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Rep. Curt Weldon,
Chair, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development

Ballistic Missile Defense
7 March 1996 - House National Security Committee
Military Procurement Subcommittee and the Military Research and Development Subcommittee

The Research and Development and Military Procurement Subcommittees jointly meet today to receive testimony from Department of Defense witnesses on the Administration's FY 97 budget request for ballistic missile defense (BMD).

Before proceeding further, I'd like to take this opportunity to commend Lieutenant General Malcolm O'Neill, the Director of BMDO, for his service to the Nation. As many of you know, General O'Neill is planning to retire in the coming months. General, you have been very helpful to us in our efforts to accelerate and strengthen the Nation's BMD programs. I'm sure I speak for all my colleagues when I say, "Best of luck; job well done; and thank you for your leadership and dedication."

Frankly, I am deeply surprised and chagrined by the actions undertaken by this Administration to try to undermine those of both parties in the Congress and those in the Administration who believe that the American people need and deserve a modest, but effective National Missile Defense. DoD witnesses and officials have been muzzled and prevented from testifying on false pretenses; the release of information on the ballistic missile threat has been timed to maximize its impact on the political process in the Congress -- and in the process support a pre-conceived policy line emanating from the White House; and certain White House staff have wildly inflated the anticipated cost of even modest NMD options.

Clearly, the American people deserve better.

They deserve the facts regarding NMD options. They deserve to know that BMDO, the Army, and the Air Force agree that a single-site, ABM Treaty-compliant NMD system can be deployed within 3-5 years for a cost of approximately $5 billion. Why, then, does the Administration continue to claim that such a system would cost $30 billion or more?They deserve to know that such a system could be effective in defeating an attack of a small number of warheads -- those delivered by a rogue nation or by China or by an accidental or unauthorized launch by Russia. The Administration claims these scenarios are far- fetched. But I ask my colleagues, is it not true that North Korea is developing the Taepo Dong II missile which may be capable of reaching targets in the United States? Are we just supposed to write-off the citizens of Alaska and Hawaii? Do they not merit protection?

Is it not true that China has threatened to attack Los Angeles' if the U.S. intervenes in the mainland's attempt to intimidate and subjugate the people of Taiwan? Does not China have the wherewithal to deliver on that threat?

Is it not true that the Russian nuclear command and control system is under-going tremendous strains -- strains for which it was never designed to withstand? Is there not rampant crime and corruption in the Russian military, and increasing instances of disloyalty on ther part of Russian officers?

These are serious issues, but unfortunately the Administration has chosen to assume the ostrich's position -- head in the sand.

Turning to the substance of today's hearing, the recently-completed DoD Review of Missile Defense resulted in a reduction in the BMDO budget over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) of approximately $2 billion. Much of that cut came from the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program -- which up until the Review DoD had asserted was the "centerpiece" of its TMD strategy. According to press reports, the DoD now plans to budget approximately $13.5 billion for BMD over the Future Years Defense Plan (FY 97 through FY 2001 ), down from the $16.6 billion figure that the Clinton Administration just last year had planned to spend over the same five years and significantly less than the amount budgeted for BMD by the Bottom Up Review. The FY 97 budget request is $2,799 billion,as General O'Neill will describe in a moment.

The Review reaffirmed the Administration's previous policy position that deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system is unwarranted; thus, no funds to actually produce or deploy such a system are included in the FY 97 request or over the FYDP. This should surprise no one given the political capital expended by the President and his lieutenants in opposing legislation to deploy an effective NMD system by a date certain.

The Review did recommend increasing the FY 97 budget request for NMD from $400 million to $508 million. However, this figure is significantly lower than the amount approved by Congress in FY 96 for NMD ($746 million), and the amount budgeted for NMD dips to $400 million in FY 99 and subsequent fiscal years under the Administration's plan. DoD's NMD program has been renamed "deployment readiness" instead of last year's "technology readiness", although whether there is a difference in technical content of the program remains to be seen.

Regarding TMD programs, the Review resulted in major changes to the DoD's TMD plans and programs. For example, DoD has retained three TMD systems in its "core" program: Patriot (PAC-3), Navy Lower Tier, and THAAD. However, under DoD's plan, the schedule for deploying each of these systems has been slipped, in some instances dramatically. Furthermore, the Navy Upper Tier system, which has strong, bipartisan support in the Congress, is not included in the DoD's "core" program and there is no commitment by DoD to actually deploy this system. Finally, the THAAD schedule has been delayed by four years or more in order to foster a competitive "fly-off' between THAAD and Navy Upper Tier Luck).

The DoD's plan is inconsistent in many respects with the TMD program direction and deployment dates required by law in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106). First, Navy Upper Tier is not included in the "core" TMD program and is not scheduled for deployment under the DoD plan, whereas Congress directed that it be so included. And second, the DoD plan would slip the dates for deploying these systems, in at least one case by four years or more.

Allow me to mention just a few of the specific TMD programmatic adjustments made as a result of the Missile Defense Review.With respect to THAAD, the Congress directed deployment of a "deployable prototype" in FY 98; DoD's plans conform to this guidance. However, Congress directed deployment of the "objective" THAAD system in FY 2000, but the DoD's plans call for delaying deployment until 2006, if ever. In fact, the latest DoD plan adopts a recommendation of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) that a "fly off' competition between THAAD and Navy Upper Tier be held in approximately 2004, with only the "winner" being deployed. The Review thus recommended a $2 billion reduction in THAAD over ther FYDP.

Navy Upper Tier. The DoD's plan does not include funds to actually procure and deploy the Navy Upper Tier system, although Public Law 104-106 calls for deployment of a "deployable prototype" capability in FY 99 and an initial operational capability (IOC) in FY 2001. The budget request for Navy Upper Tier in FY 97 is $58 million, an increase of $30 million over DoD's request last year, but almost $150 million below the amount approved by Congress in FY 96. As noted above, under DoD's plan, THAAD and Navy Upper Tier would undergo a competitive "fly-off" after the turn of the century and only one system would be procured for deployment after such a competition.

Navy Lower Tier. The DoD's plan calls for deployment of a "deployable prototype" in FY 2000 (versus FY 97 in Public Law 104-106) with an initial operational capability (IOC) in FY 2002 (versus FY 99). The DoD Review resulted in a $110 million increase in funding over the FYDP for Navy Lower Tier (from $1.4 billion to $1.5 billion). and

Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3). The schedule for deployment of PAC-3 has slipped by one year (from FY 98 to FY 99) as a result of the Review (Congress directed deployment in FY 98).

I was initially encouraged when I learned late last year that the Department was undertaking a review of missile defense -- this provided an opportunity for the Administration to reflect upon the growing missile threat and take steps to accelerate the most promising systems. Instead, they have gutted one program (THAAD) that just a few months ago was considered the "centerpiece" of the Department's TMD strategy; they have refused once again to endorse deployment of even a modest NMD system; and they have slipped the schedules for even those systems that they now claim are their highest priority (the PAC-3 and Navy Lower Tier point defense systems).

Before introducing our witnesses this morning, I would like to yield to the distinguished chairman of the Military Procurement Subcommittee, Ducan Hunter, for any opening remarks he'd like to make at this time. Following Mr. Hunter's remarks, I'd like to yield time to the distinguished ranking minority members of the Procurement and R&D Subcommittees for any comments they'd like to make. Mr. Hunter?