Dr. Stephen A. Cambone,
Senior Fellow, Political-Military Studies Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC

Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty
21 March 1996 - House National Security Committee
Subcommittees on Military Research and Development and Military Procurement

I. Impact of ABMT

Introduction

The impact of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) on the nation's ballistic missile defense (BMD) efforts has been a matter of considerable debate since the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) by President Reagan on March 23, 1983.

To understand the ABMT's impact, it is necessary to separate two activities: research and development. on the one hand, and the testing and deployment on the other, of ground-based radars, launchers or interceptors capable of intercepting a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory. The ABMT does not prohibit the former. That is, it does not prohibit R&D of ground-based ABM systems or components.(1) Nor does it prohibit R&D on theater ballistic missile defense (TMD) systems. Nor does the ABMT, strictly speaking, prohibit the testing and deployment of ground-based ABM systems. As signed in 1972 it permitted the establishment of two operational ABM sites, each with 100 deployed interceptors, and storage and test facilities and sites. An amendment in 1974 permits the sides to deploy 100 interceptors at one operational site. The Russians have a deployed ABM system around Moscow; the has no deployed ABM system. Implicit in the right to deploy is the fight to test ABMT-limited items.

The drafters of the treaty were cognizant of the fact that non-ABM radars, launchers and interceptors could be given ABM potential. The American side worried especially about the Soviet SA-2 which it believed, if armed with a nuclear warhead, could have ABM potential. So, in Article VI (a) of the ABMT, the sides agreed to that they would not give to non-ABM systems ABM capabilities and that they would not test non ABM systems in an ABM mode.

By the terms of the treaty, monitoring and verifying compliance with its terms is to be based on "national technical means" (NTM) -that is, sensors of various kinds deployed on the earth's surface, or that operate in the air or in space that "see" or "hear" an actual event. In fact, the sides agreed not to interfere with the other's NTM of verification. The practical implication of this fact is that it is only through the use of data collected from an actual test by means of its own NTM that one side can demonstrate that the other had violated a particular provision of the treaty.

As this bare bones sketch of the ABMT would suggest, the closer the US moves toward deployment of BMD-- either TMD or NMD systems-- the more the ABMT has affected US BMD programs. Thus, while it has been difficult in the past to convincingly document the impact of the ABMT on BMD R&D, that is not the case with respect to the anticipated deployment of either NMD or TMD.

In the case of NMD, concerns in the US that only an ABMT-compliant defense has a chance of being deployed has given rise to the inclination to propose near-heroic technical performance to a system so that it could defend the entire the US, including Alaska and Hawaii, from the single site permitted by the ABMT. On the doubtful proposition that such a system would be found to be technically credible on examination, I would suppose that we then begin to hear arguments that even if such a heroic system were possible, it would not be compliant because it provides for the defense of the territory defense of the US, and/or because it relied on systems whose physical properties were different than those predicated by the Treaty, and/or because it relies on components not based on the territory of the US. But this is a subject for another day.

This testimony will concentrate on the impact of the ABMT on TMD. The current disagreement between the Administration and Congress on the demarcation of ABM and TMD systems is ample evidence that the ABMT is having an impact on TMD.

ABMT Impact on Theater Missile Defense

The ABMT is having an impact on US TMD programs. The evidence of this is clear in two cases. The capabilities of the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the Navy's Theater-Wide Defense (NTWD)(formerly known as the Navy Upper Tier System) system are being restricted by the Clinton Administration in the belief that Article VI (a) requires it. In each case the Administration believes the inherent-capabilities of the systems, if fully developed, would place them-in a gray area between ABM and non-ABM systems.

Restrictions on THAAD:

Although the Administration has certified the testing of THAAD through the demonstration and validation phase of development, it cannot tell you today if that system will be certified for deployment. To the extent they hold out hope that it will be certified (absent an agreement with Russia) it is with the proviso that THAAD not be equipped with the capability to receive cueing data on its target from any source other than its own radar, eg, satellites deployed in space for this purpose. In fact, in a September 27, 1995 letter to Rep. Curt Weldon the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Paul Kaminski, has informed the Congress that the. Administration is spending $2.8M to defer incorporating this capability into THAAD.

If THAAD is certified for deployment on condition that it not be able to receive sensor data from, for example, space-based sensors this will be but the most blatant case of the ABMT causing the "dumbing down" of TMD. If THAAD were permitted to receive data from such sources, the potential area it could defend against attack from a ballistic missile fired from 1,000 km away could-- depending on the quality and timeliness of data provided-- nearly double in size. The ABMT is being applied to THAAD in such a way that its capability is being artificially cut in half against the type of ballistic missile US forces and allies are likely to encounter in the future.

Restrictions on NTWD:

The NTWD is also being deliberately restricted. This system, due to its interceptor velocity and the potential of its kill vehicle, could engage theater ballistic missiles (TBM) or their warheads in their mid-course flight; that is, after the missile has burned out or a warhead has separated from the missile. To do this, the interceptor must rely on data about the target's flight to be provided to it from sensors, eg., SMTS, other than the SPY radars aboard the AEGIS cruiser or destroyer from which the interceptor was launched.

Early concepts for NTWD called for the development of this capability. Yet the concept of operations brought forward by the Navy for certification restricts the NTWD to making intercepts only while the target is within range of the SPY radar. This practically restricts the potential for intercept to what might be called the ascent phase of a TBM flight. That is, the AEGIS ship must be close enough to a launch point of a TBM that its radar can track the flight and guide the interceptor before the TBM either attains a velocity the interceptor cannot overcome or it flies out of the radar's range or area of coverage.

Thus, it is true that if an NTWD ship is stationed so that a TBM launched relatively near the coast, or at an angle that the ship's radar can compute, the NTWD will provide coverage to an area equal to that which could be attacked by the TBM. But if the ship is located closer to the target than to the launch point requiring it make a mid- course intercept, both the area it can protect and the probability of intercepting the TBM or warhead will be severely restricted.

We cannot know if an NTWD concept that included mid-course intercepts would have been certified. Such certification was not sought by the Navy. It is a matter of speculation why such certification was not sought. But one need only consider the plight of THAAD to appreciate that it would have been an extraordinary event had the Navy brought its mid-course concept- which like THAAD depends on data from sensors other than its own radars to fully exploit its capability-- forward for review.

II. Negotiations to Obtain ABMT Relief for TMD Systems

The history of the Clinton Administration's efforts to negotiate a demarcation between ABM systems and TMD systems is too long, and too complicated, to retell here. Instead, I would like to call the committee's attention to the broader question of whether such negotiations are needed at all and what I believe are the critical questions raised by the agreement the Administration is reported to be seeking.

Need for Negotiation On TMD ?

Whether negotiations to permit the full development of TMD capabilities are required turns on the answer given to a preliminary question: are US obligations under the ABMT as a whole and under Article VI (a) in particular sufficiently clear such that the secretary of Defense (who is charged by the President with the responsibility) can certify in good faith that the TMD systems currently in development by the US can be tested or deployed in compliance with those obligations?

President Bush's secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, came to the conclusion that US obligations were sufficiently well understood that he could recommend that the US was within its fights to develop and apply unilaterally a compliance standard for assessing TMD systems that would have permitted the systems currently in dispute-- especially THAAD and NTWD- to be deployed consistent with its obligations. Secretary Cheney recognized that US obligations under the ABMT did not give it the freedom to do whatever it wished to do with TMD. The "demonstrated standard" he recommended would have permitted testing against targets below a specific velocity. TMD testing against targets with velocities faster than he recommended, ie, those that in his review he was able to clearly identify as "strategic ballistic missiles" based on the available evidence, would require a negotiated change to the ABMT.

The Congress provided its version of the Cheney position, which has come to be known as the "demonstrated standard" in the FY 1994 Authorization Act.(2) In a set of findings, Congress took the position that:... the ABMT was not intended to, and does not apply... [to systems, etc.] that are designed to counter modern theater ballistic missiles, regardless of the capability of those systems...unless [they] are tested against or have demonstrated capabilities to counter modern strategic ballistic missiles.

The findings put forward by the Congress are consistent with US obligations under the ABMT and in particular with those found in Article VI (a)(2).

As noted in the introduction, the ABMT limits ABM systems only. Article VI (a) in its prohibition on giving non-ABM systems ABM potential reinforces this point. Hence, both Secretary Cheney and the Congress have taken as the point of departure for their consideration how to define what, for the purposes of the ABMT, constituted an ABM system. Neither Cheney nor the Congress attempted to define the class of non ABM systems that could not be given ABM capabilities and could not be tested in an ABM mode. The US has no obligation to do so under the ABMT.

Now, it is the case that within the ABMT no definition exists of the terms "to give," or of"capabilities to counter." There is agreement between the sides on what constitutes a test in the ABM mode. But there is no definition of what constitutes a "strategic ballistic missile" against which a test of a non-ABM system would be prohibited.

The findings of the Congress (which are public; those of Secretary Cheney are not) lend definition to these terms. For Congress provides the key to defining a modern strategic ballistic missile in its 1994 finding on the characteristics of the theater ballistic missiles against which TMD must be designed to be effective:

... some theater ballistic missiles presently being deployed or developed (such as the Chinese-made CSS-2) have capabilities equal to or greater than the capabilities of missiles that were determined to be strategic missiles more than 20 years ago under the SALT I Interim Agreement of 1972.

With this finding, Congress reminds us that the definition of a strategic ballistic missile for the purposes of SALT I included missile systems with ranges equivalent to the CSS-2, with a velocity calculated at about 4.7 km/sec, and range of roughly 3,500 km. That missile was the SS-N-6. The association of the SS-N-6 with SALT I is critical, for SALT I was negotiated in parallel with the ABMT and its annexes contain the contemporary understanding of the basis on which a strategic ballistic missile could be defined. - In reflecting on the fact that contemporary theater ballistic missiles equal or exceed the range of the SS-N-6, and on its finding that the US cannot test a TMD against "modern strategic ballistic missiles" the Congress left implicit its conclusion: that so long as the US did not test a TMD component or system against a missile with a range/velocity in excess of an SS-N-6, it was not a test against a strategic ballistic missile was not inconsistent with the obligations of the parties to the ABMT.

The definition of a test against a strategic ballistic missile, however, does not directly satisfy the issue of how to assess the capability of the system. The Congress said that a "capability to counter" a strategic ballistic missile could be said to have been "given" only if the TMD system were actually tested against a strategic ballistic missile.. In this they were taking a position at odds with the manner in which compliance was being assessed by the Compliance Review Group (CRG), the organization established by the secretary of Defense to advise him in the performance of his obligation to certify the compliance of US BMD testing and deployment.

The CRG has been basing its assessments of capability on what is called "inherent capability." That is, was there a reasonable chance that the inherent capabilities of a system under review could allow the user to intercept a ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory? Because these assessments were taking place in advance of an actual test, the only data on which the CRG has had to base its conclusions has been computer based calculations and simulations. If there is one thing we have come to learn in this information age, it is that while the models and simulations we use may be of very high quality, in the end the results depend on the questions being asked. It is apparent that in the case of THAAD the question was asked in a way that the answer came out-- noncompliant,

Does Congress' position in the FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act that only an actual test against target flying faster than a modern theater ballistic missile (eg, the CSS-2) ask the question in a way that is in keeping with US obligations?

• First, the ABMT provides no definition of how to assess capability. The inherent capabilities standard was chosen, unilaterally, by the CRG. It was not negotiated with the USSR or Russia. It seemed to the US at the time it was adopted to be an appropriate approach. The US is fully within its fights to alter its approach. And it need not negotiate any change in approach with Russia.
• Second, it not at variance with the so-called Foster Box. This refers to testimony on the ABMT offered by Dr. Johnny Foster to the effect that in his personal opinion a system ought to be subject to a compliance review if it was to be tested against a target flying faster than 2 km/see or above 40 km in altitude. The Foster Box was not negotiated with the Russians and was intended for internal US use. But to identify a threshold for review of a test does not establish a standard for compliance nor does it define US obligations. For example, the US has certified as compliant systems tested well outside the Foster Box.
• Third, it is consistent with the monitoring and verification provisions of the ABMT. Computer projections of a sides' system can be used to bring a charge of violation, but NTM alone is the basis for verifying compliance with the treaty. This fairly establishes the basis for the case that a demonstrated standard is consistent with US obligations.

In fact, Gerard Smith testified during ABMT ratification that "we tailored the limitations [ABMT obligations] to fit the capabilities of national technical means of verification., The support of NTM for the "demonstrated standard" is confirmed by Dr. Sydney Graybeat, a member of the original negotiating team and the first SCC Commissioner?

The Clinton Administration's Choice

Secretary Cheney's recommendation was contained in a letter he sent to the Secretary of State at the end of the Bush Administration. It was consistent with the position taken by the USG on the matter of demarcation in the context of the Ross Mamedov talks and a version of it was included in a package tabled at the SCC that would have renegotiated the ABMT to permit a multisite NMD deployment. The Bush Administration was the first to advance the idea of a demonstrated standard.

It was Secretary Cheney's hope that his recommendation would become the basis for Clinton Administration policy. The position of the then- Democratic Congress' on the matter certainly lent weight to the proposition that should the new Clinton Administration be of a mind to do so, the legislative and executive branches could reach agreement that US obligations under Article VI (a) were sufficiently clear and that the unilateral adoption of the "demonstrated standard" in tests against missiles whose velocities did not exceed that of the SS-N-6 was consistent with those obligations. Such an agreement would have permitted the testing and deployment of TMD systems currently in development.

The Clinton Administration rejected this approach. Rather than viewing the issue as one of setting compliance standards in light of known obligations under the ABMT, the Administration instead concluded that the actual obligations of the treaty partners needed to be redefined. Hence, in November of 1993 the Administration announced it would seek an agreed statement in the SCC which would bring "to an end years of confusion and dispute as to what distinguishes an ABM system from a TMD system." This agreed statement, the administration said, would codify the demonstrated standard as put forward in the FY 1994 Defense Authorization Act.

As noted earlier, I will not review the history of the negotiations as they have been reported. The point to be made here is that the Administration chose a course of action-to negotiate new obligations under the Treaty- which it need not have chosen on the evidence presented to it by Secretary Cheney and the Congress. Moreover, far from leading to an end to years of confusion, it has only contributed an additional two and a half years of bitter debate on TMD demarcation that has brought us no closer to an end to confusion as to the distinction between ABM and TMD systems in the US. It is as likely to be a source of increasing bitterness and confusion between the US and Russia as well.

Implications of Negotiations

The reason we are not likely to see an end to confusion about TMD even if Administration should reach an agreement with the Russians on the issue is the substance of the agreement as it has been reported in the open press.

The Administration has argued that the agreed statement presently under discussion will permit the deployment of any TMD system with an interceptor velocity less than 3 km/sec that is not tested against a target traveling faster than 5 km/sec or over a range in excess of 3,500 km.(4) The Administration argues that this agreed statement codifies the "demonstrated standard" for any TMD system whose interceptor has a speed less than 3 km/see. This would imply that off- board sensor data could be used by THAAD, although there is no public, official confirmation of this point.

For systems with interceptors faster than 3 km/sec, the Administration argues it has Russian agreement that the national compliance standards and practices of the sides' will continue to be paramount, although this is not evident from the purported language of the agreement that has been published. That is, the Administration argues that the agreed statement does not affect TMD systems with faster interceptor velocities. According to reports, both State Department and White House officials argue that, pending a future agreement, each side will be able to use its own standards to determine whether systems with velocities faster than 3 km/sec are compliant with the ABMT.

Three sets of questions come immediately to mind if this report is true. The first set address the meaning and implication of the agreed statement itself.

• If US compliance standards as currently practiced can be used for TMD systems with interceptors faster than 3 km/sec., why can't they be used for systems whose interceptors are slower?
• Why is an agreement needed now on 3 km/sec. systems and not on faster systems, especially since the US has certified already the NTWD which has an interceptor faster than 3 km/sec? While it is true that the compliance certification for the NTWD is not as well drawn as might be in the view of some, is it not the case that the US has already certified the system as compliant?
• Why would we want to seek an agreement in the future with Russia that could undo NTWD certification? If we would not, then why should the US engage in negotiations on this issue at all?
• Does agreement not to test non-ABM systems against targets faster than 5 km/sec or with a range in excess of 3,500 km constitute a definition of a strategic ballistic missile?
• Does the adoption of the demonstrated standard for systems whose interceptor velocities are at or below 3 km/sec mean that those systems can make use of any data from any sensor for any purpose?
• Have the Russians explicitly agreed to the propositions on systems like NTWD and sensors like SMTS? In this regard, what is to be made of reports of Russian opposition to US assumptions on the status of the NTWD?

The second set of questions goes to the heart of the objective of the Administration in negotiating this agreed statement, ie, to redefine the obligations of the parties.

• Does this agreement establish new obligations of the US under the ABMT and are they different than those we recognized in the past?
• If this agreement imposes new obligations, even if the sides are free to set compliance standards for systems with interceptors faster than 3 km/sec, isn't it the case that these standards must be based on this new obligation? If not, why not?
• If standards in the future need to be based on this new obligation, how can systems faster than 3 km/sec be certified?
• If compliance standards do not need to be based on this new obligation, or if in fact no new obligations have been undertaken, on what obligation are they to be based?(6) If they are based on past understanding, do the speed and range definitions for a TMD target contained in the agreement-- ie, 5 km/sec and 3,500 km -- apply in assessing TMD systems with interceptors faster than 3 km/sec.? Can these faster systems use any data from any sensor for any purpose? What about the demonstration of capability; does it apply to faster as well as slower systems?
• If compliance standards are based on our understanding of obligations prior to the beginning of these discussions, then why can't we adopt the demonstrated standard and target definition on a unilateral basis?
• Has the US given any assurances that it would not seek to certify a system with interceptors faster than 3 km/sec until a new agreement is struck in the follow-on negotiations?

The third set of questions derive from reports that the agreement will contain annexes and other confidence building measures (CBMs):(7)

• What are these measures? Why are they needed? How are they to be treated by the sides unilaterally and in the SCC; that is, are they an integral part of the basic agreement or are they free-standing measures? Can a side modify the CBMs without modifying the agreement itself or, if a side does not honor one, some or all of the CBMs, can it be charged by the other with a breach of obligations under the ABMT?
• Do these CBMs create new obligations for both sides in the area of monitoring and verification? Among the measures reported to be under consideration are on-site visits, limits on deployment areas, etc.
• Do these expand our current obligations on monitoring and verifying the ABMT?
• Do the Russians agree that the CBMs apply to the systems of both sides?

III. Alternative Approach

The FY 1996 Defense Authorization Act requires that the Administration bring any agreement it reaches with Russia on TMD to the Congress for approval(8). flit should bring an agreement of the kind being reported, then I would urge the Congress to pose the questions raised above. I would also urge that it raise questions about a complementary agreement to multilateralize the ABMT. The act of multilateralizing the ABMT will effectively tie the hands of future presidents. Agreements- on faster TMD interceptor velocities as well as NMD deployments- will be subject to the acceptance of the additional signatories, signatories who have no equities in the ABMT itself. This is particularly telling in the case of NMD, which likely would require amending the ABMT. In essence, the defense of the US would be subject to the approval not only of the Russian Duma, but the legislatures of states like Belarus, Ukraine and Khazakistan.

If an agreement is reached to multilateralize the treaty, the Administration will undoubtedly argue, citing the INF Treaty as a precedent, that such a change does not constitute a substantive change to the Treaty and does not require that an amendment to the Treaty be voted upon by the Senate. As a matter of good government the Congress should not permit its prerogatives to be ignored on matters of treaties. In fact, it should seek from the Administration a written justification for treating the ABMT as if it were still in force given the dissolution of the USSR.

With respect to the proposed agreed statement and CBMs, a more likely course is that the Administration will choose to submit it as. a bill, subject to passage by a simple majority of both houses of Congress. I would urge the House to reject any measure that did not meet the standard set forth in Sec 235 of the FY 1996 National Defense Authorization Act. As I have suggested. Secretary Cheney, and a Congress with Democratic majorities, have endorsed an approach to TMD demarcation that permits the US to comply with its obligations under the ABMT, to deploy the TMD programs currently in development, and to do so without having to seek Russian approval. In rejecting a measure that falls short of the provisions of See. 235 of the FY 1996 Act the Congress will not leave the US TMD program, or the executive branch, without a basis for the deployment of advanced TMD systems. Neither America's armed forces nor its allies need be put at risk by the rejection of such a measure.

But this is only true, of course. if this Administration or any subsequent administration is prepared to pursue the alternative approach recommended by Secretary Cheney and put forward by the Congress. If a measure is submitted to the Congress by the Administration which falls short of Sec 235's provisions, the Congress might consider the following as part its consideration of the bill:

• first, require that senior Administration officials make available to the Congress the records that support the decision to seek an agreed statement and the CBMs with respect to TMD demarcation so that the Congress understands why the alternative of a unilateral compliance standard that it has endorsed was not chosen and what the Administration believes to be the deficiency in its understanding of US obligations under Article VI (a).
• second, demand written confirmation that the Russians have accepted the interpretations of the Administration with respect to the issues not explicitly covered by the agreed statement: eg, that national compliance standards and practices govern compliance assessments for systems with interceptor velocities faster than 3 km/sec; that "off- board" sensors like SMTS can be used for TMD; that CBMs apply to the systems of both sides.
• third, conduct a review of the compliance review process with an eye to developing ways that its findings might be made more transparent to the Congress; this is especially important because it is often the case that how the Compliance Review Group in DOD arrives at a compliance decision-- to include approaches rejected and the rationale used in coming to a decision- is as important as the decision itself. The process has a way of setting its own precedents which in turn can affect a future compliance determination.
• fourth, if it appears the measure containing a demarcation agreement either should or is likely to pass, consider establishing with it, as a condition of passage, the compliance standards consistent with Sec 235 be followed in assessing TMD compliance in the future. It would be especially important to enact such a provision if the status of systems with interceptors faster than 3 km/sec remain unclear and the administration argues that for such systems the "traditional" view of the treaty still obtains.

V. Conclusion

This testimony began with the observation that in principle the ABMT did not prohibit the deployment of NMD and that it did not apply at all to TMD systems.

The discussion has highlighted the fact that the ABMT is presently having a negative impact on the testing and deployment of two critical US TMD systems, THAAD and NTWD. It is my opinion that this impact is unnecessary and unwarranted.The US has the legal right to establish on a unilateral basis the standards it will use in judging the compliance of these TMD systems with Article VI (a) of the ABMT. These standards have been elaborated by Secretary Cheney and by the Congress. If these standards were adopted, the Administration would not need to be engaged in the current round of negotiations on TMD with Russia.

Should the US adopt this course, it needs to be understood that a change in US compliance standards does not imply any change in an understanding of obligations under the ABMT. As noted above, neither Secretary Cheney nor the Congress believed the US could avoid or re- interpret its obligations in Article VI (a).

As troublesome as the Administration' s evident intention to negotiate ah' unnecessary agreement are the reported terms of that agreement. It does not appear to protect, as the Administration claims it will, all US TMD programs currently in development. It appears to create new obligations with respect to TMD. The CBMs may create new obligations with respect to monitoring and verification under the ABMT. In concert with the agreed statement on demarcation, the Administration is also prepared to accept a multilateralization of the ABMT, a decision which would make it much more difficult to negotiate changes in the ABMT to repair shortcomings in the proposed agreed statement or to permit an NMD deployment to defend the US.

While I have suggested that the adoption of the demonstrated standard by the US would avoid the worst of these consequences, it nevertheless remains the fact that even such a decision will not overcome the impediments-to both TMD and NMD deployments posed by the ABMT. It is true, as I have said, that the ABMT does not affect TMD nor prohibit NMD of the type proposed in the version of FY 1996 National Defense Authorization Act vetoed by the President. But the fact is that, as Secretary Cheney observed. the demonstrated standard has its limitations. The threats against which TMD are meant to defend will inevitably require more capable TMD interceptors. In the not too distant future it is all too likely that those required capabilities will be in excess of what can be certified as compliant with the ABMT using the demonstrated standard.

Moreover, it remains the case that an effective NMD deployment, which on the evidence presented to Congress by former CIA Director James Woolsey two weeks ago, is ever more urgently needed. An effective NMD will inevitably exceed what is permitted for deployment under the ABMT.

Thus, in conclusion, the adoption of the demonstrated standard is but a temporary measure. It will provide the nation with the capability it needs today to defend against current and near-term TBM threats. But in the end, it cannot provide for capabilities against longer term TBM threats. And it certainly does not overcome the crippling limitations the ABMT sets on NMD deployments. In the end the ABMT, as signed in 1972 and amended in 1974, no longer serves the nation's interest.

NOTES

1 The pursuit of R&D is, however. subject to the terms of the ABMT, according to a statement made by Gerard Smith during the ABMT ratification process. when the R&D leaves the laboratory and goes to the field; i,e., when it becomes subject to the national technical means of verification of a side.

2 This language has been carried forward and can be found as well in Sec 235(a)(i)(A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996.

3 See Dr. Graybeal's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 5, 1995.

4 This conclusion and the following discussion is drawn from the report of the text of the agreed statement being negotiated with Russia by the US as it appears in "Russian Threat Cuts U.S. Defenses," The Washington Times. February 26. 1996.

5 See, "Moscow Won't Buy US Missile Stance," The Washington Times, March 14 1996. p. 7.

6 In ibid, John Holum, ACDA Director in response to the reported position of the Russians that they do not accept the US view that pending an agreement on faster systems, the sides have a unilateral right to set compliance standards is quoted as saying: "We're not prepared to accept the idea that the traditional approach to the treaty ruled out as a result of the agreement on slower systems." If this is the case, one is bound to ask, why not just use the traditional approach for all systems? What is there about systems with interceptor velocity of 3 kin/sec or less that demands an agreement?

7 See, "Deal with Russia Could Hamper Missile Defenses," The Washington Times, p. l4., December 4, 1995. as well as the citation in footnote 4.

8 The exception would be if the Administration gained Russian agreement to the provisions set out in Sec 235(b)( i ) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996.