REP. CURT WELDON
CHAIRMAN, R&D SUBCOMMITTEE
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
MILITARY PERSONNEL AND MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEES
SEPTEMBER 27, 1996

The Subcommittees will come to order. The Military Research and Development and Military Procurement Subcommittees meet jointly this morning to receive testimony from distinguished Government and outside experts on U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans, policies, and programs. This hearing is the latest in a series intended to shed light on this Administration's inadequate response to the burgeoning threat posed by missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.

We are pleased to have two panels of witnesses this morning. The first panel, before us now, consists of Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and General Joseph Ralston, U.S. Air Force, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We appreciate your presence here today and look forward to your testimony.

We also are privileged to have another distinguished senior military officer with us today, and I'd like to yield to the gentlewoman from California, Mrs. Harman, for the purpose of introducing him ....

Before hearing from other Members and our witnesses, I'd like to take a moment to point out what I consider the real and growing mismatch between the Administration's rhetoric in support of missile defense and its record of performance in this area.

Regarding National Missile Defense, the Administration's "spin" is that Congress and the White House really aren't that far apart; that the differences are modest at best. "Congress supports NMD, and so do we" is the public diplomacy line you hear.

But consider the following:

The President vetoed the Defense Authorization Bill last year because it called for deploying an affordable, operationallyeffective ground- based NMD system by 2003.The President threatened to veto legislation, the Defend America Act, because it, too, called for actual deployment of an NMD system by a date certain. In doing so, the President relied on an intelligence threat assessment that was released in a politicized manner, and that has been roundly criticized by the General Accounting Office and the President's first Director of Central Intelligence.

And, furthermore,

- The Administration has attempted to shut the door on possible, future changes to the ABM Treaty by adding up to 13 new signatories from the former Soviet Union each of which will wield a veto over U.S. missile defenses.

These are not actions in support of missile defense. These are the actions of an Administration that is diametrically opposed to building effective defenses for the American people.

The Administration touts its own NMD plan, the so-called "Deployment Readiness" program, as evidence of its commitment to defending America- But a closer look reveals that few, if any, of the pieces of a successful NMD program are in place. For example:

- Two years ago, BMDO informed the Committee that at least $800 million per year was needed to fully fund NMD research and development. Yet, the Department's plans to spend $400-$500 million for NMD through the Future Years Defense Program. This amount is insufficient to perform the necessary research and development--much less the production and actual fielding of an NMD system- Furthermore, this comes on top of the 80 percent cut in the NMD budget inflicted by the Administration upon assuming office. What was a well-funded acquisition program was decimated and turned into an unfocused, technology hobby-shop program.

- DOD also has few of the contractual elements in place to actually field an NMD system: Contracts have yet to be let for a Lead Systems Integrator or for development and production of a groundbased interceptor. In fact, the Administration refused to open contract proposals from industry on the GBI which resulted in millions of dollars being wasted and the Government deriving no benefit from this effort.

- And DOD has yet to institute an appropriate organizational structure for managing NMD system development.

Based on these considerations, I find it hard to conclude that the Administration is truly serious about developing and deploying an effective NMD system.

Let me turn briefly to the issue of the Administration' s controversial efforts to (quote) "strengthen" (unquote) the ABM Treaty.

In a joint statement issued this past Monday, Secretary of State Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister announced they had reached agreement on demarcation of strategic and theater missile defenses. This agreement allegedly would allow lower-velocity TMD systems such as PAC-3, Navy Lower Tier, and THAAD, to be developed and deployed.

Some consider this a breakthrough. In fact, there are serious questions about this agreement: Does it permit full use of data derived from space-based sensors? How does it affect Navy Upper Tier and other high-velocity TMD systems? What concessions were we forced to make in order to gain Russian agreement? And more importantly, why does the Administration feel compelled to negotiate such agreements in the first place? In fact, the United States is well within its rights to issue ABM Treaty compliance determinations unilaterally -- a key point conceded by DOD witnesses in testimony before this Committee earlier this year.

I also question the Administration's commitment to the Constitutional principle of ensuring Congressional oversight and approval of such agreements. Existing law requires that any substantive change to the ABM Treaty must be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

Yet the Administration has refused to commit to submitting this agreement or the agreement to multilateralize the ABM Treaty to the Congress. I suspect they fear that by doing so they would be forced to answer some tough questions questions which would reveal that these agreements are both unnecessary and counter to US. national security interests.

I trust that our witnesses will be able to shed some light on these and related matters. Let me now turn to the chairman of the Military Procurement Subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter, for any comments he'd like to make.

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