REP. DUNCAN HUNTER
CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
MILITARY PERSONNEL AND MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEES
SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 Whereas Mr. Weldon focused his remarks primarily on National Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, I would like to take a moment to discuss the Administration's theater missile defense programs.

There is no controversy over the question that theater missile threat is "here and now." North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, China, and many other nations possess such missiles and a willingness, under certain circumstances, to use them against their neighbors and against U.S. forces. These missiles are becoming increasingly sophisticated and longer-range, and can be used to deliver conventional as well as nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads.

We now know, of course, that in addition to the approximately 90 missiles launched by Iraq during the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein ordered warheads filled with biological warfare agents be mated to his Scud missiles. Had these missiles been used perhaps millions could have been killed. Then, just a few months ago, China showed its true colors by launching missiles toward our friends on Taiwan. It can be said that the era of regional missile warfare is upon us.

These developments should point the way to a robust program aimed at developing and deploying improved TMD systems promptly. But the Administration has failed to institute such a program. Instead, its record of performance on TMD systems over the past four years can only be considered poor.

The United States has fielded no new TMD systems in the five-plus years since Desert Storm. To be sure, some modifications to existing systems have been provided in limited instances. But the bottom line is this: If war erupted tomorrow in the Gulf or Korea, to name two likely hotspots, U.S. forces would be ill-equipped to handle the known threat. Your testimony, Dr. Kaminski, continues this point. I find that a national disgrace.

The Administration cannot blame the Congress for this sorry state of affairs. We have provided ample funding for TMD systems. In fact, we have added significant funding for various TMD systems, including THAAD and Navy Upper Tier in order to accelerate TMD programs. We have also provided statutory guidance to the Department to accelerate these programs. But the Department has refused to comply with the law and has failed to provide much-needed management attention on TMD systems.

For example, despite the importance of lower-tier defenses of ports and coastal operations, the Department allowed the schedule for Navy Lower Tier to slip. The Department refers to this delay as a (quote) "fact of life" slip, but I question that label. If the Department was serious about bringing this program to fruition, then senior leaders in the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including you, Dr. Kaminski, would have identified any problems early and acted aggressively to solve them so they wouldn't become "fact of life" delays. Someone is responsible for allowing this situation to develop and I'd like to hear your assessment of who that individual is.

In addition, I remain disturbed by the fact that the Department failed to heed the recommendation of a senior warfighting commander-in-chief during the BMD Program Review. I understand that General Luck wrote to Genera/Shalikashvili to urge that the budget for THAAD not be slashed and to apprise the Chairman of the value of upper tier systems such as THAAD as part of a layered defense architecture. Yet his opinion was summarily rejected and the budget for THAAD was reduced by $2 billion in order to free up resources for other Service modernization efforts.

This act represents a rejection of what Goldwater-Nichols was supposed to be all about: Give the warfighting CINC a greater voice in key resource allocation decisions. In this case, the U.S. commander assigned to defend the Korean peninsula was basically told by the Chairman, "Thanks, but we understand your needs better than you do."

This troubling incident makes me wonder: How many other examples are there wherein the warfighting CINC's views have been rejected? Didn't the Department learn its lesson from the Somalia debacle?

I am also dismayed by the Department's refusal to embrace the Navy Upper Tier. The system holds tremendous promise, but the Department has failed to budget sufficient resources for it, refused to designate it a Major Defense Acquisition Program as directed by Congress, and disregarded the programmatic milestone dates set in law. This record of achievement certainly undermines the Department's professed commitment to a "robust" TMD program.

And, lastly, let me say a word about thc ABM Treaty. I understand That you, Dr. Kaminski are planning to inform the Committee that a new ABM Treaty compliance certification has been signed allowing THAAD to proceed. That's great, but it begs some important questions: Why did it take so long to get this decision? Why does the certification approve the use of external cueing data from certain satellites (DSP), but not from others (e.g., SMTS)? And what is the value of and need for the recently announced 'Agreed Statement on Demarcation in light of this certification'?

I am hopeful that our witnesses this morning will be able to shed light on these topics and allay at least some of my concerns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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