
forward to strongly supporting H.R. 3144 on the House floor.
Sincerely,
Ben Gilman, Chairman.
COMMITTEE POSITION
On May 1, 1996, the Committee on National Security, a
quorum being present, approved H.R. 3144, as amended, by a vote
of 31 to 22.
FISCAL DATA
Pursuant to clause 7 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the committee attempted to ascertain annual
outlays resulting from the bill during fiscal year 1997 and the
four following fiscal years. The results of such efforts are
reflected in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which is included in this
report pursuant to clause 2(l)(3)(C) of House rule XI.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the cost estimate
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office and submitted
pursuant to section 403(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 is as follows:
May 15, 1996.
Hon. Floyd Spence,
Chairman, Committee on National Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
reviewed H.R. 3144, the Defend America Act of 1996, as ordered
reported by the House Committee on National Security on May 1,
1996. The bill calls for deployment by 2003 of a system to
defend the nation against an attack by ballistic missiles, but
does not specify how much funding would be available for this
purpose. Based on plans and estimates of the Department of
Defense, the costs of complying with the bill would total $10
billion over the next five years, or about $7 billion more than
is currently programmed for national missile defense.
Through 2010, total acquisition costs would range from $31
billion to $60 billion for a layered defense that would include
both ground- and space-based weapons. The wide range in the
estimate reflects uncertainty about two factors--the type and
capability of a defensive system that would satisfy the terms
of the bill, and the costs of each component of that system.
These figures do not include the cost to operate and support
the defense after it is deployed. The attachment provides
additional details on these estimates.
Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1996
excludes from the application of that bill legislative
provisions that are necessary for the national security or the
ratification or implementation of international treaty
obligations. CBO has determined that the provisions of H.R.
3144 fit within that exclusion.
H.R. 3144 would not affect direct spending or receipts and
thus would not be subject to pay-as-you-go procedures under
section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Raymond
Hall and David Mosher.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill, Director.
Congressional Budget Office, Budgetary Implications of H.R. 3144, The
Defend America Act of 1996
This document addresses the budgetary implications of H.R.
3144, as ordered reported by the House Committee on National
Security on May 1, 1996. The Defend America Act of 1996 would
require the United States to deploy a national missile defense
by the end of 2003 that provides ``a highly effective defense
of all 50 states against limited, unauthorized and accidental
attacks * * * [that would be] augmented over time to provide a
layered defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic
missile threats as they emerge.'' Those two requirements form
the basis of CBO's estimate. According to the bill the initial
defense must include interceptors, ground-based radar, space-
based sensors including the Space and Missile Tracking System
(SMTS), and a battle management and command and control system
to tie the components together. The interceptors can be ground-
, sea-, or spacebased. The space-based weapons could be lasers
or kinetic energy interceptors (also known as Brilliant
Pebbles). The layered defense that would eventually follow,
according to the bill's second requirement, would likely be
achieved by adding space-based weapons to the ground-based
system.
CBO estimates that H.R. 3144 would cost nearly $10 billion
over the next five years, or about $7 billion more than is
currently programmed for national missile defense. Through
2010, the system would cost between $31 billion and $60
billion. None of the estimates include the cost to operate and
support the defense after it is deployed. Our estimates are
derived from data provided by the military services and the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). While we have
been unable to review many of the details behind those
estimates, we believe that they are the best that are currently
available. In some cases, though, we adjusted the Department of
Defense's (DoD) estimates to better reflect procurement costs
and potential risks. For example, we added about $3 billion to
hedge against technical and schedule risks in the development
programs. We also reduced the estimated cost of deploying 500
space-based interceptors by $6 billion. We did not however,
adjust the estimates to reflect cost increases that typically
occur in developing systems that advance the state of the art.
Minimum Requirements and Costs. The low end of the range of
estimates reflects what we believe would be the smallest system
that would meet both of the bill's principal requirements. As
proposed by the Army, the initial defense would consist of 100
interceptors based at Grand Forks, South Dakota. Combined with
SMTS, this system would be able to defend all 50 states against
an unsophisticated attack of up to 20 warheads under many
scenarios, according to BMDO. The interceptors would be armed
with the Army's Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). To track
incoming warheads, four new phased-array radars would be
deployed, one each in Grand Forks, Alaska, Hawaii, and New
England.
This initial defense would cost $14 billion--about $8.5
billion for the ground-based system and $5 billion for the SMTS
space-based sensors. (The ground-based system could cost
roughly $4 billion less if the Air Force's proposal for a
Minuteman-based system was adopted.) The upper layer, which
would be added sometime after 2006, would employ 500 space-
based interceptors similar to Brilliant Pebbles--the less
expensive of the two types of space-based weapons. It would
make the defense capable of protecting the United States from a
more sophisticated attack of up to 60 warheads according to
BMDO, and would cost an additional $14 billion. CBO adds
another $3 billion to these estimates to hedge against
potential risks associated with the development program. Thus,
the total cost of the layered defense would be about $31
billion.
Potential Increases in Requirements and Costs. The bill
specifies that the defense shall protect the United States
against limited or unauthorized attacks, but does not specify
how big the attack might be. The high end of the range reflects
the costs of a system to protect the United States against a
more potent threat--for example, an attack that could have 200
warheads accompanied by sophisticated countermeasures. DoD
bases its operational requirement for a national missile
defense on such a threat.
CBO assumes that the ground-based layer would include 300
interceptors deployed at 3 sites and would cost $13 billion, or
about $4.5 billion more than the costs of meeting the minimum
requirements. SMTS satellites would be deployed at a cost of $5
billion. The space-based layer would include a combination of
500 space-based interceptors ($14 billion) and 20 space-based
lasers ($25 billion) for maximum effectiveness. Again, $3
billion is added in anticipation of technological and
integration problems. The total cost of this high-end layered
defense would be about $60 billion. Except for the lasers, this
system would be similar to the Global Protection Against
Limited Strikes (GPALS) system proposed by past
administrations.
Cost Comparison. The estimate for the ground-based systems
described above is about two thirds less than previous
estimates associated with earlier proposals, for example the
GPALS system. The earlier proposals focused on the challenging
threat of an unauthorized attack by the Soviet Union. Today the
focus is on smaller and less capable threats--as a result the
defines components may be somewhat less capable. Past proposals
also called for a robust program that included substantial
efforts to test the systems and to reduce and manage the
technical and schedule risks associated with such an ambitious
development effort. It is unclear how much these efforts can be
reduced without increasing risk to unacceptable levels. But if
current plans must be revised to include more thorough testing
and larger efforts to reduce risks, and if the purpose of the
defense evolves into protecting against larger and more
sophisticated threats, costs of the ground-based systems could
approach those developed for systems like GPALS--thus, costs of
the high-end system could greatly exceed $60 billion by 2010.
COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE
Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee takes exception with
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cost estimate for this
bill and offers the following specific points of disagreement
and clarification.
First, the CBO estimate fails to account for the fact that
H.R. 3144 would not require the acquisition or deployment of a
specific National Missile Defense (NMD) architecture. Instead,
it would direct the Secretary of Defense to develop an
affordable and operationally effective NMD system to defend
against limited missile attacks; prescribe and use streamlined
acquisition policies and procedures in the procurement of the
system; and submit a report to Congress not later than March
15, 1997, on the Secretary's plan for developing and deploying
such a system.
In this regard, the committee notes that in testimony
before the Committee on National Security in February, 1995,
the Secretary of Defense stated that an NMD system capable of
defending against limited ballistic missile attacks could be
deployed within five years for $5 billion. Yet, the CBO
estimate claims that an initial NMD system would cost more than
twice that amount. Similarly, the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization has proposed an NMD system architecture that could
be deployed in about four years for slightly less than $5
billion. The Air Force has also proposed an NMD system
architecture which it believes can be deployed in four years
for $2 to $4 billion. Lastly, independent experts believe an
NMD system based on upgrades to the Navy's Aegis fleet can be
deployed several years for under $5 billion. Therefore, the
committee believes that a more appropriate estimate of the
likely cost associated with the mandated actions required by
H.R. 3144 would approximate those estimates already provided by
the Department of Defense.
Further, the CBO estimate provides a cost estimate through
the year 2010 for a specific system architecture that includes
the most expensive, technologically challenging approach to
performing the NMD mission. In fact, no such architecture is
mandated by the bill. Instead, the bill grants the Secretary
flexibility in determining the appropriate architecture and
proposing such to a subsequent Congress. The committee fully
expects such a proposal to receive the necessary and
appropriate Congressional budgetary scrutiny to ensure that all
cost-benefit tradeoffs are properly explored and understood.
Therefore, the committee finds the assumption that the
Department of Defense would propose and pursue an architecture
option that would pose serious affordability concerns and run
directly counter to section 4 of the bill to be without basis
or logic.
Second, the CBO estimate assumes a ``business as usual''
approach to the acquisition of an NMD system. This assumption
fails to give appropriate weight to section 5 of the bill which
directs the Secretary of Defense to ``prescribe and use
streamlined acquisition policies and procedures'' in the
procurement of such an NMD system. The Secretary of Defense has
testified before the Committee on National Security about the
success in using such procedures to dramatically reduce the
cost of several new weapons systems, most notably the Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The committee believes that the
aggressive use of streamlined acquisition procedures and
commercial practices should produce significantly lower NMD
system acquisition costs.
Third, the committee believes that proper consideration of
any such estimate must take into account the broader budgetary
context. As such, the CBO estimate contains no discussion of
the estimated costs for deployment of a NMD system in the
context of projected defense spending over the same time
period. Such a comparison would indicate that any NMD system,
whether it costs $5 billion or $30 billion, would represent a
small fraction of the total amount of the funding that will be
available for national defense over the deployment period. In
fact, deployment of an NMD system would almost certainly
require less than one percent of total defense spending over
the next five years, irrespective of whether one uses the
President's budget or the most recent Concurrent Resolution on
the Budget as a basis for comparison. Indeed, the long term
acquisition cost for any NMD system is overshadowed by that of
many future conventional systems such as the Joint Strike
Fighter ($301 billion) or the F-18E/F Super Hornet Strike
Fighter ($81 billion). Therefore, the committee believes that
when viewed within a broader context, the projected cost of an
NMD system becomes less of an issue.
Fourth, the committee believes that any presentation of a
cost estimate must recognize that the funds required to deploy
an NMD system are already available within the limits
established for the national defense budget function contained
in the most recent Concurrent Resolution on the Budget. In
short, no increase in top-line defense spending would be
necessary to field an NMD system. The committee believes that
the issue is more appropriately one of determining priorities
within existing budgets, not one of adding new spending.
Therefore, the committee believes that the CBO cost
estimate inadequately addresses the numerous complex issues
associated with estimating the costs associated with this
legislation. The committee recognizes that given that this
legislation does not authorize or appropriate any funds, the
estimation of cost impacts of legislation that merely provides
policy direction is inherently difficult. However, the
committee believes that the margin for error associated with
such estimates is dramatically compounded when they involve
hypothetical excursions beyond the actual requirements of the
legislation.
INFLATION-IMPACT STATEMENT
Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee concludes that the bill
would have no significant inflationary impact.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, this legislation results from
hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the
committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the Rules
of the House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not
include any new spending or credit authority, nor does it
provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or
expenditures. The fiscal features of this legislation are
addressed in the estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the committee has not received
a report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
pertaining to the subject matter of H.R. 3144.
STATEMENT OF FEDERAL MANDATES
Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104-4, this
legislation contains no federal mandates with respect to state,
local, and tribal governments, nor with respect to the private
sector. Similarly, the bill provides no unfunded federal
intergovernmental mandates.
ROLLCALL VOTES
In accordance with clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, rollcall votes were
taken with respect to the committee's consideration of H.R.
3144. The record of these votes is attached to this report.
The committee ordered H.R. 3144 reported to the House with
a favorable recommendation by a vote of 31-22, a quorum being
present.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS
I offer dissenting views on the committee recommendation
and report of H.R. 3144, a national missile defense program
guideline clearly calculated to breach the ABM Treaty and
return the United States to pursuit of a ``star wars'' missile
defense program.
A less extreme formulation for missile defense program
activity was met with a Presidential veto on last year's
defense authorization bill. The ballistic missile defense issue
is also embedded in the committee recommendation and report on
H.R. 3230 and I have noted my dissenting views in that report
as well.
Despite all of the political rhetoric, there is much more
commonality between the administration and the Congress on this
issue than the conflict would suggest. Many of the differences
between the two approaches are rooted in a perception of the
timing of the appearance of a threat to which we would need
such a response. This is essentially a function of risk
management, and how to determine what type of ``insurance
policy'' we wish to purchase against such a future contingency.
What is less focused on but should be very central to the
debate, is the cost and character of the alternative
``insurance policies'' that are available to the Nation. And
this is where the parties diverge.
The administration's current ballistic missile defense plan
can provide for an affordable defense against limited ballistic
missile threats before those threats will emerge. It does so in
a way that anticipates likely changes in the threat from
today's estimates. It also does so in a way that avoids
becoming trapped in a technological cul-de-sac by a premature
deployment of a potentially misdirected system.
The committee recommendation and its report would unfocus
U.S. efforts by pursuing space-based interceptors without
regard to ABM Treaty requirements, START treaty considerations
and the threat reduction and strategic stability goals that the
treaties promise.
The known stockpiles held by Russia and China which have
been deterred for years by our strategy of mutual assured
deterrence, and they will continue to be so deterred. Nothing
has changed in the strategic environment that would suggest
that the basic understanding that led both superpowers to
conclude that the ABM Treaty served their security interests
has changed. And, as I have pointed out above, the
administration's plans will lead us to a deployable plan before
any other threat will reasonably emerge.
This recommendation commits us to an incredibly expensive
and ultimately unaffordable path. Both the department's 3+3
program and the Spratt substitute provide for a more capable
missile defense system when deployed, and one that is
affordable within current budget projections. It blends arms
control and counterproliferation activities with deterrence and
missile intercept capabilities. It thus pursues the most
effective approach to missile defense, preventing missiles from
being deployed at all, while providing a prudent ``insurance
policy'' against limited but as of yet non-existent threats.
The overreliance by the committee recommendation on a
``hardware'' solution to intercept incoming missiles in the
final minutes of their flight time, risks constructing a very
expensive 21st Century Maginot Line. Such a defense strategy
may well prove as ineffective to the 21st Century threats we
might face, as the original Maginot Line was in defending
France during World War II.
Therefore, I urge my colleagues to support the Spratt
substitute and oppose the committee recommendation.
Ronald V. Dellums.
DISSENTING VIEW OF HON. JOHN SPRATT
Before stating why I dissent, I want to emphasize the
commonality between H.R. 3144 and the substitute I offered.
Both call for a national missile defense system that can be
deployed by the year 2003. Both see the potential threat to the
United States posed by intercontinental ballistic missiles, and
both stress the importance of defending against such a threat.
-
The operative sentence in my substitute is in Section 3:
``It is the policy of the United States to develop by the year
2000 a National Missile Defense System that can be deployed in
2003.'' -
This objective does not differ much from H.R. 3144. My
substitute is preferable because it comes closer to achieving
the stated purpose of both bills.-
We are not without national missile defenses today because
of a lack of funding. More than $35 billion has been pumped
into strategic defense since President Reagan's speech on March
23, 1983. The problem has been a lack of focus more than a lack
of funding. My substitute to H.R. 3144 focuses national missile
defense on the one system attainable in the near-term: a system
of ground-based, treaty-compliant interceptors. H.R. 3144, on
the other hand, sends the Secretary of Defense in pursuit of
four different systems: ground-based interceptors, sea-based
interceptors, space-based kinetic energy interceptors, and
space-based directed energy systems. This diffuses scarce
dollars, and wastes money on futuristic technologies (such as
space-based lasers and ``Brilliant Pebbles'') that are not
attainable in the near-term, if ever. It also siphons
development money off the most feasible system: ground-based
interceptors.-
By focusing on a single architecture--ground-based
interceptors--my substitute ensures that we will have the most
effective system possible by the year 2000. If the system
developed proves its mettle in testing, and if the threat
warrants, this system can be deployed by 2003, the same date
set by H.R. 3144. -
If in the year 2000 we decide not to work toward deployment
in the year 2003, my substitute directs that we not quit, but
keep on upgrading the system with new technology and rigorous
testing. This will ensure that we can have the best possible
system ready to build and deploy whenever we perceive the need.
-
Right now, the most effective step we can take toward
reducing the threat of missile attack is to implement START I
and START II. While the findings of H.R. 3144 refer to START I,
there is no reference to START II and the importance of
lowering the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union by 66%
from the levels during the Cold War. -
The arsenal of the former Soviet Union still poses the
greatest danger to this country, whether by premeditated attack
from a hostile Russian government, or by an accidental or
unauthorized launch, or by spread of Russian nuclear materials,
weapons, or missile components to nations hostile to the United
States. We will not reduce this threat if we broadcast our
intent to abandon the ABM Treaty before START II is ratified
and on its way to being implemented. H.R. 3144 is littered with
provisions inconsistent with the ABM Treaty and unnecessarily
risks START II ratification.
John Spratt.
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