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104th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 104-582
_______________________________________________________________________
PROVIDING FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF
H.R. 3144, THE DEFEND AMERICA ACT OF 1996
_______
May 16, 1996.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Diaz-Balart, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H. Res. 438]
The Committee on Rules, having had under consideration
House Resolution 438, by a nonrecord vote, report the same to
the House with the recommendation that the resolution be
adopted.
brief summary of provisions of resolution
The rule provides for consideration in the House with two
hours of debate divided equally between the chairman and
ranking minority member of the Committee on National Security.
The rule waives all points or order against the bill and
against its consideration.
The rule also makes in order without intervention of any
point of order one minority amendment in the nature of a
substitute to be offered by Mr. Spratt or his designee and
which is printed in this report. The rule provides that the
substitute shall be debatable separately for one hour divided
equally between the proponent and an opponent. Finally, the
rule provides for one motion to recommit with or without
instructions.
The Amendment To Be Offered by Representative Spratt of South Carolina,
or a Designee, Debatable for 1 Hour
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Ballistic Missile Defense Act
of 1996''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Short-range theater ballistic missiles threaten
United States Armed Forces wherever engaged abroad.
Therefore, the expeditious deployment of theater
missile defenses to intercept ballistic missiles at
greater ranges and higher altitudes is the highest
priority among all ballistic missile defense programs.
(2) The United States is developing defensive systems
to protect the United States against the threat of
limited ballistic missile attacks. Ground-based
defensive systems are attainable, compliant with the
ABM Treaty, more affordable than space-based
interceptors or space-based lasers, and can protect all
of the United States from limited ballistic missile
attack.
(3) Defending against ballistic missile attacks upon
our national territory requires not only missile
defenses but arms control agreements and
nonproliferation measures that lower the threat and
curb the spread of ballistic missile technology.
(4) The massive retaliatory capability of the United
States deterred the Soviet Union, and any other nation,
from launching an attack by intercontinental ballistic
missiles throughout the Cold War. The Nuclear Posture
Review conducted by the Department of Defense affirms
the effectiveness of deterrence now and into the
future. While the threat of intentional attack upon the
United States has receded, the risk of an accidental or
unauthorized attack by Russia or China remains but is
remote.
(5) United States arms control agreements (notably
the START I Treaty and the START II Treaty, once
implemented) will lower the threat to the United States
from large-scale nuclear attack. The START I Treaty,
when fully implemented, will reduce deployed warheads
by over 40 percent below 1990 levels. By the end of
1996, only Russia, among the states of the former
Soviet Union, will deploy nuclear weapons. The START II
Treaty, if implemented, will reduce warheads deployed
in Russia by 66 percent below their levels before the
Start I Treaty.
(6) As strategic offensive weapons are reduced, the
efficacy and affordability of defensive systems
increases, raising the possibility of deterrence based
upon effective defenses rather than deterrence based
solely upon threat of massive retaliation.
(7) Countries hostile to the United States (such as
Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya) have manifested an
interest in developing ballistic missiles capable of
reaching the United States. These countries may
accelerate the development of long-range missiles if
they receive external support, but in the absence of
outside assistance, newly emerging threats may take as
long as 15 years to mature, according to recent
intelligence estimates.
(8) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile
Technology Control Regime, the Biological and Chemical
Weapons Convention, and continuing United States
efforts to enforce export controls will prevent or
delay external assistance needed by those countries to
develop intercontinental ballistic missiles and weapons
of mass destruction.
(9) The ABM Treaty has added to strategic stability
by restraining the requirement on both sides for
strategic weapons. At the summit in May 1995, the
President of the United States and the President of
Russia each reaffirmed his country's commitment to the
ABM Treaty.
(10) Abrogating the ABM Treaty to deploy a
noncompliant system will not add to strategic stability
if it impedes implementation of the START I or START II
Treaty. Without the removal of strategic weapons
scheduled by both treaties, the consequences and risks
of unauthorized or accidental launches will remain
undiminished, as will the potential threat of a large-
scale attack capable of overwhelming any defenses
deployed.
(11) If the nuclear arsenal of the United States must
be maintained at START I levels, significant unbudgeted
costs will be incurred, encroaching on funds for
ballistic missile defenses and other defense
requirements.
(12) Should arms control, nonproliferation efforts,
and deterrence fail, the United States must be able to
defend itself against limited ballistic missile attack.
(13) Missile defense systems consistent with the ABM
Treaty are capable of defending against limited
ballistic missile attack. Should a national missile
defense system require modification of the ABM Treaty,
the treaty establishes the means for the parties to
amend the treaty, which the parties have used in the
past.
SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.
(a) In General.--It is the policy of the United States to
develop by the year 2000 a National Missile Defense System that
can be deployed in 2003.
(b) Capability of System.--The National Missile Defense
System to be developed pursuant to subsection (a) shall be
capable, when deployed, of providing a highly effective defense
of the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks.
(c) Testing Before Deployment.--The system developed pursuant
to subsection (a) shall be rigorously tested during
development.
(d) Improvements.--If a decision to deploy the system
developed pursuant to subsection (a) is not made by the end of
the year 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the
system is improved by incorporation of evolving technology to
increase effectiveness and reduce costs of a subsequent
deployment, and that rigorous testing continues.
SEC. 4. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PRIORITIES.
The following, in the order listed, shall be the policy of
the United States with respect to the priority for development
and deployment of ballistic missile defense programs:
(1) First, maintaining the operational readiness of
the Armed Forces, including a good quality of life for
servicemembers and their families, and modernization of
weapons systems to ensure mission effectiveness in the
future.
(2) Second, as part of such modernization, completing
the development and deployment of essential theater
missile defense (TMD) systems as soon as practicable.
(3) Third, developing by the year 2000 for deployment
in the year 2003 the system referred to in section 3
and section 5(b) and developing for deployment as soon
as practicable the space-based sensors described in
section 5(c).
SEC. 5. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE.
(a) Requirement for National Missile Defense Program.--To
implement the policy established in section 3, the Secretary of
Defense shall initiate a National Missile Defense Program,
which shall position the United States, by the end of the year
2000, to be capable of deploying a National Missile Defense
system, as described in section 3(b), within three years.
(b) Elements of the NMD Program.--The National Missile
Defense Program shall include the following elements:
(1) A ground-based interceptor system that provides
coverage of the continental United States (including
Alaska) and Hawaii.
(2) Fixed ground-based radars.
(3) Space-based sensors.
(4) Battle management, command, control and
communications (BM/C<SUP>3).
SEC. 6. IMPLEMENTATION OF NMD PROGRAM.
The Secretary of Defense shall--
(1) initiate plans and actions necessary to meet the
deployment readiness goals specified in section 5(a);
(2) conduct rigorous integrated system testing using
elements representative of the National Missile Defense
architecture referred to in section 5(b);
(3) prescribe and use streamlined acquisition
policies and procedures, in accordance with existing
law, to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of
developing the system referred to in section 5(b); and
(4) develop technologies that have the potential of
improving the National Missile Defense system
prescribed in section 5(b).
SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Not later than March 15, 1997, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to Congress a report on the Secretary's plan for the
National Missile Defense Program required by this Act. The
report shall include the following matters:
(1) The Secretary's plan for carrying out this Act,
including--
(A) a detailed description of the system
architecture selected for development under
section 5(b); and
(B) a justification of the architecture
selected and reasons for the rejection of the
other candidate architectures.
(2) The Secretary's estimate of the amount of
appropriations required for research, development,
test, evaluation, and for procurement, for each of
fiscal years 1997 through 2003 in order to achieve an
initial operational capability in 2003.
(3) A description of promising technologies to be
pursued in accordance with the requirements of section
6(4).
(4) A determination of the point at which any
activity that is required to be carried out under this
Act would conflict with the terms of the ABM Treaty,
together with a description of any such activity, the
legal basis for the Secretary's determination, and an
estimate of the time at which such point would be
reached in order to meet an initial operating
capability in the year 2003.
SEC. 8. POLICY REGARDING REDUCTION OF THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
FROM WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
(a) Measures To Address Threats From Weapons of Mass
Destruction.--In order to defend against weapons of mass
destruction by preventing the spread of fissile materials and
other components of weapons of mass destruction, the President
shall--
(1) enhance efforts, both unilaterally and in
cooperation with other nations, to prevent terrorist
organizations from obtaining and using weapons of mass
destruction;
(2) expedite United States efforts to assist the
Governments of the Russian Federation, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, as appropriate, in improving
the safety, security, and accountability of fissile
materials and nuclear warheads;
(3) undertake additional steps to prevent weapons of
mass destruction and their components from being
smuggled into the United States, through the use of
improved security devices at United States ports of
entry, increased numbers of Border Patrol agents,
increased monitoring of international borders, and
other appropriate measures;
(4) seek the widest possible international adherence
to the Missile Technology Control Regime and pursue to
the fullest other export control measures intended to
deter and counter the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and their components; and
(5) enhance conventional weapons systems to ensure
that the United States possesses effective deterrent
and counterforce capabilities against weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems.
(b) Measures To Address Threats From ICBMs.--In order to
reduce the threat to the United States from weapons of mass
destruction delivered by intercontinental ballistic missiles,
including accidental or unauthorized launches, the President
shall--
(1) urge the Government and Parliament of the Russian
Federation to ratify the START II Treaty as soon as
possible, permitting its expeditious entry into force;
(2) pursue with the Government of the Russian
Federation, after START II entry-into-force, a
symmetrical program of early deactivation of strategic
forces to be eliminated under START II; and
(3) work jointly with countries possessing
intercontinental ballistic missiles to improve command
and control technology and operations to the maximum
extent practicable.
(c) Department of Defense Program.--Consistent with, and in
order to complement, the steps to be taken by the President
under subsection (a)(3), the Secretary of Defense shall carry
out a program to enhance the capabilities of the United States
relating to the threat to the United States of a chemical or
biological weapons attack inside the United States by
unconventional means. In carrying out such program, the
Secretary shall take into consideration the assessments and
recommendations of the task force established under subsection
(d). The activities to be carried out by the Secretary under
the program shall include the following:
(1) Research, development, test, and evaluation of
technologies relating to any of the following:
(A) Detection of chemical or biological
weapons.
(B) Interception of such weapons.
(C) Protection against such weapons.
(D) Response to an attack inside the United
States using such weapons.
(E) Decontamination of areas affected by an
attack using such weapons.
(2) Training of personnel for the activities
specified in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph
(1).
(3) Identification of Federal equipment and
technologies that can be transferred from one Federal
agency to another agency or to State and local agencies
consistent with the purposes of the program under this
subsection.
(d) Interagency Task Force.--(1) There is hereby established
in the executive branch an interagency task force to assess,
and make recommendations concerning, the capabilities of the
United States relating to the threat of a chemical or
biological weapons attack inside the United States by
unconventional means.
(2) The task force shall on an ongoing basis assess the
current state of the United States with respect to each of the
following and shall identify and recommend potential
improvements:
(A) The nature of the threat to the United States of
a chemical or biological weapons attack inside the
United States by unconventional means.
(B) Capabilities related to detection and
interception of such weapons or the possibility of such
an attack.
(C) Capabilities related to protection against the
effects of such an attack.
(D) Capabilities related to preparedness for, and
response to, such an attack.
(E) Capabilities related to decontamination following
such an attack.
(F) Public education concerning the dangers of such
an attack and the appropriate response to such an
attack.
(3) Membership of the task force shall include
representatives of the following departments and agencies:
(A) The Department of Defense.
(B) The Central Intelligence Agency, but only with
respect to assessment of the nature of the threat.
(C) The Department of Justice, including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
(D) The Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(E) The Department of the Treasury, including the
Customs Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms.
(F) The Department of Health and Human Services,
including the Centers for Disease Control.
(4) In carrying out its activities, the task force shall
consult regularly with, and shall seek the views of,
representatives of--
(A) State and local government law enforcement
authorities; and
(B) State and local government emergency planning
authorities.
(5) Administrative support for the task force shall be
provided by the Secretary of Defense.
(e) Annual Report.--The President shall submit to Congress an
annual report on actions by the United States to comply with
the provisions of this section. The first such report shall be
submitted not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 9. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.
(a) In General.--The President shall--
(1) carry out the policies, programs, and
requirements of this Act in a manner consistent with
the ABM Treaty or through processes specified within
the ABM Treaty;
(2) at an appropriate time, seek amendments to the
ABM Treaty, as provided in Articles XIII and XIV of the
Treaty, if such amendments are required to deploy the
National Missile Defense system prescribed in section
5; and
(3) treat any negotiated amendment to the ABM Treaty
as having entered into force only if such amendment is
made in the same manner as a treaty (including the
requirement that ratification by the United States is
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate).
(b) Modifications Restricting TMD Systems.--The United States
shall not be bound by any amendment or other substantive
modification to the ABM treaty that restricts theater ballistic
missile defense systems unless--
(1) that system is actually flight-tested against a
ballistic missile that exceeds (A) a range of 3,500
kilometers, or (B) a velocity of 5 kilometers per
second; or
(2) the agreement for such modification is made
pursuant to the requirements of section 235 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996
(Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 231).
SEC. 10. ABM TREATY DEFINED.
For purposes of this Act, the term ``ABM Treaty'' means the
Treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, and includes
Protocols to that Treaty signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, and
all Agreed Statements and amendments to such Treaty in effect.
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