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Dr. Keith B. Payne
President, National Institute for Public Policy
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University National Security Studies Graduate Program

>Ballistic Missile Defense
30 May 1996 - House Government Reform and Oversight
Subcommittee on National Security

The Long-Range Missile Threat to National Security

How severe is the threat to us posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles? Although an old question, it recently has become one of the key issues in the debate about ballistic missile defense. I would like to note at the outset that I agree with President Clinton's description of that threat. Just as a reminder, allow me to quote the President's very brief Executive Order #12938 concerning the proliferation threat to national security: "I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat."

In his Executive Order the President has, I believe, properly described the threat we face as a "national emergency." To be specific, a missile threat will exist within the foreseeable future in every region that American expeditionary forces might realistically be needed, and that threat will be magnified by the likely presence of nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads--weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In the emerging strategic environment, the combination of missiles and WMD will enable regional foes of the United States to threaten the annihilation of American military or civilian targets. Indeed, one of the primary self-declared motives for some rogue states to acquire missiles and WMD is to wield this threat of annihilation for the purposes of deterrence and coercion--particularly including deterrence and coercion of the United States. Unless proliferation is controlled and countered, the post-Cold War period will be characterized by rogue and terrorist states with the capability to deter and coerce us with missile threats involving weapons of mass destruction.

I am well aware that some say there will no missile threat to the United States for the foreseeable future, even for 15 years. Such a statement simply is a false portrayal of public discussions on the subject by intelligence officials. In fact, the Director of Central Intelligence has stated publicly that a new North Korean long-range missile now in development--the Taepo Dong II-if deployed could have the potential to strike American territory, specifically Guam, Hawaii and Alaska. And last year Admiral William Studeman, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, stated in Congressional testimony that this North Korean missile could be operational within three to five years. Even public statements from the most recent intelligence estimates dispute the frequent assertion that the missile threat to the United States is fifteen years off.

Some recent comments by Chinese officials and North Korean commentators may add insight to this discussion. For example, earlier this year, according to senior members of the Clinton Administration, Chinese officials claimed that the U.S. would not intervene in China's dispute with Taiwan because American leaders "care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan"--and because China "would rain nuclear bombs on Los Angeles." Chinese officials also reportedly stated that, China would sacrifice "millions of men" and "entire cities" to unify China, while the U.S. would not make such sacrifices. Such threats, at a minimum, demonstrate China's willingness to use their nuclear threat to deter the United States from intervention in the event of a crisis over Taiwan. Are these threats serious? Just last week we learned that China has tried to buy the most deadly ICBM technology available from Russia. This, I believe, is a serious threat.

Similarly, last month Kim Myong Chol, a North Korean reported by the Washington Post to have close contacts with the government in Pyongyang, stated frankly that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has "ordered the development and deployment" of "strategic long-range ballistic missiles tipped with a super-powerful warhead." The purpose of this missile, according to Chol, is to provide North Korea with the capability to "destroy major metropolitan and population centers." Chol adds that, "In less than 10 years, North Korea will likely deploy an operational intercontinental ballistic missile force capable of hitting the American mainland." In commenting on the potential for nuclear war, Chol observes that North Korea would "fare much better than the Americans and the Japanese" because North Koreans "have long geared all their military, political, economic and social institutions for nuclear doomsday." Given the desperate conditions in North Korea, and the potential for surprising behavior by its self-isolated leadership, this kind of talk should be cause for concern.

Some say that this missile threat has been overblown by proponents of missile defense, and that "rogue" states never would "dare" to launch a WMD strike against the United States because of our threat of nuclear retaliation. This typical comment reflects a profound ignorance of deterrence. For deterrence to have a chance of working predictably requires that we have a relatively sophisticated understanding of the opponent. This is the conclusion of my own 20- year empirical study of deterrence, and the conclusion of every other empirical study of deterrence. Think tank commentators can claim with utter confidence that future regional challengers would never dare to attack us because of our nuclear threat; but they have no basis for making such claims. In truth they do not have a clue as to how the governments in North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran, or even China will react to the U.S. deterrent in the context of a severe crisis. To promise that the U.S. nuclear deterrent will work reliably against rogue states in the future is the height of hubris. This point is beyond dispute among those who actually have studied deterrence seriously. And, to put it starkly, even if the United States were to retaliate with nuclear weapons and annihilate a state having just struck us, that would not restore the many thousands of lives potentially lost if our nuclear deterrent does not work as hoped.

In addition, debating whether a challenger would actually "dare" to launch a missile attack against us misses a fundamental point. A primary reason that missiles and WMD pose a threat to our security is because of the capability for deterrence and coercion that missiles and WMD will provide rogues and terrorists. Actually launching a missile against us has little to do with strategies of deterrence and coercion; such strategies involve the threat of missiles and WMD, not actually using them. The mere possession of missiles and WMD by regional aggressors will compel American leaders to weigh the risks of U.S. power projection--with the consequent inhibitions on our options for acting abroad. If you do not understand this distinction between this value of missiles and WMD for deterrence, versus their actual launching, you can not understand one of the primary motives for proliferation and its implications for our own national security.

Three fundamental uncertainties hinder the ability to forecast confidently ballistic missile threats to the United States through the next 10and 20-year periods. First, intelligence indicators are often ambiguous. Therefore, forecasts are subject to inaccuracies. During our 40-year confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United States devoted considerable resources to understanding Soviet missile research, development, testing, and deployment. Even so, Soviet capabilities still surprised us on occasion.

For example, while Western sources reportedly estimated that the Soviet Union possessed 20 launchers for the SS-23 missiles, Soviet negotiators revealed during talks leading up to the INF Treaty that they in fact had some 100. And, of course, we should not forget that only weeks before the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb test in 1949 the CIA released its annual report on Soviet atomic energy stating that the most probable date for a Soviet test was mid-1953.[ 1 ]

The natural ambiguity of much intelligence data is magnified by the fact that the United States has focused on the Soviet Union and consequently lacks a comprehensive understanding of developing-country missile programs. For example, Iraq's December 1989 test of the Al-Abid space launch vehicle reportedly took the U.S. intelligence community by surprise, as apparently did the 1988 Chinese announcement of its sale of CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia. Also, despite numerous inspections of the Iraqi missile program by United Nations experts, questions about its scope and maturity persist. While it is relatively easy to define the generic requirements of a successful ballistic missile program, we must realize that our ability to predict the future course of such programs for other countries with which we have limited familiarity is likely to be modest.

Second, a number of events could alter the capabilities or intentions of some states to field long-range ballistic missiles even during this decade. Therefore, forecasts are subject to the vagary of rapid change. Trade in missile technologies is brisk and can quickly improve a nation's ballistic missile capabilities. The sale of liquid-fuel rocket motor technology by Moscow to India is a prominent example, but there have also been a host of less publicized transactions. In addition, the technical infrastructure of potential proliferants is maturing even as technology is becoming more accessible. In other cases, cooperation on peaceful space programs may facilitate capabilities that could be used in military systems--permitting countries to establish long-range missile capabilities more rapidly than otherwise could be expected.

Third, there is the possibility of dramatic and rapid change in U.S. political relations with states either possessing long-range missiles or capable of fielding such systems if they so choose. It is important to note that the character of U.S. relations with such countries may be subject to relatively rapid shifts during the 1990s or early in the next century. The potential for the rapid deterioration of political relations also entails the possible emergence of shorter-range missile threats from Latin American or Caribbean countries.

History demonstrates that rapid change in political relations does occur. The fall of the Shah of Iran--a fall that caught our intelligence community by surprise--moved that state very rapidly to hostile relations with the United States. The political changes in the Soviet Union--changes that were similarly surprising-quickly led to much more cordial relations with the United States. While such changes, occurring within the space of 5 to 7 years, is not the norm in international relations, it does take place--and often is associated with conflict. Historically, over a longer period of 10 to 20 years, this type of major reorientation of political relations is much more common. In a period of political uncertainty and instability, the prospect for political relations to deteriorate rapidly with states possessing long-range missiles, or capable of fielding such systems promptly, must be acknowledged.

In summary, plausible routes to missile proliferation and additional missile threats could shape the situation during and after this decade. Either independently or in combination, these could lead to the emergence of additional missile threats to the United States. In these circumstances, the conclusion that the probability is quite low for the emergence of new ballistic missile threats to the United States for at least 15 years can be sustained only if these plausible but unpredictable developments, such as the transfer and conversion of SLVs, are dismissed or considered of negligible consequence.

In conclusion, there is an obvious missile proliferation trend toward greater ranges and greater payloads. There simultaneously is a trend toward the proliferation of WMD. Added to this dangerous brew is the self-expressed desire on the part of some foreign leaders for the capability to deter and coerce the United States with missile and WMD threats. Almost three thousand years ago the great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said that the best method for a weak state to have its way against a strong state is for the weak to use deterrence and coercion against the strong to defeat its strategy. Missiles and WMD now threaten to provide otherwise second- and third-rate regional aggressors with the deterrence and coercive capability to defeat U.S. strategy. This is an unprecedented and dangerous situation and, unless countered, it will be a defining feature of the post-Cold War order. That is why I agree with President Clinton that the proliferation of WMD and means for their delivery constitute a national emergency.

The existing difficulties with North Korea and China, combined with the inherent uncertainty surrounding when and from where additional missile threats will arise, lead me to conclude that we should now take those steps necessary to establish the legal and programmatic basis for the deployment of a limited national missile defense. Long- range missile threats may mature over the next 5, 10, or 15 years, no one honestly knows precisely when with any confidence. Yet whether 5, 10 or 15 years in the future, because of the great political impediments to our deploying missile defense, unless we start down the deployment path now we will be lucky to have an NMD system available in any of those timeframes. There are, of course, complementary means to attack the missile proliferation threat which also should be pursued. They all, however, will be inadequate in the absence of NMD.

NOTES

1. See Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making Of The Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 363.