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Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment on my behalf and on behalf of Senators Leahy, Harkin, and Bumpers.

AMENDMENT NO. 4048

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan], for himself, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Harkin, and Mr. Bumpers, proposes an amendment numbered 4048.

On Page 31, strike out line 2 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

`$9,362,542,000, of which--

`(A) $508,437,000 is authorized for national missile defense;'.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, if I could have the attention of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will come to order.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I am offering an amendment that would reduce, by $300 million, the amount of money authorized in this piece of legislation for national missile defense.

For those who do not know much about this process and have not been involved in the lexicon of Defense issues, the national missile defense, or Defend America, or antiballistic missile system, or Star Wars, all relates to a system that some say is needed to be built in order to defend America against incoming attacks from missiles launched by a potential adversary, ICBM's that would be launched by a rogue nation, or ICBM's that are launched accidentally. All of these are described as threats to our country, and it is proposed by a number of Members of the Congress, and others, that we should build a defense system against them.

Now, if I were to provide a chart to the Senate that showed an array of the threats against our country, the threats would range all over the board. The threats against our country would be, for example: A terrorist who fills a rental truck with a fertilizer bomb and drives it in front of a courthouse or Federal building in Oklahoma and murders scores and scores of American citizens. A threat against our country might be not a fertilizer bomb in a rental truck, but perhaps a small glass vial of the deadliest biological agents known to mankind, placed in a subway strategically, killing thousands and thousands of people. A threat to our country perhaps would be a suitcase bomb, or a nuclear device no bigger than the size of a suitcase put in the trunk of a Yugo car and left at a dock in New York City to hold hostage an entire city. Another threat might be a nuclear device on the tip of an incoming cruise missile launched by air, ground, or sea, by a potential adversary. Another threat might be a full-scale nuclear attack by an adversary, with dozens or scores of incoming missiles, ICBM's, or cruise missiles for that matter. Another threat might be that some rogue nation, some international outlaw on the scene, gets ahold of an ICBM and launches one intercontinental ballistic missile at our country tipped with a nuclear warhead. Or another might be simply an accidental launch of someone who possesses an ICBM with a nuclear warhead.

All of these are potential threats to our country. They are not new threats. These threats have existed for some long while. In fact, a much greater threat existed some years ago than the ones I have just described, and the greater threat was hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of missiles in the ground, in silos, armed with multiple warheads, aimed at American cities, aimed at American military targets, all poised and ready to be fired by a potential adversary called the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union does not exist any longer. The Soviet Union was fractured into a series of independent states--the Ukraine, Russia, and others--in which there were missiles with nuclear warheads targeted at the United States. But a series of arms control agreements with the old Soviet Union, and now with the independent states, has changed that much larger threat. It has not erased the threat, but it has changed the much larger threat. Arms control agreements now mean that Soviet missiles that used to be aimed at our country in many cases no longer exist.

Mr. President, I showed this piece of metal on a previous occasion. I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to show it to my colleagues again.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this is a piece from a hinge on the massive door that covered missile silo No. 110, in Pervomaysk, Ukraine. This comes from a silo that housed an SS-19, which had half a dozen warheads aimed at the United States of America. Each of those warheads had a yield of 550 kilotons each, 20 times the power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

I want to show my colleagues a chart that describes something that I think is quite remarkable. This is that missile site, which housed missile No. 110. On June 5 of this year, this photo shows the Ukrainian Defense Minister Shmarov on the left and his U.S. counterpart, Secretary Perry, watering sunflowers planted in the ground where there use to be a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile. In other words, it is where there previously existed a missile with nuclear warheads aimed at America, and there now are sunflowers growing. The silo is gone, the missile is gone, and there are sunflowers.

How did this happen? Was this a magic act? Was Harry Houdini involved? No. This happened through a great deal of diligent, hard work. Some of it was here in the Senate, which approved the arms control agreements that were negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union. Substantial credit, in my judgment, should go to Senators Lugar and Nunn, who worked to create the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which funds the dismantling of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet states. The Soviets, the Russians and Ukrainians now, began destroying nuclear weapons.

That destruction of nuclear weapons means that one way to protect America is to destroy a foreign missile before it leaves the silo; destroy the missile before it leaves the silo. This chart shows what happened. There used to be a missile. Now there are sunflowers. What a wonderful thing for humankind--that a missile that used to be aimed at us is now gone. This bit of hinge does not exist as a functional piece of some kind of nuclear threat against the United States. It is not just missiles that Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn have through their initiative in the U.S. Senate helped to destroy. Here is a picture of Soviet workers sawing off the wings of Soviet long-range bombers. This is success. Arms control agreements have worked. They have substantially reduced the nuclear threat. We are today every day seeing in the old Soviet Union--now Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan--missiles being destroyed, bombers being destroyed, and the world is a safer place as a result.

Some would come to the floor of the Senate and say, `None of this matters very much.' The hundreds of ICBM's that are now gone do not matter much. The fact that the President of Ukraine announced that his country, which had previously housed thousands of nuclear warheads, is now nuclear free; no nuclear warheads in the Ukraine is quite a remarkable thing. Some would come to the floor of the Senate, and say, `That does not mean much. What we need to do is begin a new arms race. We need an America to begin building on an expedited basis with expedited deployment a National Missile Defense Program. And we insist on doing it in a way that would make it a multiple-site system, in a way that would provide that it has a space-based component,' both of which would jeopardize the arms control agreements we currently have. And they say, `Well, if we jeopardize those arms control agreements, so be it. We will force the other parties to renegotiate.'

I am not coming to the floor of the Senate saying that research and development on missile defense programs are not relevant or unworthy. I have supported them in the past. I support them today. The administration requested $508 million in this bill for research and development on national missile defense systems and programs.

In fact, if taxpayers are interested we have spent $98 billion on strategic and theater missile defense programs; $98 billion. The most recent proposal that was brought to the Senate for its consideration, the Congressional Budget Office says, will cost anywhere between $30 billion and $60 billion to construct without regard to the cost of its operation. That is what it will cost simply to build on an expedited basis the kind of national missile defense that was called the Defend America Program that the sponsors envision.

I support the recommendation of the Pentagon to spend $508 million for research and development of a national missile defense system. What I do not support is the Congress saying, `Pentagon, you do not know what you are talking about. We insist on adding $300 million more.'

Let me read a comment from the Vice Chiefs of Staff in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. It says:

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council believes that with the current projected ballistic missile threat, which shows Russia and China as the only countries able to field a threat against the U.S. homeland, the funding level for national missile defense should be no more than $500 million a year through the Future Years Defense Plan.

That is what the Joint Requirements Oversight Council says. One might argue they are not experts. I do not know how one could credibly argue that. They are the Vice Chiefs of Staff of our Armed Services. But one could make that case and try to make that point. These are the people who ought to know, in my judgment.

General Shalikashvili in a letter to Senator Nunn says the following:

Efforts which suggest changes to or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russia's ratification of START II, and could prompt Russia to withdraw from START I.

These are the arms control agreements that resulted in taking these missiles and warheads out of the ground and reducing the threat posed to the United States of America.

General Shalikashvili says the following. He says:

I am concerned that failure of either START initiative will result in Russian retention of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons thereby increasing both the cost and the risks that we face.

We will hear no doubt, especially when the Defend America Act comes back to the Senate, if it does--and I cast a vote on that recently. This was a bill to potentially require $30 to $60 billion of expenditure on the part of the taxpayers--just to build, not to operate. It is not the right way in my judgment to do it. But that was the vote we had. Of course, I voted against cloture because, if we are going to have a debate on this, there ought to be a debate. There ought to be a thorough and lengthy debate. It is of substantial importance for this country, its foreign policy, its defense policy, and certainly for the taxpayers.

We will no doubt have comments made here--I do not intend to address these at the moment, although I would be happy to come back and do so--that reflect the comments we heard last year during the same debate. We will have maps put up talking about the threat that North Korea could pose to Alaska, or the threat that some other rogue nation would pose to Hawaii. Those statements are not justified by the facts. Those are not threats that are currently justified by information given by this country's intelligence community.

It seems to me that we ought to worry a bit about how we are spending money, for what purpose we are spending money, and where we are going to get the money. This $300 million is the first incremental first step on a long staircase. And we had a quote from Senator Dole at a press conference. The question was asked where the money was going to come from. `Senator, how much do you think this is going to cost, and where is that money going to come from?'

The answer: `Well, I'll leave that up to the experts.'

The experts are not going to pay the bill. The taxpayer will pay this bill--$300 million this year, a long step on a long staircase leading up to the Congressional Budget Office suggesting as much as $60 billion.

In the main, this is a security issue. I accept that and agree to debate it on that premise. But it is also an issue that combines the question of security with the question of, `What is it going to cost?' Well, it is reasonable to ask: How much did we spend, and how much are we going to spend to get a system? What kind of protection will it provide us?

In North Dakota, we have some experience with this. We have in my State the only antiballistic missile system that was ever built in the free world. In today's dollars, they have spent about $26 billion. It looks a little like this. It is a big concrete pyramid. It was incidentally mothballed in the same year that it was declared operational. That was built in the early 1970's with billions of taxpayers' money spent.

I mentioned that somewhere between $96 and $98 billion was spent in the aggregate in pursuit of missile defense technology. I also said I am not opposed to spending all of the money but that I am opposed to this rush to add extra money to this defense authorization bill. And I will be opposed to adding the money to the appropriations bill as well--to demand that we have accelerated deployment in a system that we are told will cost up to $60 billion, and the accelerated deployment must be combined with a multisite system, and a space-based system that, in my judgment, will jeopardize most of our arms control agreements, agreements that I think are critically important to this country.

I would say this to my friends who support this--and I have great respect for many who will stand up and support this aggressively: Senator Kyl has in the past, Senator Inhofe and others. I suspect the Senator from Virginia will weigh in on this subject. I have great respect for their views, but I do believe this. You have to make the case that spending this extra money is critically necessary for our defense. I do not think that case can be made, No. 1. And, No. 2, you also ought to make the case, given what we have talked about--the danger of the Federal deficits and who is for more spending and who is for less spending--you also ought to make the case, who is going to pay for this? Where is the $60 billion going to come from?

This bill contains the first small increment of $300 million, which may not seem like a lot of money to some but I think is a whole lot of money for the American taxpayers to shell out when they do not need to shell it out. This is a proposal that we do not need, a proposal that we cannot afford, a proposal the Pentagon says it does not want, and a proposal this country should not adopt. It defies common sense for this Congress to say to General Shalikashvili: It does not matter what you think; it does not matter what you say about arms control agreements; it does not matter how much you want to spend. We demand you spend more on this because we believe this ought to be built on an accelerated basis.

I say you have to make the case that that be done first, and I do not think the case can be made. And second, as you make that case, if you think you can make the case, tell us, who are you going to get to pay for this? Which taxes are you going to raise to get $60 billion?

Mr. President, I indicated previously we will no doubt have comments from those who say there is a direct threat to some States in our country from this, that, or the other approach. I began speaking about the array of threats to our country and let me end with the same notion. If we are concerned about the principal threats to our country, it seems to me somewhere back on the far side of the range of threats that are likely would be that a Mu'ammar Qadhafi acquires through some magic an intercontinental ballistic missile that he is able to launch complete with a nuclear warhead destined for some American city. That is one of the least likely threats.

Far more likely a threat is an international rogue, some international bandit on the scene who is more likely to acquire a dozen other devices, including, if you are talking missiles, a much more easily acquired missile such as a cruise missile, easier to acquire and easier perhaps to operate. It is much more likely that we will find a threat other than that which they are going to build the national missile defense system to protect our country against. Should our country be unprotected? No. We have always had protection with this understanding: every missile launched against our country has a return address. Every missile launched against America has a return address because we know who launches it. We see all launches in this world through our satellites. Should any country, any rogue nation, any adversary be foolish enough to launch a missile with a warhead against this country, that country will cease to exist quickly. Our defense and our deterrent has always been our ability to let everyone in this world understand you launch a nuclear weapon against our country, and our nuclear arsenal, the most capable in the world, will erase from the face of the Earth those with that kind of judgment.

That nuclear arsenal still exists, and I hope that we will support the amendment to reduce the $300 million. We will still be left with $508 million, which is a substantial amount of money, for research and development, but we will have sent a signal that we do not want to begin climbing the first step on a stairway to a $60 billion expenditure, the justification for which has not and in my judgment cannot be made at this point in this Chamber.

(Mr. ABRAHAM assumed the chair.)

[Page: S6395]

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. DORGAN. I would be pleased to yield.

Mr. WARNER. I have followed very carefully his points here. As a matter of fact, it is basically a recitation--and I say this most respectfully--of the points the Senator made last year. The Senator has been consistent in his message. But I was taken by his closing remarks of the history of the relationship between those nations possessing intercontinental systems and how our planet has thus far avoided any confrontation.

This is a subject that I have been dealing with since 1969 when I went to the Department of the Navy, I do not want to calculate how many years ago. But the Senator is absolutely right; it was the deterrence that prevented any confrontation between the former Soviet Union and the United States of America. It was the doctrine of mass destruction, mutual massive destruction. But we were dealing in those days, despite our antipathy toward communism, with governments, with military organizations that were able to grasp the reality of mutual assured destruction and had a very tight command and control over every single one of those sites.

I should say that in the many years I followed this, having served on the Intelligence Committee, there were isolated incidents where there was alcohol involved on a site here and there. We saw the occasional reports. But, fortunately, the command and control was exercised so as to eliminate what I personally regard as the prime reason for this expenditure, the accidental or unintentional firing.

In the former Soviet Union, the rocket forces were the elite. Only the finest men and, I suppose in some instances, women were put into those units. We did not have in those days the risk that I think is present today of the accidental or unintentional firing.

Quite apart from the dollars and cents--and we could debate on into the night as to what the estimates are to build the system and the time in which it is to be done, but I cannot look into the faces of my fellow Americans and say that there is any budget or any calculation which would induce me not to support this given the horrific damage from a single accidental firing of an ICBM against a major city. Take whatever you want as the budget to build this system. If you hit on 57th and 5th Avenue in New York City, it would be billions and billions of dollars in property damage and incalculable lives.

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Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator is warming up to a question.

Mr. WARNER. I am sort of on a roll here, and I rather enjoy it, but my point is, what is your concept of a single accidental firing, a risk present today that was not present during the height of the cold war? That is essentially the purpose of this system.

Mr. DORGAN. The Senator asks a good question, and I understand it well because he set it up quite well. I say to the Senator, you describe this in the context of a rogue nation or an international terrorist who gets hold of one missile and launches one missile against the United States.

I contend that it is far more likely that an international terrorist would get hold of a suitcase and put it in a rusty Yugo on the dock in New York City than be able to find an ICBM and launch an ICBM at the United States. The point I made at the start of my discussion is you have an array of threats against our country. The one you describe is a threat, there is no question about that.

Let me give you another one. How about----

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will----

Mr. DORGAN. Let me give you a threat.

Mr. WARNER. I am ready to concede that you are correct. It may well be the suitcase----

Mr. DORGAN. Let me continue before you concede. You are conceding a small part. Let us assume a captain of a Typhoon submarine goes half wacko somewhere out in the ocean and launches the entire supply of warheads on that submarine, which is 200 warheads, ICBM's, sea-launched ICBM's against this country. That is a rogue threat. There is nothing proposed by anyone, that I am aware of, nothing under any condition or any system or any bizarre scheme I am aware of that is going to protect this country against that large a threat, is that correct?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is correct. We do not have anything and that is in the realm of risk. I think farther down the scale than the single isolated incident is either in Russia or, indeed, North Korea--they are rapidly approaching the potential, with their Taepo Dong missile, which could reach Hawaii or Alaska.

My point is the Senator is correct. There is a risk from the suitcase. There is a risk from a berserk crew on a Typhoon submarine. And there is a risk associated with the accidental firing of a single, or perhaps two missiles against the United States.

But the fact that we have a number of risks does not eliminate the responsibility of every Member of this Chamber to apply, diligently, every resource we have in this country to stop these risks.

Mr. DORGAN. I would say this to the Senator, I fully accept the responsibility of doing the research and development on a missile program, a national missile defense program of some type for which there is, in this bill, $508 million--plus $300 million added by the committee, saying $508 million is not enough, we want to add $300 million more. I respect the obligation to be doing the research and development to be available and to be ready to deploy a system if it becomes certain that we need this system and conceivable we can build it in a cost-effective way. I am ready to do that.

But what I am saying to the Senator is this. If you come to us with proposals that the Defense Department says threaten to undermine the arms control treaties that now exist that result in destroying the missiles in the ground--all the missiles are out of the Ukraine at this point.

The fact is today--I know the Senator knows this because we have people on both sides of the aisle who have engineered this, and I would say the Senator has been instrumental in a number of these areas in helping this along--we are seeing adversaries' missiles now being destroyed, sawed in half, cut up. It seems to me you would agree that the very best way to destroy a potential adversary's missile is to destroy it before it leaves the ground. If you propose a national missile defense system that threatens the underpinnings of our arms control agreements, it seems to me what you have done is add to the arsenal of weapons that are potentially going to be weapons against us.

So I am willing to walk down the road, to talk about threats and how one responds to them. I am not willing, under any circumstances, not any, to do anything that I think starts to take apart the arms control agreements. It is not just me that says that. It is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others who say this threatens to destroy the foundation of these arms control agreements.

Once you start to do that you are not dealing with little rogue threats out there. You are not dealing with some international nut case who manages to find some ICBM and then manages to find a nuclear tip to put on the top of it. Then you are dealing with the questions of hundreds, perhaps thousands of additional weapons and launchers that will be retained when they should in fact have been destroyed, because we were trying to enter into arms control agreements that really do accomplish a reduction in the threat.

So, I hope--I have taken some time, but I hope the Senator understands. I am not opposed to research and development. I am opposed to adding, on top of that, money that means we will run off and buy and build and damn the consequences. I would listen to some very thoughtful people who say you are going to injure the opportunities we have had in the past and will have in the future, as a result of the arms control agreements. That is my major concern.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to reply. Let us say that the Senator and I have a disagreement on the arms control issue. I firmly believe that we can resolve with Russia any apprehension that they may have with respect to the development of this system in a manner that will pose a threat to them. As a matter of fact, I would argue it is in their interests that we have such a system because, should a missile be fired we could have some errors on our side, thinking a strike had been launched against us and suddenly trigger something against Russia.

But let us say we have a disagreement on arms control. But how does the Senator from North Dakota answer the question: We have no arms control with China, yet they have the capability of an accidental firing. We have no arms control with North Korea, yet they are within 3 or 4 years of having a missile that could hit two of our States. What does the Senator say to those arguments?

Mr. DORGAN. The entire philosophy of arms control is to reduce the stock of nuclear arms and launchers and devices to deliver arms that now exists and to try very hard to work on the issue of nonproliferation of nuclear arms. We must do a better job of that.

Do you know why? Because I think people are all too interested in going off and building things. The efforts at nonproliferation are not very sexy. It is not an area that produces the same kind of thing that a building project does. A building project, you pour concrete and get something that you can see and everybody can say, `Look what we have.' We ought to, in our country, it seems to me, take seriously this issue of who has and who is going to have nuclear weapons and pose a threat in the future.

If the Senator says it matters with respect to China, yes, it does. Sure it matters. It matters with respect to North Korea, yes. It also matters with respect to what our intelligence community tells us about the capabilities of these countries, No. 1. I will be happy to put that in the Record, because we are at odds on that issue.

But, second, it matters very much, it seems to me--it matters very much that this country behave in a way that recognizes it is in our interests to have fewer nuclear weapons in the world. And our arms control agreements, as deficient as they might be--some would want them much more aggressive--have started the process of doing what you and I might have thought unthinkable not too long ago.

The Senator was in the Chamber when I showed this chart. I want to show it again, because I suspect 8, 10 years ago, no one would have believed this. Ten years ago would anyone have believed that the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Minister of the Ukraine would be planting sunflowers on ground where there was planted an SS-19 aimed at the United States of America?

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Mr. WARNER. I say to my good friend, Secretary Perry came and met with members of the Armed Services Committee at a breakfast

hosted by the distinguished chairman, Chairman Thurmond, this morning, and recounted the very incident portrayed by this picture. We concede all that.

But I would like to come back to this issue. You stress arms control. We have a disagreement on that. Come back to China. We have no arms control--do you not agree they have the capability today of a missile system that could hit Alaska and could hit Hawaii, and that there could be an accidental or rogue firing in that nation? Just witness what happened in connection with the Straits of Taiwan here just several months ago, when we saw what in my judgment were actions by China, presumably under tight command and control, where those actions were in defiance of what I call responsible conduct by major nations in this hemisphere.

Let us go back. Let us see if we can narrow debate. They have the system, am I not correct?

Mr. DORGAN. Let me ask the Senator, since he has raised the question of China, does the Senator know approximately the estimate of how many ICBM's the Chinese possess?

Mr. WARNER. I do, but I am not sure it is a matter we should bring out in public at this time.

Mr. DORGAN. Does anyone know whether that is classified information?

Mr. WARNER. Let us just concede that we know they have them. I do not know the number--I do know it but I am not sure--let us just assume that they have a system. I think you and I can agree on that.

Mr. DORGAN. Does the Senator also agree that, should any nation----

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator will just let us take a voice vote on the Grassley amendment?

Mr. DORGAN. I will be happy to.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, notwithstanding the previous unanimous- consent request, I ask unanimous consent that we resume consideration of the Grassley amendment. I understand Senator Grassley has agreed to have the amendment voted on by a voice vote. I understand there is no further debate on this question.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

VOTE ON AMENDMENT NO. 4047

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will vote on amendment No. 4047 of the Senator from Iowa. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 4047) was rejected.

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. EXON. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to make certain the Record shows the Senator from Virginia voted in the negative by voice vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Record will so reflect.

AMENDMENT NO. 4048

Mr. WARNER. Parliamentary inquiry, are we now returning to the colloquy?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota has the floor.

Mr. WARNER. And the distinguished Senator was about to pose a question.

Mr. DORGAN. I was about to ask the question, if the Senator agreed with me, if a rogue nation--China, I suppose, would not be in the definition of `rogue nation' here; China is a trading partner of ours.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it depends on the day of the week. They do have some actions----

Mr. DORGAN. Normally, those who refer to rogue nations or international outlaw leaders have three or four in mind. Now, the Senator raises----

Mr. WARNER. You are correct, China should not be put in the same category as the generic term `rogue nation.' I am talking about the accidental, unintentional firing.

Mr. DORGAN. I understand. The Chinese have, as you know, without discussing it, very few intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Senator raises the question of the potential of a country with intercontinental ballistic missiles launching an attack against the United States.

The question I want to ask is, does the Senator agree with me that there cannot be an intercontinental ballistic missile launched without a return address; we will know instantly where it is launched from?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is correct in that.

Mr. DORGAN. If the launching of an intercontinental ballistic missile means this country immediately knows where that launching took place, is it reasonable to expect, if they attack the United States, they would expect a response that would annihilate the country sending the missile? The point is, that has been a deterrence that has been around for sometime. I thought the Senator was really talking about a real outlaw, nut leader someplace out there in space, and now he has raised the question of China.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, for the purpose of this debate, there are really only two nations which possess intercontinental systems that can strike the United States, and that is Russia and China. China has a system which can reach not only two States, Alaska and Hawaii, but, indeed, we have reason to believe that it could reach the central parts of the mainland United States. For the record, I am not talking about an organized command and control attack on the United States by China. I am talking about the accidental firing, the unintentional--perhaps in a training mission--firing of a live missile, either from Russia or China. Should not we have the bare minimum capability in this country to defend against a single or perhaps two or three missiles being fired?

I say yes. Our difference is the schedule on which it is to be built. You have reasons to believe that $500 million is enough. I feel strongly, as does the committee, that $800 million is the required amount to keep the research and development at the most expeditious pace, such as a President can make the decision with regard to deployment.

Mr. DORGAN. The Senator has narrowed this interestingly. So let me ask this question. The Air Force has proposed a system that they say is a minimal cost system to respond to exactly what you are talking about: one isolated case of one intercontinental ballistic missile, perhaps with one warhead, being launched accidentally or deliberately at someplace in this country.

There is a plan floating around that they say will cost $2 billion, $2.5 billion to defend against that, not to give us a defense that is not impenetrable, but one that gives a reasonable certainty of stopping that limited threat.

I ask the Senator, is that what the Senator would support and would that be sufficient?

Mr. WARNER. This Senator is in favor of supporting a system that could perhaps interdict up to 10, 12, 15, maybe as many as 20, certainly not an exchange as was practical, that potentially could have occurred between the former Soviet Union and the United States. China's total arsenal we have agreed we should not discuss here, but it has numbers that could approximate those amounts of exchange. That is not an accidental firing in reality or unintentional to send 10 or 20 missiles. Nevertheless, the system should be built to cope with it.

Mr. DORGAN. If I understand your response, you are not proposing then a system that would in any way protect this country against a lunatic Typhoon submarine captain who launches 200 warheads from a Typhoon submarine against this country? You are not proposing a system that protects us against that?

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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the system that I have in mind could limit the damage. Now, whether it could deal with all 20 missiles fired----

Mr. DORGAN. Two hundred warheads.

Mr. WARNER. I am not prepared to give you an answer.

Mr. DORGAN. Two hundred warheads.

Mr. WARNER. If you interdict the missile, you get 10 warheads.

Mr. DORGAN. It depends on when you interdict the launcher. But my point was, I guess most people would say you are not proposing a system that could respond to that threat. So, again, on the scale of threats, you have some you respond to, some you do not. Look, I would not support a penny for research and development if I did not think it is reasonable for us to be trying to figure out what are the threats and what is a reasonable approach to begin thinking about them and planning to meet them when they become sufficiently real that the intelligence community says this country needs to do something about those threats.

The Senator knows, and we have said before in this debate, that the intelligence community in this country does not concur that this is the time to do what is being proposed we do. The Defense Department tells us that it will undercut the arms control agreements and launch us into an orbit to spend an enormous amount of money against a system that the Senator now concedes will not respond to the more aggressive or robust threats.

Mr. WARNER. Well, Mr. President, all I can say is that what we envision is a limited system to deal with the accidental or unintentional firing. I am not prepared, nor any of us are really prepared, to give you precise numbers, whether it could interdict the entire load of a Typhoon. It depends on when interdiction takes place, whether there is warhead separation. There are a lot of factors that deal with it.

I want to also put in the Record, I respect your arguments about the suitcase. Fortunately, I think technology is not quite at the point where that is the highest risk now, but we have in place a number of systems to deter and, indeed, interdict the suitcase. It is just my concern we have nothing--nothing--in place to interdict the stray two or three missiles that could be accidentally fired or a terrorist firing against our Nation.

That is the direction in which this Senator wants to move as expeditiously as possible. And we have O'Neill, who was the prior head--he just resigned--of the BMD office, who said $800 million is the figure. I happen to agree with him. You happen to disagree. Therein, I think, we framed the argument.

Mr. DORGAN. You say $800 million. Let me make just a couple additional points. Again, I respect very much the Senator from Virginia. I have admired his work for a long while. We disagree from time to time on things. We disagree on this. I, nonetheless, think he contributes a great deal to defense policy.

This little pager that I use is about the size, I am told, of the device that brought down the Pan Am flight by a terrorist planting a device this size on the Pan Am 747 which crashed in Lockerbie, Scotland. That was a terrible attack. We know what the terrorist attack was with a rental truck in Oklahoma City. We know of many terrorist accidents. We know of the deadly chemical agent attack in Japan on the subway.

We know of the bombing of the World Trade Center by terrorists.

The Senator raises the question, what about the ultimate terrorist act of a terrorist getting ahold of, not a suitcase, not a Yugo, but an ICBM, not a cruise, an ICBM missile, and tipping it with a nuclear warhead and launching it against our country?

Again, I will say to the Senator, there is a prospect advanced by one of the services that they say would cost $2 billion that would use existing technology to provide a defense against a very limited, isolated, single missile kind of rogue nation or accidental launch. That proposal does exist.

The Senator and I may not have much disagreement if he said, let us take the limited option at minimum dollars and provide the protection against that threat that he has just described in some detail. I am not sure we would have much disagreement about that.

That is not what is being proposed, as the Senator knows. What is being proposed is a robust system, multiple sites, space-based components, accelerated deployment. That is a much, much different, much more expensive and much more extensive proposal than what we are discussing.

So again I say, if the isolated circumstances that the Senator describes were met by a $2 billion system, which one branch of the service has given me a detailed briefing on, I do not know that we would have a big disagreement. But what we are talking about here--and I believe the Senator in his heart knows we are talking about--is the potential of $60 billion over the years to build a much more capable system, at the end of which we will not have addressed the threat of a robust attack against this country.

I worry that if we spend that money, we may develop the circumstance of saying to the American people, we now have a missile defense system we have spent $60 billion for, just to build, not to operate, and then someone says, `What if somebody launches 50 missiles against us?' We say, `Well, we're sorry about that. We're not going to be able to deal with that.'

If we are talking threat, let us respond to the most aggressive threats first. Let us do the things that are necessary to do research and development on national missile defense.

I notice my friend from Oklahoma is now on the floor. I mentioned earlier he is someone who has an interest on this subject. I mentioned him in a kindly way.

But I just believe that to rush off and commit $300 million above what General Shalikashvili recommends, Secretary Perry and others recommend as is prudent and wise, given our circumstances and arms control, and other needs, I think that is not in this country's interests. So I appreciate the colloquy the Senator and I have had.

Mr. WARNER. I shall yield the floor momentarily. I have enjoyed the colloquy. But let us make it clear, this additional $300 million by the Armed Services Committee was for the purpose of the ground system. And it is our collective judgment that that amount of money is needed to keep an aggressive R&D going.

I strongly support it. And $300 million is not specifically earmarked for any system. It in fact is the BMD's program that they have at the moment. We have disagreements as to the total cost. That is clear. But I think we isolated this to be a debate between two individuals who feel equally strongly from their various perspectives.

I think we owe it to the American public to do everything we can to put in place such systems to deter against a suitcase, to deter against the Typhoon suddenly coming up and firing its whole load. But I see this as a risk, which I think is far greater, the accidental firing of a single or a double, by either a terrorist or someone who comes in and seizes an installation in China or Russia, some group, band, who goes in and seizes it and fires it somehow. That is what I want to stop.

Mr. DORGAN. If the Senator would yield on that point.

Mr. WARNER. Yes.

Mr. DORGAN. I encourage the Senator to receive the briefing, if he has not yet, on the planning that has been done by the Air Force for a minimal system at minimum cost to address exactly that circumstance.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have gotten that briefing. I am just not sure that that is a sufficiently robust system to meet the requirements as I see them.

Mr. President, there are other Senators anxious to speak. I thank the Senator. I yield the floor.

Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I will make some remarks with regard to the matter at hand, and the general feeling that I have with regard to the bill.

Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska has the floor.

Mr. EXON. Did my colleague from South Carolina wish to make some kind of a point? I have been recognized. I would be glad to yield to him.

[Page: S6399]

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have been debating this amendment now for over an hour. I just wanted the Senator from North Dakota to consider entering into a time agreement on his amendment at this time.

Mr. EXON. The Senator from South Carolina had a question for the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. THURMOND. I wonder if the Senator would agree to a time agreement on this amendment.

Mr. DORGAN. I have no intention of delaying the vote. There are a number of Senators who do want to speak briefly.

Mr. THURMOND. What is a time the Senator would wish to suggest?

Mr. DORGAN. Senator Conrad from North Dakota wants to speak and Senator Exon wishes to speak.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. EXON. All the Senator from Nebraska is attempting to do is move things along. If an agreement is reached with regard to a time agreement, I will certainly yield to the managers of the bill and the Senator from North Dakota to make that statement. In the meantime, I would like to proceed with the statement I have regarding the bill.

Mr. President, the Senator from South Carolina, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, is a very, very dear friend of mine. He does an excellent job and has as long as this Senator has been in the U.S. Senate. He works very well with Senator Nunn, the ranking member of the committee. They have worked very hard on this defense authorization bill that this Senator supported when it came out of the Armed Services Committee. But at that time I sent a first signal that I would be attempting to make some changes to improve the bill in several areas that I thought needed attention.

I will simply say to my good friend from South Carolina, that he has made noble efforts in the committee. We had thorough discussion on a lot of these issues that we are going to be taking up in the form of amendments now that the bill is on the floor, which I think is entirely proper.

What this Senator has been attempting to do since this bill came out of the authorization committee, and as late as this morning--as referenced by my distinguished friend and colleague from Virginia, we met with the Secretary of Defense--what I am trying to do is, as much as possible, make this defense authorization bill vetoproof.

In other words, if we can accommodate some of the wishes of the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense and others, that have key roles to play in what happens to the authorization bill that we will eventually pass here, it is to make it as acceptable as possible to reach some compromises on several things where I think there should be compromises, make it somewhat more acceptable to the Clinton administration, and then we will have accomplished something rather than passing a defense authorization bill that will end up dead in the water in the form of a veto.

So the comments that I am now about to make are designed, as best I can design them, to try to reach a compromise, a compromise, if you will, up front in the process of the Senate working its will on the defense authorization bill, and hopefully have a bill that will mean something.

Mr. President, the defense authorization bill before the Senate is a rather rare piece of legislation, one might say. It is one of the few spending or authorization bills for the next year receiving a sizable increase--I repeat, a sizable increase--above the administration's request.

To be specific, at $267 billion, the 1997 defense authorization bill dwarfs--dwarfs--Mr. President, any other discretionary spending program in the Federal budget. Like an out of shape prizefighter, it enters the ring $13 billion overweight from the position of the President of the United States.

Having been overfed by the majority of the Senate Armed Services Committee--and I hope we can at least partially correct that--the quarter of a trillion-dollar defense bill before the Senate is not just $13 billion above the Pentagon's proposed budget, it is $1.7 billion in excess of the originally passed budget resolution, and $4.1 billion more than the 1996 defense spending bill. At a quarter of a trillion dollars, the 1997 defense authorization bill is flush, with $13 billion in unrequested spending authority, much of which adds unnecessarily to our national debt, while adding, in the opinion of this Senator, little or nothing to our national defense.

The 1997 defense authorization bill should be termed the `wish list' bill. It is so much so that every service official and regional military commander that appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the bill was asked by the members of the majority a question, and certainly Federal managers of domestic programs have frequently heard that recently, and it is going to be driven home again during this debate. This was the question that was asked of these various military officials: `If you were given additional funds above the budget request, how would you spend it?'

Let me repeat that. Can you imagine a military person sitting before the Armed Service Committee and they are asked a question, `If you were given additional funds above the budget request, how would you spend it?' What kind of a reply would you expect? To no one's surprise, when blank checks were enticingly dangled before the witness, the replies were as prompt as they were lengthy. No military leader worth his salt, under such a scenario, could not find something that he could use.

Of the $13 billion added to the President's defense budget request, $11.4 billion, or nearly $9 out of every $10 added, went toward procurement and research and development programs. But approximately $2 billion of the add-on dollars proposed in the Pentagon's wish list is not even part of the Pentagon's own budget plan for the next 5 years, and certainly it is not, nor has it been previously, projected.

What is more, a similar portion of the $13 billion committee add-on is neither part of the long-range budget, nor any armed services wish list, including the wish lists that are included in this proposal.

In other words, the Armed Services Committee did not even get enough requests, after dangling that enticing proposition before the witnesses, to add up to the billions that we are spending. In other words, nearly $4.6 billion of the $13 billion-plus-up to the Pentagon's outyear budget plan, or a part of the services' wish list. It is something that came through the fat-feeding program in the Armed Services Committee.

In my opinion, it is vital that the American public understand this important distinction between several options:

One, what the President proposed in his budget for defense spending. Two, what the Pentagon says it needs to provide for our national defense. Three, what the military witnesses wish they could have after having the proposition dangled in front of them. Four, what level of funding the committee ultimately approved.

Such a wish-list approach to defense budgeting is not responsible, in this Senator's opinion, and stands out as a glaring exception to the manner in which painful cuts have been levied against domestic budget accounts. Nor is the end product of $13 million in additional defense spending justified and, certainly not, Mr. President, in order to do what we are trying to do in these times, when we are supposedly being prudently fiscal, to reach a balanced budget by the year 2002.

A cursory look at the defense authorization bill before the Senate indicates that a rising budget tide floats all boats. Among the largest beneficiaries of the committee's blank check wish list in the budget includes these items: An $856 million increase in the proposed ballistic missile defense spending, which has just been debated to some extent on the floor of the Senate preceding my remarks; a $760 million increase in the National Guard and Reserve equipment; a $750 million increase in DDG-51 destroyer funding; a $701 million increase in new attack submarine funding; a $700 million increase in military construction and housing funding; a $351 million increase in V-22 aircraft funding; and a $341 million increase in F-16 and F-18 funding for 10 unrequested aircraft.

These increased spending levels are only a downpayment--I emphasize once again, Mr. President, the funding levels I have just cited are only a downpayment for future spending that will confound budget-making in the years to come.

Mr. President, at a minimum, the spending level included in the defense authorization bill should be reduced by $1.7 billion to be brought into conformance with the budget resolution so as to eliminate hollow budget authority in the bill. But the Senate should not stop there. We should question the need for the remaining $11 billion increase and whether this extraordinary increase is needed to properly defend the national security interest of the United States.

Perhaps the starting point for reduction in spending authority contained in this bill should begin at $4.6 billion, the sum total of weapon add-ons and program increases not requested in the service wish lists, or contained in the Pentagon's long-range budget plan.

At a later point during the consideration of this bill, I will propose an amendment along with Senators Bingaman, Kohl, Levin, and Wellstone, to reduce the top-line defense spending figure by a modest $4 billion. This represents a full $600 million less, Mr. President, than the $4.6 billion in unsupported, unjustified, and unwise spending authority.

In essence, the Exon amendment would retain $9 billion in defense spending authority over and above the President's request. Now, let me repeat that. The Exon amendment would retain $9 billion in defense spending authority above and added on top of what the President has suggested. If the Exon amendment is agreed to by the Senate, our Nation would still be spending $155 million more in 1997 than in 1996. I would have more to say about this amendment when it is offered.

One of the most questionable of the committee add-ons, in the opinion of this Senator, is $856 million for missile defense programs--most notably, the $300 million add-on for a national missile defense system.

The Senator for North Dakota has an amendment before the Senate at this time, which has been debated for the last hour and a half. I also intend to support that, and I have included that in the numbers that I have presented and will be presenting later in the form of an Exon amendment, with several important cosponsors.

Earlier this month, the Senate debated the wisdom of the Dole star wars proposal to pursue a crash program to field a continental missile defense system by the year 2003. It was pointed out then that the threat does not and will not exist in the near term to justify such a proposition. In the longer term, all of us are continuing to look at various types of missile defenses that we may need in the long term.

Furthermore, the Dole star wars bill as presently drafted would cost, according to the Congressional Budget Office, anywhere from between $31 and $60 billion. So the $300 million plus that we are talking about now would grow to $31 billion to $60 billion just to deploy, and perhaps another $10 billion on top of that to operate. The committee's $350 million increase is an initial downpayment; $350 million may not sound like a whole lot of money. But that is a downpayment, if you will, on a multibillion dollar program most likely, at a minimum, in the range of $50 billion between now and the year 2002.

Downpayments are easy, as the average American family knows. But in this case this is a system that I urge the Senate to delete as wasteful expenditures even though there may be some arguments and some people sincerely feel that we should move faster than the Pentagon and the experts in the field tell us we should in this area. As was the case in last year's authorization bill, there are language provisions in the 1997 defense authorization bill which are unwise and may prove to be a problem down the road in getting this bill signed by the White House. This is something that I opened my remarks on by saying that I was trying to steer this bill into something that is workable and not another knockdown, dragout between the Congress and the President.

Mr. President, two provisions in particular stand out as being questionable forays by the majority of the Senate Armed Services Committee into the area of foreign policy, and each could possibly jeopardize bilateral efforts between the United States and Russia to lower our nuclear inventories in a balanced and accountable fashion.

One provision ultimately interprets the ABM Treaty demarcation between long-range and short-range missile defenses at a time when our nations are negotiating this very issue right now.

The second language provision that I have concerns about is with regard to changing the bilateral Antiballistic Missile Treaty to a multilateral treaty that includes several of the independent states of the former Soviet Union. This is a major concern of the President of the United States. And, unless this language is corrected, I think we stand a high chance of a veto. The majority's insistence that such multilateralization of the treaty would constitute a substantive change in requiring reratification by the Senate is equally meddlesome on the part of the committee.

As President Clinton stated in his April 8 letter to the Armed Services Committee chairman, Strom Thurmond, he has strong objections to this matter for very valid reasons, in the opinion of this Senator. He said in that letter:

`Refusing to recognize Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as coequal successors to the Soviet Union with regard to the ABM Treaty would undermine our own interests in seeing that these countries carry out their obligations as successors to the Soviet Union under other arms control treaties, such as START I--and START II and others--and the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty,'

Mr. President, to summarize, this year's defense authorization bill is a marked improvement over last year's bill. I have saluted the committee for its action on that in the opening of these remarks. Yet, changes must be made, in the opinion of this Senator, to reduce unjustified spending increases and delete intrusive foreign policy language before I can enthusiastically support this bill. However, I would say, Mr. President, that overall I congratulate Senator Thurmond, my friend, colleague, and chairman of the committee, for other than some of the shortcomings that I see. I salute him for a very well-balanced bill in several other areas.

I appreciate the consideration, the cooperation, and the understanding. For those of us who tried to make some changes in the committee, the chairman of the committee did not agree with us, but as usual he gave us every opportunity to make our point. We in turn supported the bill as it came out of committee with the clear understanding to the chairman that we would be making some changes on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

[Page: S6400]

Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be 60 minutes equally divided for debate on the pending Dorgan amendment with no amendment in order to the amendment; that at the conclusion or yielding back of time the amendment be set aside; and, further, that at 9 a.m. on Wednesday, June 19, the Senate resume consideration of the Dorgan amendment and there be 15 minutes equally divided for debate with a vote on or in relation to the Dorgan amendment at the expiration of that debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in light of this agreement, there will be no more votes this evening. The next rollcall vote will occur at approximately 9:15 tomorrow morning.

AMENDMENT NO. 4048

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous agreement, there are 60 minutes equally divided on the Dorgan amendment.

Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I now yield myself such time as may be required under the Dorgan amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

[Page: S6401]

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, it is unfortunate that the Senator from North Dakota does not think that the American people deserve to be defended against the only military threat that faces them in their homes every day, a threat that is growing more severe every year. Simply stated, what the Dorgan amendment seeks to do is perpetuate American vulnerability.

We have heard quite a bit about how there is no threat and how investment in national missile defense is a waste of money. Let's remember that more Americans died in the Persian Gulf war as a result of a single missile attack than any other cause. I don't imagine that their families would view missile defense investments as a waste.

It has been argued that there is no threat to justify deployment of a national missile defense system to defend the United States. This view is strategically shortsighted and technically incorrect. Even if we get started today, by the time we develop and deploy an NMD system we will almost certainly face new ballistic missile threats to the United States. Unfortunately, it will take almost 10 years to develop and deploy even a limited system.

Much has been made of the intelligence community's estimate that no new threat to the United States will develop for 10 years or more. This estimate, however, only has to do with new indigenously developed missile threats to the continental United States. It treats Alaska and Hawaii as if they were not part of the United States. Moreover, the intelligence community has confirmed that there are numerous ways for hostile countries to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in much less than 10 years by means other than indigenous development.

North Korea has also demonstrated to the world that an ICBM capability can be developed with relatively little notice. The Taepo-Dong II missile, which could become operational within 5 years, is an ICBM. Each new development of this missile seems to catch the intelligence community by surprise. It certainly undermines the argument of those who downplay the threat and the intelligence community's own 10-year estimate.

Even if we knew with certainty that no new threat would materialize for 10 years there would still be a strong case for developing and deploying a national missile defense system. Deploying an NMD system would serve to deter countries that would otherwise seek to acquire an ICBM capability. A vulnerable United States merely invites proliferation, blackmail, and even aggression.

It has also been argued that the administration's NMD program is adequate to hedge against an emerging threat. Unfortunately, the budget request does not adequately support the administration's own plan. Since the administration's NMD program is supposed to preserve the option of deploying an NMD system by 2003 it is appropriate for Congress to add sufficient funds to ensure that such an option is truly viable. The director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has testified repeatedly to Congress that about $800 million per year is needed for NMD in order to preserve such an option. This is precisely what the Armed Services Committee has recommended.

For those who argue that the Senate Armed Services Committee is throwing money at ballistic missile defense, I would point out that the amount in this bill for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is only slightly higher than the Clinton administration's own bottom-up review recommended for fiscal year 1997.

The bottom line is simple. If you think that the American people should not be defended against ballistic missiles, then you should support the Dorgan amendment. If you think that the United States should preserve the option of deploying an NMD system by 2003, then vote against this amendment. I strongly urge my colleagues to put themselves on the side of defending the American people.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and acknowledge the able Senator from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe.

(Mr. BURNS assumed the chair.)

Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator and I certainly concur in the comments that he is making. It is a very frustrating thing to have knowledge of the threat that exists out there and merely because the American people are not aware of it, we are ignoring the defense of our country which I have always understood when I was growing up should have been the primary concern or function of Government, to protect its citizens.

In a few of the things that have been said by a number of those who are on the opposite side of defending America was the discussion about the threat of suitcases, of carrying around bombs, of terrorist activities. Being from Oklahoma, nobody needs to tell me about terrorist activities. I understand. It is almost as if to say that because there are crazy people out there that burn churches and carry around suitcases, we need to address that and not address the potential of an attack on the United States of America by an ICBM, armed with a warhead that can be a weapon of mass destruction, chemical, biological or nuclear. It is like saying you do not want to have car insurance because you want to have insurance on your home. You want to have a comprehensive policy that insures you against everything. There is a threat out there and I think we need to talk about that, and certainly now is the appropriate time because we have heard Senator after Senator stand up and allege there is no threat out there; the cold war is over.

It was 2 years ago that James Woolsey, who was the CIA Director under President Clinton, made a statement, and his statement 2 years ago was we know of between 20 and 25 nations that either have or are in the final stages of completing weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical or nuclear, and are working on the missile means to deliver those weapons.

That was 2 years ago. He updated that statement and said there are somewhere closer to 30 nations now. Let us look at who those nations are, the type of people, the mentality of those individuals who are potentially armed with this type of destruction, countries like Iraq and Iran and Libya and Syria, North Korea, China, Russia, countries where just not too long ago, for example, Saddam Hussein, a guy who murdered his own grandchildren, made the statement back during the Persian Gulf war that if we had waited 5 more years to invade Kuwait, we would have had the capability of sending a weapon of mass destruction to the United States.

Well, here it is. It is now 5 years later. So let us assume that some of these guys might be right. They come up and they say, well, we do not want to do it because it might in some way affect adversely the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty was put together back in 1972, and we cannot say this was done in a Democrat administration. It was not. I am a Republican. Richard Nixon was a Republican. Henry Kissinger, I assume, was a Republican. At least he worked for a Republican. And he put together a plan. The ABM Treaty at that time was designed to address the problem of two superpowers in the world environment. Those superpowers were the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and so they put together a plan that said we will restrict our nuclear capability bilaterally.

So let us assume that they would do it. I never believed they would. Let us assume they would. If you bring that up to today, there is no longer a U.S.S.R. It is now Russia. Let us assume that Russia would agree to stepping into this issue as the former U.S.S.R. And live up to the expectation of the ABM Treaty. What about these other 25 or 30 nations out there?

Let us assume that the United States and Russia are downgrading their nuclear capability. At the same time what is Iraq doing? What is China doing? What are the other countries doing? They are certainly not a part of this treaty.

It was brought out by one of the Senators in the Chamber a few minutes ago that these people are not part and parcel to the treaty so they could continue to increase their nuclear capability, the weapons of mass destruction, and their capability to develop a missile means of delivering them.

If we do not want to take the word of somebody who is not here as to how significant and how applicable today is the policy of a mutually assured destruction, listen to what Henry Kissinger said just the other day. I had lunch with him. I asked him if I could quote him. He said yes. His statement was, `It is nuts to make a virtue out of our vulnerability.' And that is exactly what we are doing. Let us for a minute talk about the cost. I have never heard anyone throw around figures like I have heard in the Chamber of the Senate--talking about another $30 billion to $60 billion. The CBO estimate of $30 to $60 billion over 14 years was taking every system that is out there right now and saying we want to deploy all of these systems by a date in the future.

No one has ever suggested that. Right now, we are talking about in this bill looking at what options are there. Let us take the Aegis system. We have a $40 to $50 billion investment in 22 ships that are floating out there right now. They have missile launching capability. They are there. They are already bought and paid for. We need to spend about $4 billion more to give that system capability of reaching up into the upper tier and giving us a defense from an attack of a missile that might be coming from North Korea or from someplace else.

In that, we already have an investment. Mr. President, 90 percent of it is already paid for. We have some estimates here that were made by the team B of the Heritage Foundation. That is made up of people like Hank Cooper, the former director of the Strategic Defense Initiative, and several others. All of them are acknowledged experts. No one has ever questioned their credibility. They say that a Navy-wide area defense system on Aegis cruisers would cost between $2 and $3 billion over the next 6 years, plus $5 billion for a sensor satellite.

We are talking about, now, not $70 billion, we are talking about somewhere in the neighborhood of $7 to $8 billion over the next 6 years. So let us get this in perspective. Let us assume there could be some truth to the statements that these experts like James Woolsey are making, and, in fact, the threat is out there. Let us assume the Russians already have one.

This morning in a speech on the floor I used several articles, four or five of them. I wish I had them with me now. I did not think this subject would come up again. But we talked about how China is now selling technology to Pakistan, how Syria and Libya have a new, cozy arrangement with each other.

Here is an article right here that I did not use. The headline of this article, found in the Washington Times, dated May 20, `China's arsenal gets a Russian boost. Deal for ICBM technology a threat to U.S., classified Pentagon report says.'

Then it says:

[Page: S6402]

China, under the guise of buying space launchers, is enhancing its strategic arsenal with technology and parts from Russia's most lethal intercontinental ballistic missile, the SS-18, [that is the MIRV'd missile with 10 warheads] says a classified Pentagon intelligence report.

Further quoting,

Incorporating the SS-18-related military guidance or warhead technologies into China's strategic missile forces would greatly improve Beijing's ability to threaten targets in the United States. . .

Now, that is in a confidential report that so far no one has refuted. Let us keep in mind that was about the time that a high Chinese official said--during the time they were experimenting with missiles in the Strait of Taiwan, the Chinese were conducting experiments--they said, `We don't have to worry about the United States coming to their aid because they,' the United States, `would rather protect Los Angeles than they would Taipei.'

I would characterize that at the very least as an indirect threat at the United States. It is like the Senator from South Carolina said, the honorable chairman of this committee, he said, `We are being held hostage.' Threats like this: `They are not going to do that, because if they do that we will go after them.' Do they have the capability? According to the reports, yes, they have the capability.

So I just think we need to look at this in terms of the costs that have been grossly, dramatically inflated into something that is totally unrealistic--the constant use of terms like `star wars' and other things to put this into some kind of fiction environment so people will think this thing is not real.

Keep in mind what was started in 1983 and was right on target all the way up through about last year, when the President vetoed the DOD authorization bill from last year, and in his veto message said he did not want to spend any more money

on a national missile defense system. In light of that, since that has happened, we have probably had more threats that have come to the United States than we have at any other time.

We have talked about the cost. I am from Oklahoma. The cost of the damage that was done to the building itself in Oklahoma City was $500 million, half a billion dollars. That is just a drop in the bucket as to the total cost. The bomb that caused so much damage in Oklahoma had the power of 1 ton of TNT. The smallest nuclear warhead known at the present time is 1 kiloton, 1,000 times bigger than that bomb.

So I would like to have anyone, any of these Senators who seem to be so passive in their interest in protecting ourselves from a missile attack, to stop and look and remember, recall what happened in Oklahoma City on April 19 of last year and multiply that by 1,000. It does not have to be just in New York City. It does not have to be in Los Angeles. It could happen in North Dakota, it could happen in Nebraska, or anywhere.

I will conclude by saying if all these experts say the threat is out there, if all of them say the Taepo Dong 2 missile will have the capability of reaching the United States by the year 2000, and there are missiles in existence today that can already reach us, and this missile technology is permeating all the way through the various countries like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and other nations, if this is out there, just ask the question--we are talking about $300 million right now.

We are talking about $300 million, far less than just the damage to the building in Oklahoma City. Ask yourself the question: What if we are wrong?

I challenge any of those on the other side of the aisle who want to take this money and put it into social programs, to ask themselves: What good are these social programs if we were wrong on this, on our estimate as to the extent of the capability of these countries to reach the United States?

I see this as a very difficult time for us. It is difficult because it is very difficult for us to convey to the American people the truth, and the truth is, we have threats from many, many nations now. It is something that we should have as our single highest priority in this body, and that is to protect the lives of Americans. That is what we are attempting to do.

I said this morning I am supporting this bill. I think we got the very most we could out of a defense authorization bill. It is still not adequate. We should be moving forward in a more rapid pace to put ourselves in a position to spend this other 10 percent of the investment we have already spent and give ourselves some type of defense for a missile that comes over, outside the atmosphere, to the United States. The technology is there. We saw it during the Persian Gulf war. We know you can knock down missiles with missiles. This is our opportunity to go forward with this program in a very minimum that we must do to fulfill our obligation to the American people.

Last, let us look at this in terms of a nonpartisan or bipartisan priority. Back during the years that John Kennedy was President of the United States, regarding our budget to run the entire Government of the United States, 60 percent of that was on defense, 17 percent on human services. Today, approximately 17 percent is on defense and 60 percent on human services. I think we have this completely turned around. This is our opportunity to try to get back on track to making America strong again, defending ourselves against a very serious threat.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 4049

[Page: S6403]

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I have an amendment I would like to send to the desk. I ask unanimous consent we lay aside the pending amendment, and I send an amendment to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl], for himself and Mr. Reid, proposes an amendment numbered 4049.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle F of title X add the following:

SEC. . UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING CONSTRAINTS.

(a) Authority.--Subject to subsection (b), effective on October 1, 1996, the United States may conduct tests of nuclear weapons involving underground nuclear detonations in a fiscal year if--

(1) the Senate has not provided advice and consent to the ratification of a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty;

(2) the President has submitted under subsection (b) an annual report covering that fiscal year (as the first of the fiscal years covered by that report);

(3) 90 days have elapsed after the submittal of that report; and

(4) Congress has not agreed to a joint resolution described in subsection (d) within that 90-day period.

As he has in the past, Sheehan levelled similar criticism against the NATO command structure. In addition to his responsibilities as U.S. Atlantic Command chief, Sheehan serves simultaneously as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO's Atlantic Command. `As a major NATO commander, my main complaint against my NATO allies is that many of these countries took their force structure out and took a peace dividend without reinvesting in the future. [But] they didn't take the overhead out ...

`There are still 65 NATO headquarters, with over 21,000 staff officers sitting around doing paperwork,' Sheehan continued. `That's more staff officers than two NATO nations have land forces. And so you ask yourself, of $1.79 billion we invest in NATO on a burdensharing basis, why is $800 million of that just in infrastructure?'

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve the balance of my time. I inquire of the amount of time I have left versus the amount of time that the opposition has.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 6 minutes, 24 seconds. The opposition has 9 minutes, 10 seconds.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Dan Ciechanowski, a fellow with Senator Kyl, be granted floor privileges for the duration of the consideration of the DOD authorization bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur on or in relation to the Grassley amendment No. 4047 at 5:30 p.m., and following the conclusion or yielding back of time the amendment be laid aside until 5:30 p.m. this evening.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I yield back the balance of my time on my amendment.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield back my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is laid aside until 5:30.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Delila Lacevic be accorded the privileges of the floor during the pendency of the defense authorization bill. She is employed with the Center for Democracy and is working as a staff fellow in my office.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment on my behalf and on behalf of Senators Leahy, Harkin, and Bumpers.

AMENDMENT NO. 4048

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan], for himself, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Harkin, and Mr. Bumpers, proposes an amendment numbered 4048.

On Page 31, strike out line 2 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

`$9,362,542,000, of which--

`(A) $508,437,000 is authorized for national missile defense;'.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, if I could have the attention of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will come to order.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I am offering an amendment that would reduce, by $300 million, the amount of money authorized in this piece of legislation for national missile defense.