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Rep. Curt Weldon

Ballistic Missile Defense
30 May 1996 - House Government Reform and Oversight
Subcommittee on National Security

This morning it gives me great pleasure to testify before the Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on National Security on an issue of major national importance: ballistic missile defense. I thank my colleagues on the Committee for providing me with this opportunity to present the facts on missile defense -- facts that are not as well understood by the American people as they should be.

Unfortunately, there has been a great deal of misinformation put forward on the issue of national missile defense. As a result, many have expressed concerns about the Defend America Act, H.R. 3144. I would like to address a number of concerns that have been raised regarding the Defend America Act and sort out fact from fiction.

First and foremost, I would like to discuss the cost associated with deployment of a national missile defense -- because this remains the most important concern of many Americans and Members of Congress. And it is the one area where there has been the greatest distortion. Opponents insist that a national missile defense system would cost tens of billions of dollars, and now cite the CBO estimates up to $60 billion. They are insisting that a national missile defense would require layered defenses and space-based weapons, and as a result, assumed greatly inflated costs. The facts do not bear out their argument.

H.R. 3144 calls for a national missile defense by 2003 to defend only against a rogue missile attack or accidental launch. According to Pentagon officials, we can deploy such a national missile defense for between $2 and $7 billion, depending on the option the President chooses. The Air Force has stated for the record that it can provide an ABM-Treaty compliant national missile defense for $2 billion, and the Army can provide one for $5 billion within four years. These funds have already been included in the Republican budget resolution -- we are not asking for new money.

Earlier this year, the Research and Development Subcommittee which I chair had planned hearings on these Treaty-compliant options. Army and Air Force officials had prepared their briefings and were ready to testify. But mysteriously, just two days before that hearing, the Secretary of Defense put a gag on the witnesses. They were told to cancel, because this Administration did not want the record to show that the ABM Treaty and cost are no obstacle to a near-term deployment of a national missile defense. Had we heard from those witnesses, there would be less confusion and more momentum toward a national missile defense today.

Another issue continually raised by opponents of the Defend America Act is that it would require the U.S. to abrogate or withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Wrong. Under the current terms of the ABM Treaty, both the United States and Russia are allowed a single anti-ballistic missile site to defend their citizens from a ballistic missile attack. Russia has taken advantage of this provision and deployed a treaty compliant missile defense system around Moscow. As I just mentioned, there are at least two Treaty compliant option that the President could choose to deploy right now.

Yet another argument that opponents have unconvincingly used is that deployment of a national missile defense would be a major impediment to START II ratification- Having spoken with Russian officials and Russian citizens countless times, I can tell you this is a red herring. The Russians have made repeatedly clear that the real impediment to START II ratification is NATO expansion, not the deployment of a missile defense or ABM amendments. President Clinton continues to push for the expansion of NATO with little concern for START II. Ironically, President Clinton opposes a national missile defense, arguing that he fears it will undermine START II.

Given that this legislation would not cost taxpayers tens of billions of dollars, that it would not require the abrogation of the ABM

Treaty, and that deployment of a national missile defense is not a major impediment to Russia's ratification of START II, opponents have been forced to argue that there is no ballistic missile threat to the United States. Missile defense opponents cite the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate as proof that a threat to the U.S. does not exist. That claim is both misleading and dangerous. What the NIE does say is that there is no threat to the continental U.S. from a rogue nation, such as Iraq, independently developing and deploying a ballistic missile for ten to fifteen years.

Unfortunately, this Administration has chosen to ignore the ballistic missile threat to Alaska and Hawaii. If a rogue nation attempts to nuclear blackmail the United States by threatening to attack one or both of these states, would the President simply dismiss these states as a lost cause? I doubt it. Any consideration of the threat to the United States must take into account the entire fifty states, especially since previous CIA testimony confirms that long-range missiles -- the Taepo Dong 2 -now under development by North Korea may pose a threat to Alaska or Hawaii by the year 2000 or shortly thereafter.

The NIE also ignores the most realistic possibility that a rogue nation will purchase a ballistic missile or ballistic missile technology from a country that currently or will in the near future possesses the technology. North Korea, for example, has been more than willing in the past to export SCUD-type missiles for hard currency or oil. And as the country's economy continues its downward spiral, there is little reason to be hopeful that North Korea would not take advantage of any opportunity to sell its deadly new weapon.The situation in the former Soviet Union is also cause for grave concern. Reports indicate that Russian soldiers are underfed, underpaid, and highly demoralized. Soldiers have resorted to selling ammunition and weapons to obtain money for food and vodka. Recently, the power was cut off to a Russian military base, a base that happened to be the strategic command center for Russia's nuclear weapon arsenal.

Even more ominous are the proposals by some in Russia to sell mobile SS-25 ballistic missiles to foreign countries as space launch vehicles for satellites. These intercontinental-range missiles are capable of striking any city in the United States from within the United States. Should these rockets fall into the wrong hands, it would not require much effort to reverse the process by which they were transformed from long-range ballistic missiles into space launch vehicles, making a rogue nation capable of striking American cities. With Russian military corruption and disaffection on the increase, there is also reason to be concerned of the illicit sale or transfer of such weapons. And the CIA recently acknowledged to me in a briefing on the NIE that if an SS-25 is transferred out of Russia, we might not detect it. But once that occurs it would be too late to decide to deploy a national missile defense.

Even if you want to ignore these facts, it makes no sense to remain undefended until a threat emerges. It will take a few years to put a defense into place. It would be extremely unwise to wait for a threat to become clear to all before we commit ourselves to deploying a limited national missile defense. The earlier we deploy, the greater chance we have of deterring nations from attacking or developing new missiles. Until we make a decision to deploy, the Russians will not take our plans seriously or begin to discuss ABM changes with us.

As you may know, I have a longstanding involvement in U.S.Russian relations, and have worked actively over the years to promote more cooperative efforts between our nations. I started the U.S./Former Soviet Union Energy Caucus to encourage U.S. involvement in energy development in Russia. I convinced the Speaker to establish a Duma - Congress Study Group, and included funds in the defense authorization bill for an account to support U.S.-Russian technology developments.

My philosophy has never been to use Russia as a convenient political whipping boy and I have rejected efforts which would seriously jeopardize our relations with that nation. I was not an original cosponsor of H.R. 3144, specifically because I wanted time to review the bill and ensure that it would not mandate any actions that would adversely impact U.S.-Russian relations.

After considering H.R. 3411 thoroughly, I am convinced that it is the right approach. This bill will ensure that we begin working constructively with the Russians to convince them that it is in the interests of both our nations to be defended against missile threats. We should not put that necessary step off any longer, as the Administration would have us do.