Dr. Keith B. Payne
President, National Institute for Public Policy Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University National Security Studies Graduate Program

The Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S. and its Allies
28 February 1996 - House National Security Committee

THE LONG-RANGE MISSILE THREAT
TO THE UNITED STATES:
TIMING AND IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

In 1944 and 1945 German V-1 and V-2 missiles launched against Britain caused 67,111 casualties, damaged or destroyed almost 2 million homes, significantly reduced British morale and defense production, and led to the loss of 450 aircraft and 2,900 pilots and aircrew in allied air operations against German missile facilities. This destruction and loss was inflicted by primitive and conventionally-armed German missiles.

Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower acknowledged the problem posed by these unsophisticated German missiles:

"It seemed likely that, if the German had succeeded in perfecting and using these new weapons six months earlier than he did, our invasion of Europe would have proved exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible. I feel sure that if he had succeeded in using these weapons over a six month period, and particularly if he had made the Portsmith-Southampton area one of his principal targets, Overlord [D-Day] might have been written off."

A missile threat will exist within the foreseeable future in every region that American expeditionary forces might realistically be needed, and that threat will be magnified by the likely presence of nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads--weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In the emerging strategic environment, the combination of missiles and WMD will enable regional foes of the United States to threaten the annihilation of American military or civilian targets. Indeed, one of the primary self-declared motives for some proliferant states to acquire missiles and WMD is to wield this threat of annihilation for the purposes of deterrence and coercion--particularly including deterrence and coercion of the United States.

Some military and political leaders have discussed openly the value of long-range missiles and WMD for deterring or coercing the United States. For example, Former Indian Army Chief of Staff, General K. Sundarji reportedly endorsed missiles and WMD for the purpose of establishing a "minimum deterrent" against the United States. He observed that India requires such a nuclear deterrent:

"to dissuade big powers from lightly pursuing policies of compellance vis-a-vis India. The Gulf War emphasized once again that nuclear weapons are the ultimate coin of power. In the final analysis, they [Coalition members] could go in because the United States had nuclear weapons and Iraq didn't."

Most recently, China threatened to use missiles to coerce Taiwan and to deter the United States. According to public reports, the Chinese People's Liberation Army completed plans to launch a missile per day against Taiwan for one month to coerce Taiwan away from its recent drive for "independent international status." Ominously, Chinese officials claimed that the U.S. would not intervene in the matter because American leaders "care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan" - clearly indicating their intention to use their nuclear missile threat to deter the United States from intervention in the event of a crisis over Taiwan. In very recent discussions I have had with Chinese representatives, I had the opportunity to ask about these reported threats, and they were not denied.

It should be understood that U.S. conventional force superiority over the rest of the world gives regional powers a tremendous incentive to move toward WMD and missiles as the means of deterring and coercing the United States. This was the lesson of the Gulf War for regional powers: i.e., because of the obvious U.S. conventional force superiority, it is a mistake to challenge the United States with conventional forces; it is far better to deter or coerce the United States with missiles and weapons of mass destruction. We should not be surprised by this perspective on the part of some foreign leaders; it is the same deterrence route we and NATO took throughout the Cold War vis-a-vis the Soviet Union--i.e., offsetting Soviet conventional power through nuclear deterrence.

The fact that some proliferant states want missiles and WMD for the deterrent and coercive power they offer against us is important because it illustrates the new challenges we will face in the post- Cold War period. For example, occasionally, the suggestion is made that missile proliferation is not particularly alarming at this point because Third World missiles lack precise guidance systems, or because an opponent can always find other means to deliver WMD--using covert agents and sabotage, for example. These common assertions reflect ignorance of the simple fact that developing countries want missiles - including missiles capable of targeting the United States--for deterrence and coercion, as the threat from China most recently demonstrated. Missiles armed with WMD need not be highly accurate for these purposes. Cities are big, soft, and are not mobile it does not take an accurate or sophisticated missile to pose severe threats to cities. In addition, missiles can have ranges well beyond the realistic operational ranges of a developing country's air force. Mobile missiles appear to be nearly immune to preemptive strikes, and they can remain protected on sovereign territory until launch. And, following launch, they are not likely to be intercepted. In short, missiles, even primitive missiles--are the weapons of choice for the desired purposes of deterrence and coercion; trucks, barges, and saboteurs are not.

Again, this attraction of missiles and WMD for deterrence and coercion missions should not come as a surprise. It is the same route we took vis-a-vis the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. Why would anyone expect leaders of proliferant states not to recognize this same value in missiles and WMD?

It is this potential U.S. vulnerability to regional powers' missiles and WMD that is a defining feature of the post-Cold War era. The mere possession of missiles and WMD by regional aggressors will compel American presidents to weigh the likely costs involved in the projection of U.S. power abroad--with the consequent inhibitions on military options that American presidents once could consider acceptable.

Some say that this missile threat has been overblown by proponents of missile defense, and that "rogue" states never would "dare" to launch a WMD strike against the United States. This typical comment is a red herring.

Whether proliferant leaders would actually "dare" to launch a missile attack against us has little to do with strategies of deterrence and coercion; such strategies involve the threat of missiles and WMD, not actually launching them. Establishing a deterrent/coercive threat against the United States would not necessitate that a challenger actually be willing to initiate a missile attack against us. Rather, the mere possession of missiles and WMD by regional aggressors will compel American leaders to consider the risks--with the consequent inhibitions on our options for projecting power abroad. If you do not understand this distinction between this value of missiles and WMD for deterrence and coercive threats, versus their actual employment, you cannot understand one of the primary motives for proliferation and its implications for our own national security.

Consequently, my immediate concern is not whether a foreign leader would actually "dare" to launch a missile attack.

My concern is for the paralyzing effect on American presidents of missile threats involving chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads, and the prospect that aggressive and terrorist states will acquire these powerful capabilities to coerce and deter us.

How Soon Ballistic Missile Threats to The United States?

When are new ICBM threats to the United States likely to emerge? This question appears to be at the center of considerable controversy-- including public charges that the recent National Intelligence Estimate has been politicized. In particular, a North Korean missile in development, the Taepo Dong 2, seems to be a focus of this debate.

The Taepo Dong 2 has been identified in unofficial sources as having a potential range of from 3500 km to 10,000 km, and as becoming operational as early as the year 2000. Senior U.S. defense and intelligence officials recently have stated publicly before Congressional committees that the North Korean Taepo Dong 2, if deployed, would have the potential to target the United States, and could be operational before the end of the decade. For example, on August 11, 1994, Dr. John Deutch told the Senate Armed Services Committee that, "If the North Koreans field the Taepo Dong 2 missile, Guam, Alaska, and parts of Hawaii would potentially be at risk." And, on April 3, 1995, the acting Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral William Studeman, stated for the Senate Select Committee On Intelligence that,

"...it is unlikely Pyongyang [North Korea] could deploy Taepo Dong I or Taepo Dong II missiles before three to five years. However, if Pyongyang has foreshortened its development program, we could see these missiles earlier."

That would place the date for the Taepo Dong 2 at the year 2000 or sooner.

In 1993, former DCI James Woolsey stated before the Senate Committee On Governmental Affairs that the direct WMD/missile threat to the United States from proliferant states could develop "after the turn of the century," but that there exist certain "shortcuts" to ICBM acquisition that, "would, of course, speed up ICBM acquisition by such nations." These statements by senior intelligence and DoD officials from 1993, 1994, and 1995 appear to be at variance with the most recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the subject, as it has been reported in the press. These earlier statements are at variance with estimates on the subject presented in correspondence of December 1, 1995 from the Central Intelligence Agency to Democratic members of the Senate, i.e., during the recent authorization debate regarding national missile defense (NMD). For example, the press has reported that the 1996 NIE "foresees no ballistic missile threat to the United States for at least 15 years."(l) If an accurate portrayal of the NIE, this estimate of the long-range missile threat to the United States clearly represents a significant lowering of that threat than was portrayed just months earlier by the acting Director of Central Intelligence.

And, in the recent unclassified correspondence from the Central Intelligence Agency to members of the Senate, the following estimate, presumably of the Taepo Dong 2, was presented:

"a North Korean missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Alaska--but not beyond-- may be in development, but the likelihood of it being operational within five years is very low."

The December 1 estimate given by the CIA to members of the Senate states that the missile "may be in development." This represents an obvious fuzzing of earlier more definitive statements that the Taepo Dong 2 is in development.* I know that the intelligence community generally tries to stay away from definitive wording when possible, but in the case of the CIA's December 1 letter to members of the Senate, the hedging of the missile's status, i.e., it "may be in development," is at variance with both earlier, and now more recent, statements by the intelligence community about its status.

In addition, in the same December 1 correspondence from the CIA to members of the Senate, the estimate is given that the likelihood of the North Korean missile "being operational within five years is very low." Again, this is a significant lowering of expectations about the Taepo Dong 2 from that presented just months earlier by intelligence officials.

I do not know the basis for these fluctuations in the declared status of the Taepo Dong program, or in the declared expectations concerning the emergence of new long-range missile threats to the United States. Perhaps some important new information on the Taepo Dong missile has animated these revisions, perhaps there is another explanation.

I would like to take a few minutes to identify some of the factors that must argue against much confidence being placed on projections that a long-range missile threat to the United States is at least 15 years in the future. (2)

Such a conclusion can not be maintained if several plausible developments are considered--developments that could lead to new ballistic missile threats even during the remainder of this decade. These developments entail routes to the emergence of additional long- range missile threats and must undermine confidence in a conclusion based solely on current trends. Those plausible, if essentially unpredictable developments include:

• Acquisition from a foreign supplier of long-range ballistic missile components or technologies by proliferant countries hostile to the United States such as Iran, Iraq, or Libya--countries that could not otherwise field long-range missiles within this decade or early in the next. This development could occur as a result of transfers from China, and enterprises in the former Soviet Union operating independently and essentially without the consent of Moscow or Kiev.
• Indigenous development or acquisition from a foreign supplier of space launch vehicle (SLV) technology or complete systems by proliferant countries, and their subsequent conversion to long-range missile capabilities.
• The relatively rapid deterioration of political relations with countries now possessing long-range missiles or capable of promptly fielding long-range missiles if the political decision were made to do so.
• The acquisition of missiles with less than intercontinental range by Latin American or Caribbean countries hostile or prospectively hostile to the United States, or the fielding of missiles on the territory of such countries by a hostile third party. Of particular concern is the potential for the transfer and conversion of space launch vehicles (SLVs) for use as surface-to-surface missiles. The conversion of an indigenously developed SLV would require relatively modest effort. India, Israel, and Brazil will likely have such a capability before the end of the decade, followed by South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan early in the next. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Russia and Ukraine have become potential SLV suppliers--as are enterprises in those states possibly acting independently. There may be powerful economic motives affecting these states and enterprises to engage in the transfer of SLVs or ICBM subcomponents and technologies. START I apparently allows Russia to transfer missiles to Third Parties as SLVs--although the U.S. capacity to verify that such missiles would remain under Russian control is questionable.

Three fundamental uncertainties hinder the ability to forecast confidently ballistic missile threats to the United States through the next 10- and 20-year periods.

First, intelligence indicators are often ambiguous. Therefore, forecasts are subject to inaccuracies. During our 40-year confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United States devoted considerable resources to understanding Soviet missile research, development, testing, and deployment. Even so, Soviet capabilities still surprised us on occasion. For example, while Western sources reportedly estimated that the Soviet Union possessed 20 launchers for the SS-23 missiles, Soviet negotiators revealed during talks leading up to the INF Treaty that they in fact had some 100. And, of course, we should not forget that only weeks before the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb test in 1949 the CIA released its annual report on Soviet atomic energy stating that the most probable date for a Soviet test was mid-1953. (3)

The natural ambiguity of much intelligence data is magnified by the fact that the United States has focused on the Soviet Union and consequently lacks a comprehensive understanding of developing-country missile programs. For example, Iraq's December 1989 test of the AI- Abid space launch vehicle reportedly took the U.S. intelligence community by surprise, as apparently did the 1988 Chinese announcement of its sale of CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia. Also, despite numerous inspections of the Iraqi missile program by United Nations experts, questions about its scope and maturity persist.

While it is relatively easy to define the generic requirements of a successful ballistic missile program, we must realize that our ability to predict the future course of such programs for other countries with which we have limited familiarity is likely to be modest.

Second, a number of events could alter the capabilities or intentions of some states to field long-range ballistic missiles even during this decade. Therefore, forecasts are subject to the vagary of rapid change. Trade in missile technologies is brisk and can quickly improve a nation's ballistic missile capabilities. The sale of liquid-fuel rocket motor technology by Moscow to India is a prominent example, but there have also been a host of less-publicized transactions. In addition, the technical infrastructure of potential proliferants is maturing even as technology is becoming more accessible. In other cases, cooperation on peaceful space programs may facilitate capabilities that could be used in military systems--permitting countries to establish long-range missile capabilities more rapidly than otherwise could be expected.

Third, there is the possibility of dramatic and rapid change in U.S. political relations with states either possessing long-range missiles or capable of fielding such systems if they so choose. It is important to note that the character of U.S. relations with such countries may be subject to relatively rapid shifts during the 1990s or early in the next century. The potential for the rapid deterioration of political relations also entails the possible emergence of shorter-range missile threats from Latin American or Caribbean countries.

History demonstrates that rapid change in political relations does occur. The fall of the Shah of Iran--a fall that caught our intelligence community by surprise--moved that state very rapidly to hostile relations with the United States. The political changes in the Soviet Union---changes that were similarly surprising--quickly led to much more cordial relations with the United States. While such changes, occurring within the space of 5 to 7 years, is not the norm in international relations, it does take place--and often is associated with conflict. Historically, over a longer period of 10 to 20 years, this type of major reorientation of political relations is much more common. In a period of political uncertainty and instability, the prospect for political relations to deteriorate rapidly with states possessing long-range missiles, or capable of fielding such systems promptly, must be acknowledged.

In summary, plausible routes to missile proliferation and additional missile threats could shape the situation during and after this decade. Either independently or in combination, these could lead to the emergence of additional missile threats to the United States. In these circumstances, the conclusion that the probability is quite low for the emergence of new ballistic missile threats to the United States for at least 15 years can be sustained only if these plausible but unpredictable developments, such as the transfer and conversion of SLVs, are dismissed or considered of negligible consequence.

In conclusion, there is an obvious missile proliferation trend toward greater ranges and greater payloads. There simultaneously is a trend toward the proliferation of WMD. Added to this dangerous brew is the self-expressed desire on the part of some foreign leaders for the capability to deter and coerce the United States with missile and WMD threats. Almost three thousand years ago the great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said that the best method for a weak state to have its way against a strong state is for the weak to use deterrence and coercion against the strong to defeat its strategy. Missiles and WMD now threaten to provide otherwise second- and third-rate regional aggressors with the deterrence and coercive capability to defeat U.S. strategy. This is an unprecedented and dangerous situation and, unless countered, it will be a defining feature of the post-Cold War order.

The existing difficulties with North Korea and China, combined with the inherent uncertainty surrounding when and from where additional missile threats will arise, leads me to conclude that we should now take those steps necessary to establish the legal and programmatic basis for the deployment of a limited national missile defense. Whether long-range missile threats mature over the next 5, 10, or 15 years, because of the great political impediments to deployment, unless we start down the deployment path now we will be lucky to have an NMD system available in any of those timeframes. There are, of course, complementary means to attack the missile proliferation threat which also should be pursued. They all, however, will be inadequate in the absence of NMD.

Footnotes

*In very recent testimony, Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch stated before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that, "A Taepo Dong missile, which could reach as far as Alaska is in development..."

1 Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz, "Missile-threat report 'politicized,' GOP says," Washington Times, January 30, 1996, p. 1.

2 The following section draws heavily and with permission from the "Odom Report" on proliferation. See, Proliferation Study Team, The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat To The United States (Fairfax, VA: National Institute For Public Policy, February 1993), pp. 1-3.

3 See Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making Of The Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 363.