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Hon. Ronald V. Dellums,
Ranking Democrat

The Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S. and its Allies
28 February 1996 - House National Security Committee

Mr.Chairman:

I join with you in behalf of this side of the aisle in welcoming our witnesses today. To the degree that they are able to shed light on the factual and policy issues before us they would help us to understand the timing of any emerging missile threats to the United States and its forces, and the best policies and programs we might pursue to discourage, deter or defeat those threats. I will save my more substantive questions until after our witnesses have given their presentations, but I feel compelled at the outset to raise a concern and to attempt pun this hearing in a context that has not yet been properly established.

It is just weeks since we have completed conference on the FY 1996 Defense Authorization bill. One of the principle points of contention in that bill was the conflict over the need, scope and scale of missile defenses--and the relative priority as between theater and national missile defense. No small part of the deface was played out between Chose who wanted to break out of the ABM Treaty and those who believe it remains a useful agreement in pursuit of U.S. national security interests, and one which allows for deployment of an effective national missile defense system that is treaty compliant. While reasonable people can disagree on these matters, the issue unfortunately became unduly politicized as well. And, by starting out as we are today, I fear that the issue will become even more politicized.

Last year, I requested that the Committee receive an intelligence briefing on the threat issue. Despite that request, I am unaware of any such briefing. If we are serious about investigating this matter -- and this is meant as no disrespect to our distinguished panel--this is the logical place to startwould have given the Committee a chance to hear from the Intelligence Community, and to question the range of their analysis, its underpinnings and conclusions.

There certainly is a role for outside witnesses, including those who differ in their analysis from the panel today. But their testimony is better received after a classified briefing from the Intelligence Community on this

This is why I am disturbed. Whatever our partisan differences, we have had a long-standing common interest on this Committee in avoiding actions that needlessly hamper our ability to develop effective, bipartisan legislation to meet our national security requirements. We cannot do so when the Committee does not operate from the same information base, developed and critiqued by the intelligence professionals and other national security professionals who toil everyday in the service of their country. we cannot do so when legislation is written in advance of the briefings and hearings and without the input of the minority. We cannot do so when the regular order of Committee business is so inverted.

So, while I welcome today's witnesses and will look forward to their testimony, it is my fervent hope, Mr. Chairman, that these other elements of the Committee process will fall into place as well.