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QUESTION FOR THE RECORD
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTTEE
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

MARCH 25, 1996

QUESTION NUMBER 1:

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

Senator Levin: General O'Neill, the Department of Defense recently announced a restructuring of our ballistic missile defense programs to focus on countering the most near- term threats. This restructuring was supported by the JROC (Joint Requirements Oversight Council), which had input from the regional CINCS, and yourself. The restructured program stresses the near-term deployment of theater missile defense systems, namely PAC-3 and Navy Area Defense System (or "Lower-Tier") designed to counter existing threats that our forces face today from short- and medium-range theater ballistic missiles. Then the program would stress technology maturation and then deployment of theater defense systems, namely THAAD and the Navy Theater Defense System (or "Upper-tier"), designed to counter emerging threats from theater missiles. Finally, the National Missile Defense portion of the restructured program, the so-called "three plus three" aspect, would continue to develop technology for three years to enable us to make a deployment decision that could be implemented in another three years -- if warranted by the threat. But the "three plus three" program also recognizes that if we have more time to develop technology, the system we eventually deploy would be far more capable than what current technology would permit in 2003, at the end of the six years. Do you agree with the notion of placing the priority on near-term deployment of systems that can counter the threats we already face, namely short and medium range theater missiles?

General O'Neill: Yes, based on the threat, the systems available in the near term, and the funding available for missile defense, the Department decided to stress the fielding of PAC-3 and Navy Area Defense which address the immediate threat of shorter range missiles. However, fewer dollars for upper tier systems means that capability to defend wide area against the gamut of existing theater threats will be delayed.

QUESTION NUMBER 2:

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

Senator Levin: Is it important in your view to provide the resources necessary to make sure we can deploy PAC-3 and Navy Area Defense/Lower Tier as soon as possible, as the restructured program does?

General O'Neill: Ycs, based on an examination of the threat, the systems available in the near term, and available funding, the Department decided to Field PAC-3 and Navy Area Defense as quickly as possible. Therefore, the Department increased investment in PAC-3 and Navy Area Defense to ensure timely delivery to the warfighter. The Program Review increased funding for PAC-3 by $345 million and the Navy Area Defense program by $186 million ovcr the Future Years Defense Plan, FY97-01. These increases provide PAC-3 FUE in FY99 and a Navy Area Defense User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) for contingency use in FYOO. But I believe THAAD should be equal in priority with the lower tier systems, i.e., the "TMD Core Programs" should be the priority, not just the lower tier elements.

QUESTION NUMBER 3:

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

Senator Levin: Do you agree that deciding now to deploy an NMD system in 2003 isnot warranted by the threat we see today, and also would lock in technology that is not as capable as would be available if we continued to develop the technology instead of deploying in 2003?

General O'Neill: I believe that it would be premature to make an immediate deployment decision today. The Deployment Readiness Program implemented by the Department earlier this year is specifically structured to address this uncertainty. Our current program continues to develop the technology required for a capable NMD system while simultaneously positioning us to allow a deployment within three years if the threat warrants. It is my belief that the technology we would deploy at the end of the three year development would be fully capable of countering the expected threat. With this program we avoid making a premature conunitment to the deployment of an NMD, preserving the option to introduce advanced technology, but still have the capability to respond in a timely manner when required.

QUESTION NUMBER 4:

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

Senator Levin: Given the intelligence estimate that a new indigenous ICBM development effort would take some 15 years, do you agree with Secretary Perry and Under Secretary Kaminski that this NMD program is prudent and that we should take the time to produce the best technology we can field before the threat actually emerges?

General O'Neill: I am in complete agreement with Secretary Perry and Under Secretary Kaminski that the NMD Deployment Readiness Program is an appropriate and prudent course of action given the current threat projections. The nation must be prepared to respond in a reasonable time period if such a threat materializes. The deployment readiness program is designed so that we can respond, within 6 years, while avoiding commitment to an immediate decision on deployment. I think a thorough reading of the NIE would suggest that 15 years is an incorrect interpretation of the time it would take for development of an indigenous ICBM capability--if we include all 50 states as the USA. I believe that there is a fairly great uncertainty associated with the development estimate, and that such a threat could appear much sooner--that underscores the logic of the 3 + 3 program strategy.

QUESTION NUMBER 5:

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

Senator Levin: General O'Neill, there is sometimes a notion here in Congress that if we only spend more money on all these programs. we could speed them up dramatically. But isn't it the case that some technology development takes a certain amount of time that is essentially independent of spending, because you have to permit time to develop, test, refine, integrate, test again, and so on? If so, please describe the process of technology development that would prevent accelerating programs simply by adding more money to the program.

General O'Neill: There is certainly an optimum pace for developing products which allows adequate time for defining the requirements; exploring alternate concepts to determine the most efficient and effective approach to meeting those requirements; designing a system; demonstrating and validating that the proposed design will meet those requirements through a combination of modeling and testing, followed by producing the system; and finally deploying the system with adequate training and logistic support to ensure its successful operation. The speed at which the process is accomplished is a balance between optimizing the solution to the most efficient and effective system achievable with the state Of technology available, and accepting a certain amount of risk of errors in order to field a system more rapidly. Increased up-front funding allows more of the steps required to develop a system to be accomplished in parallel, which lowers the overall cost of deploying a system. However, there is always a limit to how many things can be accomplished in parallel without raising the risk of mistakes to an unacceptable level. Invariably there are some steps. i.e., final design of a system, that must wait for the results of earlier steps such as analysis of rest results. In time of crisis, the nation is always willing to accept increased risk of inefficiencies to get systems in the field as quickly as possible; while if there is no imminent perceived threat a slower, a more conservative pace is the norm.

QUESTION NUMBER 6:

TMD PROGRAM DATES

Senator Levin: Are there any technological reasons, or concerns about excessive risk, that would make it difficult or unwise to meet all the IOCs incorporated in the FY 1996 National Defense Authorization Act for the "core" TMD programs? For example, your testimony suggested some "fact of life" schedule slips for PAC-3. Is it not the case that additional money could not erase that slippage?

General O'Neill: To meet the First Unit Equipped (FUE) date of FY 1998 (as specified in the FY 1996 National Defense Authorization Act) would incur excessive risk for the PAC-3 program. The PAC-3 schedule is dictated by sequential requirements to systematically integrate missile subsystems, verify performance, conduct flight tests, and perform post flight analysis. Historically, extensive time is required to resolve assembly and processing issues encountered during the first flight test of a new missile design. Due to the serial nature of the development process, additional funding will not accelerate the PAC-3 FUE date. Acceleration could only be accomplished through expensive concurrent activities which would greatly increase programmatic risk.

In the case of the Navy Area TMD Program, technical difficulties have caused delays. The Navy Area program is schedule-limited, meaning that regardless of funding, program delivery cannot be accelerated beyond a certain point because of the time required to address technical difficulties. As a result of this schedule limitation, the earliest the program could deliver would be a User Operational Evaluation System(UOES) in 4QFY99 and First Unit Equipped (FUE) in 2QFY02.

QUESTION NUMBER 7:

DEPLOYMENT

Senator Levin: Would you advocate deploying a missile defense system to meet an arbitrary deadline if the technology is not mature or ready, and the system would not work well?

General O'Neill: No. Clearly I would not advocate deploying a missile defense system to meet an arbitrary deadline if the technology was not mature resulting in a system with poor or no performance. The NMD Deployment Readiness Program is specifically tailored to prevent this approach. The deployment decision is keyed to the detection of a threat to the United States and not an arbitrary deadline. The earliest NMD system that would be deployed would be based on the results of the Integrated System Test in FY99. This test would demonstrate that the technology was sufficiently mature to provide an acceptable level of system performance. If the threat did not warrant deployment or if an acceptable level of performance is not achievable, additional development would be performed.

QUESTION NUMBER 8:

TMD PROGRAM DATES

Senator Levin: What information was sought by and provided last year to the authorization staff concerning the IOC dates chat are achievable for the "core" TMD programs. Were the dates enacted into law the same ones that were provided by your office?

General O'Neill: There were discussions on an informal staff to staff basis on the mandatory IOC dates contained in the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Act. The Department did not advocate any specific set of IOC dates, nor did they advocate specifying mandatory IOC dates in the bill.

QUESTION NUMBER 9:

ARROW

Senator Levin: Gen. O'Neill: The U.S. and Israel have been cooperating on a joint missile development program called Arrow that is intended for deployment in Israel. Would you please describe the benefits to the United States of participating in the Arrow program, and would you agree that we are getting a significant benefit in terms of shared data and information that will benefit U.S. development programs like THAAD?

General O'Neill: The U.S. technical benefits from the Arrow/ACES come from providing alternative technologies for risk reduction efforts on U.S. theater missile defense (TMD) programs. Arrow uses the identical focal plane array, manufactured by the same U.S. vendors as that of THAAD. Also, Arrow uses the same focal plane array materials as the Navy Standard Missile II Block IV A (SM-2 Block IV/A). Arrow provided flight data to the THAAD and the SM-2 Block IV/A programs. Other benefits for the U.S. TMD development programs include risk reduction data on hypersonic missile flight, lethality and kill assessment; target signatures for infrared and radio-frequency seekers; infrared signature prediction codes; booster stage separation at high velocities and dynamic pressure; and hypersonic flight performance of radomes in the endo-atmosphere.

It is in the U.S. national interest to support the development and deployment of the Arrow Missile System in order to provide for a robust missile defense capability in Israel. This system will contribute to the deterrence of future TBM conflicts in that region and has the potential to contribute to a more robust defensive response if deterrence fails. The potential interoperability of the Arrow System with U.S. systems would facilitate effective coordinated defense with U.S. systems deployed to the Middle East theater.

QUESTION NUMBER 10:

ARROW

Senator Levin: If U.S. systems prove to be interoperable with the Arrow System, how would or could the U.S. cooperate with Israel on joint missile defense operations? Could each side provide the other with missile warning data? Are there other ways in which the systems would be interoperable?

General O'Neill: Autonomous Operations - Even if two or more systems operate independently of the other in the same theater, Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) issues must be identified and mitigated. This is necessary to insure that each system can operate without interfering with the radars, communications, ground equipment, and weapons of other systems. A minimum level of noninterference interoperability must be attained if two systems are to operate without degrading the performance of each other.

Data Exchange - Integration of remote sensor track data from another system into TMD weapon systems offers significant benefits; improved launch point estimation, better impact point prediction, and cuing.

Engagement Planning - Improved inventory control can be attained through intelligent allocation of assets through pre-conflict engagement planning. It also creates a means to test the robustness of battle management logic.